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VLADIMIR: ... The tiger 
bounds to the help of his congeners without the least 
reflection, or else he slinks away into the depths of the thickets. But that is not the 
question. What are we doing here, that is the question. And we are blessed in this, 
that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one thing alone 
is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come- 
Samuel Beckett, Waiting fir Godot 
A voice cries in the wilderness prepare the way of the Lord... 
Isaiah 40: 3 
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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I argue that following Hegel's commitment to both political 
philosophy and political theory, Max Stirner, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche 
take flight from doing political theory in the 'Western' tradition. I demonstrate 
that Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche all use their own respective notions of political 
philosophy to criticise the very idea of doing political theory per . re. 
The evidence for 
this is to be found in both their refusal to do political theory and in their notions of 
prophetic agency. I further argue that this development is bound-up with their 
particular responses to the post-Hegelian milieu of which they were a part. As 
such, Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche all subscribed to a novel form of secularised 
eschatology. Although there have been studies of this secularisation thesis before, 
most notably by Karl Löwith, and groundbreaking though this study is, it is related 
to the difficult period in which in was written (the 1930's and 40's). Löwith for 
example, is concerned with the impact that eschatological thought has on the 
formation of totalitarian regimes more generally. As a result, such studies, which 
might encapsulate Hegel's own thought, are often rejected as but a species of the 
kind of eschatological literature which are also held to be necessarily repressive. 
However, in this thesis I point to an important cleavage between Hegel and his 
followers: Hegel, despite his eschatological outlook, remains firmly tied to the 
traditional 'Western' canon in so far as we see his commitment and application to 
doing political theory, whether descriptive or normative, and as such it is also 
demonstrably supported by his own political philosophy. Whereas in the case of 
Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche, their own eschatological projects respectively, are 
used as weapons in the war against political theory. I demonstrate that this historic 
cleavage occurs because Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche read eschatology as primarily 
prophetic and forward looking while Hegel's own eschatology remains ex events. The 
former look to legitimating particular historical agencies of change while Hegel 
continues to regard the potential multiplicity's of all political agency from within 
the most promising liberal institutions of modern society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political Philosophy Versus Political Theory 
Political philosophy and political theory are often assumed to be 
qualitatively different kinds of project. Political philosophy, more often than not, 
entails a number of abstract ontological assumptions and claims concerning what it 
is to be, or to be human. Thus political philosophy will involve or engage in 
discussions of the moral and ethical basis of law, it will typically include some 
account of the state, political philosophy will also be concerned with the limits and 
the proper authority of institutions, a philosophy of power and obligation, an 
outline of sovereign principles, an account of justice, a theory of liberty, an outline 
of rights and some account of the `good life' or of the 'public interest'. 
Political theory, although related to such discussions, is much more prosaic, 
concerned as it is with the actual political structures, institutions and groups 
which make up a given society. Thus political theory is taken to be concerned 
primarily with different types of political systems, theories of political development, 
political culture, methods of political communication, systems of representation, 
electoral processes, international institutions, the constitutional rules of 
governance, theories of political leadership and of policy formulation, 
bureaucracies, an account of the military, the separation of powers and the proper 
arrangement for any given executive, legislature and judiciary. 
These two, when taken together, are often assumed to be the proper method 
of conducting such inquiries and of doing social and political theory in the Western 
tradition. The argument runs that political theory, understood in the sense 
outlined above, has always had something to teach us when informed by a deep 
and penetrating political philosophy which is based upon sound first principles. 
Thus political thought which follows in this tradition such as that which is to be 
found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, Emmanual Kant, to name but a few, is considered to be typical of just 
such an accumulatively wise, 'eternally' valuable and instructive body of thought. ' 
Of course there are exceptions to this rather simplified summary, for example, see Nozick, 1988, pps 4- 
9, who holds that political philosophy should only h applied to state theory and similarly, political 
theory is only a means to conducting thought experiments regarding competing explanations for this 
same state. 
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In this thesis I argue that political theory, understood in this traditional, 
Western sense, was largely abandoned by Max Stirner, Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Nietzsche because each subscribed to a novel kind of prophetic eschatology. ' In 
other words, Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche retreat into political philosophy and use 
it to criticise and then abandon political theory. 
Following R. G. Collingwood I will hold that to understand and unpack 
any given political philosophers thought one must recover the specificity of the 
historical problem under consideration. ' Thus I will argue back from their shared 
and underlying assumption that their own time was one of nihilism, an assumption 
that they themselves were not always aware of, to their respective political 
responses to that nihilism. ' In effect, I shall hold that the abandonment of the 
traditional form of political theorising was one of the most important and unspoken 
shared effects of German political philosophy in the nineteenth century. This is 
what I shall call Political Response in order to separate this denouement from political 
theorising of the more traditional variety. I shall further argue that this alleged 
turn of events caused them to think that their time was one in which there was a 
desperate need for a new historical agency of social change, one which was suited 
to an era in which there was a crisis of meaning, a crisis caused, in turn, by the 
death of God [I will explain what this means shortly). 
This crisis of meaning, I shall further argue, was the unintended by- 
product of Hegel's analysis of the French Revolution in his Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Thus I hold that despite Hegel's own efforts to reconcile' modern subjectivity with 
key aspects of modern life more generally, as one commentator has declared, Hegel 
"sought to achieve peace, the peace of the intellect and the peace of the city", 
Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche on the other hand, tangentially move toward a 
messianic conception of social change which follows the eschatological form of the 
In this thesis I give just one reason for the decline of political theory, there are others of course. For 
example, see the essay "Does Political lbeory Still Exist" by Berlin, 1988, p59, where he gives at least 
two reasons for the decline of theory, the first is the division of the subject into many sub-disciplines and 
the second is the commanding position of modern positivism which claims to have a more rigorous 
understanding of what constitutes knowledge in the first place. 
' This also appears to be Raymond Plant's approach to Hegel, I extend this method to include Stirner, 
Marx and Nietzsche, see Plant, 1983, p15. 
4 See Magee, 1998, pS27, for a summary of Collingwood's method. 
See Hardimon, 1994, for an extended and detailed discussion of Hegel's "project of reconciliation". 
Although it has become generally accepted that reconciliation is central to Hegel there is very little 
agreement as to what this amounts to. For example, the very notion of reconciliation would appear to 
suggest that Hegel is arguing that we ought to become reconciled to our social world. This immediately 
suggests that Hegel's political thought is normative and not descriptive. This is in turn is likely to 
determine whether one holds that Hegel's philosophy is one of immanence or of transcendence. 
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Christian faith. " Thus they understand modernity to entail the necessary 
abandonment of the Christian form of teaching, yet they retain the Christian 
method of legitimisation. Hegel, I shall demonstrate, is able to avoid this 
denouement because he is able to retain political theory in his own understanding 
of Christian revelation, an understanding which holds that this revelation was 
retrospective and not prophetic [My sense of these terms will also become clear 
shortly]. Thus Hegel is able to re-interpret modernity through his unification of 
Christian revelation and modern philosophy, rather than allow a historically loaded 
modernity to re-interpret and abandon both Christianity and philosophy. 
In my reading of Hegel's Phenomenology I argue that there is a shift in the 
philosophical problem of life during the course of that text. I take the view, in 
other words, that there is an implicit shift in so far as the central ontological 
problem is taken to be nihilism and not alienation. 7 Although this shift is only 
implicit in the case of Hegel and Marx, it is obvious in the case of Stirner, and it 
becomes altogether the point in the case of Nietzsche (the sense of the terms 
'alienation' and `nihilism' will also become apparent shortly). The argument of this 
thesis therefore, is this: the work of each of these political philosophers held to a 
conception of modernity which was shaped by the overpowering tropes of a 
secularised eschatology. I will hold that this secularised eschatology prevented 
them from developing the kind of comprehensive descriptive theory of modernity 
that we see in Hegel himself. 
I do not suggest that political theory is inconceivable without some deeper 
religious commitment. However, I do suggest that Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche 
took their own understanding of modernity to be one in which traditional political 
theory was perceived to be unsuited to their specific period, in which, according to 
their own account, widespread cultural disenchantment itself was the basis for a 
much wider political crisis. In very general terms, I use modernity here to denote 
this perception of a deep seated religious and cultural disenchantment. 
Of course, theories of crisis and the construction of political theory is an 
enormous subject which continually raises important questions and problems 
'For an interesting account of Hegel's gradual accommodation with the harsher realities of modernity 
and on his rejection of the romantic ideals of his youth, see Kelly, 1978. 
As we shall see, Hegel used the term alienation in two different senses, as meaning self-estrangement, 
the German word for this is Entfremdung, and as self-objectification or Entäußerung. In what follows I 
will use the English term alienation for both senses of the word unless the context is ambiguous, in which 
case I will specify the sense by placeing the German term in square brakets after the term appears in 
English. 
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which cannot be adequately dealt with here and which are beyond the scope of the 
present thesis. For example, what one thinker may regard as a crisis, such as a war, 
another may regard as a necessary social cleansing. Or what one may regard as an 
unfortunate breakdown in traditional self-understandings, another might well 
regard as the dawn of a new liberation (I am thinking here of the Italian Futurists). 
Nevertheless, it should become clear in what follows that at the very least, Stirner, 
Marx and Nietzsche all theorised with a sense of desperate urgency. Each held that 
their own ideas were governed by a sense that their own time was one of ever 
deepening crisis. Yet, Hegel's own political philosophy, whether we agree with 
him or not, has a calmness and a repose which appears to be in keeping with the 
goals of spiritual reconciliation which was so much a part of his particular project! 
On the other hand, even Hegel's political theory arose from a very troubling and 
difficult engagement with the events that occurred during the French Revolution, 
so I will discuss this anomaly during the course of the chapters on Hegel. 
As we shall see, for Hegel there was a desperate need to preserve the 
freedom and truth of the French Revolution in the face of reaction and anarchy. In 
the example of Stirner there was a sense in which the potential possessiveness of 
Ego identity was being undermined by any number of vacuous and competing 
ideologies, or alienation's, of the period. Marx, for his part, certainly believed that 
capitalism was in its final death agonies since it had created the harbingers of its 
own demise in the proletariat, and finally, Nietzsche believed that the last dying 
gasp of the Christian World view was eliminating all that was excellent in life and 
that a paralysing mediocrity was to be found almost every where, a mediocrity 
which could only be reversed by lawgivers and leaders of a new kind, individuals 
who were authentic in every sense. The apparently highly personalised attachment 
to notions of impending doom and crisis is the eschatological world view which was 
produced by the Phenomenology of Spirit writ large, and all this despite Hegel's efforts 
to find Reason in modernity. ' In short, after Hegel the focus of political philosophy 
becomes concerned with the legitimacy of critique itself. Thus an implicit theme of 
this thesis will be the legitimacy of critique and the relation of critique to that of 
the eschatological understandings we find here. 
" See Plant, 1988, for a concise account of Hegel's attempt to reconcile modern individuals and 
Christianity. 
I will discuss Hegel's notion of Reason in a little more detail in other Chapters, however, the most 
important point is that Reason is that faculty which openly serves human destiny and when, therefore, 
historyceases to have an independent existence. 
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Most of the important studies which have already covered this ground, 
such as Sidney Hook's From Hegel to Marx, 
'° and particularly the 'secularisation 
thesis' proposed by Karl Löwith's From Hegel to Nietzsche, " have become seriously 
dated through no fault of the authors. For example, who today would agree with 
Löwith's rather Freudian assertion concerning Marx that "the real driving force 
behind [his) conception is a transparent messianism which has its own unconscious 
root in [his) own being, even in his own race. He was a Jew of Old Testament 
stature, "... ' To be sure, Löwith's attempt to trace what he called the "self- 
dissolution of the Hegelian spirit"" was a milestone in the history of ideas but it 
was also a product of the times, where the most pressing concern facing scholars 
was the need to sever philosophy away from the Nazis and the Fascists. Löwith's 
mature thought, for example, has affinities with the cyclical thought of the Stoics 
and his rejection of eschatology per se and Hegelianism was fuelled by the appalling 
events of the period. In a real sense then, Löwith throws the baby of Hegelian 
eschatology out with the bath water of eschatology more generally. " Marx's 
political philosophy, for example, may well be messianic in some . reue 
but few would 
hold that this sense is 'transparently obvious"' As one recent commentator has 
even suggested, these two works have produced a "teleological straight-jacket" in 
the history of ideas. 16 
In any case, almost every age has at least some faction, group, class or elite 
who believe that their own time is one of political social and/or moral crisis. One 
only has to briefly reflect on our own time. Aside from the kind of 'Spenglerean' 
doomsday scenarios which posit the end of human life in some kind of cataclysm, 
such as have emerged from some elements of the ecology movement and the 
apocalyptic cosmologists, there are religious cultists and millennialists of all kinds. 
Most sophisticated of all, there are also the many versions of post-modern end- 
Hook, 1976. 
Löwith, 1991. 
Marx, 1988, p177. 
Löwith, 1994, p52. 
" Also, see Löwith, 1995. 
"Despite the similarities with Karl Popper's , 
The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1986, I would like to 
stress that these are purely superficial similarities of subject matter. Unlike Popper I do not believe that 
there is any necessary connection between Hegel, Marx and totalitarianism. See Popper, 1986, p59 where 
he says, "In our time, Hegel's hysterical historicism is still the fertiliser to which modern totalitarianism 
owes its growth". While Popper adopts a'positivist'critiqueof Hegel and Marx, see Popper, 1986, p193, 
my own critique comes from within the idealist tradition which Hegel and Marx subscribed to. Thus 
Popper's critique of Marx's prophecies, for example, Popper, 1986, p280, are based on what he considers n 
be Marx'seconomic determinism, while my own is more concerned with the similarities between Marx's 
own analysis and the tradition of the religious thought of the period. Thus my own project is completely 
different from Popper's, as are my conclusions. 
'"See Toews, 1980, p2. 
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times which predict some kind of social catastrophe, or at the very least, the 
inevitable disintegration of rational global processes. 
According to the contemporary Italian theorist Gianni Vattimo for 
example, port-hirtoire denotes the process of strangulation and ultimate emasculation 
of the avante garde of modernity. It is the process in which progress becomes 
routine, and paradoxically, a time of innovational degradation. While the speed of 
technological and aesthetic development increases, a qualitative change occurs 
where, although newer products are always possible, the sheer capacity for rapid 
global marketing, planning, creation and distribution renders everything less new. 
Modernity then, according to this view, is a crisis in which nothing has the power 
to shock and where even irreverence becomes parse. " 
The post-modernist, jean Baudrillard, arrives at conclusions somewhat 
similar to Vattimo's, but for different reasons. According to Baudrillard, media- 
stoked consumption has taken over from social production as the key locus or 
engine of social change, a social change which is becoming progressively more 
ephemeral. For Baudrillard, the endless operation and exploration of'signs' remains 
one of the few existential possibilities left open to a global population paralysed 
with cynicism. ' Such crises allegedly render both theories of classical Marxism and 
Weberianism obsolete. Alan Ryan, for example, has recently suggested, 
... 
late capitalism now has the effect of creating cultural possibilities 
that have become detached from the realm of economic necessity 
and there is no longer any logically extra-discursive determination 
by any pre-cultural substance,... '. 
Thus in contemporary terms, notions of individual cynicism and or 
existential exhaustion before great structural forces seems to underpin and 
reproduce these same structures. 
The most important point to make regarding the modern in the modern 
thought of all the thinkers considered here, is that where they may appear to 
anticipate such contemporary debates quite often, rather, there is some notion that 
individual autonomy is usurped or frustrated by any number of apparent 
''See Bellamy, 1987, pp. 727-733. 
'See Vidich, Baudrillard's "America: Lost in the Ultimate Simulacrum", Theory, Culture & Society, Vol 
8,1991. 
"Nee Ryan. Theory, Culture & , society. vol 15,1988. 
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necessities. In other words, freedom, or some version of self-actualisation, is 
compromised by necessary entailments which, if only some other view could be 
made to prevail, would prove to be merely contingent. This sense of 'if only', the 
notion that going on behind the back of modern subjects there is the suspension of 
truly human possibilities, is an important assumption of moderns such as Stirner, 
Marx and Nietzsche. This idea of potentially whole individuals who are struggling 
to become whole as such, has been referred to as the assumption of the centred- 
subject of the Enlightenment.. While I feel unable to commit to this notion with 
the same certainty as the Enlightenment thinkers did, this notion will underpin 
these discussions throughout since my desire is to engage with these political 
philosophers on their own terms. Unlike the notions of crisis which underpin post- 
modern thinking, where there is no longer any apparent reason to believe in a 
meta-narrative subject or freedom, modernity, understood in this sense, clings to 
some notion of either self-actualisation or personal authenticity or in some kind of 
centred-subject. 
As we shall see, in the case of Hegel's classical Christian account of 
modernity, the eschatological agency of social change is already immanent in 
Rational Law and the Modern State. But in Stirner's thought it is transcendence 
towards the social agency of the lumpenproletariat who will bring the new dawn of 
Egoism, for Marx it is the new industrial proletariat and according to Nietzsche, the 
task of real change will fall to the Übermensch. That this distinction between Hegel 
and the others may appear obvious is in large measure due to the enduring success 
and influence of Hegel's method and the domination of the transcendence reading 
over the immanence reading. 
Finally, my turn towards the study of nihilism and of a secularised 
eschatology might seem surprising given the fashionable recrudence of alienation 
literature in the latter half of our own century. However, it should be noted that 
this recent concern with alienation, and especially within the context of Marxist 
theory, was born on the wings of the recondite elements of a particular Marx. In 
other words, the recent concern with alienation was largely prompted by the 
historical discovery of new manuscripts, it was not an interpretative phenomenon 
or inspired by some new turn of historical events ' This is not to suggest that the 
more contemporary concern with the nature of nihilism is, in the final analysis, an 
empirical matter either, rather, the point is that the historical and developmental 
"'For example, in this regard see the storyof the discoveryof Marx's "1844" manuscripts as recounted by Lukäc's in his "autobiography". 
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condition of global capitalism, or new social processes more generally, no more 
justifies this recent concern with alienation than those conditions that were abroad 
when this term first entered into the philosophical and political lexicon of the time. 
In other words, there is no reason to believe that the term alienation was more 
valuable to the sociological and philosophical imagination in the year 1968 than it 
was in 1844, the two dates often considered most replete with meaning when one 
considers the concept of alienation. Rather, my decision to look for a concern with 
nihilism in the political philosophers considered here was initially informed by the 
challenge of the Nietzschean project to radically re-cast the entire history of the 
Western tradition. 
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The Purpose and Structure of this Work 
I hope that that this thesis might make a modest contribution to the on- 
going debate among students and scholars of Hegel alike, as to the contemporary 
relevance of Hegel's work as a whole. This debate has changed little since Hegel's 
own day, a debate in which scholars continue to be divided as to whether or not 
Hegel had produced a system worth defending, or if his `dialectical method' can be 
successfully extended beyond his own conclusions. Andries Sarlemijn, for example, 
has remarked that an adherence to a Marxist reading of Hegel usually leads to a 
disparagement of Hegel's system and an admiration only of the method. '' 
Within the context of Hegel studies this work might be seen as an attempt 
to defend a kind of 'right' Hegelianism against 'left' Hegelianism. For example, it is 
a commonplace of Hegel studies to note that the 'left' or Young Hegelian 
movement is characterised in the work of Strauss, Feuerbach, the Bauer brothers, 
and by Stirner, Marx and Engels. These Young Hegelians hold that most of Hegel's 
thought is conservative or immanent but that Hegel's 'dialectical method' 
transcends his own historical milieu and points the epistemological way forward 
towards the discovery of deep social and political freedoms. In stark contrast to this, 
the 'right' or Old Hegelians, such as the collaborators on the first edition of Hegel's 
collected works, Ph. Marheineke, J. P. Schulze, E. Gans, L. v. Henning, H. Hotho, 
C. L. Michelet and F. Forster, take the view that Hegel describes a complete system 
which has effectively integrated all the most important elements of modernity and 
which has successfully reconciled these with modern philosophy. The reputation of 
the first group has traditionally rested upon a series of stunning books which 
attacked the very basis of Christian theology, and the second has rested, much less 
dramatically, upon the production of extensive editorial work, lecture notes and a 
number of biographical and conservative monographs. However, I do not want to 
follow this old debate too closely since I am aware of the dangers of submitting to 
such a historical polarisation and of the history of other efforts to conclusively settle 
this debate. Benedetto Croce, for example, once humorously noted the many 
"lamentable" attempts to re-interpret Hegel's 'dialectical method'. Of Hegel's 
disciples he says, 
See Sarlemijn, 1975, p 10. 
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One of them dialecticized spirit as the masculine principle, nature 
as the feminine, and history as the matrimonial union. Another 
found in the Oriental world, the category of being; in the classical 
world, the category of essence; and in the modern world the 
category of the concept.... and in the ancient world, Athens was 
made to correspond with dynamic electricity, Sparta with static 
electricity, Macedonia with electro-magnetism.... 22 
By way of avoiding this apparent Hegelian law of diminishing returns I 
would like to add two important caveats to all of this. In the first place I am not 
suggesting that 'right' Hegelianism is the correct philosophical position. That 
would be a claim which is far too large for a thesis of this length. Secondly, I am 
not even claiming that 'right' Hegelianism is more philosophically correct than 
'left' Hegelianism, similarly too large, this debate has raged for many years and is 
likely to rage for many more to come. Rather, I am suggesting a reading which 
offers one reason for preferring an engagement with Hegel's whole system, rather 
than the so-called transcendent dialectical readings of Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche 
[although convention normally dictates that Nietzsche was not a 'left' Hegelian). , 
This question regarding the contemporary relevance of Hegel is 
particularly important given his own pronouncement in the Philosophy of Right that 
.. the owl of Minerva 
begins its flight only with the onset of dusk". 23 Are Hegel's, 
apparently reformist views, descriptive or normative for example? The term 
'reformist indicates that despite the tone of that work it, remains in some sense 
normative. However, it should become clear in what follows that I take Hegel's 
moderate political liberalism to be almost entirely descriptive. Thus, my reading of 
Hegel suggests that he is both a political philosopher and a political theorist but 
not a normative or prophetic thinker. One can, " of course, be a respectable 
normative thinker without being prophetic, there is a -very great difference 
between a political project which legitimately argues that a new, set of values or 
standards should be adopted and a project which claims to be able to accurately 
predict some new coming world-order. One implication of the present thesis is that 
my own research suggests that while all the post-Hegelians thinkers in question 
engaged in both descriptive and normative thinking none of them had a reason to 
think as richly or as deeply as Hegel himself did on what was 'modern' about our 
modern institutions. Furthermore, when they did think on Hegel's own terrain, 
'Z See Croce. 1915, p208. 
2' Hegel. 1991, p23. 
17 
they took flight from conventional normative thinking in any case and engaged in 
the drama of prophecy. I shall demonstrate that the effect of all of this is that 
Hegel's political theory now looks relatively contemporary, while the eschatological 
visions of the former, while retaining their original fire and excitement, now look 
strangely dated. 
One of the most difficult problems of the relations between political 
philosophy and political theory is the identification of the necessary from the merely 
contingent. Which elements of a political theory are bound and constrained by the 
nature of a particular philosophical system and which are not? (Leaving aside for the 
time being the question of what is 'true'). This is no moot point in the case of Hegel 
since one recent scholar, `' taking his cue from Deconstruction, has argued that one 
can criticise Hegel's dialectic through the Deconstruction of his views on the family 
since Hegel makes claims and allows "aporias" which exceed his system. Thus 
according to this view Hegel speaks for and against himself, a fact which leads 
eventually to the decomposition of the whole Hegelian system. 
Take, for example, the role of the state and then quite separately, that of 
women, in Hegels own thought. Clearly the developing alienation and 
objectification of the state 'form' from the period of the dissolution of Greek ethical 
life to that of Roman Law, feudal bonds, and then through absolutism to the modern 
state, is a necessary development in the journey of Geist in Hegel's thought. The 
modern state is, in Hegel's schema, not some contingent element but the very 
objectification of the spirit of freedom and modern subjectivism itself. In the quite 
separate case of women: they embody and symbolise the ethereal quality of the 
nether world. According to Hegel, women intuitively grasp the essential nature of 
the blood bonds of the family, 
Woman.... has her substantial vocation in the family, and her 
ethical disposition consists in piety. 
Furthermore, 
The difference between man and woman is the difference between 
animal and plant; the animal is closet in character to man, the 
'' See the essay by Critchlcy, in Barnett, 1998. 
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plant to woman, for the latter is a more peaceful unfolding whose 
principle is the more indeterminate unity of feeling. ''' 
While the state has proved to have an enduring role in our lives in a manner 
recognisably mapped out by Hegel, and clearly the development of the state is 
'work on the world' or'Spirit objectified', this necessary entailment is hardly true in 
the quite separate case of women. Indeed, the former phenomenon we view as 
inevitable while the assertion that women have essential affinities with 'vegetable' 
matter now provokes justifiable outrage. Going even further than this, David F. 
Krell has argued that in Hegel's treatment of Schlegel's novel L#cinde [in the 
Philosophy of Right], a novel thought to be a scandal in Hegel's own time, Hegel is 
demonstrably shaken by this libertine book which undermines his conception of 
marriage and religion, again ultimately threatening Hegel's entire system. `6 Hegel, 
it is alleged, had not perceived that the depths of modern subjectivity which 
prevailed in his own time regarding the capacities of men, would come to be shared 
by the women of our time. In this example, it is argued, Hegel was quite clearly 
wrong, that which he appeared to identify as necessary is in fact contingent. ' 
For most of the last one hundred and sixty years or so since Hegel's death it 
has been far from obvious that Hegel's liberalism would continue to command our 
attention since his own variety would seem to epitomise the kind of ethical, as 
opposed to instrumental liberalism, which has become dominant today. -" In 
addition, while liberalism has always had its staunch defenders, libertarianism, 
anarchism, Marxism, post-structuralism, feminism and depth ecology have produced 
a serious theoretical and practical challenge at one time or another to that of 
liberalism, especially the so-called ethical variety. A liberalism which is often 
perceived by such movements to be as much a part of the problem as a means to a 
solution. In any case, that debate. forms the background and provides another 
motivation for my selection of Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche in this study. The 
seminal texts of each of these thinkers has always been used as a primary source for 
these traditions respectively. Libertarian anarchism in the case of Stirner, 
communism from Marx and finally post-structuralism in the case of Neitzsche. 
I will argue in Chapters I and II of this thesis that while Hegel found an 
imaginative philosophical solution to the manifest alienation of humanity, as he 
understood it, he also discovered there a deeper and much more terrifying 
2'Hegel, 1991 pp. 206-7. 
20 See Krell in Cornell cc at. 1991.1 am paraphrasing from the editors introduction, pxvi. 
4e Bellamy. 1992, for an account of this allegedly necessary transition. 
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manifestation of the modern "Spirit". This 
is why I claim in Chapter II that within 
the Phenomenology of Spirit there is a special place reserved where this 
deep ambiguity 
first appears, the section entitled "Absolute Freedom and Terror". This discovery, 
the spiritual moment of complete freedom and the symbolic nemesis of the same, 
the Thermidor of the French Revolution, shook Hegel to the core. The problem of 
how to understand the Revolution was to stay with him even up to the period of the 
Philosophy of Right. 
More importantly, I shall argue that Hegel's historical analysis of alienation 
[Entäußerung) remained a largely religious conception which he regarded as part 
and parcel of the intrinsic structure of the Holy Trinity more generally. In the 
movement of Hegel's thought, through the structure from "Self-alienated Culture" 
to the French Revolution and to a new Spirit which is "Self-Certain" [These are 
Chapter titles taken from his Phenomenology), although a major triumph over 
alienation [Entfremdung), also contained within the nihilist turning point which 
appeared to also undermine the grounding of his new arrangement or "shape" of 
history more generally. 
On the other hand, according to the 'left' Hegelians, the peculiar Hegelian 
'arrangement' of time is not something which is understood as the cessation of 
history and the completion of the system but as a new 'becoming' which will only 
end when humanity enjoys a particular form of reconciliation, one in which the 
liberty of the mind is not contradicted by any deeper reality and where Reason is in 
command of all social structures. In short the new "shape" of history is when history 
itself ceases to have an independent existence, according to the 'left' Hegelian -" In 
the case of philosophy, Marx, following Stirner, estimated that this liberty ultimately 
signified the end of philosophy, for in the political arena it denotes an unceasing 
requirement for an institutional abolition from which there can be no escape. This 
vision of a kind of 'political negativity', we shall discover, is deeply wedded to his 
rejection of Hegel's religious account of the new 'arrangement'. 
Not-with-standing Marx's critique of German political life, we know that 
Hegel was also highly critical of the political alternatives of his own day, although 
often for very different reasons than those of his contemporaries. Interestingly, 
although Hegel is generally considered to follow in the 'natural law' tradition of 
Grotius, Pufendorf and Hume, his philosophical approach to history differed 
substantially from many of these. For example, in his Preface to the second edition of 
'" tier Norman, 1 976. p 132, here I am paraphrasing from Norman. 
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his Encyclopaedia, Vol 1 (1827), Hegel described the enlightened harmony of natural 
law theory, the modern state together with the needs of religion as that time "not 
long gone by" which was both superficial and contradictory. ` In other words, this 
apparent harmony was exposed for what it was during the events of the French 
Revolution, an immature manifestation of modernity's new capacities for freedom. 
Hegel also doubted the practical efficacy and explanatory power of early 
contractarian theories of natural law, as in the case of Rousseau's utopian escape 
from modern complexity. If by 'natural rights' we mean to suggest that 'rights' are 
those things which we possess by nature, "men are born free but are every where in 
chains", then Hegel could scarcely agree with such a formula, since such 'natural 
rights' depend on a teleology of nature which is inclusive of human beings, in the 
full sense. But as Hegel pointed out often enough, animals have neither rights nor a 
conception of good and bad since they do not have freedom Similarly, in his 
discussion of property Hegel did not believe that this was a natural right since "One 
cannot speak of an injustice in the unequal distribution of possessions and resources, 
for nature is not free and is therefore neither just nor unjust". While he held that 
"everyone ought to have property", for example, this was based on their capacities 
for freedom at "source", in other words, it was a universal capacity which was not 
universally realisable30 According to Hegel's more mature reflections on the French 
Revolution, the Declaration of the 'Rights of Man' simultaneously undermined the 
actual rights of man because these remained abstract. In this sense there is nothing 
'natural' about Hegelian 'rights'. Rights, rather, are the result of the what Hegel 
called, 'the labour of the negative', they are the historical product of the long 
process of Christian 'positivity', thus they remain an alienation, here Hegel 
anticipates Marx. 
Here we arrive at one of the most difficult aspects of Hegel's 
phenomenological account of 'rights'. If he did not subscribe to the traditional 
conception of natural law in the conventional sense then what did he offer in its 
stead? The answer is often that he proposed what commentators refer to as the 
`absolute standpoint', a notion of some kind of standard which was to be used to 
adjudicate between different knowledge claims. But such an 'absolute' only serves 
to raise even more troublesome problems, for if there is some kind of universal 
standard, some reasonable procedural invention which can be used to settle political 
disputes then why do we continue to see the bloody aspects of political conflict? 
2' Hegel. Encyclopaedia. 1991, p5. 
' Hegel. The Philosophy of Right, 1991, pp. 80-1. 
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While such questions pose no particular problems for the Young Hegelians 
such as Stirner, who held that all human interactions were essentially struggles of a 
political nature, or for Marx, who believed in the redemptive inevitability of class 
conflict, or even for Nietzsche, with his rejuvenation of the Agon [Gk. contzrt), the 
problem of continual social conflict certainly appears to be a problem for Hegel, 
especially since there is supposed to be some kind of reconciliation entailed in his 
project. We may also recall that Hegel himself certainly struggled to find solutions 
for the divisive problem of poverty and the associated underclass or "rabble" in his 
Philosophy of Right. 31 However, while an answer to this question is beyond the scope 
and space of the present work I would suggest that such a criticism of Hegel's 
political thought is based upon a misunderstanding of the notion of 'reconciliation' in 
Hegel's philosophical thought. 
Of course, if one holds that the apparently insoluble political problems of our 
own time are determined by certain ineluctable philosophical premises, that is to 
say, determined by certain ontological presuppositions, then one would not expect 
to see the resolution of political conflict in any case. Is it fair to expect that an 
'absolute standpoint' should resolve such difficulties? Is it fair to ask this of Hegel's 
Phenomenology? One might well hold, for example, that the apparent inexhaustible 
well of human needs (and difference), pre-supposed by a conception of animal 
rapacity, ensures that some form of political conflict must always endure? Similarly, 
it beholds those who posit some notion of ultimate social harmony to find ways 
towards this harmony. I do not detect any such need in Hegel's thought on either 
count. On the other hand, what if the 'absolute standpoint' is not a position of unity 
but one of absolute difference or unity-in-difference? 32 In Hegel's concept of 'civil 
society', and one should note that this a much wider notion in Hegel's thought than 
in Marx's, one can see an outline of an enduring battleground of competing needs 
which is not incompatible with this kind of idea, especially since 'civil society' for 
Hegel, remained only one element of three in the structure of his religious thought. 
Returning to the central themes of this thesis for a moment, to religion and 
modernity: if by'Christian' one means to designate one who holds to a belief system 
and a view of time which is essentially wedded to scripture and to the form of the 
Christian Bible, then it is argued here that the period following Hegel should be 
regarded as 'post-historical' time, since this is also post-Christian, for it is the period 
; 'Hegel, Encyclopaedia, 1991, pp. 266-7. 
'' This was certainly the understanding of the 'absolute' which was held by early Scottish Hegelians such 
as James Frederick Ferrier (1ß0R-1864), for example, see his "Biography of Hegel", Ferrier, 1866. 
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after the death of scripture. Further, and this is the more important point, each of 
the so-called 'post-historical' philosophers considered, again except Hegel himself, 
subscribed to an atheized political eschatology which mirrored the structure of the 
religious thought which they had so vehemently left behind. Thus, paradoxically, as 
I have already suggested, I shall argue that the expressions or forms of political crisis 
and agency under consideration are necessarily shaped by these same overpowering 
tropes of a secularised eschatology. 
In this study I have only chosen to discuss two of the 'left' Hegelians, Stirner 
and Marx. Conventional approaches such as those of Löwith, Hook and McLellan 
will run through the long list of all those who subscribed at one time or another to 
this movement. I have chosen not to do this not only because of the very real 
considerations of space but also because few of the 'left' Hegelians were to convert 
their eschatological grasp of Hegel directly into political prophecy. Each sensed that 
their own time had irrevocably changed, to be sure, but not all accepted this with 
equal zeal or consistency and often they were to become politically conservative or, 
as in the case of Feuerbach, adopt a kind of bourgeois liberal existentialism. While 
there is no necessary link between holding eschatological views and having 
prophetic visions, I do claim in this thesis that once a peculiar eschatological 
structure is adopted, which I shall outline in section I of this Introduction, then the, 
prophetic renunciation of political theory would appear to be the final result in the 
cases considered. 
Though Ludwig Feuerbach, for example, was concerned with the nature of 
alienation and nihilism he ultimately embraced the 'material' of the world and 
believed that humanity could take its cue from the meaning inherent in such 
`material'. 33 In his anthropological critique of philosophy per W Feuerbach replaced 
not only religion, but also philosophy with a radicalised sensuous rationality. In 
Feuerbach's almost Heideggerian deconstruction of Hegelian philosophy, this 
sensuous rationality replaces nihilism with Being, thus he says, "The index finger is 
the signpost from nothingness to Being"' However, as we shall see, what was only 
an "index finger" for Feuerbach becomes something much greater in the case 
studies of Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche. 
Following Löwith, I have chosen Max Stirner as my first 'post-historical' 
thinker because he is the first political philosopher to face nihilism squarely and who 
"Feuerbach, 1986, p67. 
Feuerbach. 1986, p61. 
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chose to remain with the startling implications of that nihilism rather than 
force 
some kind of philosophical retreat. Nevertheless, on first approaching Stirner he 
appears, rather deceptively, to he the least political of the three, yet paradoxically, 
his ideas have justifiably provided a deep well of inspiration for both'right' and 'left' 
libertarians. In Chapter III I will re-examine Stirner's radical notions of crisis and 
individual political agency in his book, The Ego and Its Own, to try and discover why, 
as Löwith has argued, Stirner begins the German obsession with nihilism. 
It might also appear surprising at first glance that one should associate 
Marx's political thought with nihilism rather than alienation, given that in early 
essays such as On The Jewish Question he held that political emancipation is but a 
partial step on the road towards full human emancipation. The former being' only the 
latest expression of an essentially alienated condition. Indeed, even in his mature 
work such as the first volume of Capital, we see that the most basic units of analysis, 
such as commodities and money, are also fetishized manifestations of a deeply 
alienated consciousness. Yet intermingled with these reflections we also see in Marx 
an over-arching concern with the nature and basis for political struggle and the 
ends of life. A discourse which seems to be very much concerned with questions of 
meaning and disenchantment. Two texts exemplify this phenomena, The German 
Ideology and The Manifesto of the Communist Party. 
Finally, in Chapter VI will turn to Nietzsche, as I have said, not typically 
considered to be a member of the Young Hegelians. Indeed Nietzsche was born in 
the same year as Stirner composed The Ego and Its Oum {1844). Yet, although of a 
different generation there remains something deeply Young Hegelian about 
Nietzsche's thought. His concerns were their concerns and his assumptions were 
their assumptions, the critique of Hegel, the death of God, the meaninglessness 
and disenchantment of modernity and the project of affecting a shift in historical 
consciousness, were elements of Nietzsche's thought at some point or other. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche takes eschatological prophecy much further than any of 
the others, since for him, prophecy, almost hysterically delivered, becomes his 
preferred modus operandi. 
It is the hope of the author that this study may help to place the great 
millennial projects of the last century into a more humbling perspective. As this 
century comes to a close the need to place the overblown claims of prophetic 
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political philosophy, more generally, within its millennialist context has never been 
greater. 3` 
On a stylistic note; I make no apology for the frequent use of chapter and 
section epigrams in this thesis since there are primarily used as a device to convey 
something of the broad range of opinion and concern with matters of eschatology, 
alienation and nihilism by these same founding figures of modern Western political 
philosophy. A fact that I believe to be under represented in the secondary 
literature. 
However, before we move on to these Chapters and the opening Chapters 
on Hegel, I would like to clarify my sense of some of these contestable and 
allegedly `unphilosophical' terms, I begin first with the concept of 'religious 
eschatology' then 'alienation', before finally turning to the notion of'nihilism'. 
"The theme of secularised eschatology is not new and has been recognised by others, see Stepelevich, 
p7, for example. 
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I have convinced myself by experience of the truth of the 
biblical 
text which I have made my guiding light: 
"Strive ye first after food 
and clothing, and the Kingdom of God will 
fall to you as well" 
[reversal of Matthew 6: 331.6 
Hegel to von Knebel, Bamberg, August 30,1807 
It is only from heaven, i. e., from the will of the French Emperor, 
that matters can be set in motion,... 37 
Hegel to Niethammer, Bamberg, February 11,1808 
II 
A Review of Religious Eschatology 
Philosophical eschatology begins anew with Hegel because it is he who 
most effectively transcribes our modern predicament from the Judeo-Christrian 
tradition. In a sophisticated version of the ontological argument for the belief in 
God, Hegel holds that God's consciousness logically requires an engagement with 
`otherness', thus an understanding of God's embodiment in the other suggests also 
an understanding of God as well. ' As Hegel himself said, 
... it 
follows that God can be known or cognised, for it is God's 
nature to reveal himself, to be manifest. Those who say that God is 
not revelatory do not speak from the [standpoint of the) Christian 
at any rate, for the Christian religion is called the revealed religion. 
Its content is that God is revealed to human beings, that they 
know what God is. 'O 
All of this suggests to Hegel that our modern expressions of alienation are revealed 
by theology in the first instance before being cognitively grasped by philosophy. As 
Raymond Plant has commented, of Hegel's early Bern and Frankfurt period, 
'Hegel, 1984, p 142. 
1bid, 1984, p159. 
`" Again, see Plant, 1989, for a concise statement of this position. 
"Ibid, 1998, paraphrasing from Plant. 
" Ibid, quoted in Plant, 19,98, p35. 
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It is important to notice, though, that at this stage he is not writing 
as a philosopher, seeking to set Christianity into a wider 
interpretation of human existence as he was later to do; rather he is 
acting as a kind of cultural-critic seeing what scope there might be 
for the transformation of Christianity. 41 
Prophets, by definition, inspire and found religious belief systems and in 
early German Idealism many writers flirted with the idea of founding a new 
religion so I will begin this study with a brief outline of religious eschatology in 
very general terms 4' The framework of Hegel's notion of "Absolute Knowing", 43 for 
example, has a long eschatological' pedigree. Theologians typically make an 
important distinction between 'prophetic' eschatology and `apocalyptic' 
eschatology in the Judeo-Christian tradition. " The former of these traditions would 
normally envision God accomplishing divine plans within a frame of reference 
which is mediated by human history and agency. Often such prophetic writing 
entails some kind of Judgement day, where the enemies of God would be punished 
and the faithful saved. The latter, on the other hand, always employ supernatural 
forces to bring about the divine plan and also, unlike the former, such plans usually 
entail redemption of a supernatural variety, such as the fortuitous escape to a future 
paradise or some kind of new world order. 
In prophecy, as opposed to apocalyspse, hope resides in the terrestrial, in 
the imaginative powers of a just settlement in this world. Where as in the 
apocalyptic literature, hope is found in the strength of the belief in future 
deliverance. '6 Also important is the distinctive difference between the method of 
delivery of each of these thought structures. Prophecy is more often an inspired call 
41 Ibid, 1988, p 16. 
'' Perhaps the most famous example of a new apocalyptic religious manifesto, is the disputed "Oldest 
Systematic Programme" fragment, which calls for a "new religion" of "freedom and equality of spirits", 
see Beiser, 1996, p5. 
a; In this thesis I will use'a number of Hegelianisms more or less interchangeably, such as "Absolute 
Knowing", 'absolute standpoint', 'privileged standpoint' and "philosophical historian", some of these 
were used by Hegel and some by later commentators. The important point is that each attempts to 
characterise a position from which retrospectively informed judgements might be made. Sometimes such 
judgements are epistemological, some times ontological and sometimes historical. 
: See Reddish, Abingdon, 1995, p 19, "Eschatology" literally means teachings about the last things, such 
as the opening line of the book of Revelation, "I am the Alpha and omega... who is and who was and who 
is to come", 1: 8, this is also the end of history as described by Boethius in Bk 5 of his Consolation of 
Philosophy. 
"51bid, 1995, p20. 
"" Ibid, 1995, p19, the Greek word apokalypsis means revelation. The Apocalypse Group of the Bible 
Society of Biblical Literature Genres Project, defined an apocalypse as follows, "Apocalypse" is a genre of 
revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly 
being to a human recipient. disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it 
envisages eschatological salvation and spatial as it involves another, supernatural world, p20. 
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to the faithful from some strong and undaunted human agent, where as in the case 
of the apocalypticist, the dream or vision is brought to the dreamer by an angel or 
unearthly power. Thus, as Mitchell G. Reddish has pointed out, the apocalyptic 
form, 
... involves 
both a horizontal and vertical (or temporal and spatial) 
dimensions. 7 
Strictly speaking then, in theological terms, Hegel's understanding of the 
revealed religion is a prophetic vision rather than an apocalyptic one. However, in 
one important sense, Hegel's thought does remain apocalyptic rather than 
prophetic, since the former is almost always part of the reconciliation, rather than 
the protest tradition. 
Nevertheless, there is a further important sub-division to be made between 
the different genres of prophetic literature. On the one hand, there is the first kind 
of vision in which the visionary is taken on a journey to the world of the dead. Here 
there are often visions of the new world where the wicked are being punished, 
tortures are being meted out and where the just catch some glimpse of the heavens 
which await. In such literature there is often a stark contrast between the chaos of 
life on earth and the order, stability and control which God exerts in the heavens. 
The literature of this first stamp seeks to reassure. 
In visions of the second kind there are no journeys to the heavens and there 
is often more stress upon the horizontal or temporal nature of the message, 
accompanied by signs that things are drawing to a close, such as those given by 
great wars and cataclysms of nature' This is an attempt to encourage a different 
vision of the world and while, in the final analysis, such 'end times' are driven by 
God's will, these writings usually amount to nothing less than a symbolic protest 
against the established order, ' in addition, various messianic forms may accompany 
and be interwoven into both kinds of prophecy. That is, often the coming 'kingdom 
of God' is thought to be coeval with some incarnation of God, a Christ figure or 
Master of Light. In any case, two key characteristics of this second kind of literature 
are first; the ex eventu nature of the prophecy, that is, prophecy after the fact, and 
secondly, the prophet is usually pseudonymous. Hegel's understanding of the 
'revealed religion', although reconciliatory, like apocalyptic religious writing, is 
'" Ibid, 199 5, p21. 
"Ibid. 1995, p22. 
"' Luke, 21. 
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more like writing of this second kind, it has some of the characteristics of the 
vertical type, and the horizontal type. 
However, Hegel's "Absolute Knowing" often appears more prophetic 
literature than apocalyptic since it has all the characteristics of a specific historically 
determined ex eventu prophecy. As I shall demonstrate, Hegel's retrospective 
revelation of alienation was ex events because it was dependent upon the historical 
cataclysms of the past, such as the 'spiritual' collapse of Greece, Rome and upon the 
adventures of the French Revolution. (It is also worth noting that Hegel always 
played down his own authorial specificity, but this is not a line of argument which 
can be pursued here). In any event, this is hardly a novel characterisation of Hegel's 
thought since Alexandre Kojeve argues, for example, that the inspiration behind 
"Absolute Knowing" was provided by Napoleon, the ... 
"world soul on horseback". ' 
In a famous passage in the Encyclopaedia Logic it is alleged that Hegel characterised 
this eschatological duality in the following text, among others, 
In my Phenomenolgy, of Spirit, which on that account was at its 
publication described as the first part of the System of Philosophy, 
the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase 
of mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage 
gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of 
view, the necessity of that view being proved by the process (my emphasis). " 
In other words, the important point is that only once the process has already 
completed itself, Napoleon aside, can the proper point of view be brought forth to Self- 
Consciousness, in Hegel's account. Before we move on to consider specific examples 
of prophetic literature one final point should be made, that is, prophetic literature is 
usually produced either during a period of crisis or while there is a perception of a 
crisis, " and related to this, prophetic literature is almost always a literature of 
resistance and struggle which provides an alternative world view to the oppressed 
and like full blown apocalyptic literature, there is often the hope of some future 
reconciliation. 53 
Christian eschatology appears to contain only one true apocalypse, the Book 
of Revelation, but this is not the case with prophetic writing. ' In the New 
'Hegel, 1984, p 114. 
"Hegel, 1975, pps 45-6. 
''Reddish, 1995, p24. 
s'Ibid, 1995, p26. 
"Ibid. 1995, p30. 
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Testament the coming of Armageddon is an another example of this kind of 
formulation. "Prophetic eschatology is all pervasive in the New Testament, as in the 
parables of Jesus' or according to the letters of the apostle Paul, "' these are also 
often closer to the ex eventu form of prophecy where there is no other-worldly journey 
in the vision and the bringer of the good news is an earthly figure. Jesus of 
Nazareth, for example, prior to his resurrection is presented as a flesh-and-blood 
man. ' His role is to explain and reinterpret the law as already given. 
Nevertheless, there is a great deal of structural ambiguity between 
apocalyptic and prophetic literature. Indeed, Jesus and St Paul seem to be caught 
somewhere between both prophecy and apocalypse, for example, both of these 
religious figures appear to have been convinced that God sought to bring about the 
end of all terrestrial life. " While in the Pauline writings the 'coming' is often 
asserted simply as a litmus test of belief, the apocalyptic writings of the book of 
Revelation, for example, are truly cataclysmic and messianic. Here the oppressive 
power of "Gog and Magog" must be defeated before the "kingdom of God" can 
reign. Symbolically, this reign is pro-jected forward to a time when Satan is 
... "bound 
for a thousand years" by an angel bearing a key to a ... "bottomless pit 
and a great chain" 60 The ... "first resurrection" is 
held to be the beginning of this 
thousand year reign in which Satan is incarcerated and the second comingb' or 
... "second 
death" marks the release of Satan from his shackles to face God for one 
final decisive battle. The kingdom of God is attested to when the false prophet and 
the devil are cast into the .... 
"lake of fire and brimstone" and .... "tormented day 
and night". This then is the essence of the final judgement; salvation is at hand for 
those who accept the truth of the revelation and endless torment and suffering for 
those who don't. ' In other words, the role of prophetic apocalypse is to garner and 
judge based upon the strength of belief in the future deliverance. 
One common theme throughout these religious texts is the idea of some 
kind of spiritual re-birth (of becoming), where belief in the divine nature of such 
predictions is often followed by a new commitment to immerse oneself in the true 
"Revelation, 16: 14-16. 
56See Mark, 1: 14,13, Luke 21 and the chapters often referred to as the'little apocalypse', Matt, 24-25. 
"Sec two passages from Paul's letters, I Thessalonians 4: 13-5: 11, also I Corinthians, 4: 14,6: 9. 
"Paraphrasing Reddish, 1995, p31. 
'See Stepclevich, 1997, p 98, this was also Feuerbach's understanding. 
'Nee Revelations, 20: 1-10. 
°'See John 14: 3, and Hebrews, 9: 28. 
"See Mark, 3: 26 and 14: 25 where, at the last supper or Passover, Jesus predicts that the wine which 
passes his lips is his last before entering the "kingdom of God". 
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meaning of the message while freeing oneself from terrestrial temptations of one 
sort or another, and thereby creating a new form of self-consciousness. Christian 
asceticism becomes a basic model of consciousness raising, for example, in Hegel's 
modern subjects, a modern incarnation of the religious spirit that Nietzsche found 
particularly disturbing. This is also the structural framework for a thought project 
which understands cataclysm as the dawning of an age of hope and as a grounding 
for a new beginning that all will inevitably adhere to. Typically, enslavement 
provides the community with meaning through which to understand and interpret 
sufferings, whether earthly or spiritual. 
Judaic scripture contains only one apocalypse, the Book of Daniel. This is 
the classical form of prophetic apocalypse as a pseudonymous ex eventu prophecy. 
Although this work is set during the time of the Babylonian exile of the people of 
Judah (sixth century B. C. E. ), it was probably composed around the much lacer 
period of the rule of Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria. 63 In Judaic texts, like those 
of the much later Christian texts, the prophetic form was developed by social 
movements who emphasised the evils of the age and the coming of a time of 
righteousness, often in response to some form of oppression or other. In the period 
of Antiochus, Jews were persecuted for remaining faithful to Mosaic Law and 
apocalyptic theology argued that the continual presence of suffering was due to the 
dominance of evil powers, which it is foretold, are quickly destroyed 6 
In the prophetic Jewish tradition the prime example of this messianic 
apocalyptic writing is often thought to be that of the so-called 'Isaiah Apocalypse' 
(742-687 B. Q. However, the Isaiah text lacks the visionary elements and the 
angelic mediators of true apocalyptic literature. On the other hand, like the period 
of Antiochus, the time of Isaiah was one in which Judea was threatened by external 
forces. The Northern Kingdom of Judea was annexed to the Assyrian Empire65 so 
this was also a dark and threatening period from a Jewish perspective. In one 
instance it is predicted in Isaiah that .... "the 
day of the Lord is near; as destruction 
from the almighty it will come". 66 But in the most sustained series of prophetic 
proclamations he says, "Behold, the Lord will lay waste the earth and make it 
desolate"..., because, "The earth lies polluted under its inhabitants; for they have 
transgressed the laws, violated the statutes, broken the everlasting covenant". 
"Again paraphrasing Reddish, 1995, pp. 27-8. 
°''Danicl, 7-12. 
"'2 Kings, 17. 
'Isaiah, 13: 5-6. 
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These unfortunate law breakers, we are told, are cursed and ... "suffer for their 
guilt";... 67 In an anticipation of the language of the New Testament the Old says, 
Terror, and the pit, and the snare upon you, 0 inhabitant of the 
earth! ` 
It would appear that there can be no escape from the cataclysm, the 
language and the metaphors of prophetic apocalyptic writing are always those of 
inevitability and reckoning. The metaphor of the pit is the eternal suffering and the 
snare is an active entrapment in vice and evil, for, "He who flees at the sound of the 
terror shall fall into the pit; and he who climbs out of the pit shall be caught in the 
snare". ' Only then, ... 
"in Jerusalem, ... 
he (God) will manifest his glory". Returning 
to Daniel for a moment, the predictity future-oriented nature of the prophecy, like 
the "Isaiah apocalypse", is quite obvious. However, there is surely a major 
distinction which should be made by those interested in the philosophy of religion 
between knowledge claims which are based upon past events that have actually 
occurred, whether metaphorical or historical and however they might be 
interpreted, and those which are simply based upon the sufferings of the present 
and wish fulfilment regarding the future. 
The template of the kind of horizontal prophetic and apocalyptic utterance 
which shaped Hegel's analysis of the French Revolution was decidedly ex e: wntu: 
that ... "heaven transplanted to earth". 
Indeed his entire eschatological project 
looked to the past and present, not to the future. Thus strictly speaking his 
apocalyticism was highly specific and not at all as ambiguous as the religious 
literature of the same variety might suggest. The language of prophetic utterance 
might often be 'decisionist' but it is not always ex eventu. It might be legitimately 
normative, as in the parables of Jesus, but it need not always be prophetic. As I 
shall demonstrate, Hegel made a retrospective avowal on the history of alienation 
before the coming of Hegel the prophet, in his case the prophecy was always after 
the fact. In other words, in Hegel's case this amounts to something like a definition 
of anti-prophecy. 
I would like to also suggest then, if only provisionally at this stage, that 
although Hegel, whether successfully or not, stamped alienation as a ... "blank 
destiny" and described death as the .. "absolute Lord and Master", and the Terror as 
"Ibid, 24: 1-24. 
"g lbid. 24: 17. 
°"Ibid, 24: 17-19. 
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that ... "fury of destruction"..., and finally, and although he characterised the 
Revolution as a ... 
'spiritual bath', these ideas were not exclusively apocalyptic forms 
since the content of such ideas also mirrored the content of such classical ex eventu 
eschatology. In other words, Hegel's accommodation with the political realities of 
modernity are revealed to be necessary in a manner which is demonstrably obvious 
to all those who have travelled with him on his spiritual journey. 
Given all of this, and if this thesis proves to be convincing to the reader, it 
is hardly surprising that the initial impact of Hegel's thought was theological 
rather than political or social. Indeed, Hegel's prophetic imagination, like those of 
the religious millenialists of the Judeo-Christian tradition, is one from which there 
can be no simple refutation. This is not to suggest that Hegel adopts this 
eschatological form subliminally, or unreflectively from a desire to conform to the 
religious demands of the day, there is every indication that he chose to use this 
religious template for his own Phenomenology. There are at least two very good 
reasons for this claim; first, while Hegel always holds that philosophy stands above 
religion and art and was the proper vehicle for grasping the true nature of the 
eternal, he also holds that in the final analysis, the truths of religion will find their 
place in the philosophy of the Absolute. Thus he said in his Encyclopaedia Logic, 
It is no doubt to be remembered that the result of thought 
harmonises with the import of the Christian religion: for the 
Christian religion is the revelation of reason. 70 
Secondly, and more importantly, the nature of the Hegel's "Absolute 
Knowing" is determined by this religious form, for if humanity is to stand with 
God as the image of God then like God he must be able to survey the beginning, 
middle and end of time simultaneously, as God must by definition. " In short, it 
would appear that Hegel's "Absolute Knowing" is integral to his entire 
phenomenological enterprise. 
Leaving aside the immediate theological impact of all this for the time 
being, an impact which was not inconsiderable for the immediate theological 
events of the period, the consequences for political philosophy properly so-called 
should be enough to command our attention. On one level, each thinker I consider 
here is to proclaim with prophetic fervour that their own analysis heralds the dawn 
Hegel. The Logic. 1975, p57- 
See 13oethius, The Consolation of Philosophy. 13k 5. 
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of a new era and each demonstrably attended to prophetic power in their own 
strength of belief. On the other hand, unfortunately the distinguishing feature of 
the new "shape" testified to was an empty horizon, a vista from which each and 
every perspective might well be legitimate, by definition. However, as we shall see, 
from Hegel's point of view, philosophy's time was in the past and present and thus 
'object' must actually conform to the concept of the 'subject', a largely cognitive 
matter. Also, it is worth noting that Hegel's attention to the empirical facts of 
social and political life indicated that he would have to ultimately seek legitimacy 
for his ex eventu prophecy in the logical consistency of such events. Thus, I shall 
argue in what follows that Hegel's prophetic apocalypticism is of a very different 
quality from that of his most ardent admirers and detractors alike. 
As we shall also discover, Stirner's bridge to the Egoist's of the future is the 
Lumpenproletariat, in effect these are Nietzsche's "Last Man", when retrospectively 
understood from our perspective. The Lumpenproletarian is both the bitter final 
product of thousands of years of anthropological, racial and spiritual development 
and the model for the new men of the future, the Egoists. To be sure, self-serving 
in the highest degree but, it is claimed by his admirers, these are the first truly 
honest men. Then came Marx, who believes that the future belongs, not to the self- 
serving individual (the particular), but to the new industrial Proletariat (the 
universal) progenitors of the ultimate social union. Marx holds that as an expression 
of power and inequality, politics between people will cease, giving way to the 
simple administration of things. '` Finally, comes the. Übermenarh, probably the most 
visionary prophet of these new political agencies. A mythical creature who's own 
life parodies the life of Christ, and whose teaching is an 'identikit' picture of the 
parables and testimony of both the Old and New Testaments. The Übermensch 
represents nothing less than a second coming (Ecce Homo, even if the firm is one of 
self-parody), a "transvaluation of all values" and the dawn of a new era. Each 
individual has the opportunity to re-make himself without reference to a negative 
role model of any kind and to draw on their own psycho-sexual energies and 
capacities to the highest degree. Yet paradoxically, as the epigrams to this section 
suggest, Hegel, the great theologian of the modern period would appear to have 
his feet firmly on the ground while his avowedly atheist epigones have their own 
heads in the spiritual clouds of eschatology. 
But to begin this study proper, I would like to review the discourse of 
'alienation' and of 'nihilism' since both have had a long history and both have 
'1 This formula may in fact be Engel's but it serves Marx equally well in this particular context. 
34 
proved to be elusive and ambiguous and each is the grounding concept of modern 
eschatology respectively. First, the term alienation. 
35 
The history of man's alienation and reconciliation is written by 
Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind. '3 
Alastair Maclntyre, 1968. 
III 
The Discourse of Alienation 
The term 'alienation' has not always been used primarily as a philosophical 
concept. It is worth noting that it has also been used in ordinary everyday language 
to refer to any growing estrangement which might prevail between former friends, 
it has been used in economy and law to designate the transfer of property and as a 
term for relatively general mental deviations from the norm. Most of these senses of 
the word alienation will not concern us in the present study, rather, the focus here 
will be the specific philosophical development of the concept. The origins of this 
philosophical use pre-date all the others and can be found to have a religious 
origin. ' Indeed, as we shall see, Hegel returns again and again to the religious sense 
of alienation and never really loses his hope that religion can continue to provide a 
major source of lasting and unifying power, save that of only philosophy itself. For 
Hegel, religious alienation was never something separate from philosophy but was 
always integral to it. Thus I would now like to review the religious flavour of 
alienation. 
In the book of Genesis, Abraham and Sarah are visited by three 'strangers'. ' 
However, these strangers are not what they seem, they are in fact angels of God and 
they have come to tell Sarah that she will give birth to a son when they return a year 
hence. We might like to ask, who is the first-person narrator in this story? Who is 
this that knows of such plans for a woman of ninety who no longer menstruates? 
This mystery is possibly the first example of what we might like to call, an 
'alienation' in the Western tradition. Within the Pentateuch the general 
development and discourse of'idolatry' might also be viewed as a continuation and 
evolution of this process. In any case, the point is that the 'stranger', whether an 
'{See Mac Intyre, 1968, p 11. 
"The Herachtean concern with human ontology and the logos might be thought of as a form of 
alienation which pre-dates the Judeo-Christian tradition but even if one accepts this then it is something 
which is only implied, there is no explicit use of the concept in the modern sense. 
"The Living Torah, Genesis, 18. 
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idol or angel is the figurative embodiment of all that is mysterious, unknown, 
incomprehensible, sometimes menacing and almost always revelatory. 
' 
In the Pauline writings of the New Testament there is a sense of alienation 
which would have been very familiar to Hegel. In the Letter to the Ephesians, where 
the central theme is the universal potential of the Christian gospel to unite and 
bring Gentiles (the particular Gentiles in question being the people of the city of 
Ephesus, capital of the Roman province of Asia"), to a knowledge of God's love. The 
governing problem throughout is one of alienation. ' Paul, addressing. the Gentiles 
from prison, where he was incarcerated by the Jews for advocating the equality of 
the Gentiles out-with the church said, - 
Therefore remember that at one time you Gentiles in the flesh.... 
remember that you were at that time separated from Christ, 
alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers, to the 
covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the- 
world. 
Unification (thus peace amongst other rewards such as 'Grace'), under the 
sign of the cross is the reward for the belief in the divinity of Christ and, his 
messengers, including Paul himself. The word 'remember' denotes the retrospective 
wisdom of a Self-Consciousness which represents a higher order spirituality, themes 
which we shall return to again and again in this thesis. The passage continues, 
Now this I affirm and testify in the Lord, that you must no longer 
live as the Gentiles do, in the futility of their minds; they are 
darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God 
because of the ignorance that is in them, due to their hard of 
heart; '9... 
The notion of separated here, denotes the sense of strangeness which clouds 
the relationship between these peoples; the Jews and the Christians from each other 
as well as the Gentile's separation from God. However, the context here is also 
important; the Pauline assertion is made within the context of the imprisoned. Here 
one can see something of the multi-layered texture of religious alienation; Gentiles 
'°Sce the Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 1988, p 10. 
tire Oxford Bible, 1965, map 12Ephesus is now located in what we call Western Turkey. 
Ephesians. 2: 12 and 4: 17. 
9 Ephesians. 4: 17-18. 
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are certainly alienated from God, thus alienated 
from believers, but the physical 
incarceration of Paul himself symbolically represents the alienation of the 'wise' from 
the 'ignorant'; in this case, the Christian from the Jew (one is also reminded here of 
the pre-Christian Platonic simile of the 'cave', thus the physical incarceration 
metaphor is also an epistemological idea). Paul seems to be a very strange and 
foreign individual whose faith in a false prophet is dangerous enough that he should 
be separated from the community. Finally, the stoical nature of the letter written by 
Paul in the face of his own imprisonment represents his own alienation from his 
captors as well as from the Gentiles. Separation, strangeness, anxiety, retrospective 
wisdom and danger, these are the eschatological tropes of alienation from a very 
early period of written history and the root of the philosophical and epistemological 
use of the term. We shall return to religious eschatology again before we leave this 
Introduction. 
Between the foundational -texts of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the 
nineteenth century, the period covered in the present study, alienation was used by 
a number of political and social theorists. Hugo Grotius, for example, used the term 
to denote the transfer of sovereignty from oneself to another and finally, Rousseau 
could be said to have been describing alienation in his re-working of the 'fall', the 
decline of natural man and the growth of civilisation. AD In his Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker, Rousseau is clearly alienated from the false cultivation of sophisticated 
'polite society', and in his Social Contract he said, "Everything which destroys social 
unity is worthless: All institutions which put man in contradiction with himself are 
worthless". "' Nevertheless, it is the specific Hegelian use of the term to denote a 
partial understanding, ontological separation and retrospective wisdom which is of 
particular interest here, and such a use is certainly closer to the original Judeo- 
Christian tradition and to Rousseau's use of the term than the legal sense employed 
by theorists such as Grotius. 
Richard Schacht has pointed out that Hegel used the term alienation in two 
subtly different senses, the one negatively and the other positively. In the case of the 
first example, alienation is often used by Hegel to describe a discordant relation 
which exists between the individual and the 'social substance' (social institutions) or 
between one's actual condition and essential nature. In Lukäcs' erratic but ground 
breaking study, The Young Hegel, the early use of the term 'positivity' is traced: 
'Paraphrasing from the Dictionary of Marxist Thought, p 10. 
Rousseau, 1997, p 147. 
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demonstrating that even during his early period Hegel equated religious forms of 
knowledge with the, 
... suspension of the moral autonomy of the subject. 
' 
This is also the sense used by Marx in the famous 1844 Manuscripts. However, it is 
extremely important to note that the suspension of autonomy, is carried by Marx, 
into the labour process of capitalist production, something which Hegel does not do. 
Despite his awareness of Adam Smith's work on this subject, nowhere do we find 
Hegel employing his term for alienation in the same breath as 'work'. 
On the other hand, Hegel also uses alienation in a more positive sense, one 
which is closer to that used by Grotius, to denote the sense of an act of 
transcendence and preservation or Aufheben. In other words, to denote an act of 
surrender, where one might give up an element of one's particularity in so far as one 
might obtain and sustain some higher-order good. A3eThus in Hegel's thought the 
continuation of positive alienation's are necessary spiritual steps which objectify self- 
reflective being. For example, such positive alienation's make the abstract freedom 
of the French Revolution 'actual'. As we shall discover, the end of alienation which 
occurs in Hegel's Phenomenology is the end of alienation understood in its negative 
sense, a point which seems to be almost entirely missed in the thought of Marx' 
Although it is clear that it is likely that some controversy will remain as to 
the precise epistemological status of the concept of alienation, it is also clear that in 
the case of the above, alienation has some claim to being both psychological, 
sociological and therefore also empirical. Yet, while it should present social theory 
with little difficulty in establishing empirically whether one alienates one's property 
or not, the case of sociological and psychological alienation's are qualitatively very 
different. 
However, the contention that alienation is also a philosophical concept is a 
third and even more controversial claim. Does the concept of alienation have 
something coherent to say regarding the nature of knowledge? This question is 
certainly beyond the scope of the present thesis. Yet, despite such reservations, I 
will assume throughout an engagement within the phenomenological tradition of 
"'See Lulcäcs, 1975. pp. 18-19. 
: See Schacht, 1975. 
"See Solomon, 1995. for a conventional Marxist reading of the Phenomenology which is not simply 
Kojevean, pp. 453&549. 
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philosophy, thus I will also assume that alienation has some claim to being a 
philosophical concept, as Hegel himself holds that it is. Alienation in Hegel's use is 
always reflexive, thus is always a self-alienation and therefore represents not only a 
veil of ignorance concerning the true nature of the self before the completion of his 
system, but one should also bear in mind that in phenomenological terms, a lacunae 
in self-knowledge is also a lacunae in knowing per se. In the famous Preface to the 
Phenomenology Hegel himself declares that the logic which lies at the core of his own 
Phenomenology is speculative philosophy' 8S That is, it is a philosophy of self- 
reflection (Lat.; speculum, mirror made of polished metal), in which, 
The self-moving concrete shape makes itself into a simple 
determinatness; in so doing it raises itself to logical form, and exists 
in its essentiality; its concrete existence is just this movement, and 
is directly a logical existence. 
In the first volume of the Encyclopaedia Hegel characterises the 'speculative 
philosophy' as the pagan freedom of Greek thinking which is in harmony with what 
'mind' is, as opposed to the 'dogma' of the medieval schoolmen which is immersed 
in ".. mythology and its fancies". "6 
We know from Hegel's correspondence of 1801 that he reviewed the work 
of the mathematician Johann Werneberg, who developed a theory of specularir in 
which the infinite attains self-knowledge, in the Erlangen Literary Review. ' If 
Phenomenology is to be considered within the canon of philosophy at all, then 
alienation is certainly a philosophical concept. Again, whether commentators do or 
do not take the view that alienation is a philosophical concept, Hegel always 
implied that the phenomenological process was philosophical. In the Phenomenology, 
for example, and within the context of the role of his own form of philosophy in 
relation to the other sciences, he had this to say, 
Let the other sciences try to argue as much as they like without 
philosophy - without it they can have in them neither life, Spirit, 
nortruth. ' 
"Hegel, 1977. Preface, para 56. 
"° Hegel, 1975, pps. 5 1-2. 
8 -Hegel. 1984, p84. 
" Hegel, 1977, pars 67. 
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ý, I 
Alienation for Hegel is always a form of mis-understanding, dramatically 
captured in such phrases as the, .. 'way of 
despair' and the `Unhappy 
Consciousness'. s' This sense of alienation, used as a intrinsically philosophical 
concept was also clearly understood by Marx. Indeed, even the necessity of doing 
philosophyper. re is considered here to be an expression of alienation. As Marx was to 
comment in the German Ideology, 
Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation 
to another as onanism and sexual love. 90 
The use of the term by Marx in the 1844 Manmscripts is well known: 
according to Marx, humanity is alienated from its own {non} essence, from each 
other and finally from the products of their own labour. However, as already stated, 
the alienation of labour is also a departure from the Hegelian understanding. 
To be sure, and this is the really important point for what follows, however 
much Hegel may have thought he had discerned the closure of alienation in the 
Phenomenology, the discourse of alienation did not end with him, the debate 
continued among his students. A debate, one should add again, which was 
invariably conducted within an eschatological frame of reference. To name but a 
few of those who engaged in this form: in his The Life of Jesus Critically Examined 
[18351, David Friedrich Strauss attempted to undermine the notion of the divine91 
Jesus by engaging in a close comparative analysis of the scripture. Rather, he 
asserted that, in all likelihood, the Christian gospels were essentially complex 
messianic myths developed by alienated Jewish sects under extreme political and 
social oppression 92 This is a startling work of theology which also profoundly 
impacted on the thought of the young Friedrich Nietzsche. The alienated Christian 
theologian of modern times was thereafter in a difficult position, compelled to 
admit this Christological truth before the community itself discovered it, in which 
case, such a theologian would appear to both himself and the community a 
hypocrite. ' In his The Essence of Christianity of 1841, Ludwig Feuerbach argued that 
religious belief was nothing other than an alienated form of self-projection, stating, 
s9Ibid, 1977, Para 78. 
9t Marx, 1976, p236. 
91See Strauss, 1994, p773. "Historically, Jesus can have been nothing more than a person, highly 
distinguished indeed, but subject to the limitations inevitable to all that is mortal: "... 
92Ibid. pp. 39-92. Also Stepelevich, 1987, pl9. 
9 `Strauss, 1994, p784. 
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... the 
historical progress of religion consists in this: that what by an 
earlier religion was considered as objective, is now recognised as 
subjective; that is, what was formerly contemplated and 
worshipped as God is now perceived to be something human ' 
Max Stirner, in his most important work, The Ego and Its Out, 1844, is also 
concerned with alienation, an example of the pre-egotistical formation of 
personhood. Stirner's use of the concept of alienation often appears to be more a 
kind of depth psychology than a philosophical concept. Whether the context is the 
social position of Jews or of Feuerbach's notion of essence or Bauer 's elevation of 
critique, Stirner's point is always the same: that some separation of the individual 
within him/herself occurs before the actual realisation of pure Egoism, understood 
in his sense As for Stirneis debate with Marx, we shall return to this in more 
detail in the course of Chapters III and IV. 
The sense of alienation which is of concern in the following thesis is not, 
therefore, that which we encountered in the beginning of this section, the sense of 
an ordinary everyday breach, estrangement or break in interpersonal relations. 
Neither is alienation used in the legal and psychological terms we have just 
reviewed. Alienation, rather, is either a political concept - the positive sundering of 
some element of one's personality in order that one should receive some greater 
benefit {Entäußerung} or, in the second and more important sense, alienation as a 
philosophical term which denotes a condition of partial understanding or some 
notion of a perverted human condition [Entfremdung). 
"'See Stepelevich, 1987. p 139. 
"Stirner. 1995. pp. 31-2,33-4.69.74,81-2,87,131. 
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You probably know that Carrier has been guillotined. Do you still 
read the French papers? If -I remember ' correctly, someone 
mentioned to me that they are banned in Württemburg. This trial 
is very important, and has revealed the complete ignominy of 
Robespierre's party ' 
Hegel to Schelling, Bern, Christmas Eve, 1794 
IV` I 
The Discourse of Nihilism97 
The guillotine, key symbol of the French Revolution and an early product of 
the industrial revolution, not only gave birth to a wholly new practice through the 
mechanisation of mass killing, it has also loomed large in the philosophy and 
literature of the post-revolutionary period. In the first case, the case of philosophy, 
the enlightened attempt to build a humane method of execution which could allow 
the condemned to meet a dignified end which was consonant with'their humanity, 
this project clearly failed amid indiscriminate carnage and has been viewed as 
symbolic of the hubris of the Enlightenment which gave it birth. 
In literature, for example, Charles Dicken's used the historical backdrop of 
the Revolution and the guillotine in his Tale of Two Cities to warn the English of the 
excesses of such foreigners and the folly of which they were capable. In one of the 
most extreme and violent of nineteenth century guillotine novels, Under the Knife, by 
the symbolist and esoteric French writer, Eiemir Bourges, the guillotine becomes a 
9°Hegel, 1984, p29. Also see Schmidt, 1998 for an interesting account of this letter and its relationship to 
the discussion of the Terror in the Phenomenology, especially paragraph 590. Schmidt maintains that the 
reference to the "ignominy" of the Robbespierrites suggests that Hegel took Robbespierre's party to be 
little better than the autocratic system it sought to replace. Thus the deaths of the Terror were effectively 
meaningless since little social progress was actually made. Schmidt arrives at this conclusion through an 
historical reconstruction of the references to the Terror in the PhenorwnoloU (590), where the phrase, 
"swallowing a mouthful of water" is taken to be a reference to an article in a popular magazine of the 
period called Minerva, which Hegel may have read. The article concerned was reportage on "Republican 
Marriages", that is, to the practice of binding couples together (often portrayed as lovers), and then 
drowning them in the River Seine. Apparently Carrier was the military commander responsible for this 
practice. However, while I fully accept the facts unearthed by Schmidt's excellent scholarship, I do take 
issue with his interpretation of the significance of what this practice meant for Hegel. What was "cold and 
mean" concerning such deaths was not only that they demonstrated the basic failing of the Revolution to 
bring about a more equitable notion of justice in practice, but that the selection of victims, in common with 
those on the guillotine, eventually became completely arbitrary. This is the period following Thermidor, 
after finishing off the Aristocracy and the sons of the Revolution, the Committee for Public Safety arbitrarily 
murdered young lovers at random. Or at least failed to stop Carrier from so doing. 
9 Maurice Blanchot for one has denied that nihilism is a meaningful term in his essay on "The Limits of 
Experience", see Allison, 1988. 
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potent symbol of nothingness and annihilation. ' In Bourges' novel a young Jacobin 
soldier is forced to take a guillotine around the countryside to use to use it to repress 
counter-revolution, the troops refer to it as the "Voracious Lady". Within a short 
period the young man, wearied by blood-lust, imagines the instrument having a life 
of its own and in one vision it appears before him, accompanied by thousands of 
whispering voices who call him towards the blade. 
Eventually the young soldier then steals and hides the blade of the guillotine 
to try and save the life of his pro-Monarchist lover who has been arrested and 
condemned for offences towards the revolution. However, after disposing of the 
blade the young soldier is himself discovered and condemned to death, but they can 
not carry out the execution because they do not know where he has hidden the 
blade! Eventually the blade is found by a "possessed" idiot who feverishly re- 
assembles the instrument and proceeds to carry out the executions scheduled for 
that day, and inevitably, comes the turn of the young soldier. The scene which 
follows typifies the meaninglessness of all life and death, according to the nihilist 
account. The soldier advances to the machine and calmly places his head into the 
recessed oval of the chopping block, no longer resisting the death for which he is 
fated". When his lover arrives on the scene to late too save him, she shoots the 
executioner with a pistol, 
Then she climbed the steps one by one, quickly moved across the 
scaffold, and looked into the bottom of the basket.... she knelt down, 
took the head of her lover in her hands, and piously kissed him on 
the lips, let out a deep sigh, and without trembling, with a steady 
hand, blew her brains out. 
And now, raising her two triumphant arms bathed in blood, 
brightly illuminated by the light of the conflagration, the Voracious 
Lady stood alone on this fatal Esplanade where her servitors had 
fallen. 
Here we are being challenged to think about the meaning of the revolution. 
Does Liberty, Equality and Fraternity necessarily contain the seeds of its own 
dissolution? Is the revolution inevitably drawn towards death? Such questions, as we 
shall discover in Chapters I and II, were fundamental to Hegel and the development 
of his political theory. 
"" Here I am paraphrasing from Danial Gerould, 1992, p 156. 
44 
Contemporary varieties of nihilistic description have taken three main forms 
and two sub-forms of one of these. These can be described as follows: psychological 
nihilism; this is nihilism as a phenomenon which is a state of mind, an apathy and 
listlessness where nothing appears to have value or meaning to the individual. 
Secondly, there is sociological or anthropological nihilism; a condition in which a 
lack of social and collective meaning is not simply expressed as a personal malaise 
but also as an interpretation of a malaise which has been learned from others i. e. 
here nihilism is understood as a cultural product. Finally, there is philosophical 
nihilism; this form should be divided into two distinct kinds, theoretical nihilism 
which, Nietzsche claims, develops from the Socratic truth imperative which 
ultimately denies and questions the validity of all knowledge. And the second sub- 
form of philosophical nihilism is ethical nihilism, often the product of some 
combination of the others, this is where there are seen to be no objective moral 
standards or values. ' It is the cultural and philosophical experiences of nihilism with 
which I am primarily concerned in this study. However, before I turn to the detailed 
question of what nihilism is supposed to mean we shall briefly trace the emergence 
of the term in cultural and political circles. 
It should not surprise us to learn that this ordering of nihilism bears a strong 
family resemblance to Nietzsche's since, as I shall argue, this nihilism was the very 
product of the Phenomenology which Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche are responding to. 10° 
While Nietzsche explicitly refers to nihilism in his notebooks as "when the highest 
values devalue themselves", Hegel does not, to my knowledge, ever refer to the 
concept by name. Yet Hegel is undoubtedly aware of the term nihilism, for it did 
enter into the common cultural currency of his time. 
The oldest known records of its use date from the period of the French 
Revolution. Dictionaries of the period give definitions such as, - 
.. one who is politically impartial to good for nothing. 
"' 
In this categorisation I follow Goudsblom, 1980, however, there are any number of other ways of 
defining the various forms of nihilism. For example, in D. A. Crosby's account he divides the concept into 
political, moral, epistemological, cosmic and existential, see Crosby, 1988, p8. Crosby seems to have been 
unaware of Goudsblom, 1980, however. There is considerable overlap in these two works, for example 
there is virtually no difference between what Goudsblom describes as "psychological nihilism" and 
Crosby's "existential nihilism". 
". Sm Taylor, 1979, p167, also, Otto Pöggeler, 1970. 
1°'See Goudsblom, 1980, p3. 
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There is also an entry in the Neologie on Vacabulaire der Mots Nouveaux 11, where Louis- 
Sebastian Mercier defines a nihilist in the following manner, 
Nihilist or nothingist, one who does not believe in anything. A fine 
product of the evil philosophy that flaunts itself in the fat Diaionaire 
Encyclopedique. What does it want to make of us? Nihilists! 1O' 
The term was also used with negative connotations in Germany, often as a 
popular description of the young. We might also suppose that Hegel was exposed to 
the concept, since in 1799 Heinrich Jacobi described Fichte's work as inevitably, 
and in the final analysis, 
... an idealism which 
deserves no better name than nihilism, 103 
There is also some textual evidence to suggest that the term nihilism was in 
fairly widespread use in Germany even before such commentaries on Fichte 's work. 
The term was used in a book by J. H. Obereit in 1787, by F. Jenisch in 1796 and 
more importantly, by F. Schlegel in 1797.104 Two important facts emerge from all of 
this: first of all, the term nihilism emerged from the period of the French Revolution 
and secondly, it carried with it largely negative connotations. This position 
remained much the same throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and 
certainly held during the period in which Hegel wrote the Phenomenology. Along with 
writers such as Franz Von Baader; who also argued that nihilism was a malign by- 
product of the Enlightenment, 105 From the period of the Phenomenology it is clear that 
Hegel was troubled by the legacy of the Enlightenment, referring to its highest 
product as "Utility". Thus within the context of a re-organisation of the Bavarian 
Academy of the Sciences, along what he believed to be pedestrian empiricist lines, 
Hegel wrote to Niethammer on August 8,1807, 
Experience has proven it - experience, the empirical! You know! 
And proven what? That potatoes, horseradish, teapots, energy- 
saving ovens, etc, all prospered well where the sciences flourished. 
You know! So let us promote science! 106 
"=Cited in Goudsblom, Paris, 1801, p 143, 
"'Also cited in Goudsblom, 1799 Werke III, Leipzig, 1816, p44, also see Jacobi an Fichte. 
'wIbid, 1980, p4. 
10SIbid, 1980, p4, Über die Intelligenz, 1826, Sämtliche Werke. 1, pp. 133-50. Also cited in 
Goudsblom. 
""Hegel, 1984, 
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Hegel, like Dostoevesky, proved to be a stern critic of Utilitarianism, 
pointing ultimately, to the moral bankruptcy of such a system of thought. In both 
cases, it should be noted, they argue that this moral impotency results in the 
legitimisation of murder. Hegel for his part, despite the fashion for post-modern 
critique, was well acquainted with the 'other' of reason. 107 In Russia, nihilism met 
Hegelianism in the popular work of a literary icon, Turgenev, who himself travelled 
to Berlin in the 1840, s to soak up Hegelianism at its source. 
In Fathers and Sons, (1862) and here the pejorative overtones are somewhat 
mitigated, Arkady, introducing the philosophical principles of his friend and the 
anti-hero of the book, Bazarov, to his Uncle, said, 
A nihilist is someone who bows to no authority, who accepts no 
principle at face value, no matter in how much respect that 
principle may be held. " 
Exasperated, Uncle Pavel Petrovich can only reply, 
Yes. It used to be Hegelians, and now there are nihilists. We shall 
see how you manage to exist in a void, in an airless vacuum. " 
As we shall see, in Chapters I and II of the present work the mention of Hegelian 
and nihilists in the same breath is certainly no accident of intellectual history. 
In any case, as Russian appearances of the term nihilism increase the 
popular image of the nihilist begins to take shape in the imagination of the time; in 
Dostoevesky's book The Idiot, Prince Myshkin is visited by a group of jaded, shabby, 
bohemian and provocative nihilists. By turns the character of the nihilist is 
enduringly shaped by Russian popular literature into a dedicated lover of truth, an 
uncompromising zealot, and as a ragamuffin bohemian. This image of the nihilist 
was obviously less malign than the real political movement of the Russian nihilists 
who advocated terror and political assassination, an interesting paradox in its own 
right. In any case, we shall see in Chapter II, that this literary characterisation of 
'the typical nihilist' was well known to Hegel over eighty years before through a text 
which anticipated the later Russian model, a text which was virtually a samizdat of 
the period, Diderot's unpublished book Rameati c Nephew. This book fell into Hegel's 
10 See Berthold-Bond, 1995, this included a relatively coherent theory of madness. 
11°Goudsblom, 1980, p7. 
119 Turgenev, 1972, p94. 
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hands before he wrote the Phenomenology. And in Chapter III we will consider the 
actual incarnation of such characters in the dramatir personae of Max Stirner's 
Lumpenproletariat. 
Most English language dictionaries suggest that nihilism, [Lat. nibil, 
nothing], is a doctrine in which all values are worthless and that nothing is 
knowable or can be communicated. Or similarly it can mean a willingness to reject 
all norms of morality. In his survey of modern nihilism, Nihilism and Culrure, Johan 
Goudsblom argues that, 
... nihilism is not something uniquely modern which has appeared 
out of the blue... in the course of the last two centuries... neither is it 
a timeless feature of existence or implicit in human nature,... "o 
Yet, in contrasting opinion Stanley Rosen has argued that the, 
Danger of nihilism is a permanent human possibility... the pervasive 
presence of nihilism today is due to a specific series of philosophical 
decisions of the past. "' 
Clearly the substantive meaning of nihilism and its effect is still a matter of 
dispute. As in the case of alienation, there is also some doubt as to the philosophical 
coherence and value of such a broad and amorphous term. 
In any case, it is not my intention in what follows to claim that Hegel was a 
nihilist. Clearly, such an assertion makes little sense given Hegel's determined effort 
to reconcile Self-Consciousness with modernity. Rather, I will demonstrate that 
Hegel's own response to the `modern' crisis, though problematic (given his 
acquiescence before the subjugation of women), did produce a coherent 
compendium of political theory. In other words, Hegel's answer to modern nihilism 
is realistic, pragmatic and possibly even more productive than those of the other 
theorists considered. In short, current fashionable theories of the 'End of History' 
aside, Hegel's liberalism remains the most enduring and comprehensive system, as 
political theory. 
' 10Ibid, 1972, p xii. 
1 "Ibid, 1972, p xiv. 
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It has not always been clear that Hegel, or Hegelianism, is not nihilistic, or 
at least that Hegelianism did not always inevitably lead to some kind of nihilism. 
Gilles Deleuze, for example, has suggested that, 
History in general and Hegelianism in particular found their 
outcome, but also their most complete dissolution, in a triumphant 
nihilism. ' 
In fact, with the possible exception of Stirner, none of the thinkers 
considered in this thesis should be thought of as a programmatic nihilist, although 
even in Stirner's case it is doubtful that he would have approved of the nihilist's 
apparent commitment to truth. Rather, each in his own post-Hegelian way, was 
responding to a nihilism which they regarded as a theological fait accompli. In other 
words, as Habermas has characterised it, "modernity is a single theme with ever 
new titles", and the titles are 'lack of meaning', 'ethical relativism', 
'disenchantment', 'crisis of agency' and so on. This is the very stuff of modernity. 
Nihilism, understood philosophically and politically, has often come to 
denote those who seek to actively undermine all knowledge or human belief systems 
for its own sake. However, according to Stirner, there was meaning and this 
meaning resided in the ultimate sovereignty of the individual Egoist. In the case of 
Marx, meaning ultimately lay in a rich concept of individuality to come and in a 
harmonious community of such agents, able in turn, to satisfy all the most basic 
needs of that same community. In the case of Nietzsche, a new sensual aesthetics of 
life prefigured the kind of excellence that truly made the act of living worthwhile 
and which engendered personal authenticity. None of these thinkers should be 
thought of as true nihilists then, though each was perhaps haunted by the 
appearance of nihilism, a nihilism each perceived in the historical direction of the 
human spirit itself. In the case of Stirner and Marx, they both largely accepted 
Hegel's dialectical exposition of this history, albeit critically. In the view of 
Nietzsche, Hegel was simply the apex of the nihilist process itself, the perfect 
embodiment of the kind of spiritual sansculotism which it decadent modernity. 
Finally, modern nihilism, when used in the present work denotes a new set 
of human problems and questions and it suggests that these were immanent in the 
actual spiritual adventures of the French Revolution, as interpreted by Hegel. In 
this spiritual revolution epistemological conventions, moral norms and ethical values 
IU Deleuze, 1992, p161. 
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break away from traditional sources of philosophical and religious knowledge, while 
paradoxically doing so within a framework which retained the same form as these 
original sources. 
I would now like to turn towards the religious and philosophical notion of 
alienated time and its reconciliation properly speaking. That is, to the unfolding 
religious symmetry of Hegel's theory of alienation and his own version of the ex ez ntu 
prophecy. 
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... reconciliation 
has three real stages: the stage of immediacy [or of 
the heart], which is more an abstraction than it is reconciliation; the 
stage in which the church is dominant, a church that is outside 
itself; and the stage of ethical life. 
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 1827113 
This World [Spirit] looks on as something alien, a world, therefore, 
of which it must now take possession. 
Hegel, 1806 
CHAPTER I 
The End of Alienation 
Despite the interest in Hegel's early work over the last fifty years the view 
that he was a metaphysical philosopher in the 'subjective idealist' tradition still 
persists. 114 This view of Hegel as an essentially anti-materialist philosopher who 
believed that everything that exists is in some sense mental, has only served to 
obscure his double sense of the terms Entfremdung and Entäußerung. "' 
Entfremdung, according to Hegel, refers to a sense of estrangement that may 
obtain within the person or between people and their culture (Bildung), and 
Entäußerung means self-objectification or externalisation. "6 In Hegel's thought 
these two terms are handled in a subtly discrete manner. According to Hegel's 
usage, the term self-estrangement is largely a negative phenomena although 
sometimes a necessary one, while self-objectification is a positive manifestation of 
one's concrete personality. 
However, Hegel's critics have long since held, and Marx above all, that 
Hegel indulges in a German passion for transcendent metaphysics and that he 
1 13 Hegel, 1988, p484. 
"'Of course, Hegel was an idealist in so far as that in common with all idealist doctrine, he held that 
there is no access to reality apart from that which the mind provides. However, unlike Berkeley, he did 
not hold that all reality was therefore confined to the mind. See Hegel's critique of Schelling's absolute 
idealism, Oxford, 1977, paragraphs 15,16, and in a different context but equally important, 489-491. 
Hegel described his position as one of "Absolute Idealism", he said, "For the true statement of the case is 
rather as follows. The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena. not for us only, 
but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have their 
existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine idea". And says Hegel, unlike Kant's 
"subjective idealism" this should be termed "absolute idealism", The Logic, 1975, p73" 
.s This notion of Hegel the idealist metaphysician is also adopted by Micheal Inwood, 1983, p l. 
"'Another classic example of this confusion can be found in Darby, 1990, p7 5. 
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attempts to describe obscure metaphysical entities not encountered in any possible 
realm of experience. "' For example, in his introduction to the early Hegelian 
writings on alienation by the young Karl Marx, Lucio Coletti celebrates the fact 
that Marx was able to give concrete substance to Hegel's ... "purely abstract" 
treatment of the same concept. "' However, as Warminski19 argues, this account of 
Hegel the 'subjective idealist' is clearly rejected in the dialectic of desire (The 
Truth of Self-Certainty13D) which requires a sensuous and perceived world, we shall 
certainly see that this is the case in what follows. 
According to Hegel, "Absolute Knowing" is the properly philosophical 
point of view and as such is coeval with "Absolute Freedom" of mind, thus he 
considered that the relationship of philosophy to its own thought products as 
fundamental to his whole account. In other words, in some sense the Hegelian 
'absolute' has claims to being the proper method for establishing the truth, as well 
as the system of truth and certainly in a manner which precludes any ontological 
and epistemological lacunae of the kind which are suggested in the concept of 
Entfremdung. Thus he was to say in the Encyclopaedia Logic, 
... philosophical 
knowledge is the richest in material and 
organisation, and therefore, as it came before us in the shape of the 
result, it presupposed the existence of the concrete formations of 
"'Paraphrasing F. C Beiser, see his effective defence of Hegel's conception of the unity of the "Absolute" 
and historicism, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, p288. 
118 See the Early Writings, Penguin 1975, p279. That the Phenomenology is concerned with alienation is 
seldom doubted within current scholarship. One of the most recent and important Hegel commentators 
considers that the Phenomenology is actually a work of existentialism and as such it is not a work of 
philosophy at all, i. e. not epistemological, (Harris, pxxxi). Harris contends that the Phenomenology breaks 
with the Enlightenment tradition altogether and is actually a restatement of the Romantic position 
(pxviiij, rather, it is a political and ethical text. However, this idea of Hegel the Romantic thinker serves 
to deliver an ephemeral quality to his thought which underestimates the distance he himself sought to 
put between his own thought and that of the Romantics. For example, in the Preface of the Phenomenology 
Hegel railed against the concept of creative Genius. The idea of Genius was symptomatic of that 
movement, where dark volcanic passions and bright ideas (Preface, paras 68 & 69) constituted an 
eternally crooked and flawed species for whom progress could never be expected to yield lasting 
improvements either with regard to their material or spiritual condition. Nothing was to be gained, 
Hegel explained, from the ". conceit of Genius" with its. "profound original ideas" and .. "sky-rockets of 
inspiration", but rather in the .. 
"truth ripened to its properly matured form" so as to be capable of being 
the property of all self-conscious Reason. Of course, in the Phenomenology Hegel does hope to restore man 
to the centre of things and is ultimately concerned with spirituality but in so broad a manner and his 
method of doing this is so untypical of the Romantic movement that the meaning of that movement 
would be severely compromised if Hegel's work were to be included in that cannon. Again, see 
Solomon, px&p5 for a rejection of Hegel as part of the Romantic movement, also pp. 575&638. Also 
Darby, 1990, p74. 
19 Warminski, in Barnett, 1998, p 179. 
12" Hegel, 1977, para 167. 
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consciousness, such as individual and social morality, art and religion, Lt 
[my emphasis). 
In other words, "the concrete formations of consciousness", i. e. objects in 
the world, are not mere epiphenomena of human "life" but the "self-actualised" 
material which prove the veracity of the Absolute in the first place. This is Hegel's 
conception of the Phenomenology and the Logic as the "circle of circles") If one 
wants to get at the truth of what one is, according to Hegel, then one must fully 
understand these "actualised" products, such as art and religion, which are 
uniquely ours. Thus "self-alienation's" are the most basic concepts of the whole 
system, they are, in a sense, the building blocks of the system in "becoming". 
Marx's characterisation of Hegel's concept of alienation has suggested that 
Hegel only deals with subjectivity as but a form of philosophical contemplation. 
Thus Marx alleges, as did all the Young Hegelians, that Hegel could only ever 
achieve reconciliation and harmony within the mystical world of spirit or Geist and 
not within actual society. Yet much of Hegel's discourse on alienation takes as its 
material that which he described as the realm of "actuality" (Wirklichkeit). While 
this need not imply'matter' in the modern materialist sense in which this word is 
often used, it need not exclude such an idea either. 
In what follows I will hold to a conventional reading of Hegel's project as 
reconciliatory, thus it should become apparent that Hegel's purpose during 
discussions on ways of thinking which were typified in the examples of the 
"struggle of thought against itself', or during the "ethical life" of classical Greece, 
to name but two, shall demonstrate that Hegel did indeed take the 'real' world 
seriously. Thus the closure of alienation did not just involve a contemplative notion 
of reconciliation but a reconciliation of subjective and objective worlds. One, to be 
sure, that he equated with the sacrifice of Jesus in his religious thought and thus 
already long established, but he sought a way of looking at this reconciliation that 
13 was not out of step with the realities of modernity and its disenchantment's. 
11' Hegel, The Logic, 1975, p46. 
122 There is a schematic diagram of what the "circle of circles" might look like in Sarlcmijn, 1975, p7. 
This was apparently drawn by the "Old Hegelian", Hating but was rejected by Michelet's Hegel Prize 
committee of the Berlin Philosophical Society. Probably because the boundaries between certain aspects 
of Hegel's philosophy were deemed inappropriate. 
'23 See Hegel, in Bubner, 1997, p338, "It [human cognition) should enable us to comprehend all the ills 
of the world, including the existence of evil, so that the thinking spirit may he reconciled with the 
negative aspects of existence; and it is in world history that we encounter the sum total of concrete evil. 
(Indeed, there is no department of knowledge in which such a reconciliation is more urgently required 
than in world history".... ). However, I am also aware that this reconciliation between man and his 
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Hegel's sense of closure in "Absolute Knowing" posits not only the end of 
alienation but that he also marked the turning point towards the problem of 
nihilism. The second chapter, therefore, will take nihilism as the point of 
departure, whereas this chapter is based upon the triadic structure of Hegel's 
conception of the Holy Trinity which is the religious representation of the 
"Absolute Idea" in his system. I will argue that it logically follows that states of 
non-alienation are based upon conceptual naivetes, as opposed to the conception of 
the "self-thinking idea" of the Philosophy of Mind, or similarly, of the "Absolute 
Idea" of the Logic. ' Thus I will argue for a recapitualisation of Hegel's religious 
thought in his philosophical thought, a conception which holds that God is the 
Father in-andfor-himself, that the dialectic, the struggle between appearance and 
reality is the Son understood as the creation, the fall and the final reconciliation in 
the life of Jesus. Finally, there is the Holy Spirit of the community, its alienation 
and worldly realisation as spirit. 'L' 
This chapter is sub-divided into three sections which follow this religious 
understanding: in the first section I will attempt to demonstrate that some kind of 
closure to alienation logically flows from Hegel's notion of the "Son", ' in other 
words, his reading of the significance of Christ is in keeping with his dialectical 
method. In section two we will move on to consider, contrary to Marx's accusation 
that Hegel was a kind of mystic, Hegel's deep interest in "actuality". An actuality 
which is central to his account of alienation and its transcendence which is the 
journey of the community, the "Holy Ghost". Finally, in section three we will 
modernity is precisely what is taken to be conservative by left Hegelians, since modernity itself is taken an 
be alienating in practice, according to their account, SeeJ. M. Bernstein in Pelczynski, 1984, p14. 
`4 See Hegel, 1990, pps. 312-14, Hegel remarks that in opposition to "shallow pantheism", his 
conception of the "esoteric study of God and identity, as of cognition's, and notions, is philosophy itself". It 
is the "truth aware of itself, the logical system" as a "spiritual principle", it is the "self-thinking idea". 
The "Absolute Idea" says Hegel, is the "sole subject matter and content of philosophy", in other words, 
and again paraphrasing Hegel, the highest mode of philosophy is also the highest mode of the absolute 
idea so the former is best placed to comprehend the latter, The Logic, 1996, p824. 
125 This outline of the triadic structure of Christianity is a constant in Hegel's thought, from the period of 
the early theological writings to the mature and more detailed lectures on religion of 1827. In the latter 
this structure is described under the heading, "The Consummate Religion", Hegel, 1988, p389. 
12'Hegel's dialectic has arguably been the subject of more obscurantist secondary literature than any 
other concept in the history of Western philosophy. A classic example is a number of confusing 
interpretations concerning the so-called master-slave relation, see Solomon, 1985. According to Solomon 
the dialectic is not social but pre-social, p427. While in the example of Lordship and Bondage there is 
certainly an attempt to explain the pre-historical birth of consciousness, no where does Hegel rule out 
the idea that this is also social. Solomon confuses the origin of the social with the notion of history. In any 
case, all one can do in a work such as this is to state clearly the favoured reading employed, the approach 
of the present author is summed up in this passage, again by Beiser, "The dialectic consists in the conflict 
between the end of man and his actual political condition, and the attempt by man to change these 
conditions so that they are more in accord with his nature. Since man is not from the beginning fully or 
clearly aware of his goal, and since he does not know the necessary conditions to realise it, the process of 
achieving his end will be a journey of self-discovery", p290. 
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consider another reason to believe that it was Hegel's intention to find closure, in 
his account of the 'privileged standpoint', there is contained a self-knowing Being 
which is represented in religious thought by God the "Father". While I 
acknowledge that Hegel's religious thought is often regarded lightly by scholars, 
especially of the analytic variety, who seek to locate " Hegel firmly within the 
mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition, it is not my intention to defend 
the notion of a 'theological' Hegel. Rather, I will only cover this ground in-so-far as 
it enables me to focus on the centrality of alienation in Hegel's religious and 
philosophical thought. 
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This is its (Philosophy) unique purpose, deed and goal: to arrive at 
the Concept of the concept and so to arrive at its return (into itself) 
and contentment. '`' 
... the standpoint of separation, which 
belongs to the concept of 
spirit, is not one that man should remain at either... L" 
Hegel, The Logic 
I 
Alienation and Reconciliation 
Hegel tells us in the Phenomenology that .. "absolute freedom" is a concept 
which transforms both the inner world of consciousness and the real world, ''' but 
what is the meaning of freedom here? On the one hand, there seems to be little 
doubt among most Hegel scholars that Hegel favoured some form of positive 
liberty. '30 In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Right for example, Allen Wood 
maintains that freedom is the .. "human good {which) is identified with the self- 
actualisation of the human spirit-, 13' Also, it is clear in the later Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History that this self-actualisation is clearly identified with the 
modern 132 
In the Philosophy of Right it appears that Hegel rejects the common sense 
notion of freedom as the ... "possibilities of action" which one might enjoy. Rather, 
freedom itself in his view was a particular firm of action and rather than a 
... "venting of ones particularity and .. 
idiosyncrasy", it was some act felt by rational 
Beings where these same choices realised were self-identifiable with particular 
social institutions. "' While the same theme is present in the earlier Phenomenology, 
where it is also clear that particularity for example, as in the case of the mode of 
thinking he calls "Utility", is identified with the .. "universal work" of the entire 
12' Hegel, The Encylopaedia Logic, 1991, p41. 
'Z" 1bid, 1991, p63. 
'29Hegel, 1977, para 582. Reclam, p 413. PhG. 
"'See Berlin's, Four Essayson Liberty, for a classic restatement of positive liberty. 
. we Wood, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
CUP, 1991, pxi. `C 
02 Ibid, pp. 149& 290-1. Introduction, "Freedom is nothing more than a knowledge and affirmation of 
such universal and substantial objects as law and justice, and the production of a reality which 
corresponds to them-i. e. the state. "p 134. Felix Meiner. Hamburg, 1955, pp. 145& 220. This support of 
the state should not, of course, be considered an exonerationof totalitarianism, see Avineri, 1972, pp. 176- 
93 
'"Ibid, 1991, p20, here I have in mind Hegel's famous phrase where he says that the "rational is the 
actual and the actual is the rational". 
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community: in the Phenomenology it is even more self-evident that these social 
institutions are as potentially elastic and self-regulatory as the lives of particular 
individuals. 
Unlike the Philosophy of Right, in the Phenomenology "Absolute Freedom" is 
first revealed during the revolt on the streets of Paris. During that revolt each 
individual actually transcended the social and technical division of labour in society 
and every individual knew that every other individual, in their turn, also knew this 
to be both a possibility and an actuality. In other words, "according to Hegel, it 
became an actual reality of life. " Unlike in the participatory, institutional and 
democratic Rousseauesque schema, sovereignty really did shift from the King to 
the people. "' Hegel identified the rioting and mass social unrest as a process in 
which people ate, slept, produced food, weapons and pamphlets, in short, as a form 
of life in which human proclivities and idiosyncrasies were in harmony with the 
Self-Consciousness which produced them, this is the Self-Consciousness of complete 
freedom as social fluidity. ' This conception of sovereignty contained the possibility 
of a new and radical conception of personal autonomy, and therefore, would require 
new kinds of institutions which would correspond to the depth of this new 
subjectivity, not only in civil society but in public life as well. In short, it suggested 
a new "configuration" or arrangement of history and time. "' 
Remaining with Hegel's reflections on the French Revolution for a moment, 
as I have already indicated, there we see challenged the idea that institutions, by 
definition, must embody both a technical and a social division of labour. Before the 
Revolution people living with such institutions would therefore depend for their 
subsistence upon some particular technical and social role. An individual cobbler 
would be unlikely to actualise some other existence if dependent upon the 
technical category of shoe mender for a living. However, the social fluidity of the 
' Hegel, 1977, para 584-5, Reclam Edition, pp. 14-15. In what follows I will use the term mutual- 
recognition interchangeably with that of social -recognition. Mutu al-recognition is the acknowledgement 
by each of the rights of each to be completely autonomous in all matters. In other words, there are no 
objective moral limits beyond which a person might not go. While the community as a whole might 
appear to be the only barrier to this form of positive liberty it is not. What may be true for the rights and 
the autonomy of the individual is also true for the community as a whole so effectively, this is no barrier at 
all. In short, any action is justifiable in and by such a community as community, see Gunn, 1987. Also 
Beiser, pp. 292-3. The repercussions of this are quite different from that of Kants notion of adult 
autonomy as but a form of rational self-government. 
"'Hegel, 1977, para 584-5, where he says, "The undivided substance of absolute freedom ascends the 
throne of the world without any power being able to resist it". 
"Ibid, 1977, para 594. Reclam. p42 1, the fear of social and political anarchy animates much of this 
discussion. 
" Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, 1991, pps. 352 and 376. 
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Revolution demonstrated the realisable and arbitrary ability of individuals to lift 
themselves from any given task, position or social status and relocate themselves 
elsewhere. On the other hand, this conception of 
freedom as arbitrariness does not 
sit comfortably with the realisation of freedom in the self-identity of the individual 
with the ethical state which is the dominant theme of the 
later Philosophy of Right. 
It is clear, rather, that in the Phenomenology "Absolute Freedom" 
does not coincide 
with the identification by individuals with any institution, such as those of shoe 
mender, but with the total destruction of those same institutions. 
'3' In short, 
"Absolute Freedom" can only produce an anarchy in which the community is 
unmediated by any institutions but which is, never-the-less, able to re-produce 
itself. " In Hegel's political philosophy such freedoms are abstract and immature by 
definition. 
We also find in the immediate post-revolutionary phase, that the re- 
imposition of institutional structures brings a new period of self-slavery. In the ebb 
tide of the revolution political "factions" are able to resume power and the 
... 
"legislative, judicial and executive powers" begin to re-assert themselves, but 
not as actualised universals since "factions" always remain particular by definition. 
This is the developing account of abstract freedom given by Hegel during his 
section on the revolutionary "Terror", he makes it quite clear that with the re- 
composition of these powers real freedom once again becomes a casualty because 
... 
"representation" is not ... "actual", a 
freedom 
... "by proxy", says Hegel, is no 
freedom at all. The Revolution was a cataclysmic spiritual advance, according to 
Hegel, so we find that in his critique of the terror, Hegel subscribes to the view 
that ... "Absolute 
Freedom" amounts to nothing less than the self-awareness by all 
of the possibilities of action by all. "0 However, as we have seen, this is an 
understanding of freedom Hegel also considered to be quite immature. "Absolute 
Freedom" then, is whole and true, but the kernel of truth it contained must 
mature, as it does in the later sections of the Phenomenology and in the Philosophy of 
Right. 
'31Ibid, 1977, pars 589, Reclam, p417. It is also worth noting that it was certainly this aspect of Hegel's 
thought which appealed to many of the most famous anarchists of the nineteenth century, for example: 
Stirnerand I3akunin were both deeply influenced by the Phenonrnology. See Solomon, 1985, pp. 582-4. 
139 In reality probably quite badly, goodness knows what kind of bread the cobbler might produce while 
exercising his absolute freedom to be the baker? 
'40This notion of a decisive break in Hegel's thought after the Phenomenology is not new, see Solomon. 
1985, p4&14. 
58 
For Hegel, human beings are completely self-determining by definition, 
this is their true nature. '4' Hegel takes the view that in the beginning all beings 
are ... 
"being-for-self or pure negativity". He says, 
The result is the same as the beginning, only because the 
beginning is the purpose.... and that the .. realised purpose, or the 
existent actuality, is movement and unfolded becoming,... unrest 
that is the self.... 
Later in the Phenomenology he describes the modus operandi of human 
consciousness as the ... 
"absolute unrest of pure self-movement",.. or... "the absolute 
negativity of everything determinate". "' In Hegel's account this account of 
consciousness is the fundamental basis of what constitutes being human in the first 
instance, it is the journey of the ... "way of the soul" out of the ... 
"natural 
consciousness". 14' The "natural attitude", the complete antithesis of "Absolute 
Knowing", represents the complete immersion of man in natural life. According to 
Hegel, man submerged in nature is pre-alienated man, thus pre-philosophical man, 
but he is still man and not animal. 
In the Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel demonstrates this understanding very 
clearly in his discussion of the Mosaic legend of the "fall". " To be a "natural" 
being is to "wear the garb of innocence" says Hegel and as such one is merely 
animal in-so-far as one is incapable of doing evil, for "there is no evil in nature". 
However, to be human means to be evil i. e. to be capable of subjectivity. This 
Hegel calls "severed life", that is, it is an alienation. The purpose of thought is to 
work through this alienation and return to a higher form of "concord", one must he 
capable of reaching the universal and the objective. 
Hegel continues, Adam is forbidden to eat of the "tree of knowledge", (of 
the tree of life nothing more is said for the time being) but the "serpent, the 
likeness of God in the knowledge of good and evil" tempts Adam to do just that. 
Adam's first sense of shame in his own nakedness once he eats of the fruit 
represents the birth of human consciousness. Hegel goes on to say that for his 
"'In the third volume of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences [EGI, he said, "For this reason 
the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind isLiberry: i. e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or 
self-identity", pars 382. And from the student notes or Zusätze we learn, "The substance of the mind is 
freedom, i. e. the absence of dependence on an other", Oxford, 1990, p15. 
'42Hegel, 1977, pars 163, Reclam, p 129, also para 588. Reclam, pp. 416-7 & para 22, Reclam, p2 3. 
143Ibid, 1977, para78,163,646 & 659, Reclam, p414-15. 
''" Hegel. The Logic, 1975, p42. 
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transgression man must work in the sweat of his 
brow, this curse, far from being an 
eternal damnation, is viewed by Hegel as something positive, 
for, 
.... if it [work) 
is the result of the disunion, it is also the victory over 
it. 
One should not read this too literally, "work", in this case refers to all such 
products of specifically "human" activity, as he said, it is "individual and social 
morality, art and religion", not as in the case of Marxian alienation, only the 
modern labour process. According to Hegel then, if the tree of life represents the 
finitude of the body then the tree of knowledge represents the infinitude of Geie, 
that which is necessary and eternal, the journey of thought and the infinitude of 
philosophy itself. "Work" is the means of transcendence for, 
.... in these outside things man 
is dealing with himself. 
Thus, philosophy is not something which is ultimately forbidden, the tree of 
knowledge is a gift of God whereas the tree of life is denied man in the expulsion 
from Eden. As Hegel says, 
The hand that inflicts the wound is the hand that heals it. 
and finally the lesson here, according to Hegel, is that, 
Philosophy is knowledge, and it is through knowledge that man 
first realises his original vocation, to be the image of God. 
In other words, the reconciliation of alienation is symbolically represented 
in the life of Christ, the Son of God and symbolic image of the Father. Freedom 
means that humanity has a choice, either to find, build and identify with those 
aspects of life which are in harmony with freedom itself or to remain alienated and 
spiritually dysfunctional. 
Returning for a moment to the theme of religious representation, it would 
hardly make sense to say that God is himself alienated. The unity of man and God 
we must surely suppose, is both a choice and the end of alienation which is implied 
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in the act of choosing per 2.1'5 In any case, the more important point is that in the 
pre-philosophical 'natural attitude''' man is immersed in nature and not disposed 
to know alienation, but in the shame of his nakedness he becomes aware of `others' 
and his separation from them. In short, he becomes alienated, and alienation 
amounts to nothing less than the gift of philosophy itself which must eventually 
find resolution. 
In Hegel's account the distinction between man and animal is interesting. 
Animals just are what they are, they have a strictly limited programmatic set of 
behaviours, while human beings are what they are not, our behavioural repertoire 
and the myriad ... "impulses and inclinations", which 
drive such a repertoire are 
finite, while the "Absolute Idea" is infinite and eternal. In his "Introduction" to the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History he said, 
It is customary to present history as beginning with a state of 
nature or state of innocence. But according to our present 
conception of the spirit, its initial condition is not a state of freedom 
at all but a state in which the spirit as such has no reality. "" 
In other words, according to Hegel, nature is contingent but Geist is a 
necessary movement. This idea also provides the basis of Hegel's dilemma 
concerning beginnings. The problem of the "natural consciousness" is this; how is 
philosophy possible given the beginning of man and the natural consciousness? Or 
to put the problem in more philosophical terms, how can something eternal emerge 
from something contingent? However, Hegel did not consider that man was once a 
natural being existing in a state of nature in the first instance, again returning to 
The Lecturer on the Philosophy of World History, he said, 
This notion of a perfect primeval condition does, however, contain a 
philosophical element- namely the realisation that man cannot have 
originally existed in a state of animal insensibility. This is perfectly 
correct; man cannot have developed from a state of animal 
insensibility, although he may have from a state of human 
insensibility. 
14S See the New Testament, Matthew, 26: 36. The story of the events at Gethsemane suggest that Jesus 
chose his calling. 
'a° See Hegel, the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol III, pp. 369-79, University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995 {VGPI. See Solomon, 1985, pp. 3O2-3. 
Hegel, 1987, p98. 
'ý" Hegel, 1987, p133. 
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In short, the 'natural attitude' is not a natural state in the animal sense at 
all. This further enriches our grasp of the Genesis account of beginnings which we 
saw earlier. " The movement from "immediate state" to the spiritual life is one of 
Aufheben. " The 'natural' animal element of man is preserved as organism, to be 
sure, but in the movement of thinking per . re, which 
is man's essence, he becomes 
sensible man, something qualitatively different from animal. Thus man is both man 
and animal but he is also neither, he is "Man" in Hegel's special spiritual sense of 
the "self-thinking idea". Where philosophy strives to fill in the gaps here, religion 
succeeds in its allegorical account, which is why Hegel said that religion can exist 
without philosophy but philosophy cannot exist without religion. "' The ultimate 
solution to this problem of beginnings in Hegel is beyond the scope of the present 
thesis's' and is certainly not crucial to the main thrust of my argument but Robert 
Pippin has supplied a much condensed version of what such beginnings might look 
like in logical terms. 
Hegel calls the process which leads from the standpoint of the "natural 
consciousness" to comprehensive "Absolute Knowing", "determinate negation". 13 
""See Darby, 1990, chapter one, this problem was probably prompted by Rousseau, who was all the 
rage in Hegel's youth. Also, while Flay, 1984, is correct to insist that the Phenomenology is essentially a 
philosophical work, in so far as Hegel engages with many of the epistemological concerns of other 
Western philosophers: Hegel certainly seeks grounds for warranted access to truth claims and hopes m 
acquire knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. However, Flay goes too far when he insists that such 
a reading automatically invalidates readings of the Kojcvean stamp, see Flay, pp. 53-4 also p3 and the 
notes on pp. 270-71, [again see Beiser, 19931. Flay misses the larger point in his analysis: that the pre- 
phenomenological obfuscation of knowledge, i. e. before "Absolute knowing" is, according to the Marx- 
Kojeve account is the clearest example of alienation itself. This point is even implicitly admitted by Flay 
where he uses the term "tension" when discussing the dialectic. He says, "What was introduced as a 
result of the first complete dialectical movement was a tension between experience as given in the 
natural attitude and the imputed warranty for that experience which was to lie in the pre-suppositions 
elicited from the natural attitude", p41. Even clearer, ... 
"from the perspective of the philosophical quest 
for certainty in an absolute standpoint, these worlds [of knowledge) are worlds in which we arc unfree, 
caught up in the bondage of an interest structure which we do not comprehend in itself", p53. 
Aso Hegel, The Logic, 1991, p 61. 
'S' Ibid, 199 1, p 12. 
"- See Flay, 1984, for a comprehensive discussion of this problem. 
153Hegel, 1977, paras 79,80,81,87,89. Determinate negation [Reclam, pp. 70-3 .. 
bestimmte 
Negation}, ... 
"as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby arisen, and in the negation the 
transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of 
itself". In other words, the determined thrust of Being to reach the truth of itself and the world is in itself 
the truth which comes as a revelation given by Hegel, see also Para 670-1, where the ... reciprocal 
recognition which is absolute Spirit"... is also the basis for ... "the assurance of 
Spirit's immanent self. 
certainty"..,.. "it is the God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure 
knowledge". Finally, Para 808, where he says of the World Spirit. .. "[its] goal is the revelation of the 
depth of Spirit, and this is the absolute notion". Hegel's notion of determinate negation is one of the most 
fundamental components of his philosophy and one of the most heavily criticised. For a defence of 
Hegel's doctrine of 'essence' from the charge that he denied the law of contradiction see Hegel's 
Metaphysics and the Problem of Contradiction by Robert Pippin, in Stewart. 1996. See Para 80 where he 
says.. "Hence the progress towards this goal is unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to be found on 
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In Hegelian terminology determinate negation is a term which is synonymous with 
the practical reflexivity of phenomenology per . e, that 
is, with the process of thought 
categories examining themselves. The issue here is the explanation for change 
which lies at the heart of Hegelianism, why should something which is self- 
identical change and can an essence both be and not be? As Robert Pippin has 
noted, this problem is so complex that it would undoubtedly require a volume of 
interpretation four hundred pages or more in length which would, in turn, simply 
duplicate the size and scale of the Logic. "' The best that can be achieved here is to 
briefly summarise Pippin's commentary'on the Logic. 
Hegel's understanding of contradiction is not, as Russell has charged, just 
to assert that Hegel confused the "is of predication" with the "is of identity", in 
other words, that something can be both P and not P, a conception that is a 
... "trivial and stupid confusion", claimed Russell. However, Hegel does hold that 
there is a difference between essence and appearance, and that there is also an 
identity between these, but as Pippin suggests, Hegel 
... argues that the "essence" of illusory being is, properly 
understood, the moments of Schein [appearance) itself, that there is 
no essence behind the phenomena, but that essence itself is the 
"recollection" (Erinnerung) of the process of phenomenal change 
itself (when phenomenal is meant in its Kantian sense, or as 
subjectively conditioned appearances). 155 
Hegel's point in this procedure, according to Pippin is to, 
... insist that we can never be satisfied with simply predicating a 
universal of some particular (or of another universal for that matter, 
as in generic essences). 156 
Determinate negation then, concludes with "Absolute Knowing" as the 
revelation of the role of a recollective process"' where, 
any of the stations on the way". On the 'completion' see "Absolute Knowing" and retrospective 
knowledge of change see paras 394,437,900 & 803. 
""See Pippin, p240. in Stewart 1996. 
1S5Ibid, 1996, p246. 
'5'Ibid, 1996. p250. 
's'Ibid, 1996, parago. 
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.. 
knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge 
[does find] itself, where notion corresponds to object and object to 
notion. ' 
Or again, as he said in the Preface to the Phenomenology, 
... it it what the thing 
is not. 159 
The "natural consciousness", for its part, is able therefore, to be both self- 
identical and [potentially) different. One analogy, again taken' from Pippin, might 
be to compare the disruption within the "natural consciousness" with that of the 
seed of a plant. "A plant "is not" its seed or blossom or fruit, but neither is it 
something "other" than the becoming of these moments". 
" Thus the properly 
spiritual and philosophical point of view pre-supposes the end of alienation 
(Entfremdung), understood as man's estrangement from his own self-knowledge. 
"Absolute Knowing", which is an absolute after all, is Hegel's term for this self- 
knowledge. The end of alienation is, therefore, logically consistent with the Holy 
Trinity invoked by Hegel's religious system. This is because only with the 
completion of the growth in the plant are we in a position to see becoming in itself. 
Thus it logically follows that one can only see the recollective understanding as 
alienation ends with its own self-completion. The "natural consciousness" 
according to this logical account is both animal and man, both organic and 
spiritual but it is also neither, it is becoming itself as a kind of closure. 
I would now like to turn to another set of arguments for believing that 
Hegel sought closure and reconciliation in his system, to Hegel's account of Death, 
to his historical account of 'reality', then in section II to a quite different kind of 
evidence, to the notion of Geist and the community which Hegel held to be the 
Holy Ghost and finally in section III, to the concept of the 'privileged standpoint' 
of the "self-thinking idea", or God the Father. 
1S8Hegel, 1977, para 80, Reclam, p71, Solomon, 1985, p15, while Solomon, with some justification, 
might assert that the very nature of the phenomenological project might exclude the possibility of a 
single and eternal view of the cosmos he does not seem to take on board the notion that this fact in itself 
might well be the absolute. 
'"Hegel, 1977, para 3. 
"This same point is made by Hegel in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, he says "-. just 
as the seed bears within it the whole nature of the tree and the taste and form of its fruits, so also do the 
first glimmerings of spiritcontain the whole of history", 1987, p83. 
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The Son continued, the death and resurrection ofJesus, 16' 
The idea of death in Hegel's religious thought, and by implication, that of 
resurrection, is central to Hegel's ontology as a whole. Death makes its appearance 
in a number of important places during the course of the Phenomenology. Death is 
fundamentally important in the dialectic of Master and Slave, " in the dilemma of 
Antigone and during the terror of the French Revolution. There are also a number 
of significant passing references to death, such as the one included in the Preface 
where he says, 
... the life of spirit is not the 
life that shrinks from death and keeps 
itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it 
and maintains itself in it. 
Much later in the text he tells us, "It [Spirit) wins its truth only when, in 
utter dismemberment, it finds itself'.. 163: a turn of phrase which recalls some of the 
nihilistic literature of the post-revolutionary period that I mentioned in the 
Introduction. Such imagery prepares us for some of Hegel's most disturbing 
passages in which he describes the Thermidor as a nightmare of nihilism, a world 
16' In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827,1988, Hegel says, "God has died, God is dead- 
this is the most frightful of all thoughts that everything eternal and true is not, that negation itself is 
found in God", p405. And further on he says, "God, that is to say, maintains himself in this process [of 
resurrection] and the latter [the death of God) is only the death of death", p465. And of the resurrection 
he concludes, "This is the presentation of the second (element of) the idea, the idea in appearance, the 
eternal idea as it has become [present) for the immediate certainty of humanity, i. e. as it has appeared. In 
order that it should become a certainty for humanity, it had to be a sensible certainty, which, however, at 
the same time passes over into spiritual consciousness, and likewise is connected into the. immediately 
sensible- in such a way that the history of God is seen in it, the life that God himself is", p470. 
'62Hegel, 1977, paras 178-96. Reclam pp. 140-49. Again the master-slave relation is also one of the 
most controversial and contested of Hegel's concepts. Again in the "philosophical" reading of Flay, 
1984, pp. 17-28, he takes the view that Hegel's use of the term is neither the critical Socratic questioning 
of the subject-matter nor the .. 
-way of the subject-matter itself.. but is representative of the myriad 
presuppositions which are implicit within all thought forms in relation to any individuals activities". Flay 
calls these .. 
"praxical presuppositions", p2. Such a reading might well be absorbed within the so-called 
materialist accounts of the master-slave section. The class struggles of the feudal order which Hegel's 
medieval terminology evokes might well be thought to be based on the operation of such praxical 
presuppositions: such as, why do we worship the Lord? Why am I tied to this land? Or even, why do I 
have to yield to the expropriation of my produce? If this sounds a rather literal interpretation then 
consider Flay's own examples of praxical pre-suppositions on p20. It has now become something of a 
commonplace to regard Marx's description of political and social struggle in Capital between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat as a materialist re-working of the master-slave relation, this latter view 
was certainly adopted by Alexandre Kojeve, 1989.1970-3. There is some evidence from the text to 
suggest that Hegel himself may have had any, or all of these meanings in mind. In the opening 
paragraph of the section he said, The notion of its unity {Self-Consciousness) in its duplication [i. e. facing 
another Self-Consciousness) embraces many and varied meanings, para 178. In short, Flay's 
understanding of the "dialectic", when looked upon in this light, is increasingly similar to the notion of 
the unity of theory and practice of Marxist theory which he claims to reject. 
"3Hegel, 1977, Preface, para 32, Reclam, pp. 32-3, and para 590, Reclam, pp. 417-8, also see Gunn, 
1987. 
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in which spiritually crumpled revolutionaries step 
forth upon the guillotine to meet 
their death with arms aloft and heads held high. Both the leaders of the Revolution 
and innocent bystanders alike meet their end in what amounts to an ecstasy of 
slaughter, self-destruction and meaningless carnage. Yet, 
freedom, as we have 
already seen, finds itself here "in utter dismemberment", at the very moment of 
death the truth of freedom as entirely negative is both the "refreshing bath", in 
that from that point on all past structures of self-understanding are stripped away, 
but also we see that freedom is also full of dread because in the immediate 
aftermath there is nothing to fill the form of freedom with any content since all such 
content belongs to the past. Death presents consciousness with the horrifying 
prospect of nothingness, " it is the opposite of all life or the ... "negative", the 
termination of everything which is sought after and enjoyed through life. The 
... "coldest meanest thought of all", said 
Hegel, is the ... "death that is without any 
significance". 
Furthermore, the driving ontological impulse provided by the fear of death 
is not something which is negated with the end of estrangement in Hegel's 
thought. Rather, one seeks immortality in 'earthly' deeds, in other words, in the 
second sense of alienation as that of externalisation. Just as Jesus died on the cross 
only to rise again and unite with the totality of the Absolute, the Self-consciousness 
which deliberately teeters on the edge of death before death itself is realised, will 
rise to the level of world historical significance once such self-sacrifice is recognised. 
This is often the role which is fulfilled by Hegel's "world-historical individuals". 
The maiutic impulse which is born from the resolution of the master-slave struggle 
and which gave rise to philosophy in the first instance is also the result of this same 
fear. Thus significantly, only with the wilful risking of life and only during the 
course of actions which typically entail a violent disregard for this life, only through 
some form of conscientious transgression, are existential and philosophical barriers 
overcome in Hegel's account. 
Encounters with death are never rejected in Hegel's thought as something 
too foolish or morbid for serious philosophical contemplation or lacking in 
existential significance, rather human beings are constantly reminded ... "by 
looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it".., and in the political and 
social processes of 'life', that death is the final word on all matters. Funerals and 
honouring the life of the dead, as in the case of Antigone, life or death struggles for 
prestige, as in the case of the Master-Slave relations, the intellectual battles of 
"See Camus, 197l, pp-103-16. 
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Reason over abstract principles in the service of truth which were customary during 
the Enlightenment, and the struggle by peer groups and the final self-sacrifice of 
one's life and the acceptance of death during the Revolution were, according to 
Hegel, the means through which a particular life finds true meaning, fills the form 
of freedom with content. True meaning here is the preservation and transcendence 
{Aufheben} of Geist over death. 
Certainly, "Self-Consciousness" knows that eventually it must cease to exist, 
but the idea of death is the... "hard saying" and the necessary reminder of the need 
to actualise in the world. For Hegel, this process is the ... "the magical power that 
converts it [consciousness} into being", as such this final move towards a subjective 
understanding of one's self-potential, towards the "good infinity" and 
metamorphoses, all of this is religiously represented in the final sacrifice and 
reconciliation of Jesus, the "Son" of God. 
One of Hegel's most trenchant criticisms of Christian thought is also to be 
found here for he held that such failures of self-understanding are the very stuff of 
difference between alienated and non-alienated existence. The Unhappy 
Consciousness of the Phenomenology, for example, seeks what amounts to a living 
death in this world and then transcendence in the next world, a ... "God 
knows 
where? " says Hegel. 'bs Thus alienation continued throughout the period of spirits 
unfolding until the revelation of knowledge and self-autonomy which is in 
harmony with its content. 1 
The entire process which has been outlined here, the growing self- 
awareness of the inward depths of subjectivity, the expansion of externalised 
autonomy and the eruption of negativity from within the "natural consciousness", 
are all fundamental elements of the dialectic. However, the classical example of the 
dialectic as the "Son" is to be found in the section of the Phenomenology entitled 
"Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" 
and in the sections on "Stoicism", "Scepticism" and the "Unhappy Consciousness". 
"'See The Philosophy of Right, 1991, pp. 14 & 20. 
1°°To elide the German terms Endlichkeit and Entäußerung [infinity and self-objectification) as I do here 
legitimately follows Hegel's use of the terms where bad infinity is in fact a form of alienation as self- 
estrangement and where good infinity is its opposite. While Hegel, long before Marx, held that 
damaging effects to individuality were always the end result of finitude and alienation, this is not always 
immediately apparent from the tone of the Phenomenology. Hegel's closing passage of almost poetic 
serenity in the Phenomenology strikes a very different note, more conciliatory, than that of the struggle 
between the ... "expropriators and expropriated"... which forms the dramatic finale to Marx's 
acknowledged masterwork [Capital). 
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These terms were used by Hegel to describe the dialectical struggles for self- 
mastery which occur both between individuals and within individuals. 
There have always been at least two major streams of interpretation of the 
master-slave dialectic. On the one hand there is the literal reading which has 
always thought that Hegel's analysis is in some sense anthropological or ethical. In 
other words, that he is suggesting a struggle between actual Master types and 
Slave types, Lord over Vassal, Capitalist over Proletariat or Men over Women, or as 
in the ethical interpretation, Good struggles with Evil, or Jesus struggles with sin. 
Such a reading is typified by Marxists such as Kojeve. On the other hand, there is 
also a tradition of Hegel scholarship which locates this Master-Slave struggle 
within the traditional concerns of Western philosophy. Readings of this kind 
suggest that Master and Slave is a phenomenological metaphor for the self-reflexive 
cross-examination of philosophy itself. Allied with this account there is often some 
notion that this rending within, can also be viewed as some kind of psychological 
metaphor. I take both traditions to be perfectly legitimate on account that there is 
some textual evidence to be mobilised in each case and since they are not mutually- 
exclusive in any case. For the purpose of the present work this difference of 
interpretation is irrelevant since I would hold that both readings ultimately 
conclude on the theme of reconciliation, both, in other words, serve my purpose 
equally well. 
In the case of the literal reading of the dialectic of Master and Slave, there 
is a struggle to the death for survival which metamorphoses into the first moment 
of recognition. 167 Ontological progress cannot logically begin with a fight which 
resulted in death in the first instance because there is no recognition submission 
and deference to be gained by the victor from such a fight. A corpse, by definition, 
"'Hegel, 1977, para 178, where he says, "The detailed exposition of the notion of this spiritual unity in 
its duplication will present us with the process of recognition". The interpretation of the Lordship and 
Bondage section of the Phenonenology which is given above owes much to Kojeve of course. It must be 
recognised that recent Hegel scholarship has taken issue with Kojeve s interpretation in the strongest 
possible terms, [See P. T. Grier in Stewart, 1996 for example, where the former said, "Kojcve s end-of- 
history thesis has no real grounding in Hegel's texts, " p 186. Especially, continues Grier, the notionsof the 
... 
"fight for prestige carried out for ... recognition, the notion of ... historyas the historyof the working slave 
and similar ideas concerning ... master-slave ideologies". Leaving aside the obvious 
fact that the 
penultimate chapter of the Phenomenology is entitled "Absolute Knowing", or the notion of determinate 
negation which was outlined above [see the main text), Grier seems to have quite simply overstated his 
assertion that there is a lack of textual evidence for such claims. In one passage Hegel talks of 
... -independent shapes, individuals submerged in the immediacy of 
life" [186] and in the next he says. 
"In so far as it is the action of the other, each seeks the death of the other" (187]. Towards the end of the 
master-slave section Hegel says. "Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he 
truly is. " [ 195]. And the point of the struggle? The concept of... `honour" is mentioned, albeit in a much 
later context [594]. Clearly it is one thing to claim that such remarks are open to a varieryof readings but 
it is quite another to suggest that Kojeve didn't find such concepts in the text. 
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is an entity which is unable to provide such -recognition. This struggle for 
recognition presupposes an actual world, thus the concrete historicity of Hegel's 
medieval metaphor [Lordship and Bondsman), since the fight can only begin when 
subject is confronted by some external object. In the passages entitled "The Truth 
of self-Certainty" Hegel said of the first moment of consciousness that "... the whole 
expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it,.. and that the .. object of 
desire,.. 
upon which recognition depends is ... a 
living thing"... "B 
On the other hand, Hegel's description of the struggle for recognition can 
also be understood as an interrogation of the assumptions of the "natural 
consciousness" by the proper philosophical consciousness. As Joseph Flay has 
suggested, looked at in this way the Master-Slave dialectic becomes a sequence of 
moments in the life of the traditional philosophical inquiry and gives another level 
of meaning to this complex medieval metaphor. In this kind of account 
phenomenology is a kind of monological enterprise in the Cartesian tradition in 
which Hegel examines and re-examines the foundations of knowledge claims in the 
Western canon until eventually arriving at the appropriate juridical system for 
proper philosophical inquiry. 
Never-the-less, as we have seen, whether understood metaphorically or 
literally, closure of a kind and reconciliation remain the end result. Again, leaving 
aside the question as to the ultimate correctness of Hegel's views, closure is 
presupposed in the metaphorical reading in which "Absolute Knowing" in the 
Phenomenology is taken to represent the complete unity of subject and object, in 
other words, when it is viewed as the completion of philosophical dualism, or even 
when taken as a procedural instrument with which to assess competing knowledge 
claims, since an incomplete procedural instrument is not one at all. This is self- 
evident in the very possibility of the expose of the "natural consciousness". I would 
also hold that closure is presupposed in the literal reading in which death 
continually meets its other in the resurrection of recognition, whether the literalism 
is slave, proletariat or women matters little, the existential reality that is "life" is 
only complete when it recognises its opposite and when it includes freedom of mind 
per., something denied in death but not in life. In any case, theologically, Hegel 
moves from the notion in the Early Theological Writings, of Jesus as but a teacher 
of Kantian ethics, towards a new concept of God as the self-recognition of God in 
"" Hegel. 1977, paragraph 167. 
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man. Thus the divine becomes a species of human fellowship, and this is the 
important point about death, the infinite is constituted through the finite. " 
I would now like to turn to a brief description of these phenomena, 
phenomena which constitute the second element of the Holy Trinity. In Hegel's 
religious thought this is the human community actualising itself, in religious terms 
it is the "Holy Ghost", and as part of the Trinity and as a part of the whole, the 
"Holy Ghost" must play its part to push Spirit forward towards reconciliation. 
16v See Westphal, 1992, pps 227-229, for more on the theme of spiritual reconciliation which is broadly 
in line with this reading. Also, again in the Lectures on the Philosophyof Religion of 1827,1988, Hegel 
says,... "there are two conditions for this appearance" [of the unity of the human and the divine}. The first 
mode of revelation, says Hegel, is that which ... -which 
leads as a whole to the elevation [of spirit), ... 
by 
way of nature and the world. The other mode, he continues, .. "is the 
higher one and occurs through the 
finite spirit. This is what displays the interest of the standpoint at which we now find ourselves. Divinity is 
recognised by finite human beings in what is objectively available to intuition, sensibility, and immediate 
consciousness", p456. And there is also the following footnote from the lectures of 1831, "This is the 
appearance of God in the flesh...... The possibility of reconciliation is present only when the implicitly 
subsisting unity of the divine and human is known. Human beings can know themselves to be taken into 
God only when God is not something alien to them, [i. e. not an accidentl,... but rather when they are 
taken up into God in accordance with their essence and freedom", p456. A later version of this lecture 
adds, "in accordance with their essence, freedom and subjectivity", same page. This is also self-evident 
from Hegel's conception of Christ as a free spirit. Christ the transgressor. says Hegel, "i. e. is free", p461. 
The point is that although human beings are finite their freedom is infinite, suggests Hegel, they come to 
know this through the resurrection. 
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... only that which externalises itself... obtains an actual existence10 
Hegel, 1806 
II 
The "actuality" of dialectic 
The Holy Ghost is an objectification or externalisation of the particular 
consciousness called human Self-Consciousness, i. e. it is the spirit of the 
community, according to Hegel. "' This only raises the further problem of the sense 
in which the works of man could ever be thought to reach closure or summation, 
since taken at face value this seems to be a preposterous idea. Following the birth 
of consciousness in the maieutic dialectic of Master and Slave. " Hegel immediately 
points out that this new consciousness, though an important historical advance, is 
pregnant with possibility, and that the new found freedom of the slave 
consciousness is in the first instance purely internalised, not yet a consciousness for 
the self. " Hegel calls this phenomenon Stoicism, " the Stoics, of course, are known 
for their philosophy of stringent ethics and rigid self-discipline. 
Hegel characterised the position of the Stoics as one in which they denied 
the significance of external necessity, because the only thing that really mattered to 
them was the inner attitude that one adopted toward such circumstance s. 175 To be 
sure, this stoical consciousness may have been an advance in terms of the growing 
self-awareness of individuality and of course, it certainly is over the slave who is 
simply an object for the master. But because the stoic is one who ignores or negates 
"o Hegel, 1977, para 298. 
"'Hegel, 1988, p47 5, he says, "In the subsisting community the church is, by and large, the institution 
whereby [its) subjects come to the truth, appropriate the truth to themselves, so that the Holy Spirit 
becomes real, actual, and present within them and has its abode in them, whereby the truth can be 
within them and they can enjoy and give active expression to the truth of the spirit; it is the means 
whereby they as subjects are the active expression of the Spirit". In other words, the congregation in full 
voice is the living embodiment of both their own freedoms and subjectivity and that of God in the world, 
thus according to Hegel, the spiritof God is a major cultural force in this world, at the very least. 
1'2Returning to the theme of beginnings in Hegel's philosophy: the term maieutic is a useful one which 
encapsulates the notion of intellectual midwifery, and of the dialectical birth of recognition. The word 
maieutic has Socratic origins in that Socrates mother was said to be a midwife, but the word is often used 
to describe intellectual birth processes more generally, in this case, recognition, see Flay, 1984. 
''3Hegel, 1977, para 197, Reclam p 150, Hegel says, "In thinking, I am free, because I am not another, 
but remain simply and solely in communion with myself, and the object, which is for me the essential 
being, is in undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my activiryin conceptual thinking is a movement 
within myself'. 
" Ibid, 1977, para 198. Rcclam p151, for a more detailed description of the Stoics and Hegels less 
abstract statements on that school see The Hegel Dictionary, 1992, pp. 262-65. 
"'Ibid, 1977, again see para 198, Reclam p 151. 
71 
the real world, Hegel holds that Geist is practically taken back to the world of 
slavery. 16 
This internalised manifestation of alienation occurs because the Stoic has 
turned her back upon the crucial, formative and independence creating role of 
objectification. t The notion of the Stoic, in reality as well as in the popular 
imagination, as one whose body is held in chains but whose Spirit is always free, is 
utterly rejected by Hegel, rather he said, ... "this its essence is only an abstract 
essence". True independent consciousness can only exist and develop through the 
satisfaction of desire and creative activity in the real world, according to Hegel. In 
other words, real living freedom, the "self-thinking idea" must engage with the 
actual world, indeed can only come about through the self-conscious appropriation 
of nature that this notion of freedom implies. Hegel's point here is that the internal 
repression, self-control and self-mastery of the Stoics was simply a form of internally 
self-imposed bondage which was the inevitable consequence of their retreat into 
their own thought's as a form of free thinking. On the other hand, Hegel did find 
something to admire the Stoics for since he held that the raising of this internal 
slavery to the level of a World view during a period when slavery and actual 
bondage were still thoroughly wide spread was a "world-historical act". "s 
The next turn in the spirit of the community comes with a dialectical self- 
transformation within the independence of mind which Stoicism brings. The Stoical 
attitude is inherently and by definition, restless and unstable according to Hegel. 
Although the Stoic may remain wholly repressed, unable to affect the real world at 
will, the idea of a restless, self-directed and critical thought which is constantly in 
motion has emerged. Hegel describes this as ... "the actual experience of what the 
freedom of thought is", or Scepticism. In other words, the price the Stoic has to pay 
for internal peace is the act of choosing per . w. 
In a sense the Stoic must at the very 
least, choose to ignore her physical or emotional agonies, thus a measure of freedom 
is unavoidably and necessarily gained. 
Again, the important point to bear in mind here is that the dialectic of the 
Stoic, the Sceptic and the Unhappy Consciousness, which I will briefly consider in a 
moment, are all forms of the Master-Slave struggle, and are, therefore, different 
modes of alienation. The dialectic of Scepticism is one of the most important of 
"Ibid, 1977, para 199, "This manifold activity tie work} has now contracted into the simple positing of 
differences in the pure movement of thinking", Reclam p151. 
'"Ibid, 1977, para 202, Reclam pp. 153-4. 
"Ibid, 1977, paras 202-5, Reclam 153-57. 
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these early transitions in the Phenomenology because from this comes the notion of 
the unchangeable or Supreme Being [Unwandelbare], as such this is the birth of 
monotheistic religious experience, or of God himself. " 
In any case, Hegel tells us that Scepticism is the actual freedom of thought 
so cherished by the Stoics, this thought form is characterised by Hegel as choice 
selection and a shifting doubt about everything that is seen, heard and felt. This 
doubt, quite significantly, also extends to all ethical life and yet paradoxically the 
Sceptic continues to perform all the above functions of life and make decisions in 
the work-a-day world: a contradiction between ... "deeds and words". Where the' 
Stoical consciousness was once the unity of masterfullness and servility in a single 
Being, the Sceptic rather, is also the synthesis of the master and slave, but in the 
outward and external world says Hegel, these moments conduct themselves like 
the ... "wilful squabbling of children". 
180 
According to Hegel, the doubting Sceptic is "self-infinite", that is, when 
thinking in modes of doubt, as it were, it soon becomes apparent that such 
doubting could go on endlessly. Hegel calls this phenomenon the "hostility of 
thought against itself' in the Encyclopaedia Logic. However, doubting is always 
doubting something, thus doubting posits the object which is also, by definition, 
always singular, since an object in this sense must exist in both time and space. All 
doubting of singulars therefore, becomes a singular moment of Self-Consciousness 
i. e. for the doubt-er. 
Amidst all of this difference then, is the stark relief of the ... "unchanging 
and genuine certainty of itself' as doubting subject. However, this latter moment 
of consciousness is actually an unconscious movement because it rambles between 
the "certainty of self' and systemic doubt, unaware that it has posited an 
unchanging moment, that is a consciousness that is certain of itself but does not 
exist in time or space. The eventual coming to consciousness of this unchanging 
moment is literally the birth of the notion of some infinite Being. The continuation 
"9Ibid, 1977, para 228, as so often in the Phenomenology, Hegel only reveals what the definitive 
meaning of a concept is after he has used that concept many times over in previous paragraphs. In this 
particular case, the term Unchangeable is used many times before it is used in conjunction with the 
notion of a supreme Being (Unwandelbaren Wesen). This phrase would remain ambiguous, read 
perhaps as unchanging essence, were it not for the fact that in context it makes an appearance while 
being juxtaposed with some notion of a mediator (Vermittler) and that in this passage there is a second 
sense of Wesen as will [Willens), a purely metaphysical aspect. This strongly suggests that here Hegel is 
talking of some form of infinite monotheist force and not only of the priest or minister, Reclam p 168. 
1tl°lbid, 1977, para205. Reclam pp. 155-6. 
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of this dialectical movement Hegel describes in 
his account of the Unhappy 
Consciousness. 18' 
Long before the Jena period of the Phenomenology, Hegel was interested in 
the form as well as the content of religion. As early as 1793, Hegel held that the 
most enduring spiritual obstacle which stood between the substantially incomplete 
Geist and "Absolute knowing"1e' were the two halves of an un-reconciled 
Christianity, between what he called "objective" and "subjective" religion. 183 The 
failure of objective religion, especially true of Christianity, lay in the fact that 
essentially it was an enormous edifice of formalised, historical and theological rules, 
in short, it was a dogma. Therefore, it was not only a self-externalised body of 
knowledge but it was also beyond any conceivable comprehensive self-identification 
by ordinary people, especially the German people, "' in other words, it was also an 
estrangement. 
Hegel held that the form of religion, Christianity as the modern religion, 
was also profoundly alienating. In a significant analogy, particularly so when one 
considers the use of the pre-Revolutionary analogy, he compared objective religion 
with, 
1e'Ibid, 1977, pars 214, there is a brief summary of the dialectics which lead to this consciousness. 
182An incidental but not unimportant point concerns the coherence of the concluding chapter of the 
Phenomenology. The following story, though well known is seldom detailed: Hegel composed the 
closing chapter of the Phenomenology during the night and early morning of October 12th and 13th 
1806. While he sat writing at his desk Napoleon's artillery were bombarding the town of Jena in 
preparation for an assault on the morning of the 13th. In the event Napoleon did enter the city as 
planned and the World Spirit himself passed below Hegel's window on horseback, [See the letters 
71,73,74 & 95). Hegel himself retold this tale in order to excuse the considerable disorder which is to be 
found in the Phenomenology generally, and in particular, with the concluding chapter at the fore front 
of his mind. In a letter to Schelling dated the 1st of May, 1807 he was to lament that, .. "Working [my 
way) into the detail has, I feel, damaged the overview of the whole [Phenomenology]. This whole, 
however, is itself by nature such an interlacing of cross-references back and forth that, even were it set in 
better relief, it would still cost me much time before it would stand out for yourself all too easily- that 
even individual sections in many respects would still need further groundwork for them to be brought 
into subjugation". Commenting on the last section in particular he continues,. "Make allowances for the 
greater want of form in the last sections by recalling that I actually completed the draft in its entirety in 
the middle of the night before the battle of Jena", p80. Thus the idea that every line of the Plxnomenology 
is perfectly ordered and that each and every sentence is pregnant with meaning, is clearly wrong. The 
chaotic organisation of the Phenomenology is also one of the themes of Solomon, 1985, although I 
disagree with his view that Hegel is an appalling writer. 
183See the Tübingen Essayof 1793: Religion ist eine, [In Harris, p484, Appendix). Even from this early 
period Hegel makes a clear distinction between an objective religion ie the pictorial religion of the 
various holy books which are the equivalent of the naturalist's cabinet, full of dead insects, dried plants, 
animals which are stuffed and pickled, and the more deeply felt subjective form of religion. The latter 
on the other hand is alive, as we arc, because it is principally held as sentiment, thus internalised and 
because it also effects our outward behaviour. 
"' Thus in his Early Theological Writings Hegel doubts the value of a form of religion which is 
essentially Middle Eastern rather than "Teutonic". 
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The man who builds himself a palace on the model of the great 
house- lives in it like Louis XIV in Versailles, he hardly knows all 
the rooms in his property, and occupies only a small sitting room-, 
Rather, he believed in this early fragment that, 
.... Religion must 
help man build his own little house, a home which 
he can call his own, how much can it help him in this? 'g' 
The new form of thought which humanity could be happy with and at home 
in was intended to be the concluding -concepts of his Phenomenology, his Logic and 
the final volume of the Encyclopaedia. " However, the actual difference between the 
form of Phenomenology and that of religion is that while the content of Christianity 
might well be the true, its promise could only be fulfilled in an other world, 
according to Hegel, thus leaving a number of unexplainable mysteries, thus 
alienation's, in this world. Furthermore, the legitimacy of this whole enterprise 
hinged upon the scriptures themselves, scripture which Hegel was undoubtedly 
unhappy with. The "Absolute Idea", on the other hand, held out the promise of 
subject-object identity which cast out any notion of either ontological or 
epistemological understandings of alienation. 
The point is that the form of alienation as Unhappy Consciousness is not 
unlike that of schizophrenia, we can see that it is suffering from what can best be 
described as a form of split personality. 187 Hegel holds that this is a form of 
consciousness which would always be problematic and inherently unstable. ' 
Further, having a "mind of ones own" 189 can never lead to 'victory' under such 
circumstances because victory would, by definition, involve the partial defeat of the 
other within and vice versa. 190 In other words, the development of freedom and of 
the desire this freedom implies would lead to guilt and disappointment, then by 
turns, to the self-renunciation of freedom itself and hence to a form of crippling 
individuality. The even more damaging repercussion, one may recall, was that the 
"See Harris, pp. 494-5. 
"'See the Earliest System Fragment quoted earlier. Also I would draw the readers attention to the 
Preface to the Phenomenology where he says, "To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to 
the goal where it can lay aside the title 'love of knowing' and be actual knowing- that is what I have set 
myself to do", Para 5, Reclam, p 12. A truth which we are later told is constitutive of being-in-itself (An- 
sich-sein}, Para 82, Reclam, p72 (An-sich heißt Wahrheit}. 
"'See the editorial comments by R. Kroner to the theological essay of 1800, UPP, P309. JET NW). Also 
the recent book by Danial-Berthold Bond, Hegel's Theory of Madness. 
1Hegel, 1977, Para 206, Reclam p 157. 
'x9Ibid, 1977, Para 196, Reclam pp. 148-9. 
""Ibid, 1977, Para 209, Reclam pp. 158-9. 
75 
unity of Master and Slave ideologies within Scepticism gave rise to the notion of the 
Unchangeable, ` the single Supreme Being, the Unhappy Consciousness is but the 
mirror image of that same moment. 
One can now see why, in Hegels view, this particular temper is alienated 
from his/her true essence. The idea of a supreme unchanging being, which in turn, 
is given priority as a thought form over every other, or again, as Hegel would 
suggest, becomes ... "essential". As such this essential shape of 
Geist is something 
painful and agonising because it mobilises and resonates with the thought of life's 
opposites, death, eternity and nothingness. In other words, this dialectic of the 
Unhappy Consciousness is the ancient religious duality of body and soul in which 
subject stands opposed to object. " Negation and eternity are universals, thus the 
opposite of these qualities is embodied in the finite and particular which it this 
form of individuality. Alienation here consists in the dual quality of the struggle, of 
the working in and on the world and in the feeling of separation from something 
which is much greater. In this alienation the human community are not at one 
with God, they are not God but remain contingent rather like puppets dangling on 
a string. 
In one telling passage Hegel makes it quite clear why, in his view, this 
Unhappy Consciousness remains such a miserably unhappy creature, 
[itj.. does not know that this its object, the Unchangeable, which it 
knows essentially in the form of individuality [God], is its own self, 
is the individuality of consciousness. 193 
In addition to the centrality of these communal self-alienation's it is also 
worth noting that for Hegel there is no question that Christianity as a cultural 
phenomenon can transcend its own contradictions between this world and the next 
while remaining within the boundaries of liturgical orthodoxy. For example, with 
the advent of Christian moral culture new expressions of mis-recognition take 
centre stage. Again returning to the Phenomenýdogy, Hegel argues, 
"'Ibid, 1977, paras 208 & 643. Reclam p158 & pp. 452-3. On the subject of the first appearance of God 
in the text: it is worth noting that although, according to Findlay's analysis (Miller trans), God does not 
appear until paragraph 671, Findlay also teeters on the brink of introducing "Him" during the passages 
from 210-15. 
t92Ibid, 1977, para 209, Reclam pp. 158-9. 
'v`Ibid, 1977, pars 216, Reclam p162. 
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... obedience to service and praise, 
by setting aside sense- 
knowledge and action, produces the consciousness of unity with the 
absolute being, though not as a unity which is actually perceived; 
on the contrary, this service is only the perpetual process of 
producing that unity, a process which does not completely obtain 
its goal in the present.. 194 
Again as in the case of the passive Stoic, the Christian form of religion 
simply cannot absorb the truth of "actuality". Later with the passing of the Roman 
civilisation into the medieval Christian period, this theme dominates Hegel's 
analysis, the post-Roman world is also the world of the Unhappy Consciousness. He 
says, for example, 
The whole, therefore, like each single moment, is a self-alienated 
actuality; it falls apart into a realm in which Self-Consciousness as 
well as its object is actual, and into another, the realm of pure 
consciousness which, lying behind the first, is not a present 
actuality but exists only for faith. " 
This theme of the alienated form of religion is taken up again in the later chapter 
on religion where he concludes, 
The Spirit of the community is thus divided from its religious 
consciousness, which declares, it is true, that in themselves they are 
not divided, but this merely implicit unity is not realised, or has not 
yet become an equally absolute being-for-self. ' 
Hegel pointed towards the perpetual spiritual conflict within and between 
communities, he expected that this was likely to continue. This was because the 
diversity of forms provided by the Protestant impulse, [in turn an implicit product 
of the Christian doctrine of individualism), could only create doctrinal schisms over 
meaning. ' Thus he could complain that ... "the actual world is still 
disrupted". 
'y'`Ibid, 1977, para 534, Reclam p379. 
"Ibid, 1977, pars 486, Reclam pp. 345-7, paragraphs 484 to 486 are a brief and concise summary of 
the decline of Roman Law and Christianity into Enlightenment. Reclam pp. 344-7. 
'9°Ibid, 1977, para 787, Reclam pp. 549-50. 
"'Hegel comes close during these discussions, to some kind of anticipation of the effects of Protestant 
inner-worldly asceticism not unlike that described by Max Weber. Of course, it is open to question as tu 
whether or not Hegel actually has either Protestantism orLutheranism in his sights here, but it does not 
seem unreasonable given the attention he devotes to religions of the world more generally. For his views 
on the rights of Protestants see the ETVC', UPP, pp. 126-31. 
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Only wich the complete transcendence and end of estrangement, could the 
certainty-of-self fully emerge. 
So both the medieval subject with which we began, with the master-slave 
struggle, and their Ministers, are wretched and unhappy creatures. According to 
Hegel, the latter are described as those that completely fail to come to terms with 
their own freedom of Self-Consciousness. ' The Minister, for example, gives up bir 
own individuality in the act of presenting his judgements as those of God and the 
former, like the latter, the ordinary subject of Christianity, fares little better 
because he defers to the priest and like the priest he has to deny himself the 
pleasure to be found in the real world and in working to satisfy earthly desires. 
Here Hegel points out that they must continually engage in ... "fasting and 
mortification's" before this universal entity. This desperate situation amounts to 
nothing less than the self-deprivation of both inner and outer freedoms, in short, 
such a Being denies itself full individuality and is quite simply self-alienated. '" 
More importantly, this self-alienation of the community's religious leaders, 
between the community and between all of them and God amounts to a further 
self-alienation which can only be completed when the self-understandings of these 
same agencies are self-identical with the goals, purposes and processes of God 
himself as the "self-thinking idea". Thus only in the final "Holy Trinity" of God 
himself do the parts become one. However, before we move on to chapter two and 
the production of nihilism I would like to conclude this chapter by briefly 
considering the ultimate concept of this Trinitarian conception, God the Father 
and the "self-thinking idea". 
"'Hegel, 1977, para 228, Reclam pp. 168-9. 
""Ibid. 1977. pars 229 & 673. Reclam p169 & p474. 
78 
The perspective adopted by the philosophical history of the world is 
accordingly not just one among many general perspectives, an 
isolated abstraction singled out at the possible expense of the rest. 
Its spiritual principle is the sum total of all possible perspectives "00 
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History 
III 
The 'privileged standpoint' 
Famously, the Phenomenology of Spirit ends with what has often been taken to 
be God's own recognition of himself. 2» While the justification for this 
interpretation might be sound enough, given what we know of the development of 
'God' in Hegel's thinking, this startling claim seems less than obvious if the 
Phenomenology is taken to stand alone. However, what does seem to be beyond 
dispute is that the concluding paragraph of the Phenomenology does contain all the 
elements for the completion of the concept that is expressed in Hegel's method of 
historical writing, the mode which he called "philosophical history". ' I would like 
to contend that this mode of writing amounts to a 'bird's eye' or Godlike overview 
of human affairs which is synonymous with Hegel's logical account of God the 
Father as the "Absolute Idea" or the "self-thinking idea". 
We have seen how those phenomena which Hegel described in the flow of 
determinate negation, the series of recollections of development and resolution of 
the subject-object problem both abstractly and concretely, were actually played out 
in the various modes of self-alienation's. However, it is still necessary to follow 
through at least one example, in outline, of Hegel's historicist account of the 
development of critical thought itself before we come to some assessment of the 
200 Hegel, 1997, p30. 
201 Hegel ends the Phenomenology with the somewhat ambiguous quote from Schiller's Die 
Freundschaft, which runs, ... 
"from the chalice of this realm of spirits foams forth for Him his own 
infinitude", 1977, para 808. AN Miller has translated the German personal pronoun ihm as "Him" 
with a capital "H" obviously to suggest that the person in question is God. More cautiously, I would 
suggest that within the context of the more general summing up which this paragraph does, suggests 
rather, that this"Him" is he who believes that the process of science and has demonstrated the validity of 
this science (Wissenschaft). It remains an open question at this stage in Hegel's thought whether this 
will ultimately characterise his conception of God or not. However, in the much later Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion of 1827, Hegel 1988, says, "But we have already seen what God is in and for 
himself: he is this life-process, the Trinity, in which the universal places itself and therein remains 
identical with itself. God, in thiselement of eternity, is the conjoiningof himself with himself, the clo l-e 
of himself with himself', [my emphasis), p403. The ultimate veracity of Hegel's religious perspective is 
not the issue here, however, the religious framework does suggest nothing less than a Godlike capacity to 
survey the course of history on the part of the phenomenologist. 
202 Hegel, 1987, p 12. 
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nature of the complete 'privileged standpoint'. 
One clear example of this is to be 
found in Hegel's appreciation of classical studies. 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Marx said, 
The greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology and its final product- the 
dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle, is on 
the one hand that Hegel conceives of the self-creation of man as a 
process, objectification as loss of the object, as externalisation and 
the transcendence of this externalisation. 
Marx appears to find an accurate characterisation of Hegel's Phenomenology until he 
Says, 
This means, therefore, that he grasps the nature of labour and 
understands objective man, true because real, man as the result of 
his own labour. 
In this remarkable statement Marx openly gives Hegel the credit for a 
discovery that Hegel did not make, unless that is, one adopts a kind of 
Feuerbachean position and conceives of Hegel's concept of God as but a self- 
supporting and self-directed community of workers. Marx considers Hegel's notion 
of man's self-estrangement to be synonymous with that of his objectification. Thus, 
for Marx, objectification within bourgeois economy is but a form of self- 
estrangement, it is not a manifestation of one's concrete personality, as it is in 
Hegel thought. Bearing this Marxist re-interpretation in mind, and leaving aside 
the larger question as to whether Hegel or Marx is ultimately correct about such 
matters, Marx's re-reading of alienation suggests that reconciliation is not a goal of 
the Phenomenology since the concept of externalisation appears to be incompatible 
with his concept of freedom. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, this 'left' Hegelian critique attempts 
to wrestle the restless core of dialectic free from Hegel's system. However, as we 
have also seen, in the self-division of man typified in the life of Christ, or in the 
example of Stoicism and Scepticism in the Phenomen(logy. we see that this same 
division was expressed in and through the "hostility of thought against itself", i. e. it 
203 Marx, 1975. pp. 385-6. 
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is but one part of the "self-thinking idea" in the process of its self-resolution. This is 
the process which leads towards the 'absolute standpoint'. 
The Phenomenology was never the kind of project which would lend itself 
easily to explanations of Hegel method, why he took what elements he did to be 
contingent and fleeting as opposed to those he held to be both necessary and 
eternal. Indeed in a famous book that first brought Hegel to the attention of 
English speaking readers in 1865, by Stirling, called The Secret of Hegel (it has often 
been remarked upon that Stirling himself may have found the secret but he seems 
to have been reluctant to part with it). In any event, Hegel set himself the task of 
explaining his method in his, The Science of Logic and in his Logic lectures. However, 
in the dense analysis he provides in his Introduction to the Lectures on World History, 
entitled, The Varieties of Historical Writing, `Oi Hegel distinguishes between three 
types of history which appear to emerge from his thought on logic. These modes of 
historical writing are original or intuitive, reflective and finally, the philosophical 
mode. 
In the first of these, original history, the writer narrates events in which he 
has participated in some fashion, thus the spirit of such writing is immediate and 
non-analytical, the presuppositions, assumptions and dogmatism of the writer is left 
unquestioned in his own mind. Oral history might well be typical of this approach. 
However, in Hegel's view such a history suffers from the obvious limitation that the 
narrative will only consist in a very limited perspective, perhaps in the events in 
which the writer participated. Thus, as in the case of a War, the perspective or 
feelings and motivations of the other side are hardly likely to be considered in such 
a report. 
This major defect of particularity is surmounted in the second approach 
mentioned, the reflective form of history. In this second variety of historical writing 
the historian will attempt to apply general ideas and conceptions which would 
enable him/her to impose some order on entire epochs. Thus they would 
retrospectively survey contradictory accounts of a battle, weigh-up and assess 
different motivations in the views of the participants and question those 
assumptions and motivations from the writers own historical perspective. 
Unfortunately the flaw here is that the honesty and immediacy of the first kind of 
method is lost because the historian has imposed his/her own values and concepts 
unquestionably during the process ofgeneralising. 
'"'The Philosophy of Right, CUP, 1987, pp. 11-24. 
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Finally, we come to Hegels philosophical history. This is an attempt to 
yield a method which can utilise the best of both forms of historiography but which 
can also move beyond the limitations of each. Necessarily more complicated 
however, this latter method is also epistemologically identical with Hegel's theory 
of knowledge more generally. ' As the Frederick C. Beiser suggests, Hegel, 
... 
demands that the philosopher bracket his own principles and 
presuppositions and permit consciousness to examine itself 
according to its own standards. The philosopher will then find that, 
through its self-examination, ordinary consciousness will be 
compelled to admit the truth of subject-object identity. Ordinary 
consciousness will discover through its own experience that the 
object is not given to it but essential to its own Self- 
Consciousness. 
Hegel's own apparent lack of success, when he tried to apply these rules of 
practical-reflexivity, would appear to throw the validity of his phenomenological 
project as a whole into doubt. I mentioned one such example in the Introduction to 
this thesis where we considered the role of women in Hegel's thought and another 
in the example of Marxism and Young Hegelianism more generally. There I noted, 
for example, that the feminist and deconstructionist account took the view that 
dialectic appeared to extend beyond Hegel's own system, and of course there is also 
the Marxist critique that I have just mentioned, which appears to support the 
Young Hegelian contention that dialectic is not successfully closed by Hegel's own 
system. But I say again, my point is not to irrefutably demonstrate that Hegel's 
system is true but just to demonstrate the much more limited claim that Hegel 
himself intended to close his system and find reconciliation. Philosophical history, 
"Absolute Knowing", the "self-thinking idea", the 'absolute standpoint' and what 
I will call the 'privileged standpoint' of critique, are all to be taken as different 
terms for the reconciliation of thought with itself in Hegel's philosophy. Nowhere is 
this role clearer than in the reasons and importance of the study of the classics in 
Hegel's view and the role such study plays in the development of philosophical 
historicism. 
2"'Beiser, p284. 
2OoAgain, l3eiser is more lucid in his description here than the present writer, also note that Flay's reading 
of the Phenomenology as the unity of the natural and the philosophical consciousness would seem aw 
point in the same direction. While Beiserpointsout that Hegel does not always consistently pursue this 
method in the VGP. 
ý- 
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In his speech to the Nüremburg Gymnasium of September 29,1809, 
Hegel attempts to justify the continuing program of classical studies to his High 
School students. Concerned with the disproportionate growth of other aspects of 
the curriculum he notes, for example, that classical studies are now but "two-fifths 
of the whole curriculum". ' Indeed Hegel expresses his "joy at the wisdom of our 
government" for protecting the status of classical education. a t' Remarkably, Hegel 
takes the view in this speech that the primary role of classical studies is to cause 
alienation in his students. These students are to be immersed in a "remote and 
foreign world", since such a world claims Hegel, is of natural appeal to young 
people since they are almost certain to be lured by "what is strange and far 
away". " Through such studies students will learn of the "centrifugal force of the 
soul", as it appears to spin in every direction. The ultimate purpose of this 
confrontation and immersion in alienation is only a means to provoke the 
imagination, not to contribute to that deeper and altogether more profound 
rupture of the spirit which occurs between man's reason and his intuition, or 
between his head and his heart said Hegel. A solution to this latter alienation can 
only be approached after much greater exertions. Hegel admired the classical 
world, he tells us in this same essay, because they were able to endure the "cruelty 
of fate", they were certainly aware of the darker aspects of human existence and 
mortality and yet they were still able to draw a "veil" over such harsh realities, 
remaining all the while "free and moderate". Drawing towards a conclusion he 
says, 
It is a necessary illusion to begin by mistaking distance for 
profundity; in fact, the depth and strength to which we can attain 
can be measured only by the distance between the point to which 
we are fleeing and the centre in which we were engrossed at first 
and to which we shall finally return again. 
Again, invoking the notion of a time-line which includes a beginning, a 
centre and an end, Hegel argues that the relative distance travelled by the human 
spirit matters less than, and is certainly no measure of, the completion of an idea 
that was already there in the middle of the time-line, the classical world, but is 
only revealed as such in the event of its own completion at the end. The 'idea' in 
question is freedom and the self-identification of that freedom with the necessity of 
the journey travelled. Thus the studious exertions of a speculatively driven 
Hegel, ETW, 1975, p330. 
'o" lbid, 1975, p323. 
209 Ibid, 1975, p328. 
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alienation are the practical means through which Hegel wants to prepare 
his 
students for modernity itself. Classical studies, far from becoming more irrelevant, 
according to Hegel, are a necessary pre-requisite for the confrontation with 
disenchantment and the social atomism of modernity. 
Hegel's perspective and his reading of Antigone should be seen in this 
educative and character building light. In Antigone, Hegel indicates that during the 
course of the heroine's troubles that it would have become apparent to the audience 
that what was formerly projected as but a smooth and harmonious world in 
Antigone's abiding duty and loyalty, between the family and its members and 
between the people and the King, was actually a "veil" placed over the true 
determinants of self-knowledge. Thus, Sophocles the poet and playwright is a kind 
of philosophical historian who brackets off the dominant attitudes of his own day 
and reflexively examines the respective attitudes of the actors involved. Like many 
other great personalities in Hegel's historical lexicon, Sophocles was able to 
appreciate life from the position of a 'privileged standpoint', not unlike his later 
description of just such a philosophical historian. 
Hegel is deeply interested in the "beauty" of Greek tragedy of course, art 
which is produced in this particular case, by the almost unbearable phenomenon of 
witnessing an individual being ripped apart to the point of self-destruction is 
grasping towards the Absolute standpoint. Sophocles, for his part, in bringing this 
drama before the Athenian audience was forcing them to face the challenge that 
such apparently necessary developments entailed. Should Antigone obey her duty 
to the state or to a higher duty to her dead brother and to the immutable bonds of 
blood? 210 In this drama Sophocles successfully exposes what Hegel called the evil of 
... 
"blank destiny". '" This is what contemporary social theorists would refer to as 
210Ibid, 1977, p267, it is worth noting here that Miller's otherwise lucid translation of the 
Phenomenology does not do full justice to the ambiguity of this section. His translation of the heading to 
the section reads a. The ethical world. Human and DivineLaw: Man and Women. The use of the term 
Divine suggests a deity or monotheistic supreme Being, in English. There are three reasons for 
considering this inadequate: First of all, a monotheistic God would not be in keeping with the 
polytheistic Hellenic context, secondly, we know that, in common with many men of his generation, 
Hegel considered that the female sex were incapable of reason and therefore literally part of nature, see 
the PR, 1991, Para 166 & addition, where women are compared with vegetables. Finally, we know that 
Hegel had an unusually intense relationship with his sister and that he thought of her in some sense as 
blissfully naive, in the positive sense. The German heading reads, Das menschliche und Göttliche 
Gesetz: der Man und das Weib. Here women are specifically contrasted with the notion of Göttliche 
Gesetz, c. g. with Godlike laws. This more ambiguous reading suggests that women are analogous, for 
Hegel, with a natural order of things and is more consistent with the context of the passages which 
follow where there is a relatively extended discussion of the ... natural ethical community ... of the 
family, 
see the Phenomenology, pars 450. Again it is also worth noting that on this subject. Solomon, 1955, is 
quite confusing. On the one hand he interprets the divine in the traditional manner out of context, then 
continues to talk of Hegel's understanding of the family as a state of nature, pp. 542-4. 
2"Ibid, 1977, Para 477, Reclam, p340. 
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determinism. Sophocles, finding a breach in alienation, opens open the "centrifugal 
forces of the soul". `' In other words, Hegel holds that the revelation of this blank 
destiny by the Hellenic dramatist serves to bring about an expanding sphere of 
moral responsibility and personal autonomy. The fictional and mythical account of 
this young women's civil disobedience is a political and social drama of historical 
significance which serves to change the course of "actuality". 213 
This political drama makes possible a moment of recognition, not only in 
the text of the play itself, and here he quotes from Antigone, who said "Because we 
suffer we recognise we have erred", but more importantly, it invokes a moment of 
recognition in the Athenian audience. The decisions which are taken by the key 
characters in the unfolding events of the play are taken by people who have 
unwittingly suspended their own autonomy. In reality Antigone is not bound by 
nature or familiar relations, 214 ... "this 
determination of immediacy means as such 
that nature enters into the ethical"... Athenian life is irrevocably changed, 
according to Hegel, in a moment in which an irrevocable spiritual advance is 
achieved. `" Thus, the ethical life of the community moves from a position of non- 
recognition to one of partial-recognition. Henceforth, the ... "ethical shape of Spirit 
has vanished and another takes its place". Explaining this development in world- 
historical terms Hegel continues, 
This ruin of the ethical substance and its passage into another form 
is thus determined by the fact that the ethical consciousness is 
directed on to the law in a way that is essentially immediate. This 
determination of immediacy means as such that nature as such 
enters into the ethical act.... 
Following the collapse and passing of the Spirit of the ancients, Hegel said that 
another, 
... [substance) emerges as a formal universality in them 
[individuals], no longer dwelling in them as a living Spirit; on the 
212 See Hegel, ETW, 1975, p328. 
2t3Antigone, Socrates and Jesus are all examples of how law-breaking can have a historic role in Hegel's 
historiography. See Jay Bernstein's essay entitled Conscience and Transgression: The Exemplarity of 
Tragic Action, in Browning, 1997. "Bernstein insists on the ineliminable moment of "conscience" and of 
transgressive action as the sine qua mw of all recognition. Only by breaking rules can individual Self- 
Consciousness crystallise out of ethical life", says Finlayson, also Browning, 1997. 
''"'Hegel, 1977, pars 473, Reclam, pp. 334-5. 
1"Ibid, 1977, also pars 473, Reclam, p334-5. 
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contrary, the simple compactness of their individuality has been 
shattered into a multitude of separate atoms. 216 
This new "shape" of Spirit is the Roman citizen, the ... "empty unit" of 
Legal Status, '" and so we see the dialectical advance into a new "shape" of 
consciousness, to use a 'track and field' analogy, we see the baton that is spirit 
subsequently handed on to the next bearer of the 'privileged standpoint' and so on 
until the final completion of the series in the Self-Consciousness of the 'Absolute 
Know-er' of philosophical history. The moral and ethical dilemmas thrown up in 
the Antigone are the most beautiful of the aesthetic works of man, according to 
Hegel, precisely because these contain the end or reconciliation of mind with itself, 
as beginning and end of spirit. 
This journey of the spirit, advances however, only as far as the Godhead 
that is the "Son", thus though the journey might well advance philosophically and 
logically, indeed there may even be an advance in the march of the "Holy Spirit" 
towards final unity in the Trinity, the Trinity in-and-for-itself is completed with 
the return of the "Son" to the Father, in other words it can go no farther, in Hegel's 
view than in the revelation of Christ himself. In the early theological writings 
Hegel said of this event, 
The culmination of faith, the return to the Godhead whence man is 
born, closes the circle of man's development. Everything lives in the 
Godhead, every living thing is its child, but the child carries the 
unity, the connection, the concord with the entire harmony, 
undisturbed though undeveloped, in itself. It begins with faith 
outside itself, with fear, until through its actions it has [isolated 
and] separated itself more and more; but then it returns through 
associations to the original unity which is now developed, self- 
produced, and sensed as a unity. The child now knows God, i. e. the 
spirit of God is present in the child, issues from its restrictions, 
annuls the modification, and restores the whole. God, the Son, the 
Holy Spirit! '1e 
In this remarkable theological passage written in Frankfurt around 1798-9 
or at the very latest in 1800, in any case at least six years before the Phenomen'Jo1", 
21°Ibid, 1977, pars 476, Reclam p289. 
'"Ibid, 1977, pars 480 Legal Status, Reclam p339, Rechtzustand. 
.! " Hegel, 1992, p273. 
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we see that in all essentials, Hegel's mature thought is but a detailed elaboration of 
themes already present and complete. This passage also demonstrates that the 'left' 
Hegelian critique may have missed the point. In Hegel's account of the 'privileged 
standpoint' this moment is ultimately reached and finally consummated only after 
the unification of the Trinity. The Trinity was unified in religious form in the 
resurrection of Christ, the "Son", it was unified in spiritual form by the French 
Revolution, "The Holy Ghost" and finally, it was only realised in philosophy by 
Hegel's own revelation of "Absolute Knowing" in the 'privileged standpoint' of the 
philosophical historian. 
Marx, for example, misses the point here because he conflates estrangement 
and objectification. Shlomo Avineri trying to break free from this confusion says, 
... the major 
difference between [Hegel and Marx) them has, 
however already been pointed out by Lukäc's; while Hegel sees 
alienation as a necessary aspect of objectification, Marx maintains 
that alienation does not reside immanently in the process of 
production itself, but only in its concrete historical conditions, 
therefore, there exists the possibility of ultimate salvation, whereas 
the Hegel one will never be able to dissociate the cross from the 
rose of the present " 
I will return to this theme of Marx's turn towards the politics of "salvation" 
in Chapter IV. For the time being I note that the circle of estrangement is 
complete and transcended in Hegel's thought, the remaining "objectification's" are 
then but a series of particular developments which are left to the "Holy Ghost", i. e. 
the process of the civic development of the human community in accordance with 
the principles of this same unity, the stations of the cross in the present. Thus in 
Hegel's critique of Marx, as it were, the existence of "class-struggle" would not be 
interpreted as further evidence that objectification was but another form of 
estrangement but rather as an attempt to rationally work through the necessary 
mediations between private interests according to the much larger principles of the 
"Holy Trinity", the most important principle of which is mutual-recognition.! ' I 
investigate why Marx is unable to do this when I come to consider his own form of 
eschatological thought. 
219 Interestingly, this quote is taken from Harris, in Stepelevich and Lamb et al, 1983, p52, where 
Harris takes the view that Hegcl's version of alienation is more plausible here. 
21" My sense of the term mutual-recognition, already mentioned (see above), will also bediscussed in 
Chapter Il, however, it has been claimed that Fichte discovered the principle of mutual-recognition in his 
deduction of the "Other" in his Foundation of Natural Law, see Bubner, 1997, p 78. 
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In the largely similar approaches of some Feminist and Deconstructive 
critiques there is a much greater challenge to the coherence of Hegel's thought. 
One may recall from the Introduction to this thesis that they have argued that 
Hegel makes claims regarding women and the family which exceed his system. In 
other words, because Hegel considered that women were forever destined to play a 
more 'natural' and earthy nurturing role in the family and that they were only 
capable of bonds which were brought about through the realm of feeling, not 
Reason. Thus, they argue, here is an example in which Hegel quite simply makes 
sexist claims which are not only unjustified by his system but mark the turning 
point of its dissolution. While it is not my intention to try and defend Hegel 
against such claims, since I am not entirely convinced that Hegel's position can be 
defended in any case, I would suggest that as in the case of the Marxist critique 
this defence would probably have to revolve around an interpretation of what 
Hegel's system is supposed to be and upon the nature of his notion of 
reconciliation. 
In any event, the conclusions of the dominant feminist critique can be 
summarised as follows. " The idea is that because Hegel 'forced' a closure to his 
system, all manner of difference becomes a victim of identity logic and there is no 
credible dialectical logic left in his system. Thus identity logic becomes a method of 
domination and denial rather than reconciliation in Hegel's philosophy. Therefore, 
instead of a reconciliation which arises from latent contradictions which are 
supposed to entail unity or the identity-in-difference of subject and object, mind 
and matter, universal and particular, history and nature and between man and 
women. Rather there is simple domination of objects over matter, over the 
particular, over nature and over women and so on. In this sense then, both the 
feminist and Deconstructive critique of Hegel are the true heirs and successors of 
post-Marxian 'left' Hegelian critique more generally. 
The more important point for the purpose of the present account is that in 
my view there is nothing in Hegel's analysis of Sophocles Antigone, or for that 
matter in Hegel's statements in the later Philosophy of Right concerning women and 
the family, that prevents Hegel from logically attempting to close his system. In other 
words, the reason he believed that it was time to try and close the system was 
provided by the ex eventu prophetic notion that the most open of all principles, the 
ascension of a social conception of adult autonomy, had been finally established 
'' Here lam paraphrasing from Mill's in Stewart, 1998, pps. 265-6. 
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here on earth by the events of the French Revolution. In this autonomy there is 
identity-in difference by definition. Thus Hegel's circle of circles, imagery he used 
in both the theological writings and in his Logic, remained a closed system but still 
retained the capacity to become an ever more inclusive circle. In the last paragraph 
of the last book of his Enc}'ctopaedia for example, the "Absolute Spirit" appears to be 
dynamic rather than static, as a philosophical idea it is complete or "eternal" but 
"eternally {it} sets itself to work". `-- 
Thus it appears that even in the case of Antigone, for example, we see that 
in the role of a woman as a . river, she is offered autonomy in 
Hegel's analysis since in 
the brother-sister relationship there is an absence of unequal and particular 
desires. ' Recall that Antigone found herself in such an impossibly tragic position 
because she was left with the stark choice of either obeying the civil law or obeying 
God's law, the ultimate circle of circles. In any case, one problem with this feminist 
account is that it breaks into the middle of Hegel's system to locate its critique, it 
is not clear to me that this 'historical' account of a woman's role in Ancient Greece 
and in Hegel's own day in the Philosophy of Right, is not a moment of dialectic before 
the final closure of the Logic. Of course, this is hardly an adequate defence of Hegel, 
the dialectician, since it is likely to lead to the further objection that if his own 
application of his method is to bring results then he should not have made such a 
mistake with regard to women in the first place. If he could make such a mistake 
how are we to test the veracity of his other views, such as those on the modern state 
and so on. This is a perfectly reasonable objection which cannot be adequately dealt 
with here, but I have indicated that the feminist critique is far from being a water- 
tight case. 
It is still worth noting that one reason why Hegel found such aesthetic 
beauty in Sophocles' play was because Antigone heroically chose to obey the law 
which offered her the possibility of honour and recognition, she obeyed the basic 
tenant of the "Holy Trinity", which consists only in her participation in the 
dynamic play of recognition. In other words, Antigone, although allegedly cast in 
the hopelessly 'feminine role' ascribed by Hegel, one which was undisputedly sexist 
by all ocher accounts, does not prevent her from operating according to the higher 
principle of the Trinity or system. In both the Phenomenology and in the Philosophy of 
Right Hegel may have attempted to use Antigone as an example of women's 
exemplary contribution to "family piety" but his own attempt to describe her in 
'" Hebel, 1990, p315- 
12 Ibid, 1998, p 247. 
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such terms could not be so reduced within the totality of the system overall. In 
other words, despite Hegel's apparent denial of his own sexism, the principle of 
social-recognition held good whilst remaining within the explanatory power of the 
system as a whole, a fact that is also implied in the 'privileged position' of the 
philosophical historian. 
As Jay Bernstein has indicated, within Hegel's gallery of individual spirits 
the most important figures are always those who are able to effect a shift of Self- 
Consciousness, even if it means taking part in forms of civil dis-obedience. This 
process is synonymous with the dialectical movement of the 'privileged standpoint, ' 
whether it is that of a historian or of a playwright. Thus Jesus or Sophocles, or some 
of those who I have not considered, such as Socrates or Hegel himself, such types 
stand outside the system before the system's closure, and reflexively cross-examine 
their own thoughts and concepts. However, in Hegel's account such an 
examination leads one back into the system of logic itself, not through domination 
but through logical flows and categories, only now the system has become larger 
because the "self-thinking idea" of God in-andfor-himself remains a totality who 
simply becomes richer in his/her particular moments. Such moments would appear 
to include the developing subjectivity of women. 
Never-the-less, whether Hegel's system can be defended or not, and I am 
aware of the limited nature of this argument, I would also like to argue that apart 
from the most recent forms of the 'left' Hegelian critique, such as the feminist one, 
there are other "aporias" of Hegel's system which demand our attention and which 
appear to burst forth from within his system. 2"4 For it is clear that Hegel himself 
appeared to hold, from time to time, that Godlike freedoms did not necessarily lead 
to anything other than a form of free thought which was entirely in harmony with 
mans/womans new condition. In other words, freedom when understood as the 
social-recognition of absolute autonomy appears to be relatively unproblematic. Yet 
Hegel's disquiet with the French Revolution suggests that he did hold some 
reservations regarding that event and it is to these that I would now like to turn. I 
would like to consider a phenomenon which exerted enormous theoretical 
224 In what follows I am indebted to Adorno, 1973, pps 361-365, where he points out that, "After 
Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as sanctimonious, as wronging the 
victims; they balk at squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached, out of the victims fate. And these 
feelings do have an objective side after events that make a mockery of the construction of immanence as 
endowed with a meaning radiated by an affirmatively posited transcendence". It seems to me that here 
Adorno throws out the greatest challenge to the immanece reading of Hegel's thought as system. 
225 For example, in the Encyclopaedia Logic, Harris translation, he says, "When we think freely, voyaging 
on the open sea, with nothing under us and nothing over us, in solitude, alone by ourselves- then we are 
purely at home with ourselves", paragraph 31. 
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significance for Hegel but which has been misunderstood by some Hegel 
commentators; the presence of nihilism in Hegel's system. As Hegel himself said in 
the Phenomenology, 
If all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the question 
arises, What next? What is the truth Enlightenment has 
propagated in their stead? 
He continued, 
Since in this way it [Enlightenment] grasps in general every 
determinateness, i. e. all content and filling, as something finite, as 
a human entity and [mere) idea, absolute Being becomes for it a 
vacuum to which no determinations, no predicates, can be 
attributed. ' 
2 Hegel, 1977, Para 557, Reclam pp. 394-5. 
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Thanks to the bath of her Revolution, the French Nation has freed 
herself of many institutions which the human spirit had outgrown 
like the shoes of a child' 
Hegel to Zellman, Jena, January 23,1807 
German idealism has been called the theory of the French Revolution. ` 
Herbert Marcuse 
CHAPTER II 
The Emergence of Nihilism 
In what follows I shall reconsider Hegel's analysis of the French Revolution, 
and more specifically, the presence of Diderot in Hegel's Phenomenology. It is still the 
case that in most studies of this relationship Hegel's use of quotes from Diderot's 
remarkable text RameaüsNepheu? are seldom explored. 230 In section II will briefly 
outline some of the ambiguity in Hegel's attitude towards the Revolution. In 
section II I will look at the formation of the `privileged standpoint' against 
Enlightenment. In section III I will outline Hegel's use ofDiderot's text in context 
and finally, we will finish on the theme of the new "shape" of spirit that animates 
much of Hegel's mature thought and on his political theory. It will emerge that 
while Hegel implicitly accepted that his own age was characterised by a new 
nihilism, which he himself set up in part in his "bitter criticism of the Terror", as it 
is characterised by Marcuse, Hegel does at least attempt to construct a political 
22'Hegel, 1984, pp. 122-23. 
228 Marcuse, 195 5, p3" 
79DcnisDiderot, 1966. It is also worth noting however, that although I have chosen the appearance of 
RameaM'J Nephew here, the concept of irony, as developed by the Schlegel brothers might work equally 
well. Hegel says in his Lectures on Aesthetics, 1998, p63, the Schlegel's ... "with their critical talent, put 
themselves near the standpoint of the idea, and with great freedom of speech and boldness of 
innovation". Although Hegel does go on to criticise them for not being systematic, and therefore 
unscientific, this remains high praise indeed. Just as God gives meaning so must his spiritual 
actualisation's, there would appear to be a fine dividing line between nihilism and the absolute in this 
account. 
23"See Solomon, 1985, p555 for example, where Rameau's Nephew is only allegedly absorbed into 
Hegel's text as a means to highlight the wit of the philosophe. Typical of this neglect is the fact that in 
over one hundred and fifty papers published over a twenty-five year period in at least one scholarly 
journal, there is not one explicit reference to Hegel's quotes from Rameaü s Nephew, see the Owl of 
Minerva, vol 25, No 2. The only work I am aware of on this theme is David W. Price, "Hegel's 
Intcrtextual Dialectic: Dideroi sLe Neveu de Rameau in the Phenomenology of Spirit", Clio 20,1991. 
223-33. 
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theory which takes this nihilistic problematic into account. As the contemporary 
German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas has pointed out while, 
Hegel is not the first philosopher to belong to the modern age, he is 
the first for whom modernity becomes a problem. '; ' 
Similarly, this nihilist moment, re-named decadence by Nietzsche, would later 
resonate with force against the modern notion of universal autonomy which gave it 
birth, 
What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devalue 
themselves. The aim is lacking; "why? " finds no answer. 232 
Nowhere in the Phenomenology of Spirit do we find Hegel using the term 
nihilism, but I will hold that this is the problem that fills much of Hegel's political 
imagination from the period of the Phenomenology of Spirit through to the later 
Philosophy of Right. 3 In Chapter I, we saw that for Hegel the necessary march of 
philosophy is presupposed in the unknown, which was in turn dependent upon an 
incomplete self-knowledge, Z34 this is his understanding of alienation 
{Entfremdung). 23s We also saw how Absolute Freedom, a product of the 
Enlightenment, was consummated with completion of his philosophical project and 
in the absolute standpoint of the phenomenologist, this marked the end of 
alienation: thus enabling the full possession of the actual world by this same 
'privileged standpoint'. '" This whole idea is also consistent with the etymological 
131Habermas, 1990, p43. 
232 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 1967, p9. 
"'The word nihilistic does appear in the Miller translation, para 521. While this might well capture the 
essence of both the meaning and the context of the discussion of Diderot 's text Rameau's Nephew [see 
below], the German in this passage is actually zerreißende Urteilen not nihilismus or nihilistisch. A more 
cumbersome but accurate literal translation would be a judgement which tears to pieces. 
2'lnvery general terms this Hegelian notion of alienation is also reminiscent of Aristotle's usage where 
the latter says that man philosophisesdue to a sense of wonder. 
13SHegel, 1977, para 596, The movement of the world of culture and faith does away with this [Greece 
and Rome] abstraction of the person, and, through the completed alienation, through the ultimate 
abstraction, Substance becomes for Spirit at first the universal will, and finally Spiritsown possession. The 
present thesis is necessary not least because of the confusion which often unwittingly accompanies the 
use of general terms such as alienation and nihilism. For example, after a lucid account of the 
development of the modern concern with alienation, post-revolutionary nihilism and the current melee 
of political thought, Darby, 1990, p216, concludes that one response to modern nihilism might be to 
return to philosophy, to our sense of wonder in the full Aristotelian meaning and to engage in utopian 
and imaginative thought projects. Yet as we saw in Chapter one of the present thesis this is exactly the 
kind of alienation which complete freedom has buried. 
''Of course readings such as those of Flay might want to insist that it is one thing to provide warranted 
access to truth claims and a wholly different thing to extrapolate from this to ethical and political 
theories. Whether successful or not my point is always to suggest that this is actually the task Hegel set 
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origins and religious history of the concept of alienation itself. However, now I 
would like to take the argument one step further and demonstrate that, as one 
commentator has recently remarked, "The French Revolution,,,, is seen by Hegel as 
"'3' the overcoming of alienation,... 
In a concise passage, where he effectively summarised the journey he 
believed he had charted, Hegel was to say, 
Here, [during the French Revolution).. knowledge appears at last to 
have become completely identical with its truth; for its truth is this 
very knowledge and any antithesis between the two sides has 
vanished, vanished not only for us or in itself, but for Self- 
Consciousness itself. In other words, Self-Consciousness has gained 
the mastery over the antithesis within consciousness itself. 
Then he adds that, "This antithesis rests on the antithesis of the certainty 
of self and the object" 2 This passage suggests that according to Hegel, the 
citizens of revolutionary Paris lived a life that was `absolutely' true, in the special 
phenomenological sense that during the early days of the Revolution their Self- 
Consciousness was ultimately all they required to live their lives. However, the 
transition from alienation [Entfremdung] to "Absolute Freedom" and from 
alienation to "Absolute Knowing" is a difficult transition for Spirit in the 
Phenomenology, this fact clearly emerges from Hegels ambiguous reading of the 
lessons of the French Revolution and it is to this ambiguous reading that I would 
now like to turn. 
himself. Also see RB Pippin's essay entitled, "You Can't Get There from Here: Transition problems in 
Hegel's Phenomenoloo n/Spirit", Cambridge, 1993, p73. 
'"` See Norman, 1976, p 105. 
2 'Hcgcl, 1977, para, 596. 
2"Nietzsche for one understood the sense in which these revolutionaries where indeed the ... "last men". 
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... insanity- mania or 
frenzy, In the French Revolution,... the almost 
complete collapse of civil society caused many people to become 
insane. 240 
Hegel, Encyclopaedia 
I 
The French Revolution 
There is a well known anecdote which goes that on the outbreak of the 
French Revolution in 1789, Hegel, then a nineteen year old student of the 
Tübingen seminary, joined his school friends Hölderlin and Schelling in planting a 
tree of liberty to celebrate what he later referred to as this ... "heaven transplanted 
to the earth". " Yet, as some scholars have noted, Hegel always held a somewhat 
ambiguous and critical position concerning the social and political benefits of the 
Revolution no less than on the effects of the Revolution on philosophy as a 
science 2' For example, the Hegel scholar Shlomo Avineri considers that for Hegel 
.. "the moral 
life of the spirit" which emerges from the ... "blood 
bath" of the 
revolution is essentially the geographic and spiritual extension of the Napoleonic 
Code which guaranteed some ... 
"conversation with the people such as a free press" 
and a .. 
"number of other important French inspired institutions". 243 
Hegel interpretation is often caught between four political readings of the 
Revolution, `4' Hegel is either viewed as a kind of reluctant revolutionary, as a 
conservative, as a liberal, or finally, as a theorist of totalitarianism. In the first view 
his tacit support for the revolution and his analysis of modern individualistic 
240 Hegel, 1990, p135. 
"'See The Hegel Dictionary, 1992, pp. 20-21 and the Phenomenology, 1977, paragraph 110. We also 
know from his letters and other testimony that Hegel celebrated Bastille Day all his life, see H. S. Hams 
in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, 1993, p26. Also Avineri, 1972, p3. Remarkably, many 
scholars still consider the Phenomenology an apolitical text, some of these we have already considered 
such as J. Flay, where the Phenomenology is taken principally to be a philosophical text in the traditional 
sense. Others such as Solomon, 1985, feel able to assert that there is ... "no politics in the 
Phenomenology", p 16 & p516, and this despite the attention Hegel devotes to the principles, and events 
of the French Revolution, not to mention the evidence of the letters of the period. 
242See Laurence Dickey's essay, "Hegel on Religion and Philosophy", Cambridge, 1993, p307. The idea 
here is that philosophy became partisan and lost its power of objectivity with the revolution. 
"'See Avineri, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 66-7. This is also reputed to be the view of Kojeve who considered 
that the communist Chinese revolution of 1948 was simply the extension of the Napoleonic code in the 
East. 
24 The literature which debunks the notion of Hegel as apologist of the Prussian state or as totalitarian 
thinker has been decisive, see Knox's effective contextualization of Hegel's political positions vis a vis the 
Prussian policy of the period in his "Hegel and Prussians", and Kaufmann's effective demolition of Karl 
Popper's claims in this latter regard, "The Hegel Myth and its Method", both in Stewart, 1996. 
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freedom is often seen as one of the deep sources of European socialism or even of 
anarchism. In this case the Marxist critique of Hegel holds that Hegel was a 
supporter of bourgeois rights to be sure, but that the inner core of his method is 
revolutionary. Thus Hegel's alleged attempt to square his philosophy with Prussian 
hegemony in Germany is seen as largely a matter of unprincipled expediency. In 
the case of the second reading, Hegel is taken as a kind of Burkean conservative 2" 
in so far as he viewed the French Jacobeans as naive utopians who had abandoned 
all the organic and traditional institutions of the ancien rregime in their haste to 
construct their new order. ' Here his support for the family and his alleged 
suspicion of one-sided freedom is marshalled as evidence that he considered human 
nature both rapacious and dangerous, an idea which is often rooted in biblical 
notions of original sin or upon concomitant notions of volcanic passions and 
romantic essentialism. 247 In this account Hegel becomes the conservative defender 
of the religious and monarchical hierarchies of pre-Revolutionary Europe. In the 
third case, Hegel's ambiguous defence of the Revolution is taken to be an example 
of his power politics in which everything, even the most flagrant abuse of power, 
can be legitimately defended by the powerful, thus Hegel's attitude in support of 
the Revolution is taken to be further evidence of his totalitarian outlook. 
Z"sjürgen Habermas, in his Theory and Practice, takes a more complicated view of the nature of Hegel's 
political conservatism. Habermas takes the view that Hegel, quite unlike Burke, did not leave the 
actualisation of abstract Right to the ... "prudence of the state", rather he sought instead to demonstrate 
that the development of abstract Right was actually an.. "objective process", pp. 125-6. Here Habermas 
reading is undoubtedly more sensitive than many although even his thesis is not original since he largely 
follows Camus' interpretation, see The Rebel, Penguin, 1971, p103. Habermas says of Hegel's 
understanding of the revolution, see p123 he [Hegel sought) ... "to conceptually legitimise the 
revolutionising of reality without the Revolution itself". In his generalising sweep through Hegel's 
thought, Habermas reconnoitres Hegel's understanding of the Revolution as a problem-solving exercise 
concerning the philosophical (i. e. theoretical), consolidation of Right, hence his constant referral to 
Hegel's later works. However, Habermas does not expand on the mutually-recognitive moment without 
restraintwhich so thoroughly disturbed Hegel and the latter mans celebrated ambivalence towards the 
Revolution. 
`46Again see Avineri, 1972, p 184. Also see Charles Taylor, Cambridge, 1979, p 103 & pp. 118-25, 
closely follows Avineri 's reading. In Taylor's account of Hegel's reading of the revolution, the root cause 
of social disorder and political excess during the thermidor is also a lack of liberal institutions, avacuity i. e. 
a lack of opposed, competing social and political institutions and processes. Absolute Freedom thus 
becomes quixotic since these, if set up, would ultimately stand against absolute freedom. In a more 
general sense I empathise with Solomon's disquiet on the nature of Taylor's reading of Hegel, Solomon, 
1985, p6. Taylor takes Hegel tobe an idealist: someone who believes that the absolute is everything in 
the Universe unfolding as a matter of rational necessity. Finally, see Rockmore, 1993, pp. 52-3 for the 'sw 
plus_ hra in reductionist accounts of Hegel's analysis of the Revolution. 
24'Also it is claimed that his famous phrase in the preface of the Philosophy of Right that "What is 
rational is actual; and what is actual is rational" is a philosophical justification of the status quo. For a 
repudiation of such a thesis see M. W. Jackson, "Hegel: The Real and the Actual". Yirmiahu Yoeel, 
"Hegel's Dictum that the Rational is Actual and the Actual is Rational: Its Ontological Content and its 
Function in Discourse", and finally, E. L. Fackenheim, "On the Actuality of the Rational and the 
Rationalityof the Actual", all in Stewart, 1996. 
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On the other hand, the final view, that Hegel was a moderate liberal who 
approved of the freedom and liberty of the Revolution but not the lawless violence, 
is now dominant within Hegel scholarship. 24ß It is also the reading which I favour in 
what follows, although I do not want to rehearse these arguments here I will just 
briefly mention the following by way of summary. The problem with the first 
reading, that of Hegel the socialist or anarchist, is that this idea simply does not 
square with Hegel's mature writings of reconciliation and one is therefore left 
defending the position that there were two Hegel's. Such personality 'splitting' 
seldom does justice to the ambiguous nature of the development of thought within 
any given individuals thought and quite often does do interpretative violence to the 
writings in question. Secondly, Hegel was certainly no utopian or normative 
thinker of the socialist variety and he clearly did not believe that society could 
somehow be created from a void or from the kind of clean slate provided by the 
Revolution. Such an interpretation does not square either with Hegel's historicism 
or his critique of 249 
In the case of the reading which looks to Hegel the conservative, the 
problem here is that this interpretation ultimately casts Hegel down as an 
implacable enemy of the very freedom, Absolute Freedom, ' which he always 
thought the most important dialectical product of the pre-Revolutionary 
consciousness. While Hegel may have harboured some fears as to the lack of 
equanimity possessed by the Enlightenment consciousness in reality, a condition 
which produced the Revolution, it is hardly likely that he was opposed to its most 
important product, that is, the social recognition of complete adult autonomy. Both 
Kant and Schiller, for example, and long before Hegel, had attempted to mount a 
liberal defence of the French Revolution. In a treatise on religion written in 1793 
Kant countered the argument that the French were not ripe 'for freedom with the 
axiom that men only become ripe for freedom once they are set free. -"" For the same 
reasons, the notion of Hegel the totalitarian is hardly worth considering here. More 
plausible then, is the reading of Hegel as the liberal critic of the excesses of the 
Revolution but as the upholder of its freedoms. The questions remains however; 
what kind of liberalism did he arrive at and why? And how should we read his 
attitude to the Revolution philosophically and theologically. 
'4" See J. Stewart, 1996, for example, for an accumulative defence of Hegel the liberal, and Wood. 
1991. 
""Hegel, 1977, Para 594. 
=`0 I am paraphrasing from Wilkinson and Willoughby [Eds], in Schiller, 1982, pxvui, "Their first 
attempts will naturally tic crude, even dangerous; but says Kant, "we must be free in order to learn how 
to use our powers wisely in freedom". 
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From the moment of its conception, the practical efficacy of the 
Phenomenology was always intimately integrated with the Absolute Freedom of the 
Revolution. Hegel's project or system, could only be differentiated from many of the 
others of the time if the end of alienation and the identity of self and object or of 
philosophy and the natural consciousness, which formed the culminating theme of 
his epistemological endeavour, was presupposed by the social recognition of that 
same revolution. In other words, the vantage point or 'birds eye view' of the 
'absolute standpoint' is an integral product of the Revolution. If it is taken that 
Hegel's understanding of the Terror is one where that horror is seen to be the 
inevitable consequence of Absolute Freedom, then that freedom must also be 
retrogressively denounced in perpetuity. Thus this is one more reason for rejecting 
the notion of Hegel the conservative, because this is simply not what Hegel did in 
any of his writings. "' 
The conservative interpretation culminates in a failure to take Hegels 
thesis of "Absolute Knowing" seriously and on its own terms. ' Rather, the social 
recognition of "Absolute Freedom" which the Revolution established, albeit briefly, 
amounts to nothing less than the Revelation'53 of an irrevocable standard of 
judgement through which all human past and relations present and were to be 
examined and interpreted. ' However, the future can never be grasped by the 
understanding in the same manner as the past and the present; from the beginning 
of the 'closure' of "Absolute Knowing", the "circle of circles", everything is opened 
up to "negativity", this is why the ... 
"owl ofMinerva", e. g. philosophy, is never able 
to plot the course of future events as it once did those of the past and present. 
"'Thus Taylor, 1979, can say,.. "reason realises itself means that the outcome arises out of human action 
which is not really conscious of what it is doing, which acts while seeing through a glass very darkly, but 
which is guided by the cunning of reason", p 123. Also see Rockmore, 1993, Philosophy, Hegel will say, 
is nothing other than the conceptual understanding of its own historical moment, p49. 
""Typical of this sort of attitude is that of Albert Camus, who characterises Hegel's "End of History" as 
.. "blind romanticism", 
197 1, pp. 177-8, although paradoxically, he states earlier in the same work that 
[Hegel placed] .. 'emphasis on the end of 
history. Until then there is no suitable criterion on which to base 
a judgement of value. One must act and live in terms of the future", p112. Also, note that the notion of 
the "End of History" is more than just a political concept, i. e. modern liberalism, as Fukuyama has 
suggested. If God is to be replaced by humanity (Absolute Knowledge), then humanity must have the 
same omnipotent qualities as God. Boethius pointed out in his Consolations of Philosophy (Bk V), that 
God must, by definition, be able to simultaneously see the beginning, the present and the end of man, in 
other words God must survey all of time. Leaving aside the controversy of an "End of History" thesis for 
the time being, clearly "Absolute Knowing" posits this same ability for a completely terrestrial Being, 
that is, the wise contemplative phenomenologist. Post-historical man is Godlike in that he/she is the 
master of his/her own destiny and is therefore, a master of time. 
"'If the word 'revelation' seems a little too strong or inappropriate then consider the comment made by 
Stepelevich, 1987. pps, 179 & 186. The term 'nakedness was common currency among all the Young 
Hegepans, particularly with Marx and Bauer. They were undoubtedly picking up on a theme of 
'exposure' which was present in the Phenomenology itself. 
''Hegel, 1977, pare 56, in other words, the speculative method of the Phrnonwno1 y. 
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Philosophy can only ... "paint its grey on grey", it is only ever able to vindicate 
"Reason" cast in the past and present. While all events before the revolution were 
viewed through the murky depths of alienated consciousness, the non-alienated 
viewpoint supports the veracity of later notions such as the "cunning of reason", 
when applied in this manner. `55 In short, the "owl of Minerva" thesis, when torn 
from the raison Aire of the phenomenological enterprise and taken as an essentially 
conservative statement, does not retain much coherence, a point often made by 
Hegel's 'left' Hegelian followers. ' 
But what kind of thing is social recognition in Hegel's thought? One 
contemporary analytic scholar, Charles Taylor, takes the view that, 
... Hegel was one of the profoundest critics of [the) notion of 
freedom as self-dependence. He laid bare its emptiness and its 
potential destructiveness with a truly remarkable insight and 
prescience. He has paradoxically helped both to bring this modern 
doctrine to its most extreme expression and to show the dilemma in 
which it involves us. 
According to Taylor, Hegel throws out the baby of freedom with the bath 
water of nihilism. In other words, here Taylor correctly perceives that social 
recognition is empty of all meaningful content. 7 It is what libertarian political 
theorists would call 'negative freedom', in that it posits the measure of personal 
freedom to be the extent to which an individual is free from all external constraints 
on their actions. Freedom is thus defined as freedom from everything coercive. Social 
recognition is the universal self-understanding of this autonomy of persons. In other 
words, such freedom simply defines the empty thought of what a person might well 
become, it does not describe what they are since it only minimally defines their 
possibilities not their actualities. Taylor's claim that this is nihilistic is true 
(although his claim that Hegel held to this concept of freedom as an ideal is 
wrong), because such freedom does not posit anything of value such as truth, or the 
2s: See Rockmore, 1993, p130, hence the common insistence in an irrevocable cleavage between the 
Hegel of the Phenomenology and of the Philosophy of Right, or indeed between the two halves of the 
Phenomenoloy. 
'Hegel, 1977, para 5, the conservative thesis makes little sense when compared with Hegel's ultimate 
goal, which he states clearly in the Preface to the Phenomenolog}". This point was made, though more 
obliquely, in Chapter I of the present work, the reader might like to recall that Hegel sought to replace 
"love of knowing" with "actual knowing". 
2 "'See Taylor, 1979, p 167 and Wood, PR, MP, 1991, pxi. 
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good and so on. However, as we shall see, Hegel was at least implicitly aware of 
this alleged "aporia" which is thrown out by the "centrifugal forces of the soul". 
' 
On the other hand, it is perfectly legitimate to ask why Hegel was so 
critical of an event which he undoubtedly held to be the birth of modernity? 
''' 
While there is some excellent secondary scholarship on the subject of Hegels 
reading of the Revolution many of these tend to miss the important and distinctly 
Hegelian point, that the Self-Consciousness which immediately precedes the 
sunburst of the Revolution itself is always likely to yield the more profound clues as 
to the meaning of that same event. -"O In another context Hegel once said, 
Great revolutions which strike the eye at a glance must have been 
preceded by a still and secret revolution in the spirit of the age, a 
revolution not visible to every eye, especially imperceptible to 
contemporaries, and as hard to discern as to describe in words. It is 
lack of acquaintance with this spiritual revolution which makes the 
resulting changes astonishing [my emphasis). ' 
In the Phenomenology this ... 
"secret revolution" is caused by the Self- 
Consciousness of the modern nihilist, a consciousness which preceded the actual 
Revolution and it is to that Self-Consciousness that I shall now turn. 
258 Thus Hegel's critique of this kind of freedom is also an anticipation of a critique of libertarian thinking 
more generally. Also Sse Kainz, pps. 83-91 who suggests that the transitional significance of the Terror 
and the post-revolutionary period is the thought of freedom and the subsequent recoil from emptiness, .. it 
discovers in the negative quiet of the aftermath of destruction the positive necessity of substantial reality, 
says Kainz. Thus morality is a question of form, the movement from Catholic France to Protestant 
Germany, p91. According to this schema the last sections of the Phenomenology arc the Protestant theology 
that underpins the Philosophy of Right. In another sense the Hegelian concept of God is radically 
transfigured, as Feuerbach demonstrated, thus the free will is not given by metaphysical notions of God 
such as in Descartes. 
''"For an interesting exposition of the section "Absolute Freedom and Terror" sec Gunn, 1989. While 
Gunn rightly points to an implicit awareness of the chaotic conception of individual liberty which lies at 
the root of Hegel's thought he mistakenly confuses this understanding on Hegel's part wich an 
anarchism [at least in his analysis of what is important in Hegel]. In what follows I will attempt to 
demonstrate in passing that while Hegel might well have understood this he sought to preserve the 
promise of freedom and still accommodate the realitiesof the modern state. Thus it is not so much that 
the "system program" fragment, for example, should be rejected as the youthful scribbling of a young 
revolutionary, or adopted as a founding statement as Gunn would have it, see p65, rather, the question is 
one of how the state is to be made a mechanism of equality and fairness for all when the Self- 
Consciousness which produced it also simultaneously undermines such a project. 
2"ETW's, UPP, 1992, p 152. 
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In the French Philosophic writings, ... what is worthy of admiration 
is the astonishing energy and force of the Notion as directed against 
existence, against faith, against all the power of authority that had 
held sway for thousands of years' 
Hegel, Jena Lectures of 1805-6 
II 
The "Secret Revolutionary" 
Some might think that Diderot's text Le Never Dc Raneau is outrageous 
when considered within its historical context. Diderot himself seems to have 
withheld it from publication, perhaps fearing that it would cause a scandal or a 
political backlash against the Encyclopedie 263 More mystery than fact surrounds this 
text. Why it was written? Why is there no reference to it in Diderot's voluminous 
correspondence? Was it an attempt to defend the Encyclopedie? Was it merely a 
warning shot in the musical wars between the French and Italian opera lovers of 
the period? ' What was Diderot trying to achieve and who were his targets, if any? 
Though the purpose and transmission, loss and rediscovery of the 
manuscript is clouded in confusion and mystery, `65 we do know from the dating of 
the first mention of the text, that Hegel was one of the first to see a copy of the 
Nephew. Hegel uses sections of the text no less than three times in the Phenomenology, 
[which was written in 1806]. 36That Hegel uses three quotes from the Nephew is all 
the more remarkable once one considers that Aristotle, who is so highly esteemed 
by Hegel, is only mentioned twice by name, indeed Plato is also only mentioned 
twice and Kant once' In any case, it seems that only one year earlier {1805}, a 
"'Hegel, 1995, Vol III, P384. For the approximate dating of these lectures see the Translators Note, 
Vol I, opening page. It is worth pointing out that this quote must be understood within a suitably 
ambiguous context (given the subject matter i. e. the revolution), this is entirely in keeping with Hegel's 
temper. On the negative side, he continues, "With the healthy human understanding and earnestness of 
spirit, and not with frivolous declamations, it has rebelled against the condition of the world as legally 
established, against the constitution of the state, the administration of justice, the mode of government, 
political authority, and likewise against art". Hegel calls this. "barren content", p384. 
26 'Diderot, 1966, see editors introduction, p 11. 
20 Ibid. 1966, p35. 
205 Ibid, 1966, pps. 19-22. 
"Hegel, 1977, paras 489,522 & 545. Reclam, pp. 349,370 & 386. 
'° Ibid, 1977, see index pp. 593-4" Of course, in the case of Hegel's texts the frequency of a mention is 
seldom a reliable guide to the importance of a given thinker in Hegel's mind; although Kant is only 
mentioned by name once, he obviously figures highly in the Phenonrnobki. Never-the-less. by Hegel's 
own standards the use of three direct quotes from a Diderot text is obviously very significant. 
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copy ofRamearu: rNephew found its way into Goethe's 
hands via Schiller where upon 
the former man is said to have produced a German translation before returning it 
to Schiller. ' Hegel was acquainted with Geethe so we must suppose that before 
this version of the manuscript was returned to Schiller, Hegel was given the 
opportunity to read it. 39 Before we consider the specific use that Hegel makes of 
Diderot 's text a few general comments on the nature of the text may do much to 
illuminate why Diderot was so uncharacteristically shy about publishing. 
Ramearis Nephew is a work of consummate psychological, sociological and 
philosophical nihilism. '70 Hyppolite and Price are correct in their characterisation of 
the Nephew as an example of a "deeply lacerated consciousness" but they do not go 
far enough in their explanation of the significance of this text for Hegel. Only 
sociological and philosophical nihilism will concern us here since psychological 
nihilism may be a personality trait of the Nephew but this is not enough in itself to 
constitute a moment of the zeitgeist. Diderot successfully portrayed an individual 
and an ethos, in one who believed in nothing, not even in himself and in so extreme 
a fashion and to such an extent that his own opinions and viewpoint were 
continuously self-contradicted and undermined. 
n' The Nephew himself symbolises 
disorder, mayhem, madness and insanity (hence the opening epigram to section I of 
this chapter). On the other hand, from the opening line of the text which runs, 
"Diderot, 1966, pps. 20-1, according to the editors introduction this copy probably came to Schiller via 
a German officer who had made a clandestine copy in St Petersburg. Presumably, the original source of 
this copy would have been from some of the original material which was left by Diderot to Catherine the 
Great of Russia. 
269There is no mention anywhere of Hegel having made a copy of this for himself but we might 
reasonably suppose that he must have taken notes because Hegel is known to have taken notes on 
almost everything he read,. Also the quotes from the Nephew are produced almost verbatim in the 
Phenomenoloo so are unlikely to have been reproduced from memory alone. 
270Meaning, in accordance with the definitions used in the Introduction to this Chapter, that the Nephew 
is both a philosophical and ethical nihilist. That same nihilism has evidently produced an individual who 
is also a socio-pathological nihilist. However, this last categorisation will undoubtedly hold only if one 
considers the result of philosophical and ethical nihilism to be in some sense abnormal. Some may 
consider such cynicism a healthy critical distance from other members of society, as Nietzsche would no 
doubt contend. This latter assertion is controversial and beyond the scope of the present work. For the 
purposes of the present work, the most important point is that philosophical and ethical nihilism were 
identifiable rhetorical positionseven during the early period under consideration. 
`-'See Diderot, p76, if the idea of Dideroras a precursor of Nietzsche seems a little far-fetched, where he 
says. "The man who must have a manual won't ever go far. Geniuses read little, but do a great deal and 
are their own creators. " Particularly Nietzschean, is the theme of acts which are so evil that they have a 
certain aesthetic purity, this is most evident on p 97. There is also the notion that society could not 
function without "lies", see p 112. Also sec Simon, 1995, where she argues that both Rousseau and 
Diderot anticipated the anxieties of mass culture and more recent trends. Finally, some distinction should 
be made between what Nietzsche thought to be the beginning of nihilism and Dideroi s text. Nietzsche 
thought the Socratic project the beginning of nihilism. However, it could plausibly be argued that 
Socrates sought to humble man in the Cartesian and Humean sense of finding solid grounds for our 
knowledge, the ideas we hold to are often ill thought out. In the case of Socrates this was an ethical 
project rather than an epistemological one. Dideroi scharacter, on the other hand, would seem to be the 
first real nihilist in the sense of one who deliberately sought to undermine all attempts to find either 
ethical or epistemological grounding, just for the sake of it. 
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Come rain or shine, my custom is to go for a stroll in the Palais- 
Royal every afternoon at about five, 
We are left in no doubt that Diderot presents himself as a representative of 
predictable reliability; in short, as order personified. '" Yet, in the Nephew, 
Diderot, the arch philosophe and defender of the faith of Reason and Enlightenment, 
left open to question such antithetical values as the nature of good and evil, 
madness and sanity, irrationality and reason, the ugly and the sublime. " In 
addition, he questioned the value of education (given his polemical defence of 
education against Rousseau this is all the more remarkable), as well as literature, 
history, geography, art and indeed any other topic of substance. ' 
In broad strokes then, the meeting between Diderot and Jean-Francois 
Rameau is straightforward enough. '' While out walking Diderot bumps into 
Rameau who is in a condition of some agitation because he has just been released 
from his position of music teacher for telling his wealthy patrons what he really 
thought of them. While they, for their part, may have relished Rameau's 
entertaining and outrageous behaviour in most cases, he apparently went too far on 
one occasion and was subsequently dismissed. During the discussion which follows, 
which is by turns haphazard and meandering, bawdy and high-flown, the two men 
discuss politics, ethics, music, education and much else besides. Diderot, attempts 
to present in a reasoned manner the argument that the views of others must count 
for something, that money is important to happiness but no guarantee of the same, 
that education is of value and in short; he takes many of the positions one would 
expect from a man of the Enlightenment such as he. The Nephew however, will 
have none of this, and in what amounts to a masterpiece of modern cynicism he 
trashes each one of Diderot's somewhat commonplace stuffy airs and pretensions. 
Jean-Francois Rameau is the stereotypical bohemian rag-a-muffin. In his 
opening biographical profile, Diderot described jean-Francois in terms which leave 
us in no doubt that he thinks the latter a scoundrel, a wastrel and a good-for- 
nothing. What's more, this is a characterisation that the Nephew is all to willing to 
agree with. When Diderot, in complete exasperation, tells the nephew that he is 
... "an idler, greedy", cowardly and 
has 
.. "a soul of 
dirt", the latter calmly replies 
-"Ilbid, 1966, p33- 
-31 bid, 1966, p83. 
'Ibid, 1966, p57. 
'"J. F. Rameau was an actual character of the period, the Nephew of the great composer, Jean-Phihppc 
Ramcau. 
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that he had already conceded as much. Images of Rameau are of a man who is 
both 
aggressive and pathetic, he indulges in violent arm waving, 
dancing, singing, 
crying, indeed the whole panoply of behaviours that would attract the attention the 
police today. It would appear that Diderot wants us to consider whether such 
behaviour is actually madness or that passion which comes with the commitment to 
something greater. 
In one passage it appears to the reader momentarily that Diderot, the 
philosophe himself, is in an ambiguous position, in offering some kind of justification 
for bringing us the Nephew, he says, 
If one of them (a wastrel] appears in a company of people he is the 
speck of yeast that leavens the whole and restores to each of us a 
portion of our natural individuality. He stirs people up and gives 
them a shaking, makes them take sides, brings out the truth, shows 
who are really good and unmasks the villains. It is then that the 
wise man listens and sorts people out. ' 
Hegel undoubtedly recognised a familiar object here in that the Nephew 
could be seen as a development of the 'privileged standpoint' over against the 
Enlightenment, for it is by no means self-evident that Diderot, the wiser man, 
actually wins the arguments that are presented in the text? Often the weight of 
the argumentative balance seems to favour the Nephew and simply serves to make 
Diderot's literary experiment even more compelling. ' Indeed, in the opening page 
Diderot appears to undermine his own critical thinking, reducing it to the kind of 
vacuous cynicism he later devotes so much energy in finding a suitable refutation 
to, he says for example, "My ideas are my trollops". Why would a pbiktsophe go to 
such lengths as to effectively undermine his own position, vis-ä-vis Enlightenment 
assumptions? This then is the setting of the discussion and the puzzle of the text. 
The content of the discussion is no less remarkable than the setting. The 
nephew takes the view that life is a waste of time because there is no ultimate 
purpose or meaning in the cosmos. For example he asserts over and over that there 
is no honour worth striving for, nor wealth nor beauty, therefore how each chooses 
to waste their time is a matter for them and them alone. -' 
''_°Ibid, 1966, p35. 
'Ibid, 1966, pK 1, "Sometimes 1 was astonished by the rightness of this clown's judgements about men 
and characters. I told him so". 
rslbid, 1966, pps. 37,38,39 & 52, 
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The important thing is to evacuate the bowels easily, freely, 
pleasantly and copiously every evening..... That is the final outcome 
of life in every sphere... 
says the Nephew, with the profane irreverence which is his hallmark. His 
arguments are also often inconsistent, illogical and self-contradictory, for example; 
on the one hand he is contemptuous of mediocrity and on the other, he is equally 
contemptuous of genius, because the latter make poor citizens, fathers, mothers, 
brothers or friends. "' 
The Nephew not surprisingly, has even less time for the arts or 
philosophy. 10 Throughout the dialogue the Nephew refers to the "I" of the 
narrative disparagingly as "Mr. Philosopher". In his view such types have nothing 
to offer life. Rather, he prefers the, 
... wisdom of Solomon, ... 
drink good wine, blow yourself out with 
luscious food, have a tumble with lovely women, lie on soft beds. 
Apart from that all the rest is vanity. "' 
While at first glance this might appear to amount to nothing more than 
mindless philistinism, a thoughtful reconstruction of Diderot 's text suggests rather 
a more serious point: his arguments, as in the examples of his critique of the arts 
and education, have more in tune with the 'other' of Enlightenment Reason, in a 
depreciating nihilism which appears to anticipate the discourse of modernity which 
was to follow' The Nephew does not take the view that art is worthless, the point 
is that art does not have access to truth claims of the kind which it is often claimed 
to have "More importantly, the last sentence of this quote demonstrates that the 
Nephew also took the view that society's structures were dependent upon a poly- 
valance of social recognition, a recognition which he viewed as little more than a 
2'9Ibid, 1966, pps. 38 & 52. 
2''Ibid, 1966, p43. 
28'Ibid, 1966, p65. In much the same vane the Nephew declares later that, .... "all 
down and outs are 
united in front of food", p84. 
282 See Hume, 1985, pxviii., much more eloquently, Hume once wrote, "When we see, that we have 
arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sic down contented; the we be perfectly satisfied in the 
main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and refined 
principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it 
required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary 
phenomenon". 
28`Diderot, 1966, pp. 57-9. 
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narcotic of dependency. "Apart from that all the rest is vanity", 
' he says in a 
classic statement of modern nihilism, the idea here is quite simply that philosophy 
cannot provide reliable knowledge of any kind, neither meaning to human 
existence nor an ethical code which one might live by. Here was the Spirit of the 
Revolution against the Enlightenment encapsulated in a furtive and secret text, a 
text written by one of Enlightenment's most colourful and authoritative 
representatives. 
"'Ibid, 1966, p65, anticipating the much later debate between Strauss and Kojeve, 1991, and on the 
side of Strauss, the Nephew takes the view that society consists of only ... tyrants and slaves. Similarly, the 
notion of altruism is simply reduced to a category of bad faith. These are strikingly modern observati ns. 
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The former [reasonersj however, will find in their very frankness a 
strain of reconciliation, will find in their subversive depths the all 
powerful note which restores Spirit to itself. " [my emphasis] 
Hegel, The Phenomenology 
III 
The "all powerful note" 
On first glance Hegel's use of quotations from Diderot's text look quite 
superficial, employed only for effect. ' Indeed, the last quote (the "fallen idol 
quote") which is employed by Hegel may well lend some weight to this view 
because it is clear that it has been employed to provide flair and literary flourish' 
However, we shall return to this quote after some consideration of the important 
first and second quotations employed by Hegel. The first of these I shall call the 
"moral indoctrination" episode and the second the "manic" episode. 
A brief glance at the structure of where these fall reveals that all three 
occur within the central section of the text entitled Spirit. Furthermore, both of 
these occur in the sub-section of Spirit which is entitled Self-alienated Spirit. Culture, 
and yet in the further division of this subject which is called The World of Self- 
alienated Spirit, Culture and its realm of actuality, the other corresponding section to this 
being Faith and pure insight. Although both quotes occur within the same section 
the second occurs much later, and the final quote with which we began occurs a 
remarkable forty pages later [in a completely different section entitled, The struggle 
of the Enlightenment with Superstition. ' The placing of the first two important quotes 
in the section Culture and its realm of actuality, as we shall see, is not without 
significance. 
All the quotes, including the less important final quote, are used during 
the historiographically crucial phase of the most intense self-alienation. 
Furthermore, they are used during a discussion of pre-Enlightenment socio- 
political contradictions on the one hand, and on the other, during the important 
moment of reason's struggle with religion. While the decline of the medieval social 
and political structures were determined by the growing complexity of modern 
""'Hegel, 1977, Para 522. 
2 °Ibid, 1977, paras 489,522 & 545. Reclam, pps. 349,370 & 386. 
2'Ibid, 1977, Para 545. 
1e'Ibid, 1977, Para 488. 2 111KI, 1977, 
paras 522 
& 541. 
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power forms the actual direction taken by such societies was 
dependent upon 
spiritual elements. This is wholly consistent with Hegel's early thesis in 
his 
theological writings that a secret revolution of consciousness must precede the 
actual revolution. `'9O 
The opening passages of Culture and its realm of actuality consists of immensely 
abstract discussions concerning legal and political processes; essentially law and the 
basis of right. `T' While every citizen might appear to be recognised as such in pre- 
Enlightenment times this is clearly not the case, 
This equality with everyone is, therefore, not the equality of the 
sphere of legal right, not that immediate recognition and validity of 
Self-Consciousness simply because it is.... 
This is the objective right which can only come with the social recognition 
of the revolution itself. 'g' Then in a short but crucial passage Hegel wants to 
demonstrate that the necessary product of Roman law is the development of the 
"universal substance", i. e. the modern (but still absolutist) state. It is at this 
juncture that we arrive at the first use of material from Diderot 's text. Those 
individuals who thrash about vainly trying to assert their "particularity" against the 
modern state are simply deluding themselves that they are special and unique, they 
are prematurely egotistical before a state which is still dominated by feudal 
structures. 193 
In asserting their "particularity" such individuals are rejecting culture and 
in so doing they are also rejecting the state and self-objectification as Bildung. This 
is, in Hegel's account, the same kind of reactionary romanticism, that is typical of 
Rousseau, where some notion of a corrupted natural man is employed to denote, 
ultimately, a corresponding rejection of civilisation. However, this romantic notion 
of individuality is far from esteemed by other members of the community and as 
such it is scorned by the more level headed members of society. The next important 
move in consciousness is not the retreat into some kind of harmony with nature but 
the radical new awareness of the ability to control and dominate nature. There can 
be little doubt that the type of individual Hegel has in mind here as a classical 
example of the immature consciousness is typified by Diderot 's Nepl". 
2"Ibid, 1977, paras 484,485 & 486. 
2""Ibid, 1977, para 488. 
2921 have placed the word objective under inverted commas here to indicate that it is by no means clear 
what objective right means here. 
"Ibid, 1977, pars -49. 
Ak 
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If we return to Diderot 's text for a moment then, we see that in an appeal 
to the Nephew, the "I" {presumably Diderot himself), attempts to convince the 
bohemian that the morality of the many is always to be preferred, he then marshals 
as evidence in support of his contention the responsibilities of parenthood. `94 
However, the Nephew retorts that the result of such moral indoctrination is only 
likely to result in a confused child, the formation of whose mental condition would 
be torn between the norms of society and the immoral example of his own father. 
The Nephew further claims that the outcome is almost surely going to be the 
production of a ... "rogue" or a 
"mediocrity". It also transpires during the 
conversation that the Nephew would prefer to induce the former of these 
personality traits if possible. 
Somewhat surprising is Hegel's use of this example in his own text because 
he appears to side wich the "I" rather than with the Nephew. Surprising because 
one would expect that only a Self-Consciousness which decisively rejects social 
norms and values would be likely to produce the "bath of Revolution" in Hegel's 
thinking? However, Hegel's dialectical thought weaves a more subtle path because 
we see here that it is the existence of the oppositionper se which is crucial. It is the 
tension between those who reject norms and values and those who passively and 
unthinkingly accept the same that throw up this particular text, Rameau's Nephew. 
Thus Diderot, like Socrates and Sophocles in an earlier age, bears witness to his 
own generation, his own developing 'privileged standpoint' perfectly captures the 
contradictions of the time. In doing so he demonstrates that each must construct 
and shape their collective world by definition and that there can be no refuge for 
individuals in notions of the natural. '' Hegel says at this point, 
The process in which the individuality moulds itself by culture is, 
therefore, at the same time the development of it as the universal 
essence, i. e. the development of the actual world. 
In the thought of the Nephew philosophical nihilism is the highest 
expression and the final product of alienation. On the one hand, for Hegel the 
Nephew is the symbolic representation of a one sided particularity but on the other 
the "I" of the narrative represents objective right, that is, represents adherence to 
the collective meanings embodied in the developing state formation of modernity. 
""Diderot, 1966, p 108. 
'"Hegel, 1977, para 490. 
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Here Habermas is correct in his estimation of Hegels ambiguous position. It is 
clear that for Hegel, celebrating the nihilism that created the revolution is not the 
same thing as whole heartedly celebrating nihilism pert. 
In the second "manic" quote, the task of unpacking the significance of the 
example is more difficult because the entire episode is submerged within the 
context of an obscure musical debate. ' During the period in which Diderot 
composed the Nephew a debate raged as to the respective merits of French and 
Italian music. The Nephew, we are told, enjoys the music of the Italian maestro 
Duni, and in particular he admires the skill with which the composer is able to 
mimic the natural passions. ' Also, note the overlap of the theme of the natural 
here as in the first example. In any case, the Nephew makes it known that he is 
only able to admire the French composers of the day in so far as they are also able to 
do likewise. When Diderot or the "I" goads him into revealing his thoughts more 
generally on French music, he proclaims that ... "it's 
dull". ' Adding to his analysis 
that he does not like all Italian opera, especially that of Pergolisi, one of the so- 
called Guerredes Bouffons. This is the specific backdrop to the actual quote which is 
used by Hegel, a specificity which appears to defy intelligible notions of 
significance, yet use it he does. `-' 
Cautious writers choose the form in which they present their ideas; this I 
assume, was true of both Diderot and Hegel 30° Thus a close reading will pay as 
much attention to the action which is taking place in a given text as to the 
meaning of that text. It is reasonable to assume that Hegel would have had the 
outlandish imagery described by Diderot in mind when he chose to pluck this 
quote for his own use. Thus, without working on this assumption it is easy to see 
why most commentators could easily bypass this second quote. This discussion of 
obscure matters concerning the course of the music of the period and the behaviour 
of the Nephew might appear irrelevant to the matter in hand, Warr and its realm of 
actuality. If however, we pay careful attention not only to the setting and the 
speeches of the characters in dialogue, but also to the action, then Hegel's use of 
this second quote appears quite significant. 
Diderot tells us that during the course of this impassioned argument 
concerning the merits of the various operatic traditions, that the Nephew becomes 
'Diderot, 1966, p102. 
2''1bid, 1966, pp. 97 & 98. 
"'Ibid, 1966, p97. 
""''Hegel, 1977, para 522. 
'O"ParephrasingGourevitch & Roth, 199 1, px. 
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overly stimulated and quite appears to loose all contact with his sanity. He mixes 
up all the tunes into a cacophony of sound, he sarcastically lampoons French opera 
before going on to lampoon all music, including that which only a few moments 
earlier he had so vigorously defended. Indeed his mannerisms and gestures so alarm 
Diderot that he is surprised that the Nephew is not carted off to the local asylum. v" 
The action is important here because Diderot becomes dispirited by the whole 
event. i0' Despite the force and cogency of the Nephew's arguments, his plea for a 
more naturalistic music, an interesting anticipation of Richard Wagner 's 
Schopenhaurean romanticism, and his sophisticated rejection of reason as the 
preferred mode of building artistic expression, Diderot cannot take this man 
seriously because of the manner of his delivery. He said, 
Did I admire? {the Nephew} Yes, I did. Was I touched with pity? 
Yes, I was. But a tinge of ridicule ran through these sentiments and 
discoloured them.; "; 
This episode is a perfect example of the kind of destructive judgement 
which questions everything, even itself, "Where the highest values devalue 
themselves". Hegel goes on to say that all of this is achieved in a language which is 
... "clever and witty", indeed it is the complete ... "perversion" of every idea and 
every form of reality. Of such judgement Hegel said [and here we come to his 
specific use of the material), 
This kind of talk is the madness of the musician .... who heaped up 
and mixed together thirty arias, Italian, French, tragic, comic, of 
every sort; now with a deep bass he descended into hell, then, 
contracting his throat, he rent the vaults of heaven with a falsetto 
tone, frantic and soothed, imperious and mocking, by turns.; 04 
In other words, as in the first example where Hegel considered that 
modernity emerged from the tension between social conformity and "particularity", 
which in turn created the pre-requisite of state formation, in this example the 
break with autocratic state forms is foretold in the nihilist consciousness of the 
dispossessed bohemian ragamuffin. As Hegel said, 
"Diderot, 1966, pp. 102-3. 
"121bid. 1966, p26, it is also worth noting that this passage is even more significant in that, in terms of the 
views actually expressed by Diderot in his other writings, the roles are actually reversed here, Diderot 
preferring French music, see the Editors Introduction. 
1966, p103. 
"''Hegel, 1977, Para 522. 
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... the 
demand for this dissolution [of reason) can only be directed to 
the Spirit ofculture itself, in order that it return out of its confusion 
to itself as Spirit, and win for itself a still higher consciousness.; OS 
This reading of the first two episodes is further supported by the more 
straightforward third one, the "fallen idol" quote. "' During the discussion entitled 
The Struggle of the Enlightenment with superstitioin, it is clear that Hegel has little 
sympathy for the official representatives of religious belief. He says, 
The masses are the victims of the deception of a priesthood which, 
in its envious conceit, holds itself to be the sole possessor of insight 
and pursues its own selfish ends as well j' 
In addition to this self-conceit the clergy are purveyors of a ... "tissue of 
superstitions, prejudices and errors". Hegel contends that the reason of the 
Enlightenment, like perfume, will diffuse amongst their falsehoods as it does in the 
... "unresisting atmosphere". 
Then quoting from Diderot he says, ... "crash, bang 
and wallop" their world will come crashing about their heads like so many falling 
idols of old.; 0" Thus this final quote is perfectly consistent with the theme of the 
other two, the slow disintegration of the old order in the collective imagination 
before its actual disintegration. 
To conclude this section, when we contextualize these quotations from 
Diderot 's Rameau'. r Nephew, drawing on the discussion itself in the case of the first 
example and upon the dramatic activity in the second, we see that for Hegel, 
Diderot is the modern Sophocles. The text is the very epitome of the revolutionary 
consciousness, a fiery cocktail of rebellion. On the one hand it reflects the new self- 
awareness of the ability to build society afresh and it combines this same realisation 
with the elements of both irrational and rational irreverence before every power, 
astral or earthly. This new Self-Consciousness is manifest in the language of 
nihilism where nothing said has any value and everything said is contradictory, 
nothing more valuable than the assertions of a self-confessed liar and 'waster. 
Despite all this Hegel felt able to say, 
°'Ibid, 1977, Para 524-5. 
'Ibid, 1977, Para 545. 
"' Ibid, 1977, Para 542. 
'OFIbid, 1977, Para 546. 
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In such talk [witty irreverence], this particular self, qua this pure 
self, determined neither by reality nor by thought, develops into a 
spiritual self that is of truly universal worth. " 
This is the eve of the French Revolution in practice as Culture and its realm of 
actuality. The new universal individual of post-revolutionary life is quite different. 
Such an individual is one who withdraws from moral commentary or from asserting 
their particular value-judgements as if they could be universally applicable, but is 
still able to recognise their duty. Thus we are left with the following puzzle, the 
history of the 'privileged standpoint' is realised by Hegel and culminates in 
"Absolute Knowing", and the final closure of self-alienation is found in the 
destruction of one-sided Enlightenment by the return of speculative philosophy or 
freedom of mind and the "Absolute Freedom" of the Revolutionary moment. 
However, the nihilist attitude which is embodied in the Nephew can only lead to 
terror because it remains essentially destructive, empty, abstract and immature. 
The solution Hegel finds to this problem is to retain a conception of philosophy 
which is essentially retrospective. Hegel's prophetic 'privileged standpoint' remains 
ex eventu. For Hegel, the task of philosophy is the inwardizing of the 'absolute 
standpoint' and the practical realisation of abstract freedom ["an empirical matter" 
he says in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History), not the promise of 
redemption in some future social agency. 
Finally, the "all-powerful note" which restores the course of spirit, 
according to Hegel, is a humbled conception of Reason which takes care only to 
manifest itself in a procedural form which does not contradict the modern depth 
subjectivity's of the new social agency of the Enlightenment. This remains a 
different conception of Reason than that of Kant's because this new humility of 
Reason posits no moral agenda of its own, neither that of self-government nor 
ultilitarianism. It requires only the internalisation of the fundamental basis of the 
new procedural realm or form it inhabits. 
"Ibid. 1977. p Ara 526. 
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The German professors of constitutional law have not stopped 
spewing forth masses of writings on the concept of sovereignty and 
the meaning of the Acts of Confederation. [Meanwhile]. The great 
professor of constitutional law sits in Paris.; O 
Hegel to Niethammer, Bamberg, August 29,1807 
IV 
'Post-Historical' Existence 
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Hegel's conception of freedom 
rejected the reductive positive notion of freedom understood as possibilities of action. 
Rather, he favoured the idea of freedom as a particular form of appropriate action.; " 
Here Allen Wood is correct when he says, Hegel describes freedom as, 
"being with oneself in an other", that is, actively relating to 
something other than oneself in such a way that this other becomes 
integrated into one's own projects, completing and fulfilling them 
so that it counts as belonging to one's own action rather than 
standing over against it. 
In other words, freedom requires the unity of subject and object, it 
demands the rational non-alienated appropriation of our own self-products. In 
short, Absolute Freedom is the closure of "thought which is hostile to itself". 
However, as we have also seen in this chapter, the closure of alienated dialectic 
understood as Entfremdung brings with it the additional responsibilities of a 
rationalised self-conception of Entäußerung. But the transition between the two 
forms of alienation remains problematic because the lesson of the "Terror" was the 
demonstration that social recognition remained 'abstract', that is, it remained a 
superficial exercise in freedom as universal arbitrariness and the rejection of social 
roles (The Nephew), and in the drawing up of abstract principles and formal 
documents re-stating a liberty which was wilfully disregarded by political factions. 
The purpose Hegel now sets himself is to demonstrate in the present how social 
recognition can be truly internalised in order that the empirical details might be 
made manifest in a rational Entäußerung. 
""Hegel, 1984, pp. 139-141. 
311 See Wood, introduction to the Philosophy of Right, 1991, pxi. 
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The most common misunderstanding regarding Hegel's political theory has 
been one which is often found in both Marxist and Liberal readings: namely, that 
he held that a, 
... political community 
is defined by a number of common goals 
[thus values) that are logically prior to those of its members. 
''` 
In very general terms it may well be argued that the validity of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right is interdependent on some basic adherence by members of the 
political community to a very broad range of basic assumptions. On the other hand, 
this is a very long way from notions of the modern state as some form of 
preconceived metaphysical entity.; " In short, Hegel's response to modern nihilism, 
with its concomitant value neutrality, was to develop in response, a system of 
institutional structures which would, in turn, constantly preserve [Ai+fheben} social 
recognition's 'privileged' moment. In one sense, social recognition is certainly 
compatible with the traditional liberal notion of a means-indentured morality 
which is located in the self-worth of each individual, regardless of the ends of 
man. 114 However, as Hegel well understood, this does not necessarily entail that 
social recognition is in itself a value, rather, following the . census communis of the 
Scottish school, Hegel held that social recognition was an epistemological as well as 
an ontological phenomenon. 315 The fact that value might be inclusive to social 
recognition, in so far as it is of some benefit to the individual unalienated psyche for 
example, is nothing other than a coincidence of sorts. The Phenomenology, as Flay has 
pointed out, is a work of traditional philosophy in this sense at least; there is a 
desire on Hegel's part "to get at the truth", to lay aside "love of knowing and 
become actual knowing". 
To be sure, Hegel was not a proponent of political or philosophical nihilism, 
for Hegel, as we have seen, identified the human good with the self-actualisation of 
" : See Belamy, 1987, p693, also, this is a position which is taken by Kant and which Hegel is, above all, 
trying to critique. 
-4`41bid, 1987, p698, in an interesting analogy with the operation of language, Richard Bellamy has 
suggested that in Hegel's political theory the community stands in relation to the individual in much the 
same way as the rules of language relate to speech. Whilst vocabulary and grammar do not determine 
what we think and say, they do structure it. 
; 'See Kant, 1992, pp. 93-13O, for a classical statement of this kind of liberalism. However, unlike 
Hegel, Kant takes the view that such liberalism is rooted in a moral autonomy which is given, rather 
than the product of recognitive processes. Thus in the final analysis Kant 's liberalism is ahistorical and of 
a kind which Hegel is concerned to transcend. 
"'kY Hegel, 1995, p372. 
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the Spirit. 't'his is also clear from the closing paragraph of the Phenomenology, he said 
there, 
... the two together (phenomenology and appearance), 
comprehended History, form alike the inwardizing and the Calvary 
of absolute spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, 
without which he would be lifeless and alone. 
And then in his famous adaptation of Schillers Die Freundshaft, we have Hegel's 
optimistic conclusion that, 
.... from the chalice of this realm of spirits 
foams forth for Him his 
own infinitude. 16 
While this notion of "Absolute Knowing" in the Phenomenology may, by 
turns, be read as an existential theory, a psychological metaphor, a system of 
philosophy and even as a theological imperative, it is not explicitly political. It is 
little more than a sketch of the later "Absolute Idea" but it is also something 
different from the "Absolute Idea", in so far as "Absolute Knowing" represents the 
`privileged standpoint' of the know-er and the Idea is that which he knows. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 1, Hegel was not particularly happy with the form 
of his presentation of "Absolute Knowing". Quite clearly his philosophical sketch 
at the end of the Phenomenology had none of the coherence or comprehensiveness of a 
fully worked-out political or ethical system and should not be extrapolated as such. 
But while Hegel held that this existentialist notion, whether theological or not, to 
be a good, this does not mean that he was naive enough to believe that in complex 
societies such existentialism was self-advancing. As we have seen, the theory of 
Absolute Freedom itself undermines this very same doctrine of self-actualisation. 
For Hegel, nihilism was the product of the search for truth and freedom and once 
the latter was revealed as empty of positive content then objective notions of truth 
would be the first casualty. Freedom in this sense, will only serve to undermine 
itself, only after social recognition becomes subjectively internalised by every 
individual can freedom be sustained and take its proper form, Hegel says, 
... absolute 
freedom leave[s) its self-destroying reality and pass[s) 
into another land of self-conscious spirit where, in this unreal world, 
freedom has the value of truth.; '' 
"'Hegel, 1977. Para 808. 
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It is not the intention here to follow the well-trodden path of so many 
others and offer another interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy. Neither is 
there space here for such a thing. Rather, the point is to underscore the way in 
which the assumption of nihilism shaped this theory, both in the Phenomenology and 
in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's solution to the political dangers of value neutrality 
and moral relativism was an attempt to map out the most promising social 
institutions of self-understandings and self-mediations. This much is self-evident 
from even the most cursory glance over the index to the Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right with its mediations of singular, particular and universal. However, if the 
argument of the present thesis is sound then Hegel must be found to be 
demonstratively addressing the problem of how one constructs, institutions of self- 
mediation which are posteriori. That is, our institutions must be based on our ever- 
changing experiences of the real world, and not upon our knowledge, so-called, of 
transcendent values which are given to cognition or are a priori. 
In both Hegel's early and mature thought, inter-subjectivity and communal 
forms of self-understanding may frame our interests but there is nothing which 
suggests that all or even most of these self-understandings are determined by 
society or the bonds of community. For Hegel, the post-historical "shape" of the 
world demands that our institutions necessarily appear before our values, not the 
other way round, as is most commonly held in political philosophy. In the 
Phenomenology he was to say, 
... spiritual essence has already been designated as ethical 
substance; [that is, the state] but spirit is the actuality of that 
substance. 
He continued, 
Spirit, being the substance and the universal, self-identical, and 
abiding essence, is the unmoved solid ground and starting point for 
the action of all....; '. 
In the much later Philosophy of Right he said, 
"Ibid, 1977, para 595. 
t18lbid, 1977, para 439. 
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.... it is only through 
being a member of the state that the individual 
{individuum) himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life. 
On the other hand, in the same passage a little further on he also goes on to 
describe the state as ... "the march of God in the world", ... a phrase which 
has 
undoubtedly led some to speculate in favour of the view we are trying to refute 
here, namely; that Hegels account of the state remains, in some sense, 
metaphysical or transcendental. 319 However, we also know that for Hegel, the 
march of God was also analogous with the march of Napoleon himself ... "this world 
spirit on horseback", and literally, in the further march of the Napoleonic Code 
across a still backward and almost feudal Germany. "" The Phenomenology in effect, 
was the Self-Consciousness of the Napoleonic Code. In the final paragraph of the 
chapter on post-historical morality Hegel said, 
... it [satisfied Being) is 
God manifested in the midst of those who 
know themselves in the form of pure knowledge. ' 
As Kojcve as argued, on the one side is Napoleon and on the other is Hegel, 
Consequently, they are these sheer opposites for one another; it is 
the completely inner being which thus confronts its own self and 
enters into outer existence. 
Kojeve is surely correct in his view that the identity of these "opposites for 
one another" is Hegel and Napoleon, in-so-far as the latter represents the 
Entäußerung of the 'absolute standpoint' writ large. Thus while many have argued 
that Hegel notoriously sought the rational justification for the thesis that might is 
right, such scholars have failed to see that for Hegel, Napoleon was a unique case. 
Napoleon's basic law was the maturation of the spirit of the modern state. Once 
these universal institutions of the modern state, such as those of education and the 
other institutions of civil society, the corporations and some form of representative 
democracy was in place, then new philosophical criteria would apply in the analysis 
of political projects. 
The anarchy of the French Revolution shook Hegel badly, even in the much 
later Philosophy- of Right, concern with what went wrong was always uppermost in 
39Hegel, 1991,258a. 
42UHegel, 1984, letter Nos 71,73,74, & 95. 
"'Hegel, 1977, para 671, also see Kojeve, 1989, p 69. 
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his political imagination. Could the promise of the freedom of the revolution be 
preserved, without the empty destruction and violation of the dialectic which 
produced it, be saved? How could the social fluidity of the "spiritual masses", 
which had abolished all institutions, be reconciled with the new institutions of 
post-historical life? In fact, Hegel's point is quite simply that reconciled they must 
become for modernity's lesson is that they have no choice, there can be no real 
going back. In the introduction to the Philosophy of Right he said, 
If the will determines itself in this way, [in the anarchist sense of 
freedom as arbitrariness) or if representational thought [die 
Vorstellung) considers this aspect in itself {für sich) as freedom and 
holds fast to it, this is negative freedom or the freedom of the 
understanding. This is the freedom of the void, which is raised to 
the status of an actual shape and passion. If it remains purely 
theoretical, it becomes in the religious realm the Hindu fanaticism 
of pure contemplation; but if it turns to actuality, it becomes in the 
realm of both politics and religion, the fanaticism of destruction, 
demolishing the whole existing social order, eliminating all 
individuals regarded as suspect by a given order, and annihilating 
any organisation which attempts to rise up anew. "' 
In other words, there can be no going back to the beginning or the middle 
of the dialectic. Using language which had been lifted straight from his own 
Phenomenology he continued, 
.... and its [freedom} actualisation can only be the fury of 
destruction. `; 
Hegel is quite clear that the 'particularity' of absolute freedom will in the 
end cancel itself out if it is not mediated by social institutions such as those which 
emerge as rational in the present, thus in the Philosophy of Right he warns that, 
... the people, during the French Revolution, destroyed once more 
the institutions they themselves created, because all institutions are 
incompatible with the abstract Self-Consciousness of equality.; '4 
'''Hegel, 1967,5 Remark. 
`''Hegel, 1977, para 589. 
''4Hege1,1967,5 Remark. 
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The spiritual sansculottism of the revolution had to be replaced by "actual" 
sansculottism, this was the task of the Code, the actualisation of 
freedom without 
the empty negativity of the social recognition of the Revolution. 
3''' 
The underlying rationale of Hegel's political philosophy can thus be 
summed up as follows: the post-historical conception of freedom is one which does 
not regard possibilities of action or the shallow venting of ones peculiarities, as in 
the case of the Neplww, as substantive freedom but only as a theoretical freedom. 
While such a subjective viewpoint is a spiritual prerequisite of modernity, it is not 
the mature way. The modern state and the other major constitutional embodiments 
of modernity suggest rather, that freedom is best realised when one actively relates 
one's own projects with these social structures. When one's own life plans are 
integrated with such institutions to the extent that they are viewed as one's own 
rather than as something which, in Hegelian language, stands over against one. ' 
The fact that this idea depends upon the ability of individuals to act rationally to 
the extent that they are able to identify with the sum total which is greater than 
themselves, is some thing else again and is not a proposition which can be 
adequately dealt with here. 
According to Hegel then, institutions which are properly constructed 
around the basis of social recognition [that is, are universal} may enable us to 
further our infinitely differentiated projects if these are able to provide multiple 
levels of communication both horizontally and hierarchically, and if these are also 
able to freely disseminate information and knowledge to those who require it, but 
all of this is only realisable if actual political and social power is also widely 
disseminated throughout society. This is why we find through-out the Philosophy of 
Right a concern that power should not become concentrated into fewer and fewer 
hands.; ' 
In any case, the identification with these institutions, especially the modern 
state, requires, at the very least, the ability to rationally project, assimilate and 
harmonise with an infinitely more complex social organism. ' Thus it falls upon the 
individuals of a post-historical society to responsibly submit to the inevitable 
compromises that such a state would have to make. Thus we see that in such a 
32 Hegel, 1977, Editors Introduction, pxxrv. 
"'Again, here I follow both Wood and Bellamy. 
''See Hegel, 1967,15R, 23. Hegel, 1990,328a and 385. And Hegel, 1977, pars 584. 
12S Hegel, 1967, para 244, one example of this is Hegel's concern that the creation of a rabble is Lkely to 
lead to its opposite, the concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands. 
429 Hegel, 1977, paras419 & 437. 
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scheme it is the individuals who are shaping themselves and their values, to some 
extent, to the more complex demands of the rational state and the other 
institutions of modernity and not the other way around. 
Finally, Hegel always stubbornly refuses to engage in anything other than 
execrntu prophecy. Thus within the context of a discussion of the "Old World" and 
the "New", he says in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
... prophecy is not the business of the philosopher. In history, we are 
concerned with what has been and what is; in philosophy, however, 
we are concerned not with what belongs exclusively to the past or 
to the future, but with that which is, both now and eternally-... in 
short, with reason. 330 
4" Hegel, 1997, p 17 1. 
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You know also that I always had a penchant for politics. 331 
Hegel to von Knebel, Bamberg, August 30,1807 
V 
Political Theory and Ex Eventu Prophecy 
It is not my intention here to explore Hegel's political theory in any great 
detail, however, the important point is that in the course of Hegel's long spiritual 
glance backwards he identifies all the most important modern institutions of 
modernity, the growth and expansion of the modern state, the growth of 
constitutional law, the balance of power between the Monarch, the elected 
assemblies, the judiciary and the state bureaucracy, the states monopoly of 
legitimate violence and the role of international law. "2 Not one of these elements of 
government is less important today than it was in Hegel's own time. Hegel also 
describes in detail the development of civil society, the property relation, the 
modern family, the marriage contract, the system of needs and in his view the 
proper function of welfare. All of this can be ascertained by even the most 
momentary and superficial glance at the table of contents of his Philacopby of Right, 
which amounts to nothing less than a comprehensive compendium of observations 
on modern state and society. 
More important than the precise detail of Hegel's description of political 
modernity then, its accuracy or validity, from the point of view of the present 
thesis, is the epigraphic rational Hegel himself gives in the Preface to the Philosophy 
of Right for why he sought only to identify Reason in the present. "To comprehend 
what is is the task of philosophy, for what it is reason", he says. As far as his 
treatment of political science is concerned and as a "philosophical" composition, his 
text he says ... 
"must distance itself as far as possible from the obligation to 
construct a state as it ought to be; such instruction as it may contain cannot be aimed 
at instructing the state on how it ought to be, but rather at showing how the state, 
as the ethical universe, should be recognised". "' I have already discussed the so- 
called left critique that has suggested that this apparent political pragmatism on 
Hegel's part, was an attempt to curry favour with the Prussian authorities and so 
will not repeat it here, except to remind the reader that Hegel's positions in the 
33'Hege1,1984. 
;1 See Hegel, 1991, p343, "The constitution is essentially a system of mediation". 
"' Hegel, 1991, p21. 
122 
Philosophy of Right were certainly not a description of Prussian hegemony in any real 
sense. 
The great challenge of the times, suggests Hegel over and over in the 
Philosophy of Right, is to find an intellectual or cognitive grounding for reconciliation 
with the social atomism of modernity, social atomism which threatens to create 
... "a 
formless mass whose movement and activity can consequently only be 
elemental, irrational, barbarous and terrifying" . 
334 Again, let me repeat, the social 
anarchy of the Revolution and the vulgar utilitarianism of Enlightenment 
rationality, when one-sidedly developed in the sphere of the modern market 
economy, are the fundamental basis of nihilism and Revolutionary freedom in this 
account. Thus, Hegel took the view that social atomicity and the self-serving 
individualism of bourgeois culture was causing the disintegration, of what we today 
would call trade associations, and was therefore, driving trade interests towards 
internal competition and collapse. "' According to Hegel the modern market 
economy was both a blessing and a curse, it displayed the "inner necessity" that 
underlay a deeper social membership but it also contained a counter-tendency in so 
far as it also threatened to create a homo economicus. 3 
In other words, there is a profound political dilemma at the root of all of 
this. On the one hand, Hegel needs to produce, if he is to demonstrate how 
externalisation [Entäußerung] can be rationally dispatched in the service of 
meaning to overcome strangeness and isolation [Entfremdung), a self-disclosing 
and deep seated social subjectivity which is able to self-identify with the bigger 
picture. " On the other hand, the social atomism itself would seem to preclude 
such an attempt on the part of externalisation. In a decidedly modern nightmare, 
nihilism, the absence of meaning, prevents the overcoming of strangeness 
[Entfremdung] and the necessary rational for suffering and struggle is lost in the 
first instance. 
Hegel's escape from this paradox is in keeping with his religious 
formulation of the same problem, one which I have already examined, it is 
eschatological, but it is an eschatology which is clearly ex eventu. Returning to the 
Preface to the Philosophy of Right, we find Hegel toying with Rosicrucianist imagery. 
;" Ibid, 1991, p344- 
33' lbid, 1991, p 455, where he says, ... "the spirit of atomicity, [is causing) the corporations to 
fall to 
pieces". 
Ibid, 1991, pps 227-29 and Editors introduction, I am paraphrasing Wood here. 
&c Norman, 1976, p103. "The French Revolution, then, is seen by Hegel as the overcoming of 
alienation".... in other words through the self-recognition that the work of the Revolution is our work etc. 
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If some of his more demagogic colleagues such as 
Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773- 
1843) had cast philosophy in the agitational role of crowd pleasing at the 
nationalist book-burnings of the Wartburg Festival of October 1817, then Hegel 
will recast it in the mould of agitation's opposite, in carefully crafted Reason. 
"" The 
appropriate role of political philosophy he says, is to encourage the recognition of 
... 
"reason as the rose in the cross of the present". In other words, the present is the 
earthly and its sufferings and alienation's [understood as both Entfremdung and as 
Entäußerung], and the rose is the divine, the Absolute Idea comprehending itself. 
In Hegel's view, the process of social recognition, that is, the modern 
institutional manifestations of social recognition outlined a moment ago, must 
serialise, these must teach people how to mediate between Reason and suffering. 
The ultimate meaning and purpose of suffering must be revealed if spirit is to 
understand the success which is already Reasons own in the provident ascendancy 
of these social and political institutions and in the face of sufferings continuation, 
albeit even if the latter is a progressively diminishing phenomenon. "God does not 
wish to have narrow-minded and empty-headed children. On the contrary, he 
demands that we should know him; "..., says Hegel. What God's children should 
know, in Hegel's view, is that their belief in his "providence" is fully justified 
cognitively, and is finally revealed retrospectively in a spiritually loaded history of 
the world. Philosophy, unlike religion, is able, according to Hegel, to unearth 
Reason amid suffering in a detailed way. " Philosophy must be its own time 
apprehended in thought, as he said in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. 
To summarise so far, I have demonstrated in this concluding chapter on 
Hegel that he took the view that the Enlightenment project was an inevitable 
product of philosophy's search for truth but that it was also a fatally flawed product 
in so far as it led to the one sided development of the individual. This unhealthy 
psychosis was brilliantly personified in Diderot 's character sketch in Ramea /s 
Nephew. While it may be true that the Nephew was paradoxically, both alienated 
and a nihilist, it was the nihilism which interested Hegel. The Absolute Freedom of 
the Revolution was a necessary product of the Enlightenment because the rational 
`-" Ibid, 1991, pps 384-86, for a full description of this event and Hegel's reaction to it. 
339 See Hegel, in Bubner, 1997, p336, "It is one of the central doctrines of Christianity that providence 
has ruled and continues to rule the world, and that everything that happens in the world is determined 
by and commensurate with the divine government. This doctrine is opposed both to the idea of chance 
and to that of limited ends.... Its end is the ultimate and universal end which exists in and for itself. 
Religion does not go beyond this general representation; it remains on the level of generality. But we 
must proceed from this general faith firstly to philosophy and then to the philosophy of world history. 
from the faith that world history is a product of eternal reason, and that it is reason which has determined 
all its great revolutions". 
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critique of all the previous modes of superstition and prejudice inevitably 
undermined that same critique. The blood bath of the Revolution was always 
present as a possibility, this was the dark side of the Enlightenment. Diderot's 
characterisation of the witty sophistication of the salons of Paris, now suggested 
different imagery in Hegel's historical imagination, rather suggesting the 
emptiness of the guillotine, only this time as socio-pathology. As such, the salons of 
polite society were dark recesses of human consciousness indeed. 
A term such as nihilism is notoriously slippery, so much so that both 
traditional rationalist and analytic approaches have often regarded it to be of very 
limited value, if any value at all. However, we have seen in this chapter that the 
generalising historical power of such a term allows us to reach a deeper level of 
understanding concerning the connection between Hegel's political philosophy and 
his political theory. 3'0 Liberal institutions, the rule of law, elected assemblies, 
corporations, and the organisations of civil society such as a free press, which I 
haven't mentioned, are means rather than political ends. In other words, these are 
value-neutral institutions which match a value-neutral world. Hegel's prophetic 
"Absolute Knowing" or completion of history refuses to look forward but remains ex 
ez ntu, legitimated by the past historically and the eternal philosophically, not held 
a hostage to fortune in some distant future scenario. This is not so in the case of the 
influential thinkers which fill the remainder of this study, Max Stirner, Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Nietzsche and in what follows I shall explain why. 
-"'This is necessary, of course, because of the ambiguity of the text itself. 
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As long as you believe in the truth, you do not believe in yourself, 
and you are a- servant, a- religions man. 
Stirner, The Ego and Its Own 4' 
CHAPTER III 
Post-Historical Existence I: The Lrmpenprdetariat 
Introduction 
In what follows I will argue that Max Stirner was an anarchist and a kind of 
nihilist. I will try to demonstrate how this anarchism and nihilism flowed from his 
reading of Hegelianism and from his political critique of some of the dominant 
views of other Young Hegelian's, principally those of Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno 
Bauer. I will hold that Stirner sought to irrevocably transform society and that the 
purpose of this social transformation was to bring about a new social order which 
was in turn based upon a new conception of individualism. Finally, I hope to 
demonstrate the extent to which Stirner's political critique was a hostage to 
eschatological fortune, in other words, the full extent to which his anarchism was 
determined by the nihilism of the period. }' 
In section one I will outline some of the basic ideas of the Hegelian's, 
Feuerbach and Bauer, who provided the polemical stimulus to Stirner's book, The 
Ego and Its Oum. In section two I will look at some of Stirner's most important ideas 
such as his notion of the "Egoist" and some of the secondary scholarship which has 
characterised Stirner as, among other things, an existentialist. Then in section 
3' Stimer, 1995, p312. Max Stirrer, whose real name was Johann Casper Schmidt (1806-56}, was 
perhaps one of the most remarkable of all the Young Hegelians. One of the few in this group to actually 
hear Hegel lecture at Berlin University, he rejected the life of productive radicalism which many of the 
others chose in favour of a kind of slothful independence. He only ever wrote one substantial volume, Der 
Einzige kndxin Eigentum, the publication of which gave him sufficient confidence in his future that he 
abandoned his position of schoolteacher at a local school for young ladies. Der Einzige did bring him a 
brief period of fame and notoriety before he virtually all but disappeared from the literary scene. 
Eventually he sank into poverty, the debtors prison, divorce and an early death after being stung by an 
insect. His one apparent act of affirmation following the publication of The Ego and In Own being his 
attempt to set up a milk delivery service with his wives inheritance. In the event he lost all of Marie 
Dähnhardt s money and when Stirneis biographer caught up with her many years later, the story goes 
that all she would say regarding her "very sly" first husband was that she had never loved him nor 
enjoyed what she regarded as a real marriage with him. 
"' See Schmidt, 1999, p19, where he says of Hegel's view of the Revolutionary violence, "The Terror 
thus enters the pages of the Phenomenology as one more example of the fruitless effort to master 
objectivity by killing it". What was true of Hegel's view of the Revolution is even more true of Stirrer's 
political philosophy, as I shall try to demonstrate in what follows. 
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three I will examine the extent of Stirner's messianism and finally in section four I 
will draw some of this together in a characterisation of Stirner's anarchist politics 
and nihilist rendering of Hegelianism which was to prove to be decisive for the 
future direction of German philosophy. For as Karl Lüwith has suggested, the 
German obsession with nihilism, meaning Nietzsche and the post-Nietzscheans 
above all, began with Stirner's own understanding of Hegelianism. 
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Against Feuerbach and Bauer 
Stirner's study of the contemporary thought of his colleagues opens with a 
challenge; to re-examine the concept of 'man' developed in the thought of 
Feuerbach and Bauer, 
'Man is to man the supreme being', says Feuerbach. 
'Man has just been discovered', says Bruno Bauer. 
And Stirner replies, 
Now let us take a more careful look at this supreme being and this 
new discovery. 
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-72), studied philosophy with Hegel at 
Berlin University for two years. In a letter to Hegel dated 1828, Feuerbach gave 
Hegel the credit for his own religious eschatology. For Feuerbach, again moving 
beyond Hegel, the perfectibility of the kingdom wholly consists in the free 
operation of Reason itself. He wrote that he hoped that Hegel's system would, 
... become the expressed universal spirit of reality itself, to 
found, as 
it were, a new world-epoch, to establish a kingdom.... There is now 
a new basis of things, 
he continues, 
.... a new history, a second creation, where..... reason will become 
the universal appearance of things. " 
The messianic cone is a typical part of the legacy of Hegel's system. As 
Lawrence Stcpclevich has pointed out, it was well understood from the very 
beginning of the Young Hegelian movement that this, ... 
"apocalyptic tone, this 
sense of historical revolution, was the essential ingredient of the Young Hegelian 
`'`Quoted in L. S. Stepelevich. 1987, p5. 
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metaphysic". #' Most of Feuerbach's work was in some sense a critique of 
contemporary religious thought, from his Thoughts on Death and Immortality [1830}, 
through to the book which brought him fame, his The Essence of Christianity [1841) to 
his later work, On the Essence of Faith in Luthers Sense {1844]. In his Towards a Critique 
of Hegels Philosophy {1839}, Feuerbach continually pressed the fact that he thought 
a new day had dawned, 
German speculative philosophy [i. e. Hegel) stands in direct 
contrast to the ancient Solomonic wisdom: whereas the latter 
believes that there is nothing new under the sun, the former sees 
nothing that is not new under the sun. 345 
Feuerbach, typically, considered Hegel's philosophy the revealed truth; this 
truth was contained in the thesis that the Phenomenology had essentially retained the 
content of Christianity but in keeping with Hegel's treatment this form is now one 
of the 'idea' and the 'concept' together rather than the pictorial imagery of the 
scriptures. The retention, therefore, of the liturgical and other practices of Western 
religion was, according to Feuerbach, an historical anachronism and the last dying 
gasp of self-alienated consciousness. A condition in which humanities most elevated 
feelings, aspirations, thoughts and hopes become attributes of God rather than the 
self-products of men. While religion usefully served to remind man that the 
universe and nature is a unified system or his own essence, Feuerbach's radical 
religious anthropology sought to construct a new secular humanism which was 
based, ultimately, on the love and understanding of fellow man, thus bypassing the 
need for any form of traditional religious mediation. ' In short, he sought to de- 
theologise Hegel's system. 
An example of Feuerbach's critique of religious belief, taken from his 
magnum opus, The Essence of Christianity should serve to demonstrate his method. In 
chapter twenty-one, entitled "The Contradiction in the Revelation of God" 
Feuerbach turns to traditional ontology. He points out that ultimately, proof of 
God's existence must fall upon the belief in revelation since "proofs drawn from 
reason" for the existence of God are "merely subjective". This is because "A God 
who only exists without revealing himself, who exists for me through my own 
mental act, such a God is merely abstract, imaginary",.. "" 
"Ibid, 1997, p5. 
"'l bid, 1987, p95. 
"'Here lam paraphrasing M. Inwood, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 1995, p276. 
"Feucrbach. 1989, p204. 
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However, a God who "gives knowledge of himself through his acts alone" is 
thought to be "objective", says Feuerbach. Furthermore, a theological objectivity of 
this kind, which is "in itself a mere theory" actually becomes to the religious mind 
a "practical belief, a matter of conscience, - a fact". And crucially, a "fact is that 
which one must believe nolens volens;; 
' a fact is a physical force not an 
argument"... ' Thus through this process the religious mind becomes the passive 
being and God becomes omnipotent self-activity. But, asks Feuerbach, why does 
God, "who needs nothing", invest in man, why is the revelation directed towards 
man at all? It is, after all, man who determines the need for this active God, as God 
does also of man, both man and God are reciprocally determined in this 
arrangement but, says Feuerbach, "in revelation man determines himself as that 
which determines God, i. e. revelation is simply the self-determination of man, only 
that between himself the determined, and himself the determining, he interposes 
an object-God". 350 
Finally, that which must come from God to man, "comes to man only from 
man in God", from the "ideal nature of man to the phenomenal man, from the 
species to the individual". Feuerbach concludes that in revelation what actually 
occurs is that "man goes out of himself, in order ... to return to himself". Thus 
"theology is nothing less than anthropology", meaning that knowledge of God is 
actually nothing other than "knowledge of man", the species-being historically 
understood. In Feuerbach's view each presentation of God is actually the idealised 
collective expression of the nature of man to other men, hence his admiration for 
Hegel's historical elevation of reason. 
Now we have a fuller appreciation of the opening quote by Feuerbach with 
which Stirner opens Der Einzige, "Man is to man the supreme being", this epigram 
should be understood literally. However, Stirner cannot accept the notion of a 
generic "supreme being", rather, as we shall see, the one "supreme being" that he 
is prepared to accept is the revealed Ego, but this is to anticipate my exposition. 
Feuerbach's analysis does fall short of Hegel's system in at least two 
respects. First, unlike Hegel, Feuerbach does little to demonstrate that his 
ontological thought, principally the value of reciprocity understood in species terms 
as generic mankind, should not just be considered as one more "kind" or "type" 
"The New College Latin & English Dictionary gives "unquestioningly". 
"Feuerbach, 1989, p205. 
"Olbid, 1989, p206. 
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[thinking here of Hegel's critique of the Nephew), of life. Hegel had at least tried 
to demonstrate how his Phenomenology was the "true" in terms which were cognisant 
of the history of philosophy i. e. the dove-tailing of epistemology and freedom with 
something eternal, i. e. the "Absolute Idea". To some degree we are expected to 
assume that this is also Feuerbach's Hegelian starting point but perhaps this was 
unlikely to be convincing for Stirner. Secondly, as we saw with regard to Hegel's 
conception of the historical absolute or'privileged standpoint', Hegel held that the 
duty of philosophy was to think in the past and present, since that which was 
deemed providential could only be retrospectively deduced. Thus the true moral 
Spirit of "self-certainty" in Hegels view is not based upon love of man but on 
conscience, which is here another term for the subject ification of social recognition, 
although in this case it is freedom, the French Revolution internalised. 
A late convert to left Hegelianism, Bruno Bauer (1809-82), like Feuerbach 
and Stirrer was one of the Young Hegelian's who actually attended Hegel's 
lectures, though in the case of Bauer, principally those on religion. In his first major 
study of Hegelianism, which was written anonymously, The Trumpet of the Last 
Judgement over Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist (1841), Bauer adopted the bombastic 
position of an outraged Christian. The tone throughout this work is even more 
apocalyptic than Feuerbach's. Indeed, the themes of nakedness, exposure and 
revelation are some of the most enduring of the entire piece, something which is 
also noted by a recent English translator of The Trumpet. "' 
In The Trumpet, Bauer sarcastically accuses Hegel, the "Master of Deceit", 
of "adultery" with the "Whore of Reason", he characterises Hegel as the -devil 
incarnate, a corrupter of youth and as a cult leader with his own "disciples" from 
Hell. 3S2 This method of delivery, far from being merely stylistic was deeply rooted in 
the content of Hegelianism as Bauer understood it. In a telling phrase which 
echoes Hegel's own analysis of the fall of man from the Garden of Eden in the Logic, 
Bauer asserts that it was the "cunning of the serpent which brought our forebears 
to the Fall", that is, the tree of knowledge is the "deadly web of the system" of 
philosophical principles. Everything is questioned, nothing is believed and 
everything is corroded. In other words, critique itself, according to this parody is 
the work of the devil, not the work of the Lord. Bauer, of course, also parodied 
Hegel's own centrality as an emissary from God in an attempt to undermine the 
pretentious absurdity of such a claim, he says, 
"'. See Stepclevich, 1987, p 186. 
"'Ibid, 1987, p178. 
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Hegel was called forth and fixed at the centre of the University of 
Berlin! 
Although, of course, when it comes to the presentation of his own views 
then the apocalyptic form which is in keeping genre remains. In his role of devil's 
advocate, Bauer identifies Hegel's "Absolute Idea", the substance of the world as 
appearance and the Self-Consciousness of the same, as the "kernel" of Hegel's 
system. Such an idea specifically reduces religious belief, holds Bauer, to an 
"objectified" moment of Self-Consciousness itself. Thus Bauer sums up the 
repercussions of this in the following manner, 
Who partakes of this kernel is dead to God, for he holds God 
dead. 353 
The political consequences of this death for Bauer, should not surprise us, 
again emerging from the problems of nihilism and its apparent empty horizons of 
negative freedom, he said, 
And so philosophy must be active in politics, and whenever the 
established order contradicts the Self-Consciousness of philosophy, 
it must be directly attacked and shaken. Servitude, tutelage, is 
unbearable to the free spirit:... 54 
However, in a further twist, Bauer, still in the guise of our Christian pietist, 
then goes on to raise his objections to the involvement of the "philosopher" in these 
same vulgar temporal regions, the foremost of which is the notion of the 
Enlightened philosopher judge, if not quite the Platonic philosopher-King. )" 
According to Bauer, this role of judge, while automatically setting Hegel against 
the state, Church and religion of his day contained even greater dangers than the 
death of God. In his later essay, The Genus and the Crowd, which appeared in his own 
journal, the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung, 1844, he makes it clear that he believes that 
the price of this untiring critique for its own sake may be too high, he says for 
example, 
3s3Ibid, 1987, p181. 
"lbid, 1987, p 184. 
4`5 Ibid, 1987, pl85. 
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Criticism has brought forth bright and rigid men into an illusory 
self-reliance, and they already claim to know the whole of the world' 
and are quite ready to rule it. But it also calls forth a reaction 
which also grows to become universal and all-encompassing, for it 
strengthens itself through these bright figures who have now 
become puzzled by the criticisms thrown at them. 356 
In other words, criticism for the sake of criticism is ultimately nihilistic and 
freedom reduced only to the level of the process of social recognition undermines 
itself since social recognition is, as we have seen, "empty of positive content". 
Again, as Nietzsche was to comment later, "Nihilism- when the highest values 
devalue themselves". Bauer echoes Hegel's own concerns, which Hegel voiced with 
regard to Diderot's Rameau'sNephew land with regard to the aesthetic theory of the 
Schlegel brothers). 357 
In any case, in the closing pages of this article Bauer, anticipating later 
positivist critiques of Marxism, paints a picture of two stark alternatives; on the one 
hand there is a sardonic glance at notions of an 'organic' conception of mass 
satisfaction and harmony. Rather, it is likely that some measure of naked coercion 
would be required to exert the total social control necessary for the successful 
implementation of such a plan, there would be, in Bauer's view, a "despotic 
condition of subdued atoms". Or the very opposite, ultimately the existence of free 
criticism would threaten this same conception. 
Hence, all these attempts end in an inevitable war of the multitude 
against spirit and Self-Consciousness, and the significance of this 
war is found in nothing less than the fact that in it the cause of 
criticism is set agar st the genus. (my emphasis). 
Not unsurprisingly, neither Feuerbach nor Bauer look to an extra-terrestrial 
world for redemption, they do not posit chaos in this world as opposed to the order 
of a heavenly world. There is nothing reassuring in their alternate vision and 
certainly no promise of a better life to come in a different form of existence. Like 
3S61bid, 1987, p204. 
35, Hegel, 1993, pps 69-75, also objects to the development of the concept of irony by the Schlegel 
brothers, on the grounds that it is not properly philosophical, or speculative. Hegel complains that the 
Schlegels absorbed the abstract "I" of Fichte into their own form of irreverence and literary criticism. The 
danger says Hegel is that now "nothing has any value in its real and actual nature". In effect, Hegel is 
suggesting that this kind of modern irreverence which refuses to take anything seriously is ultimately 
nihilistic. 
133 
Hegel, both Feuerbach and Bauer are less sanguine than apocalypticists proper 
who might posit a second coming. Suggesting perhaps, that the move 
from 
eschatology, in general terms, to political prophecy is not inevitable. 
In the case of Feuerbach, the present is a time in which sensuous 
experience and not religious belief would be elevated to the only mode of legitimate 
expression of and for, love between men, acting as the fundamental basis of all 
social interaction (it was certainly Feuerbach's sense of materialism, expressed in 
the notion of the "species-being", which so appealed to the young Marx). In the 
case of Bauer, the endless infinite of critique for its own sake creates a perpetual 
and ongoing conversation which would, in all likelihood, undermine the stability of 
society by pitting the intellectuals against the masses and in turn undermine 
critique itself. 
Thus we find that both Feuerbach and Bauer remain very cautious as to 
what all of this might mean politically. Feuerbach, for his part, undoubtedly hoped 
to offer a new secular humanism358 which was at least implicitly critical of the 
ruling order of the day, and while it is true that Bauers suspicion of the masses 
suggests a more ambiguous political legacy, it is also true that his vision of the 
independent critic has much in common with the bourgeois anti-hero 
cosmopolitanism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
independent critic is the new discovery but that new discovery must leave the 
multitude behind. The more fundamental point here is that both Feuerbach and 
Bauer address one and the same problem; that of the continuing problematic of 
man's self-estrangement {Entfremdung}. 
As far as our study of Stirner is concerned, he has two dominant and equally 
unpalatable eschatological readings of Hegel to deal with. In Feuerbach's 'species. 
being', Stirner can only see yet another oppressive abstraction and the elitist 
pretensions of absolute critique are suggestive enough, both remain within and 
produce, new alienation's {Entfremdung}, on the one hand the notion of man the 
species-being and on the other, the aloof eccentric social critic. As we shall see in a 
moment, Stirner wants to take Hegel's account of the 'privileged standpoint', or 
philosophical historian, in a different direction, one which he holds to be the avatar 
3"'Feuerbach, 1985, p332, it has been remarked by David Leopold that Feuerbach closes The F. rxerr c( 
Christianity wich something like a re-establishment of Christian sentiment, something which Stirrer 
certainly picked upon. However, it is also worth nothing that these comments fall within the context of 
a discussion of bread and wine seen as a kind of epiphany or celebration of earthly sensuality much like 
Heeel's own remarks on the "last supper" in the Early Theological Writings. 
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of Hegel's method, but not in the direction of a transfiguration into Feuerbach's 
species-being or critic but towards a new conception, perhaps the ultimate 
conception of individual sovereignty. 
In any case, as David Leopold suggests in his lucid introduction to Stirner's 
book, Stirner attempts 
... to unsettle 
by demonstrating that modernity fails to escape from 
the very thing that it claims to have outgrown- namely religious 
modes of thought. "' 
Stirner's cause is not one which is committed to the content of the notion of 
the "Absolute Idea" itself in all its Hegelian richness and historically loaded Spirit, 
reason, art and religion but with the form of the "possessor" of Egoistic knowing. 
Stirner sought to affirm the potential of all men (despite his endless 'I' statements), 
as an anti-essentialist uniqueness, he cannot settle for an abstraction such as 
species-being which is potentially totalitarian, like all such abstractions in his view. 
For Stirner, the ultimate content of knowledge as self-knowledge matters little, he 
is only concerned that the form of revelation be compatible with such a know-er. 
Metaphorically speaking, the cargo that the vessel is carrying matters much less 
than the shape of the vessel itself, which must be designed for speed. 
"9Stirner, 1995, Editors Introduction, pxix. 
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At the entrance of the modern time stands the'God-man'. At its 
exit will only the God in the God-man disappear? 
Max Stirner 
II 
The Egoist 
In Stirner's view, Hegel's conception of "Absolute Knowing" is nothing 
more than an assertion of the complete, total and irrevocable power of the 
individual qua individual. 0 In an allusion to Hegel's concept Stirner said, 
Absolute thinking is the affair of the human spirit, and this is a holy 
spirit. Hence this thinking is an affair of the clerics, who have a 
'sense for it', a sense for the 'highest interests of mankind', for 'the 
spirit'. 36' 
But what does Stirner propose in place of the 'absolute', the 'species-being' 
and the 'critic'. Stirner's The Ego and Its Ozon, appears to anticipate the 'popular 
psychology' genre of our own time. In presentation at least, it seems to be a literary 
assertion of his own personal proclivities, and the more interesting sections appear 
to be a kind of personal testimony, a 'quack' psychology full of random assertions 
and individual quirks. ` One implication of this psychological reading of Stirner is 
that his book becomes a-political, concerned rather with aspects of 'personal 
development' in the narrowest sense. 
Thus some authorities have often portrayed Stirner as a 'psychological 
egoist' in a related sense, meaning that he held to the empirical claim that all 
intentional behaviour is motivated by the individual agents greatest interest. ' As 
David Leopold suggests, the passages which support such a view in the text are 
°" Ibid, 1995, pps 318-19, where he concludes, "People have always supposed that they must give me a 
destiny lying outside myself, so that at last they demanded that I should lay claim to the human because 
I am- man. This is the Christian magic circle. Fichte's ego too is the same essence outside me, for every 
one is ego; and, if only this ego has rights, then it is 'the ego', it is not I. But I am not an ego along with 
other ego's, but the sole ego: I am unique.... And it is only as this unique I that I take everything for my 
own, as I set myself to work, and develop myself, only as this. I do not develop men, not as man, but, as I, 
I develop- myself. This is the meaning of the- unique one. " " 
3" Stirner, 1995, p 306. 
'"Even Scepelevich, 1987, p 14, describes Stimer as the apotheosis of a "withered.. irrational egoism". The 
net affect of such an assessment is to reduce Stirneis political ideas to a set of rather anodyne 
psychological catechisms of little historical interest. 
; tier Leopold in Surner, 1995, p24. 
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infrequent, more accurately, Stirner merely held that the power of the Ego, the 
willing actions, are simply our actions rather than actions carried out in the name of 
self-interest. While Stirner would certainly have found a measure of agreement in 
some elements of laissez-faire doctrine, for example; such as the idea that it was not 
the business of government to be involved in the commercial decisions of individual 
agents, he would not subscribe to the laissez-faire commitment to the individuals 
self-interest' In other words, he might well agree with certain motifs of Adam 
Smith's thought but he would never have subscribed to many of Smith's 
observations concerning the necessity of state intervention or his support for legal 
and juridical processes. Likewise, he would have found little agreement with an 
argument such as that given by Mandeville, in his "Fable of the Bees", to the effect 
that private vices add up to public benefits. s As we shall see, Stirner would have 
simply rejected any notion of a collective public benefit just as he would also oppose 
the idea that any man should be a slave to his passions. 
In two very important respects the Ego differs from texts of the 'pop 
psychology' genre. In the first case, Stirner's notion of'personal growth' is not read 
psychologically through the development of individual persons, rather, Egoism is 
only metaphorically compared with individual growth. In reality Stirner reads the 
development of Egoism from his own idiosyncratic stadial account of history, as 
being composed of three phases, the "realist", the "idealist" and finally the 
"Egoist" phase' Secondly, and still in the first part of his book, there is an 
extensive engagement with all the most important political ideologies of the period, 
such as conservatism, liberalism and communism, a critical project hardly likely to 
be undertaken by a'psychologist' of personal growth. 
In Stirner's critique of these theories he often appears to anticipate 
Nietzsche's thought, so much so that it was once suspected that the latter may 
have plagiarised from the former. " However, Stirner's Egoism and Its Oum is not a 
popular manual of personal growth, but a political treatise on the "exit" from 
modernity. In other words, modernity, in Stirner's account, continues to be 
populated by 'ghosts', 'spirits', 'phantasms', 'demons' and all sorts of other self- 
alienation's [Entfremdung]. 3' The central question for Stirner is how to ultimately 
'°'Ibid, 1995, pps. 174-5. 
"Paraphrasing, Thomas, 1980, p 129. 
'Scirner, 1995, pps13-18. 
There is no hard evidence that Nietzsche ever read Stirncr, see Gilman and Parent, 1991. "9 As in the case ofMarx, which I will cover in the next chapter, Stirner seems to have little appreciation 
of the dual sense of alienation often used by Hegel. 
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break out of this condition. As Leopold says of the second constructive half of 
Stirner's book, there his task is to "characterise the future epoch of egoism". 370 
Egoism, according to Stirner, is practically based upon his notion of 
"owness". 37 For Stirner, owness is a form of self-mastery, but not in the stoical 
sense, for Stirner does not regard self-denial highly, rather, any waiving of one's 
own appetites or pleasures remains a mis-guided way of self-aggrandisement, in the 
end, altruism being but a sub-specie of the self-action of the Ego. In general, self- 
assumed obligations, such as the obligation to others, is rather, but another form of 
alienation since one only has an obligation to oneself, since all social ties which bind 
are alienation's according to him. 37' Similarly, owners must not be sacrificed to the 
passions, and here there is common ground with stoicism, for Stirner suggests that 
one must not be a slave to any over riding purpose such as the drive to accumulate 
property or amass private wealth. According to Stirner this is a "one sided, 
unopened and narrow egoist". 373 
"Ownness", for Stirner, suggests that one must always dominate ideas 
rather than the other way around, ideas must never become fixed in the mind or 
dominate one's life. 374 Thus Marx's later criticism in the German Ideology that Stirner 
remains trapped within the mystified form of Hegelian idealism, is largely hitting 
out at a straw man since Stirner clearly repudiates the notion of idealism in that 
sense. 75 Stirner is always concerned with the corporeal body, his sensuous 
existence, but it must not dominate just as ideas and thoughts must not. Thus he 
says of his body, ... "it thirsts 
for [freedom] hourly". 376 All in all then, as David 
Leopold suggests, Stirner's ideal seems to be the cultivation of an "emotional 
detachedness" towards both one's passions and ideas. 377 
As one might expect from all that has been said so far, Stirner's objections 
to Feuerbach are based upon Stirner's revulsion with the notion of some social 
conception of morality. Yet, despite this, David Leopold, for example, holds that 
3'oStirner, 1995, pxxii. 
Ibid, 1995, p 141. 
;" Ibid, 1995, p 175. 
'" ` Ibid, 1995, p 70. 
; ''` Ibid, 1995, p 302, thus he says, "The thought is my own only when I can indeed subjugate it, but it 
can never subjugate me, never fanaticizes me, or make me the tool of its realisation". 
"' Marx, 1976, p 130, take for example, "We spoke of the German philosophical conception of history. 
Here, in Saint Max, we find a brilliant example of it. The speculative idea, the abstract conception, is 
made the driving force of history, and history is thereby turned into the mere history of philosophy". 
" Stirner, 1995,1995, p 14 1. 
'' Ibid, 1995, p xxiii. 
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Stirner was not a nihilist. 378 Leopold cites Scirner's discussion of Nero, ' where Stirner 
appears to condemn him, not on his record of immorality and his various violations 
of others but because he was "possessed", much like a moral man, his passions were 
allowed to gain the upper hand and violate his own self-mastery. " Thus concludes 
Leopold, 
Stirner is clearly committed to the 'non-nihilistic' view that a' 
certain kind of character and mode of behaviour (namely, 
autonomous individuals and actions) are to be viewed above all 
others. 0 
However, for two reasons, the kind of minimalist concept of 'morality' 
invoked here by Stirner, . against what 
he considered to be the oscillating' 
`antediluvian' morality which dominates, indeed his call for an understanding of 
morality which is beyond 'good', and 'evil', has more in common with the "nihilist 
rejection of all values than this largely linguistically meaningless and 
philosophically dubious concept of morality that David Leopold suggests. First, 
Stirner wants to re-define the word morality out of existence, in order to do this he 
has to render it virtually meaningless, he is able to say, for example, "We [the 
Egoists} are perfect altogether, and on the whole earth there is not one man who is 
a sinner" Secondly, on a slightly deeper philosophical plane, it is clear that Stirner 
rejects all values as essentially relative to time and place. For Stirner there can be 
no'absolute truth', he says for example, "To the believer, truths are a settled thing, a 
fact; to the freethinker, a thing that is still to be settled'. " And later in the text, 
during a discussion of the "owner" he said, 
You alone are the truth, or rather, you are more than the truth, 
which is nothing at all before you. You too do assuredly 'criticise', 
but you do not ask about a 'higher truth'- namely, one should be 
higher than you, 38''... 
Indeed, he also says in the same passage that the truths of others arc 
reducible to their power and if their power proves less than the "owner's" then it 
must merely "dissolve", "their truth is their nothingness", claims Stirncr. Stirner's 
conception of'truth' is solipsistic, ".. it [truth] has its value not in itself but in nie. Of 
"' lbid, 1995, p xxiv. 
"Ibid, 1995, pps 51-53. 
Ibid, 1995, pxxiv. 
i81 lbid, 1995, p 306. 
i83 lbid, 1995, p 312. 
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itself it is valuele c. The truth is a- cni#tr. 3 Also, we shall see that Stirner's 
positions on the rule of law, on crime and punishment, on justice and equality are 
entirely consistent with this solipsistic relativism. For example, Stirner's new moral 
compass beyond good and evil does not even rule out incest, infanticide and 
murder' It is difficult to imagine how much closer Stirner could be to the 
traditional understanding of a philosophical and ethical nihilist than this without 
explicitly declaring it so. 
Stirner's concept of the Egoist emerged out of the direct challenge to what 
he saw as the reproduction of theological alienation's and self-estrangement's by 
Feuerbach and Bauer. Stirner posited the Hegelian "Absolute Idea" in corporeal 
terms, not as the "self-thinking idea" but as the corporeal reality, that of a grasping 
individualism without moral or ethical restraint properly speaking, since each 
Egoist was only capable of what they were capable of, none could do more than 
they had the power to do. Self-restraint is a meaningless phrase if Stirner is to be 
understood correctly. The avatar of freedom is what any given individual can fill the 
empty horizon of their own lives with. Life according to Stirner, only has the 
meaning that any given individual can ascribe it, this is the horror of the nihilistic 
empty negative freedom of the French Revolution and the Terror. With the death 
of God in the thought of Feuerbach and Bauer, the empty space is ready to be filled 
with the nothing of the Ego, a 'being' allegedly in a constant state of becoming. 
; ei Ibid, 1995, p 313. 
" Ibid, 1995, p281-2. 
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In the history of the dialectic Stirner has a place apart, the final, 
extreme place. 
Gilles Deleuze i5 
III 
The Prophet 
In his influential book on Nietzsche, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze 
devotes a section of Chapter 5, entitled The Overman: Against the Dialectic, ' to the 
place of Stirner in nineteenth century thought. The question Deleuze essentially 
addresses is this; in what relation does ' Stirnet s Egoism stand to the thought of 
Hegel? This question primarily arises because Stirner's own' estimation of his 
powers would appear, despite the entire thrust of his radical atheism, towards a 
kind of conception of personal divinity, in the closing pages of The Ego and Its Own 
Stirner the prophet said, 
They say of God, 'names name thee not. That holds good for me: no 
concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me; 
they are only names. Likewise they say of God that he is perfect and 
has no calling to strive after perfection. That too holds good of me 
alone. 38' (my emphasis). 
and furthermore, 
I am owner of my might, and I am so when I know myself as 
unique. 
All future time is open and an endless horizon of possibilities, the 
omnipotent Ego will fill the future with the pro-jeccions of Its self-will. 
Significantly, the German irregular verb Sein [to be) is the knowing component of 
the sentence [Ich bin Ego), to be is to be Ego. Every thing .... "pales 
before the sun 
of this consciousness" {der Sonne dieses Bewußtseins}. ' In other words, Stirner 
appears to re-apply Hegel's own critique, in-so-far as he explicitly takes Hegels 
own analysis of the Enlightenment, where one-sided rationality is exposed as 
3 5Deleuze, 1992, p 159. 
""I bid, 1992, 
"" Stirner, 1995, p324. 3111 Ibid, 
p324 and Reclam, p412 
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Utilitarianism, to its logical conclusions in social practice since only that which is 
useful to the Ego is useful per.. 
The sense in which Stirner's thought might represent the final position of 
the dialectic is a complex problem, not least because many of Hegel's interpreters 
would hold that the dialectic does not rest in any final position but is contradiction 
in a state of endless becoming. If one subscribes to such an interpretation then it is 
hardly likely that any one theorist or historical figure is likely to become an 
avatar. '' Yet Gilles Deleuze argues that within the Young Hegelian movement 
Stirner merits a special place because his thought constituted the end of the 
dialectic properly speaking. In other words, Stirner's self-appropriation of his own 
powers, his own capacities and desires and his own freedoms represents a kind of 
absolute sovereignty of self-assertion. Stirner's Egoism represents, in other words, 
not just another programmatic interpretation of the Hegelian manifesto, but the 
logical limits of the personal development of self-power and individual sovereignty 
per se. In a sense, Stirner posits the 'end of man'. The similarities with Nietzsche's 
conception of the "Last-Man" should be briefly recalled here. 
Nietzsche, who we shall discuss more fully shortly, argued in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra and elsewhere that the final product of two thousand years of Christian 
thought was the "Last-Man". The "Last-Man" is predominantly a product of 
dominant Christian values, he is a product of pity, the Christian value par excellence, 
according to Nietzsche. Thus modern anarchism, communism, egalitarianism and 
democracy are, in his view, the final and most decadent political manifestation of 
such values and such men. Nietzsche despised these "Last-Men" because they 
expected to receive their goods and satisfactions 'on a plate', they turned away from 
exertion and effort, the "last men" were, therefore, selfish in the deepest sense of 
the word, they were soft and self-serving. 
It would seem, therefore, that there are at least two very different 
descriptions of the kind of man who is constitutive of such an eschatological end 
state in these post-Hegelian times. On the one side we have the Egoist who is a 
model of self-power, self-reliance, a lawgiver and negatively moving creature, he is 
what he is not, as Sartre might have said. Or on the other side, we have Nietzsche's 
"Last-Men", the resentful, destructive and grasping individual of sloth and laziness, 
and of course I note, if only provisionally, that the "Last-Men" appear to be the 
precise opposite of the Übermensch. 
- ""Marx, 1973, "The Method of Political Economy", pps. 100-108. 
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In his book Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze implicitly separates these two 
conceptions with reference to the Nietzschean idea of the "will to power" as a active 
and reactive force. According to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, reactive forces are 
those actions which recoil from some previous action, energy, or position, often 
perceived to be a 'harm', thus they are always self-limiting because they react 
against a pre-set agenda, their behaviour is always set by some external agenda or 
other. However, an active force, on the other hand, is built upon nothing, in other 
words, not according to some wrong type of action, such action allegedly comes from 
some deep well of personal 'authenticity'. 390 In this sense, active force is supposedly 
beyond good and evil. 
Staying with these two characterisations for a moment we can see that 
Stirner's Egoist does not lend itself easily to the Deleuzean-Nietzschean model of 
an active force. Stirner was dialectically engaged with the humanist agenda setting 
models provided by Feuerbach and Bauer, and in turn with Hegel's understanding 
of modernity as the progressive unfolding of Self-Consciousness. Stirner had much 
to react against, as we have already seen, he sought to define Egoism over and 
against what he perceived to be the continuing theological alienation's and self- 
estrangement's represented in the "species-being" and in the "critic". In other 
words, the Egoist is not the Nietzschean Übermensch, the creator of new values, since 
Stirner's Egoist is far more likely to reject the old moral tables of values, and such" 
values as he represents, are only those which are minimally required for such acts of 
destruction. In Deleuzean terms, the Egoist is a self-serving reactive nihilist. 
This is the precise point where the important eschatological milieu which I 
have outlined becomes theoretically decisive. Why, for example, are we being 
asked to take Stirner's Egoism more seriously than Feuerbach's humanism? 
Stirner's response to this question is to prophetically deliver the Ego in order that it 
appears to be an historical inevitability. Thus in another version of the 'End of 
History', history itself will cease to have an independent existence as the self- 
supporting Ego makes the future its own. The real question as to the actual 
inevitability and validity of these claims in reality, through the actual passage of 
time, matters little, for the purpose of the present study, the important point is 
that Stirner himself, in adopting the prophetic form of delivery, indicates his desire 
to be taken seriously as a prophet of the future. 
39OThis phrase belongs to Micheal Tanner. 
We are supposed to believe in Stirner's claims because they allegedly reveal 
what will inevitably take place in the future. The prophetic eschatologist, as opposed 
to the ex eventu variety, wants to close the gap in consciousness that he perceives 
exists between what has already occurred in his consciousness and the unreflective 
consciousness' around him, he wants to raise consciousness by creating a kind of 
deja vu effect in his audience. Stirner's Egoism is the new "privileged standpoint", it 
is ontologically 'true' because he is apparently able to conceive of it in the first 
instance. But unlike Hegel's immanence of Reason in the present and its 
legitimacy in the spiritual adventures of the past, Stirner's Ego can only be 
validated conclusively with the actual appearance of Egoism on the world agenda of 
the future as described by the prophet. 
As we saw in the introduction, one can also now see the significance of the 
ambiguous authorial specificity of The Ego and Its Oum. Much of The Ego and Its Own 
is composed in a first-person narrative, thus we are led to suppose that Max Stirner 
is the Egoist, but then, Max Stirner is a nom de guerre. Thus we should not be 
surprised to find that Stirner does not accept any personal responsibility for 
whatever use his book may be put to by other Egos, even though he anticipates that 
political mischief might well result from his writings. Stirner is positing a deep 
structural transformation in the consciousness of man and as such he cannot be 
held personally responsible for simply elucidating the inevitable. Just as one might 
hold that though the revealed God created man, God cannot bear the 
responsibility for the decisionism of man long after that initial act of creation. 
Similarly, Stirner holds that Stirner must not be held responsible for this act of 
divine authorship, 
I see how men are fretted in dark superstition by a swarm of ghosts. 
If to the extent of my powers I let a bit of daylight fall in on the 
nocturnal spookery, is that perchance because love to you inspires 
this in me? Do I write out of love of men? No, I write because I 
want to procure for my thoughts an existence in the world; even if I 
foresaw that these thoughts would deprive you of your rest and your 
peace, even if I saw the bloodiest wars and the fall of many 
generations springing up from the seed of this thought- I would 
nevertheless scatter it. Do with it what you will and can, that is 
your affair and does not trouble me.; 91 
391Stirner, 1995, pp262-3. 
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Continuing in the same divinely inspirational vein, Stirner draws some 
conclusions as to the value of his revelation to others and where it might well lead 
them, he said, 
You will perhaps have only trouble, combat, and death from it, very 
few will draw joy from it. 
In Stirner's prophetic imagination, the idea that nothing could really have 
been avoided, is the real lesson of the retrospective self-justificatory prophet who 
must bring the daylight to men's lives. In one of these typically prophetic moments 
and while railing against the millennial aspirations of the German Nationalists, 
Stirner offered personal testimony to his divine greatness, 
To-morrow they carry thee to the grave; soon thy sisters, the 
peoples, will follow thee. But, when they have all followed, then- 
mankind is buried, and I am my own, I am the laughing heir! 
Stirner's genealogy of modernity charts the death' of God, that most 
profound crisis of the `spirit', but unlike others, he claims he has no need of 
spiritual resuscitation. In a striking series of images which recall some of Hegel's 
own in the Phenomenology (and Feuerbach's theology) Stirner argues that modernity 
begins with the Reformation. Thus with Luther, claims Stirner, Christianity 
returned to the question of the "heart", indeed he says, 
The heart, from day to day more un-Christian, loses the contents 
with which it had busied itself, until at last nothing but empty 
warm-heartedness is left it, the quite general love of men, the love of 
man, the consciousness of freedom, `Self-Consciousness'. 392 
Stirner recognises that this represents the end of religion and the death of 
God, of course, but more importantly, he further recognises that the turn towards 
an "Absolute Knowing" Self-Consciousness will undermine everything in its own 
wake, leaving behind the emptiness of the nihilistic moment. Following the above 
passage he continues, 
392 Stirner, 1995, p28. 
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Only so (with Self-Consciousness) is Christianity complete, because 
it has become bald, withered, and void of contents. There are now 
no contents whatever against which the heart does not mutiny, 
unless indeed the heart unconsciously or without 'Self- 
Consciousness' lets them slip in. 
In other words, in Stirner's account, the feelings of empathy and the 
mutual understandings which end with the social recognition of adult autonomy in 
the events of the French Revolution, become transparent to Reason and reflexive 
cross-examination. Thus the celebrated ladder of the Phenomenology which is 
supposed to lead one to the "Absolute Idea", is thus kicked away before one gets 
there due to the creeping effect of estrangement. For Stirner, these events bring a 
crisis of a kind even for him, indeed a crisis that was far worse than the problem of 
the `loss of belief in the content of Christianity that Christianity must address. For 
Stirner, the greater problem was the profound "lie" promoted by the young 
Hegelian ideologies which where rushing in to fill the void (and here is another 
remarkable anticipation of Nietzsche). Thus his war against the notion of man the 
"species-being" and the 'God' of "criticism" was central to his whole project, 
indeed it was his raison d'&re. But in a nihilist modernity where Self-Consciousness 
had apparently cut the ground from its own feet, what legitimacy could not be 
found for any position that could oppose the "hearts" occasional "slip" back into the 
new self-estrangement's? It was Stirner's self-proclaimed mission to expose this 
phenomena and its most important adherents, Feuerbach and Bauer. 
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IV 
The Political Philosophy of Anarchism 
Stirncr's images of the modern state are, by turns, among his most 
memorable and significant contributions to political philosophy but the question 
remains as to worth of these impressionistic ideas to the tradition of Western 
political theory. Returning to Hegel, we see that the state is ... "the complex inner 
articulation of the ethical", and ... "the architectonics of the rational... ", he insists, 
for example, that the modern state pursues collective aims in a way that leaves 
room for the expression of individuality. 393 For Stirner, on the other hand, the state 
is the personification of modern evil. ' As David Leopold suggests, according to 
Stirner, the state is a beast and a machine: both "Lion and Eagle" but also a giant 
impersonal system of cogs which move "the clockwork of .... individual minds". 
" 
The state is both the God, for some men, and the work of the Devil in others, "the 
Lord of my Spirit, who demands faith and proscribes to me articles of faith, the 
creed of legality". In Faustian imagery, the state is also the one for whom we must 
pledge our very "souls". ' Stirner's critique of the state was a part and parcel of his 
blanket rejection of all collective values, social norms, standards and indeed any 
entity which could be described in institutional terms, he said, 
As long as there still exists even one institution which the 
individual may not dissolve, the Ownness and self-appurtenance of 
me is still very remote. 397 
All social norms stand opposed to the Ego because these posit a collective, 
self-estranged interest which, by definition, cannot ever be commensurable with 
the particular interest of "owness". Old Testament commandments and Kantian 
formulations such as the 'categorical imperative' carry little weight with Stirner, in 
his terms these are the collective expressions of a social oppression which sought to 
limit the particular powers of the individual Ego. In this regard Stirner's rejection 
of universals and the language of universals may have echoes in some modern 
39' See Cornell, Rosenfeld and Carlson [Eds], pxi. 
3114 Hegel, 1991, p 15. 
"S Stirner, 1995, pxxv. 
; '° Stirner, 1995, p273. 
; 9'Stirner, 19R5, p192. 
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analytic arguments such as those of Quine or Ryle. ' Stirner, was, for example, well 
acquainted with David Hume's critique of such universals. 399 
Returning to the case of the state, Stirner posits this antagonism in terms 
which directly challenge Kantian as well as Hegelian metaphysics, 
Own will and the state,.... are powers in deadly hostility, between 
which no 'perpetual peace' is possible. " 
Stirner simply rejects the immanence of Reason and state law, even upon 
utilitarian grounds, supporting rather, forms of social transgression. In the case of 
murder for example, he says that those who have within their 'power' to murder 
shall do so, those who have it within their power to punish the murderer, will do so, 
and those who have it within their power to commit murder without sanction, will 
also do so. To be sure, in Kant's schema, Stirner in legitimating actions which may 
well be self-defeating is relinquishing his power as a moral agent, he is either feeble 
minded or simply insane. But this is entirely the point because according to Stirner, 
Kantian morality exists only as an abstract ought of community whereas the Ego is 
a sovereign power without reserve. In other words, anticipating the modern anti- 
psychiatry movement in this regard, Stirner holds that it is society that is 'insane' 
not the Egoist. Thus says Stirner, 
.. my satisfaction decides about my relation to men, and that I 
do 
not renounce, from any fit of humility, even the power over life and 
death. 401 
Stirner does not view the self-power of the Ego as an end to be attained in 
itself, or even as a means to some higher-order good, such as one might expect to 
find in the service of Reason, freedom or authenticity, Stirner is no existentialist. 
The measure of self-power available to the individual just is. For the Ego there is no 
end to be attained, it stands against all such moral oughts, whether cultural or 
religious, which would want to make something of us. 40' According to Stirner such 
ideas are "wheels in the head"403 or "spooks" [Der Spuk), that is, self-estrangement's 
"See Quine, 1953. 
3 Stirncr, 1985, p79. 
4001bid, 1985, pl75. 
a01lbid, 1985, p282. 
4021bid, 1995, p216. 
40; Stirner, 1991, p46, the actual term used by Stirneris "die Sparren", which literally means rafter i. e. a 
joist which is used to hold a roof up. The English translator gives 'Wheels in the head". 
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which would simply replace one set of fixed ideas with others. Thus in Stirner's 
system of naked power relations there is no room for philosophy or theology. God is 
dead, 404 philosophy is dead, and especially the various notions of 'Absolute' of his 
own milieu. For example, take Stirner's demonstration of how his own concept of 
the Ego is different from that of Fichte's, much earlier,, transcendental Ego?, He 
explains, 
When Fichte says, `the ego is all', this seems to harmonise perfectly 
with my thesis. But it is not that the ego it all, but the ego destroys 
all, and only the self-dissolving ego, the, never-being ego, the - 
finite ego is really I. Fichte speaks of the `absolute' ego, but I speak 
of me, the transitory ego. ' 
Fichte posits the notion of the Ego as the form of the underlying reality of 
all things, thus it is the great universal, Stirner, in complete contrast to this posits 
only the particular Ego which is present to his consciousness, it is the Egoist of the 
'privileged standpoint', thus it is not a moral ought but a prophetic description of 
what will be. Stirner's Egoism is the "creative nothing" of the new nihilist world 
outlook. As Nicholas Lobkowicz suggests, Stirner is, 
... the man who made the final step.... which leads 
beyond 
Hegelianism and negates it. For Stirner achieved the final 
concretization of Hegelianism by reducing all Hegelian categories 
to the naked individual self; .... 
"f06 
As we have seen already, `it is not the Ego's spirit that thirsts for freedom a 
Ih Hegel, but its body. Any given measure of freedom that a corporeal body can 
enjoy is, therefore, a reflection of its ability to mobilise its self-power. 407 As such this 
Ego is an entity which -is constant fluidity, in its constant condition of becoming 
from one moment to the next it can only be defined retroactively. Again, from this 
perspective of absolute negativity, one can conclude that Stirner remains constant 
in his opposition to all social institutions per se and his invective is never more 
ferocious than when directed towards ideas as democracy, communism, the state or 
the nation, since all such institutions are, in turn, underpinned by collective norms 
and values which bind one to yesterdays, or even to that mornings decisions. 
404Stirner, 1995, p 140. 
4051bid, 1995, p163. 
a"` : SCe Stepelevich, 1987, p 14. 
4(r Stirner, 1995, p 141. 
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Gilles Deleuze has suggested in his own analysis of Stirner that this means 
that, 
Overcoming alienation thus means pure, cold annihilation, a 
recovery which lets nothing which it recovers subsist: "it is not that 
the ego it all, but the ego destroys all" (Scirner). 40B 
For Deleuze, "Stirner is the dialectician who reveals nihilism as the truth of 
the dialectic", here Deleuze finds agreement with both Crosby and Lobkowicz. The 
idea is this; the transformation of slave recognition in the Phenomenology culminates 
with the "I that is We and the We that is I", that is, with the social recognition of 
complete mutual autonomy. But as I have already suggested, this avatar is empty of 
all value-content because it is composed of self-knowledge which is not yet 
'inwardized'. Thus the claim by Kant, Schiller and Hegel that this immature idea 
of freedom presented itself on the world stage during the Terror of the French 
Revolution. Deleuze, Cosby and so on, hold, and this is the main point with regard 
to Stirner, that Stirner is the first to adopt such a point of view nakedly in a thesis 
of political philosophy. 
Stirner called the Egoist the "Unique" one, meaning of course, that each 
individual qua individual is a repository of a completely different mix of 
characteristics from every one else. In his classic study of nineteenth century 
thought, and in anticipation of the views of Gilles Deleuze, Karl L8with said of 
Stirner's The Ego and its Oum........ it is in reality an ultimate consequence of Hegel's 
historical system". 4» Löwith makes this claim because he takes the view that the 
last paragraph of "Absolute Knowing" in the Phenomenology is literally the 
completion of the historical development of `difference' a'o In other words, what the 
know-er knows is that each is his own, each is free and autonomous, their Self- 
Consciousness is in inner harmony with the uniqueness of their nature or self in the 
first place. 
Of course, it appears to be quite paradoxical to hold on the one hand that 
Stirner has no commitments to values of any kind in the manner of the nihilist, 
while on the other, simultaneously taking the view that he valued this same 
'`o"Deleuze, 1992, p 161. 
401öwith, 1964, p 103. 
4 "Although the Phenomenology should be taken as the last word on the'spiritual' development of man, it 
still left room for man's'logical' development, hence the Science of Logic. 
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position. However, when the depths of uniqueness, or modern subjectivism are 
regarded as truly limitless, Stirner would argue, one is faced with the requirement 
that one can only consume without recourse to the constraints of some naturally 
grounded morality, a morality which might otherwise be inscribed in the 
firmament. As Hegel said in the closing lines of the Phenomenology, invoking' both 
human and divine inspiration... "from the chalice of this realm of spirits foams forth 
for Him his own infinitude". This understanding of the value-neutrality of the 
Revolution's social recognition, which is ultimately the source of Hegel's unease, is 
something that Stirner is quite at home in. The idea of scholars such as Löwith and 
Deleuze is that Stirner represents an extreme political actualisation of this 
Hegelian dialectic in this final sense, but this does not necessarily denote nihilism 
as a positive result. 
We have seen how (in Chapter II) nihilism was a cynical by-product of the 
Revolutionary Spirit, the political manifestation of which, was the actual French 
Revolution and the Terror. All of this was revealed in Hegel's ex etvntu prophetic 
revelation during the course of the spiritual adventures in the Phenomenology. Thus it 
should not surprise us to find that there is a remarkable similarity between 
Diderot's profile of the Nephew in Rameau's Nephew and that of the Egoist in 
Stirner's The Ego and Its Own. Both the Nephew and the Egoist challenged what 
they saw as the totalitarianism of the linguistic cage, both performed a fortissimo of 
irreverence, neither would defer to any authority, morality or conventional value 
system and finally both were essentially bohemian 'wastrels' who sought only to 
consume and not create. 
Stirner was acutely aware of the nihilist moment which Hegel had 
discovered in the spiritual and intellectual products of the Enlightenment, the 
"one-sided rationality" of which Habermas has spoken, however, Stirner held that 
the other young Hegelian's were not being true to that nihilist moment, they tried 
to reinvent `morality' or the 'good', Stirner rejected this. In this sense he was being 
true to the historical unfolding of nihilism. Stirner might well symbolise the avatar 
of modern diremption, atomisation and the privatisation of the individual life- 
world, but he was also the first to hold to nihilism as a coherent political project in 
theoretical terms. Nihilism requires, at the very least, a commitment to the 
philosophical position that all meaning is quite unstable and where meaning exists 
it must be systematically undermined. Stirner, in creating the Egoist as 'absolute 
negativity' creates a creature who seems to be able to fulfil this task 
philosophically, at least to his own satisfaction, but what does such a conception 
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suggest politically? Rejection of the state, as we have seen, but he also has much to 
say about society and social relations more generally. 
Stirner's alternative to social structures, public institutions, political and 
economic organisation is his "association" or "union of egoists". "' This union is the 
concrete replacement for the state and "human society". As far as Scirner is 
concerned "human society" is something which is to be utilised, transformed and 
eventually "annihilated". The criteria or litmus test of the "union of egoists" must 
be "an unmeasured freedom of allowances" where one can be oneself, may act as 
one pleases, may think as one pleases, where one can live in any way that one cares 
to and by oneself if one so chooses 41' The key to success for such a union, is free 
413 flowing social "intercourse", according to Stirner. 
Indeed, Stirner considers "human society" little better than "prison 
companionship", a situation in which honesty between persons is the first casualty, 
where furtiveness and secrecy reign and where "plotting" is endemic. Rather, the 
true "union" would, by definition, be open, honest and each and all would 
understand that self-willing lies behind each and every action. In such 
circumstances there would be no need for anything other than the most naked self- 
assertion of individual desires and proclivities. In addition, membership in the 
"association" would not be binding, according to Stirner and individuals would be 
allowed to move in and out of the union as they saw fit 414 In other words, in 
somewhat analogous fashion to the Hegelian socially recognitive moment of 
"Absolute Freedom" during the French Revolution Stirner's "union of egoists" is 
the social recognition of Egoism by individuals of individuals. Stirner does not 
shrink away from the Terror as a possible by-product or epiphenomenon of 
"Absolute Freedom", rather he embraces it all. Hence his defence of criminality, 
law breaking murder and incest. 
One might expect that this socially recognitive "association" would be 
unlikely to favour property holding, yet interestingly Stirner makes no demand for 
the abolition of private property. In his view private possessions are one of the basic 
prerequisites of Egoism. However, he does have a theory concerning the 
distribution of private property. According to Stirner this phenomena is a historical 
product of the "respect" for private property which is part and parcel of the 
4UStirner, 1995, pl61-2. 
a12Ibid, 1995, pl89. 
"; Ibid, 1995, p195-i. 
"'I bid, 199 
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development of the laws and regulations of Western market society. For those, 
such as the socialists and communists, who bemoan the unequal 
distribution of 
property which capitalism entails, Stirner simply replies that their solution to this 
problem, the common holding of all private property in the general interest, to be 
another meaningless abstraction which simply undermines Egoism and does 
violence to all individualism. Stirner argues, rather, that private property, is 
perfectly in keeping with the development of the "union of egoists", 
Property is recognised in the union, and only in the union, because 
one no longer holds what is his a fief from any being. 415 
Furthermore, 
If men reach the point of losing respect for property, every one will 
have property, as all slaves become free men as soon as they no 
longer respect the master as master. Unions will. then, in this 
matter too, multiply the individual's means and secure his assailed 
property. 416 
Stirner's analogy with the master-slave dialectic suggests that just as the 
slave becomes his own master at the very point of disrespect and freedom from the 
master. So too can the propertyless Ego ascend and accumulate property when all 
have lost respect for the specifically bourgeois form of property. This is because 
Stirner equates "respect"' with interest.. In other words, when the "union of egoists" 
takes hold then no one will any longer care who has property and who has not. 
Thus under such conditions there would be more than enough private property for 
those who want it. Clearly, the plausibility of such a theory largely depends upon 
the notion that each Egoist would have unique, thus differing needs. This is an 
assumption that Stirner inherits from the Hegelian legacy of modern subjectivism 
and self-actualisation, the "Absolute Knowing" of uniqueness. 
Finally, we come to the historical agents and the mode of this messianic 
social transformation; Stirner's rebellious ragamuffins, "the proletariat" or 
"paupers", the "vagabonds" and the young "unruly heads" or intellectuals, the 
disenfranchised petty bourgeois sons and daughters of modernity. 417 Stirner looked 
towards the poorest and most motley of society's rejects for individual rebellion, the 
a151bid, 1995, p279. 
a'°I bid, 199 
i"Ibid, 1995, p102. 
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total sum of which would bring the whole system of institutions crashing down. 
Individual rebellion was superior to revolution because all revolution, engagement 
with political parties and even the revolutionary crowd, required some kind of 
"self-sacrifice", "' by individuals on behalf of the collective, this amounted to a loss 
of "owness". Individual rebellion, on the other hand, was a method which was in 
keeping with Egoism because it involved the taking of possessions which 
individuals wanted and was thus an increase in self-power. He continued, 
Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as 
synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of 
the established condition or status, and is accordingly a political or 
social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a 
transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from 
men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising, but a 
rising of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the 
arrangements that spring from it 419 
However, Stirner did not only look to the modern underclass for salvation, 
he also saw a role for the "intellectual vagabonds", those who found the "hereditary 
dwelling-place of their fathers" too "cramped and oppressive" no doubt a physical 
metaphor for an intellectual condition. Such individuals were perfectly placed to 
become rebellious, according to Stirner, because they had the time and money to 
truly educate themselves in the new ideas, thus they break through "traditional 
bounds" and they "run wild" with "impudent criticism" and an "untamed mania 
for doubt", (again one recalls the significance of Rameatis Nephew for Hegel). 
Stirner's vision of social transformation could not be more different from 
that of the communists, for example, with their organised political revolutionaries, 
raising of arms and ideological propaganda machines. Rather, in Stirner's 
apocalyptic imagination he appears to anticipate the idea of a society sliding into 
gradual decay and dismemberment as Egoist consciousness gained ground, social 
institutions would become less and less able to deal with increasing levels of non- 
co-operation among its members. There would probably be a growing 'black 
market', or alternative economy as citizens would with-hold more and more of their 
taxes, which is their Egoistic right, leaving police forces and standing armies 
crumbling and starved of cash, crime and corruption would rise steadily and crimes 
416Ibid, 1995, p228. 
' 191bid, 1995, pps. 279-80. 
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against property would be endemic. Unconventional behaviour would increase 
throughout society and loose and chaotic alternative "associations" would spread 
steadily to replace these dying institutions. 
This prophetic vision was necessarily dependent upon the elements of 
Hegelianism and its associated eschatology which I have already considered, the 
death of God, the idea of histories completion and of the closure to mans self- 
estrangement, but we must also recall that Stirner also held to the view that these 
developments would only occur in the 'advanced' "Caucasian" countries of the 
West. Stirner took the view that the Occident represented the most advanced 
social development and that civilisations could be charted from simple beginnings 
to ever more complex models. This kind of racialized stadial conception of 
development had little to do with either Hegel or eschatology since, although 
broadly derived from Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy, it was also one 
of the most unquestioned assumptions of the entire period, including one assumed 
by Hegel himself. 
Related to this Euro-centrism we come to one of the most serious charges 
which have been levelled against Stirner's, The Ego and Its Own; that it is lacking in 
concrete empirical analysis, that his social agents are the least likely agents of 
social and individual rebellion and finally, that his idealism leads inevitably to a 
kind of disinterested political quietism. Marx, for example, holds that Stirner only 
sought an inward transformation of man. In fact, the very opposite appears to be 
the case, in one passage of the Ego it is clear that Stirner considers the "speculative 
philosopher" (i. e. Hegel) and the "Shaman" as synonymous for this very same 
reason, precisely because they are inward looking. ' 
However, it should also be clear enough from some of Stirner's ideas that he 
cannot be charged with political quietism. His attack on the state, on capitalism 
and the market system, on all the political parties of the day; indeed his opposition 
to all institutions is not polemical or disinterested speculation, but was intended to 
have an effect, as a consciousness changing prophet he sought nothing less than 
complete social transformation This is why he adopted the same prophetic tone 
throughout his writings as the other Young Hegelians, in order to justify and effect 
just such a rebellion. But first must come the belief in the irreducible self-power of 
the Ego, this is a prerequisite of the appropriate, as opposed to misconceived, forms 
of action. 
'=°Ibid, 1995, p3OO. 
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Stirner even anticipated Marx's critique in this regard; Marx's critique of 
the Lumpenproletariat runs that the poor have always been with us and they have 
never rebelled, thus there is no reason to suppose that Stirneis underclass are the 
messianic agents of social transformation. However, Stirner is quite clear that 
Egoism has to be the final wave of a new consciousness, its very closure, its 
messianic inevitably is the guarantee of its success because it is a fact of his own 
consciousness. Stirner says, it is "truly no new wisdom" that the rabble have settled 
for very little in the past, and when they have demanded more they have been 
"self-seekers" (in the limited sense of minor pettiness), however, he says, it is not 
"necessary either that the thing (Egoism) be new, if only consciousness of it is 
present". " Stirner marks a departure because he made explicit something in 
modernity that Hegel did not: that the end of self-estrangement brought nihilism 
in its trail, Stirner's response was to embrace this nihilism as a political philosophy, 
he said, 
... only individuals can enter into union with each other, and all 
alliances and leagues of peoples are and remain mechanical 
compoundings, because those who come together, at least so far as 
the 'peoples' are regarded as the ones that have come together, are 
destitute of will. Only with the last seperation does separation itself end and 
change to unification (my emphasis). ' 
To be sure, if anarchism is that doctrine which rejects all political authority 
whilst also maintaining that collective behaviour is not only possible but desirable 
without such order then Stirner was undoubtedly an anarchist. " In addition, 
Stirner, like all anarchists, had little time for nation states or territoriality and its 
concomitant monopoly of violence. He rejected all such ideas and all positive law, 
he supported the full development of each individual and had little time for any 
social structure, whether economic, political or cultural which did violence to such 
individualism. However, as we have seen, Stirner does not refuse to theorise 
modern political institutions because he is an anarchist, rather he is an anarchist 
because of his position as the first `post-historical' nihilist. His reading of Hegel's 
notion of "Absolute Freedom". In other words, his complete denouement of 
4211bid, 1995, p229. 
4221bid, 1995, p205. 
"` For a summary of anarchist principles given by anarchists themselves see Alexander Berkman, 1980, 
and Peter Kropotkin, (no date given), and Emma Goldman, 1969. For a good scholarly introduction tu 
the history of anarchism sec Miller, 1984. 
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alienation is the root cause of his rejection of political theory as traditionally 
understood. 
The purpose of The Ego and Its Own was to transform individuals living in 
society in order that society itself might be transformed. In order to achieve this 
Stirner had to sweep away all the remaining expressions of self-estrangement's 
which continued to haunt individuals. This is why Feuerbach and Bauer were so 
important for Stirner, for in the thought of these two men was contained the most 
sophisticated reading to date of the post-historical world following the "absolute 
standpoint" in the Phenomenology of Spirit. But, asked Stirner, how radical was the 
notion of species-being ("stuck fast in abstraction", 4'4), and where would it lead, or 
as in the case of Bauer, what hope was there that critique itself might well assist 
the Ego? Both Feuerbach and Bauer had failed to learn the most important 
element of Hegel's teaching; that "Absolute Freedom" was completely value- 
neutral, thus both Feuerbach's new sensuous being and Bauer's critique should be 
swept away with this same nihilism. 
Finally, in line with the messianic eschatology of the period, a radical shift 
in consciousness was necessary if the new opportunities which nihilism opened up 
were to be taken advantage of. The end of self-estrangement brought forth nihilism 
and thus a nihilist political response emerged from within Stirner's 'privileged 
standpoint' of Egoism, this response ultimately accepted the instability of all 
meaning. Stirner's agents of social change, the Lumpenproletariat, served as the 
mirror image of this instability, the social underclass of modern society were at 
least blessed with an unstable nothing, which in turn made the "union of egoists" an 
inevitable historical phenomenon. The only chance if new and inappropriate 
notions of morality were not to do violence to Stirner's messianic individualism. 
However, as we shall see in the chapter which follows, for Marx the die was 
now radically re-cast after having confronted Stirner. Although many of his chosen 
targets would continue to consume him, Marx's move towards a political 
philosophy of self-actualisation had, above all, to answer Stirner's radical 
individualism. Marx's critique of bourgeois justice was constructed with only two 
groups in mind, and Stirner did not fit into either of these. On the one hand Marx 
challenged the classical political economists such as Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Say 
and Mill, who he alleges, all took the bourgeois social relation as something 
'natural'. And on the other hand, the second group, the Utopian Socialists, saw 
4 "Stirner. 1995, p300. 
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socialism as nothing more than the full realisation of these same values. In other 
words, abstract values such as formal freedoms, abstract equality and justice, in 
there very abstractness only served to mask the concrete problems that are present 
in the society of their own time, and worse they projected such abstractness into 
the future in the course of developing their utopian schemes. Since Stirner's 
prophetic Egoism was anti-essentialist, anti-bourgeois and destructive rather than 
constructive, it was bound to reject both traditions as well. However, Stirner also 
stood in the way of Marx's reconstruction of communal forms of justice, thus Marx 
had to find a way of both agreeing and disagreeing with Stirner. I would now like 
to examine how he tried to achieve this. 
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Just as the peoples of Antiquity lived out their pre-history in 
imagination, in mythology, so we Germans have lived out our post- 
history [nach Geschichte) in thought, in philosophy . `'s 
Marx, 1844 
CHAPTER IV 
Post-Historical Existence II: The Proletariat 
Introduction 
In what follows I shall demonstrate that Marx's messianic political 
philosophy, following Stirner, was a necessary response to the nihilism that he now 
perceived to be dominant within post-Hegelian thought. Following both Hegel and 
Stirner, Marx was required to find some new way of legitimating his own 
`privileged standpoint' since Stirner had demonstrated that a standpoint that had 
admitted nihilism through the door of history could not be used to justify a positive 
political program of any meaningful kind. Yet paradoxically, and despite his 
occasional denials to the contrary, I shall also insist that Marx's own solution to this 
problem of nihilism remained a product of the very German Idealism from which 
he sought to escape. '`' 
In ocher words, it is generally assumed that at the very least; Marxism is 
defined by the fact that as a body of philosophy, it locates and signifies a new 
425 See the new translation by J O'Malley which runs "Just as ancient peoples live their past in their 
imagination, in mythology, so we Germans have lived our futon' history in thought, in philosophy", CUP, 
1994, p62. The term nach Geschichte can be translated as post-history or after history, however, future 
history is undoubtedly chosen by O'Malley in order to make Marx's meaning clear and create some 
distance between his critique of the Hegelian "Absolute Idea" and the "end of history" in the bourgeois 
sense. 
42°The Portable Karl Mnx, p118, the epigram is from the "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right". 
; `' See William Maker, "Hegel's critique of Marx" in Desmond et al, where Maker points out that Marx, 
while engaging in normative or messianic thinking, adopts the very position that he accuses Hegel of, i. e. 
of mystifying idealism, since Marx believes in the final analysis that ideas, revolutionary class- 
consciousness in this case, can change reality. Hegel, in stark contrast makes it clear again and again that 
it is not the business of philosophy to engage in prophetic political thinking. Also see Kelvin Knight, in 
the Maclntyre Reader, pps 224-5 where he refers to the myth of Marx's materialism and to the book of 
the same name by George L. Kline, finally see Carol C. Gould's Marx's Social Ontology, MIT, 1978 for 
similar themes. As Gould suggests, in the final analysis, according to Marx, subjects act causally upon 
objects but objects do not act causally upon subjects but only provide the basic circumstances for the 
agents self-change. Although Gould holds that this is Marx's position and not Hegel's, it should be 
obvious from my own description of Hegel's "Absolute Idealism" that I take the view that this is also 
Hegel's position. 
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agency of social change in the industrial proletariat as the new model army. 
This 
'discovery' is often thought to be revolutionary, that is, it posits knowledge which 
is 
monumentally specific to his analysis. " It is this assumption that I would like to 
challenge in this chapter since what is often forgotten is that Marx's 'discovery', 
the proletariat, which was not empirically deduced in any case, but his specific 
transformation of this idealism, was itself, conditional upon the nihilism of 
modernity. ' Thus, I will further argue that the rejection of traditional political 
theory by the revolutionary proletariat in Marx's account, is a necessary move if one 
accepts certain Stirnerean tropes, such as the latter's eschatological and prophetic 
attack on alienation [Entfremdung), the death of God and the disenchantment's of 
the Young Hegelian metaphysic. 
Indeed, it is noticeable that Marx's theory of class-consciousness does not 
emerge from the work of David Ricardo, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson or any of 
those other important luminaries of the Enlightenment who founded modern 
economics and the human 'sciences'. While the thinkers of the Enlightenment may 
have anticipated many of the ideas of the later German romantics and the German 
idealists, class-consciousness as class-consciousness is certainly not one of them. 
Furthermore, the notion of proletarian class-consciousness does not even emerge 
principally from the ideas of the French Revolution, the ideas and values of that 
particular historical event are declared to be bourgeois by Marx himself (he holds 
that these were a form of class-consciousness to be sure, but obviously not the 
universal interest that he is looking for). A30 Rather, I shall argue that Marx's 
identification of the proletariat as the new messianic force of history is conditioned 
by the turn ofStirner, from alienation to nihilism and from collective consciousness 
to unique consciousness. Stirner's concept of individualism presents Marx with his 
greatest challenge, to come up with a universal interest, thus a non-nihilist 
interest, which is consonant with individuality. "" 
428 See Eagleton, 1989, pp165-175, for an attempt to debunk the allegedly unique character of 
Marxismand for a discussion of the problems of identifying what essential qualities are supposed to 
constitute Marxism today. 
429 As mentioned earlier [see Kamenka), Marxism is often said to be a product of French politics, English 
economics and German philosophy, however, it could easily be argued that German idealism itself is also 
a product of these same disciplines. 
4'OMarx, 1992, p 147, for example, where Marx criticise the "world historical necromancers" who did not 
see the distinction between the events of the 1850's in France and those of 1789. The leaders of the 
French Revolution had, said Marx, "accomplished the task of their epoch, which was the emancipation 
and establishment of modern bourgeois society". 
"' Very few readings ofMarx'stheory of class-consciousness have been located within the historical and 
cultural milieu of German Idealism. 
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I shall further argue that the meaning of two of Marx's most important 
concepts, namely those of class-consciousness and revolution, are both embedded 
within this peculiar 'German' sense of post-historical existence, a world in which 
theory becomes action and reflection becomes a practical affair. I shall demonstrate 
that this occurs from within the framework of Hegelian idealism and the 
background of nihilism that we met in chapters II and III. This nihilism implied an 
end to 'doing philosophy' as was traditionally understood, in Stirner it meant a 
corporeal absolute sovereignty of the Egoists own body, philosophy which is held to 
be virtually synonymous with the contemplative nature of German idealism, is 
rejected in Marx's account. However, this produces an important paradox in 
Marx's project: he found that he had to resuscitate philosophy in order to end it. 
This paradox forced Marx to deny the meaninglessness of nihilism and re-open the 
discussion on alienation [Entfremdung), which is to do 'philosophy' in Marx's own 
terms, giving the concept of alienation his own characteristic stamp. In effect, his 
own account of alienation provided the 'philosophical' justification that was 
required by revolutionary class-consciousness, a trajectory which nihilism ruled out 
and which Marx had to defeat both theoretically and practically. "' 
As I have argued in the opening chapters, in Hegel's thought neither " 
"alienation" understood as self-estrangement and the cloud of unknowing 
[Entfremdung), nor as "objectification" {Entäußerung), is coeval, with doing work 
per i. Thus while it appears that Marx's reworking of the concept of alienation is a 
kind of `philosophical' project, Marx eventually abandons this project in his 
particular reworking of the concept. Marx's concept of alienation will only be 
expressed negatively in the objective relations which are defined by capitalism and 
the division of labour. Thus in class society no good can come of work or alienation 
[Entfremdung or Entäußerung], since even the benefits which may be expressed 
within capitalism, such as a massive upsurge in the productive forces, must always 
432 If it could be said that the integrity of Stirneis thought had suffered at the hands of political 
ideologists of every description, then this was always incomparably less so than the case of the 
posthumous fate of Marx's ideas. Marx, of course, has been claimed by democratic socialists, violent 
revolutionaries, social reformers, radical democrats, critical theorists and post-structural deconstructionists 
to name but a few. In addition his thought has been castigated, by turns, as a deep well of totalitarianism, 
as a form of hopeless utopianism, as politically naive wish fulfilment and finally, as just plain illiberal. 
On the other hand, the 'midterm' reports by Western scholars which were fuelled by the discovery of 
major works by Marx in the 1930's such as the 1844 Manuscripts, the German Ideology and the Grxndris e 
have led to a more objective appraisal of Marx's oeuvre. Although the plan of the Grundrisse suggests that 
Marx was planning to write extensively on matters of traditional political theory, such as the state, 
representative democracy and soon, there is no evidence that he intended anything other than a critique 
of such theory, rather than a reconstruction. All in all the accumulation of effort over the years since his 
death has led to the production of thousands of books and papers on his controversial ideas. It is with some 
intrepedation therefore, and not an insignificant amount of humility, that any contemporary scholar 
should proffer yet more reflections on Marx. 
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remain only a provisional benefit. With Marx, alienation loses the Hegelian sense of 
being a spiritually loaded objectification [Entäußerung], and instead it becomes a 
specific phenomena of a particular historical account of 'work' as a deforming self- 
estrangement, thus Marx re-loads suffering with new content. On the other hand, 
rejecting nihilism is also a recognition that it has presented itself in the first place. 
This implicit concern with nihilism, as a kind of shadow of alienation, does emerge 
and become explicit from time to time, and we will see this when we come to 
consider Marx's understanding of modernity in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. 
In what follows I shall try to avoid the old debates concerning Marx's 
Hegelian legacy. For example, according to Marx, Hegel's concept of "Absolute 
Knowing"433 had only foreclosed on philosophy to replace it with an idealist 
contemplation of the world which was essentially quietist and yet another 
manifestation of alienation. Thus in the famous "Postface to the Second Edition" of 
Capital of 1873, while recalling his youthful enthusiasm for Hegel he says, "With 
him [Hegel) it [the dialectic) is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order 
to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell". "' Following Feuerbach, 
Marx held that such mysticism could only be expressed conservatively because such 
thinking must remain apart from the practical work of "sensuous" forms of human 
emancipation. For Marx then, as for the other young Hegelians, Hegel was a 
conservative, his thought simply represented the highest philosophical expression 
of Prussian authoritarianism. Such charges have been answered more than 
adequately by a whole new generation of Hegel scholars and it is not my intention 
135 here to cover this ground again. 
However, more importantly, while the epistemological status of Hegel's 
form of phenomenological unmasking [consciousness must always examine itself), is 
entirely in keeping with his idealism, Marx's apparent rejection of Hegel's 
idealism, on the other hand, only serves to obscure the epistemological status of 
such practical reflexivity in Marx's own thought. " As I shall demonstrate, in some 
433McLellan, 1988, p102, for example, see the section "Absolute Knowing" in the 1844 manuscripts 
where Marx laments that this Hegelian moment "implies the transcendence of alienation". 
"4'Marx, 1986, p103. 
' 35For example, see Ottman, Knox, Kaufmann, Gregoire and Avineri, in Stewart (Ed), 1996. 
"The clearest possible example of Marx'sphenomenological method is to be found in the introduction 
to the Gtwndritre, 1973, pp. 100-108. During a long discussion of Hegel's method Marx points out that 
the only way to approach the study of capitalist society is to study the abstract categories that such a 
society uses to study itself. He points out that nothing would be more natural than to study .. 
"the path of 
abstract thought, rising from the simple to the combined, [which) would correspond to the real historical 
process". However, because every ... 
"abstraction ... is a product of 
historic relations.. these ... possess their 
full validity only for and within these relations". In other words, in order to get behind the back of such 
taken for granted categories, such abstract determinations must be examined internally in order to expose 
their contradictions. Thus, he continues, "The Christian religion was able to be of assistance in reaching 
162 
of Marx's most important texts there seems to be the use of a method which is 
conclusively idealist in this phenomenological sense. In the 1844 Manuscripts and 
the Grundrisse, for example, there are passages on alienation which should 
demonstrate beyond any doubt that this epistemological ambiguity remained with 
Marx well into his so-called mature period. A close reading of Vol. 1 of Capital 
before the appearance of the Grundrisse draws a similar conclusion based upon the 
notion of "commodity fetishism" which is developed in the opening chapter. "" In 
my reading of Marx, he remains an idealist in this important sense. Ultimately, for 
Marx as for Hegel, the course of history is a product of human consciousness. 
To this end, and despite his 'heroic silence' concerning the precise nature 
of communist society and his rejection of a particular conception of philosophy, I 
shall argue that Marx was preoccupied with creating the kind of meaning which 
would unify the apparent subjectivity's of socially, nationally and ethnically 
heterogeneous people. This raises the two fundamental questions of my own 
reading of Marx; firstly, what role does a critical unmasking play in the production of social 
meaning for Marx? and secondly, how does the particular process of the production of social 
meaning effect his theory of political change? I shall argue that the answer to the first 
question lay in the need to invest a particular social agency with truly messianic 
potential. Like other post-historical thinkers considered here, this same messianic 
template produces another form of revolutionary politics since Marx requires a form 
of social and political 'activism' or decisionism from individuals in the political 
arena rather than the measured response of the political theorist. ` 
Particularly prominent in my account then, are those texts which 
demonstrate Marx's concern with the need to create a new account of the universal 
rather than relative interest. In his Introduction to a Critique of Hegel'. r Philosophy of 
Right, the German Ideology and the Communist Manifesto, Marx is concerned to deal 
an objective understanding of earlier mythologies only when its own self-criticism had been 
accomplished to a certain degree, "... Marx's method, therefore, consists of studying, in the first instance, 
the general abstract categories of self-understanding ... 
"which obtain in more or less all forms of 
society",.. then he tackles "The categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society and on 
which the fundamental classes rest".. Marx then goes on to list an enormous project of which the three 
volumes of Capital are but one fifth of the whole. The point is, Marx does not base his study on the kind 
of empirical abstractions dealt with in positivist sociology, for these do not determine reality- such 
abstractions are simplifications and do not reflect the total richness of actual experience. Marx is primarily 
interested in building up a rich totality of determinate abstractions, i. e. abstractions which arc, never the 
less, real and therefore which also determine the outcome of human affairs, such as exchange value and 
abstract labour. In the argument that follows I will attempt to highlight this phenomenological Marx 
wich reference to his rejection of class membership in favour of class consciousness. 
43' Marx, 1986, pps. 435-43. 
438 In an reminiscence of her husband's circle, Marrianne Weber recalled of the young Marxist, George 
Lukac's, in his view, "The final struggle between God and Lucifer is still to come and depends on the 
decision of mankind". 
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with the negative epistemological effects of the disenchantment of the world and 
the social division of labour, effects which might well undermine the homogeneity 
of mankind's interpretative powers. In other words, class action per . re, collective 
expressions are elevated to the realm of the 'true philosophy' i. e. it becomes the 
actualisation of Hegelianism. 439 This is also related to Marx's objections to all the 
relativists of his own day, such as Stirner and Stirner is mercilessly savaged in 
Marx's polemics for this reason. 40 Thus placed we are in a much better position to 
understand why Marx considered the nihilism of Max Stirner such a great danger. 
According to Marx, Stirner's messianic egoism invested nihilism with new tools, 
such as a startling new account of the basis and justification for the individual 
purpose and interest, and this in turn provided a major repulse to Marx's 
developing theory of communism. 
Of course, the larger question remains open; did Marx correctly identify 
the historical agents of social change in the proletariat? While I claim that Marx 
held that the potential for revolution was inevitable, a lesser but still contentious 
claim than that of the so-called orthodox Marxists, for whom it was often held that 
proletarian revolution per . +e was 
inevitable. In any case, if revolution was not 
thought to be inevitable by Marx but simply one possible outcome which might 
emerge from specific objective historical conditions, then this simply raises an even 
more fundamental question concerning the imperatives of Self-Consciousness. In 
other words, the nature and the possibilities of his notion of a willing class- 
consciousness which is revolutionary and the project of critical unmasking becomes 
increasingly more vital to the practical efficacy of his project. Thankfully, questions 
concerning the moral or ethical requirement for revolution and the truth content of 
Marx's claims concerning the inevitability of revolution are too complex to be dealt 
with here but framing such questions in the first place does raise some related 
99 Lukäcs, 1990, here I follow Lukäcs interpretation were he characterises his own position of 
"revolutionary messianism" as a "Hegelian distortion", p14, also p21, and where he says he was wrong to 
put the Hegelian "totality", by which he means the working class, at the centre of his system. He said 
"Proletarian science is revolutionary not just by virtue of its revolutionary ideas which opposes it to 
bourgeois society, but above all because of its method. The primacy of the category of totality is the bearer 
of the revolutionary principle in science", p27. 
440 Marx'sattitude towards Stirneris unprincipled and often Marx betrays his own deepest fears in what 
he does not say regarding Stirrer. For example, he says in one passage in the German Ideology, p185, 
almost all of which is devoted to criticism of Stirrer, that "Stirrer" and his whole philosophical fraternity, 
among whom he is the weakest and most ignorant member, ... ", thus one should consider why, if this is 
true, Marx spend so much time attacking him? Either way this attack does nothing to endear one a) 
Marx, after all, if Stirner is really as ignorant then he should not have attacked from such a position of 
strength, or else if he is really much more interesting or challenging, then Marx should have, rather, 
admitted as much in honour of the truthful view of things. 
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issues. Again, does such a willing `decisionism' takes Marx straight back into the 
camp of German idealism that he set out to criticise? 44' 
This question concerning the very grounding and the possibility of the 
project of critical unmasking, might seem at first glance to be a startlingly basic 
question. However, it is related to a number of such questions which are all too 
seldom discussed, such as the basic intentionality behind Marx's political 
philosophy. Of course, Marx certainly sought a communist revolution and an end to 
alienated relationships, but one might argue that alienation is 'normal' in the sense 
that Nietzsche might have meant. As we shall see in the concluding Chapter of 
this thesis, Nietzsche held that alienation was an inevitable part of the human 
condition and a necessary prerequisite of both critical thinking and great artistic 
achievement. `' 
In other words, assuming that one remains broadly in agreement with 
Marx's theory of alienation, then it is difficult to see why revolution rather than 
evolution should inevitably follow from his analysis, why violent destruction rather 
than institutional reform? " The gradual reform of alienating social institutions and 
ways of life could just as plausibly follow from any such critical project so long as 
the ultimate goal remained the same i. e. the transformation of the cause of the 
problem, which was the capitalist mode of production. Of course, the stock reply to 
this last question is that Marx required the active destruction of the capitalist state 
which would always remain an instrument of class oppression. However, this in 
turn, simply begs the question of the opposing theories of universalism and the 
legitimisation of such theories. In other words; why we should agree with Marx's 
class analysis of the state rather than Hegel's? 
In any case, in this chapter I am not primarily concerned with Marx's 
ultimate ambition for humanity. My concern in this chapter is to try and 
"'For such idealists the act of willing is the grounding of all knowledge. Most classically, such a position 
was developed by Fichte in his Foundations for the Science of Knowledge. "In his transcendental dialectic 
(Critique of Pure Reason), in order to decide between determination by nature and the assumption of 
freedom, Kant had already made an appeal to the rational interest which, no doubt, aims at freedom. 
Fichte turned this theoretical dispute into a fundamental decision of human existence; "What sort of 
philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one is". An inborn interest in freedom 
pleads for idealism. Idealism can be compelling because of the immediate obviousness of its principle, or 
in other words, because it relies on the dual character of consciousness and Self-Consciousness. In 
everything it observes it observes itself. This is only achieved on the basis of free activity and can never be 
causally explained by dogmatism as brought about by things external", Rüdiger Bubner, 1997, p76. 
This is Walter Kaufmann's position. 
Marx, 1976, p80, thus they [proletariat} find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, 
hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the 
state; in order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the state. 
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demonstrate the way in which he produces meaning and associated with this same 
primary goal how it in turn shaped the outcomes of his fragmented political 
theorising, such as it is. In other words, I am concerned with answers which might 
dislodge Marx's obvious objections to nihilism and modernity from his 
eschatological messianism and the self-justificatory nature of this same messianism. 
In short, does the messianic political form necessarily follow from his way of 
producing social meaning, as opposed to the kind of individualistic messianism 
which produced Lumpenproletariat for Stirner? 
In the first section of this Chapter I will outline Marx's concept of praxis, 
and I will do this against the specifically 'German' context of his intellectual 
formation. Then in section two I will turn towards his important distinction 
between the notions of class consciousness, and class membership in order to 
demonstrate why the 'sociology' of empirically defined class structure does not 
interest Marx. Indeed, only the phenomenologically understood idealist concept of 
a messianic moment of Self-Consciousness as class-consciousness is of importance. 
Then in the third and final section I will relocate Marx's 'messianic' concept of 
historical agency within the Hegelian framework I introduced in the first three 
chapters of the present work before finally turning towards his notion of the 
political. 
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As far as Germany is concerned, the criticism of religion is 
essentially complete, and the criticism of religion is the 
presupposition of all criticism. 
Marx, 1844.444 
I 
"Praxis" emerges from Hegelianism445 
Nowhere is the peculiar German context of Marx's thought more self- 
evident than when it came to his appreciation of the Hegelian legacy of praxis. In 
Marx's understanding of Hegelianism, the most important aspect of this legacy 
came to him via some of the key moves in the German theology of the period, a 
theological crisis which systematically de-mythologized, de-sanctified, 
disenchanted and replaced the fundamental basis of Christian belief. 
In the first instance, Marx fully agreed with Feuerbach's reversal of the 
subject-object predicate in Hegel's philosophy. 'As we saw in chapter three of the 
present work, Feuerbach proposed in his Essence of Christianity that although Hegel 
had begun to question man's alienated relation to God in earnest he had stopped 
short of drawing out his Phenomenology to its logical conclusion. For Feuerbach, this 
logical conclusion was that Phenomenolgy, which had proposed that 'Man was God', 
should actually be reversed, that is, should have proposed that 'God is Man'. God 
is replaced with the genus, man the 'species-being'. ' This provided Marx with 
one of his most formative understandings; to the effect that once God is cleared out 
of the way, historically speaking, then the true relation of "man to man" could be 
properly examined in a new, specifically modern way and that the dream of 
Enlightenment was realisable. In other words, this allegedly cleared the way for 
full and free social intercourse between persons. 
*'Ibid, 1976, p63. 
"' There appears to be no single English equivalent for this German term, it means both experience and 
practice together, (applied experience) from the Greek: praxis, doing, action. medL: prae' kris, practise, 
exercise. Marx uses the term on many occasions, particularly important is his use of the term in a 
Hegelian context such as in his lntrodwction to a Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right. 
41" Marx, 1975, pps. 97 & 157, or at least it should be noted that Marx fully agreed with Feuerbach's 
reworking of Hegel until his confrontation with the thought of Max Stirrer. Thus in the 1844 
Manuscripts he has nothing but praise for Feuerbach and only one year later in the fragmentary sixth 
thesis on Feuerbach, and after reading Stirrer, he criticises Feuerbach for the very thing he had praised 
him for in the first text. This was first drawn to my attention by Richard Gunn. 
44' McLellan, 1999, pR 1. 
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"Criticism" before Feuerbach, lamented Marx, was continually dogged by 
theology, and Hegel in Marx's view, had done little in his own writings to 
demystify knowledge forms. " In a very important sense, Feuerbach was true to 
Enlightenment in so far as he drew forth the real atheism of Enlightenment 
rationality in a way that the Enlightenment philo ophe themselves had failed to do. 
' 
In any case, Marx sought to fully develop the notion of critique as praxis, that is, as 
a union of theory and social action. Thus proving that he was an heir of the 
Enlightenment, Marx holds that a disabused notion of critique, free from religion, 
myth and superstition is the same thing as Reason. The point here is that this 
concept could only present itself after the death of God. Before the death of God, 
criticism was bound by theology and theology was essentially either mystical or 
contemplative in Marx's view. 
The death of God, which I have been able to trace in general terms 
elsewhere [see Chapters II & III], can be more concretely drawn when we turn to 
the use of the term praxis by the Young Hegelian Polish nobleman, August von 
Cieszkowski (1814-1894). Cieszkowski was the first to use the term praxis in the 
distinct way which was to so influence Marx [although Hegel's use of the term 
Entäußerung in both the Phenomenology and in the Philosophy of Right is virtually 
identical to praxis). If Hegel had drawn up history into three basic civilisations, the 
Oriental, the Classical and the Christian-Germanic, then Cieszkowski radically re- 
cast the formula. 
In Cieszkowski's view the true triadic structure of history was Antiquity, 
Christianity and the Future. 450 In chapter three, entitled "Teleology of World 
History", taken from a work which was well known to Marx, the Prolegomena to 
Ilirtoriosophie, Cieszkowski argued that just as the "world of art and immediate 
beauty" passes over from "classical antiquity" to the "Christian epoch" as the world 
of "thought, of consciousness and philosophy", so too the future would become the 
world of action. That is, future action would be the action of the feeling of beauty 
*'"Ina letter to J. B. Schweitzer, 24th of January, 1865, Marx said, "Compared with Hegel, Feuerbach is 
extremely poor. All the same he was epoch-making after Hegel because he laid stress on certain points 
which were disagreeable to the Christian consciousness but important for the progress of criticism, and 
which Hegel had left in semi-obscurity", Marx-Engel's, Selected Correspondence, 1960, p185. In the 
Preface to his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 he said, "The first positive humanist and 
naturalist criticism dates from Feuerbach. The less bombastic they are, the more sure, deep, 
comprehensive, and lasting is the effect of Feuerbach's works, the only ones since Hegel's 
Phenomenology and Logic to contain a real theoretical revolution", see McLellan, p76. 
449 Even David Hume, one of the most consistent of the Enlightenment atheists, was an atheist on 
epistemological grounds. Such arguments were very different from the ontological nature of those of 
Hegel and Feuerbach. 
4S° Here I am paraphrasing Stepelevich, 1987, p55. 
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(antiquity) and the wisdom [Christianity) of thought as action, i. e. praxis. In the 
eleventh Thesis on Feierbach of 1845, Marx wrote most famously, "The philosophers 
have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it". In the 
Prolegomena of 1838, only seven years before, Cieszkowski himself wrote, 
... just as art still 
had to give way to the rising sun of thought and of 
philosophy as soon as it had gone beyond itself- though raised up to 
a higher stage- and had to exchange its former absolute value for 
itself for a subjection to the interiority of thought, so too must 
philosophy in the future suffer itself to be chiefly applied. And just 
as the poetry of art stepped over into the prose of thought, so must 
philosophy descend from the height of theory to the plane of praxis. 
To be practical philosophy, or (stated more properly) the philosophy 
of praxis, whose most concrete effect on life and social relations is 
the development of truth in concrete activity- this is the future of 
philosophy in general... 
and then anticipating Marx with the following startling formulation, he continued, 
... ust as thought and reflection surpassed the fine arts, so now the 
deed and social activity will surpass the true philosophy. "' 
Cieszkowski then goes on to point towards Fourier's socialism, 452 as the 
possible beginnings of a model of what "practical philosophy" might well look like, 
but again, in an argument that was well rehearsed before Marx adopted it, 
Cieszkowski does not like the look of the utopian element in Fourier's thinking. '" 
Cieszkowski insists that "consciousness now certainly has to outpace the dead", 
that is, the "design of social relations" should proceed with confidence into the 
future and without reference to those institutions which are inherited. Only 
fourteen years after Cieszkowski's book Marx makes an almost identical point in 
the opening pages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte when he said, "The 
tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on-the minds of the 
451 Ibid, 1987, p77- 
`2 See Fourier. The Theory of the Four Movemenu, 1996, Fourier's early socialism is reformist and utopian, 
not apocalyptic. He believed, for example, that the natural order was as yet, incomplete, pxxi. 
Interestingly, the editors introduction concludes on the following note, "The Theory of the Four 
Movements is a reminder that 'socialism' began as an attempt to discover a successor, not to capitalism, 
but to the Christian church", pxxvi. It is also worth noting that Engels always held Fourier's thought in 
very high regard. See his footnote on Fourier in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, 
1986, p216. 
. s' Stepelevich, 1987, p85. 
living". '" Utopianism, claims Cieszkowski, is not "rational enough" in that it does 
not "unfold from reality" but "capitulates to a predetermined reality". In other 
words, a utopia by definition, closes off some of the possibilities of an infinitely open 
future because of its location in the temporal structure of present reality. As 
Cieszkowski suggests, "Just as everything new never emerges into the world all at 
once, so also no utopia is ever realised in the world directly". 
Marx rehearsed the same arguments and -arrived at similar conclusions to 
those of Cieszkowski. Marx's own critique of utopian thought can be found in both 
Vol. I of Capital and in the Grundrisse. In chapter 10 of Capital, entitled, "The 
Working Day" Marx sarcastically comments upon the factory "relay system" in 
which workers were quite often shuffled from job to job or even from factory to 
factory. According to Marx this system is as perverse a product of the bourgeois 
imagination as Fourier's "courses seances". These "short sessions" were supposed to 
satisfy the eleventh human passion, that is, the passion for the kind of "variety" 
which would make work attractive in Fourier's ideal society ass In the same chapter 
of Capital, Marx also comments upon the fact that three of Robert Owen's most 
cherished utopian ideals, the "ten hour day", "the combination of education with 
productive labour" and the "worker's co-operative societies" were, even by the time 
of the composition of Capital in 1865-7, all surpassed by historical reality, the first 
was a "Factory Act", the second was an "official phrase" in all Factory Acts and the 
last was "already being used as a cloak for reactionary swindles". " 
In the Grundrisse, Marx covers some of the same ground but this time he 
explicitly relates the concept of bourgeois work to the notion of "self-realisation" 
which he shared with Hegel. Again, Marx's criticises both Adam Smith and 
Fourier for their distinctive approach to the problem of increasingly unsatisfying 
"work", each assumes that work is a curse and each does so because they have only 
bourgeois expressions of work, or the "historic forms" of work in mind, as he puts it. 
For Smith, relief from work is to be provided by periods of "tranquillity", says Marx, 
thus Smith can only conceive of partial momentary freedoms from the "historic 
form" of work. Thus, according to Marx, Smith removes the pleasure of the 
problem-solving aspect of work from "work" ferse. 
4'4 Marx, 1992, p 146. 
u"Marx, 1986, p403. 
""I bld, 1986, p413. 
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In Marx's view, Fourier is little better than Smith because he wants to find 
relief from work in the distractions of "mere fun" and "amusement°457 As opposed 
to the case of Fourier's utopianism, Marx argues that in a communist society the 
satisfactions to be gained from the new form of work would come from its usage as 
a form of sublimated problem solving. According to this view, self-realisation comes 
from the composition and solving of problems with "the most damned seriousness 
[and) the most intense exertion". 58 In other words, Marx conceives of self- 
realisation through a quite different "work form", one which is not necessarily easy 
or relaxing but challenging and rational. This is an important point, Marx is 
required to invest the potential work form of the future with new meaning if the 
alienation of bourgeois societies is to be transcended [Aufheben). Thus again, Marx 
follows Cieszkowski in arguing that utopians were in principle no better than 
bourgeois economists since they had no conception of substantive freedom 
unfolding from such a new "work form". This is because they, in turn, begin with 
the same presupposition, in effect, that work forms are a-historical. 
Thus Marx looks to create social meaning from two important 
developments in German philosophy and both in opposition to the nihilism of 
modernity, both requiring a re-working of alienation [Entfremdung and 
Entaüßerung). Firstly, the death of God prepared the way for full and unabridged 
rationality in all economic, social and political matters and that same rational 
discourse became forward looking and grounded in social action per . e. 
In other 
words, distance and self-estrangement between people is lost as a result of the truly 
common bonds and self-understandings of such collective project building. Thus 
work on the world, the objectification of man, is allegedly meaningful in its own 
right, presumably because the unmasking of particular interests which is entailed 
by such collective projects facilitates authentic expression rather than deceit and 
bad faith among and between individuals. 
In Marx's on-again, off-again Hegelian idealism he ultimately returns to 
"absolute idealism". For example, in a very similar kind of self-objectification 
[Entäußerung) to that of Hegel's in the Grundrisse, we see a remarkably 'idealist' 
account of such project building and its centrality to human subjectivity and 
alienation [Entaüßerung). Of the part such alienation plays in the creation of a 
shared world, he said, 
's' In the case of Fourier this claim is certainly true since an important element of his future 'harmony' 
was sexual hberation. 
. 458 Marx, 1977, p611. 
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Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric 
telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human 
industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human 
will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are 
organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of 
knowledge objectified. " [my emphasis] 
Secondly, Marx recognised that authentic expression, simply because it is 
authentic, would in all likelihood, produce a problematic heterogeneity of desires, 
needs and particular requirements which in there turn would make the creative 
satisfaction of all such wants very difficult to solve. Never the less, this only serves 
to bring forth the second value [hence meaning), of his new sense of social 
objectification; the depth satisfactions of problem solving. The exercise of technical 
and social ingenuity on the part of individuals becomes worthwhile and satisfying 
in its own right, according to Marx, when applied to serve the needs of such 
particularity. 
Thus when we reconsider Marx's critique of Stirner's Egoism, this critique 
emerges most clearly when just such an extended discussion of the social basis of 
project building is undertaken. According to Marx, the social division of labour, 
which is coeval with the form of capitalist private property, is a barrier to the 
satisfaction of the developing multiplicity of desires because it prevents the "all- 
round activity and thereby the full development of all potentialities". `G0 Thus in 
opposition to Stirner, Marx wants to claim that his own commitment to the 
"private individual" rather than the "general", selfless man is more honest than 
even Stirner's egoism 461 This in turn raises the whole notion of the "false form" of 
consciousness and the "Theory of Justification" as Marx himself calls this discussion 
in the German Ideology' 
"" lbid, 1977, p706. 
"'Marx, 1976, p255. 
Ibid, 1976, p247. 
"'ý Ibid, 1976, p242. 
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... "the consciousness and ability to 
lead this struggle exist- in 
objective terms- only in the class-consciousness of the proletariat, it 
alone can and must be the leading class of social transformation in 
the approaching revolution". 
Lukac's, Lenin. 
II 
Class-consciousness, class-membership and praxis 
Marx has little to explicitly say concerning the subjectivity of modern class 
relations. Where he does say something concerning class-consciousness this has 
often led to even greater confusion than could reasonably be expected from 
someone for whom the whole issue was so central. For example, when Marx 
discusses the "Working-Day" in Chapter 10 of Capital Vol. I, he suggests that the 
regulation of the day, "the stroke of the clock, limits, pauses of the work", was not 
the product of "parliamentary fancy" (by which he presumably means self- 
conscious politically motivated behaviour). Rather, these regulations were 
"developed gradually out of the circumstances as natural laws of the modern mode 
of production". At this point in his analysis of capitalism such regulation is thought 
to be a product of"a long struggle of the classes". ' Thus "The establishment of a 
normal working-day is the result of centuries of struggle between the capitalist and 
the labourer". ' And again, five chapters later, in Chapter 15 on "Machinery and 
Modern Industry", he states that "Factory legislation" is a "methodical reaction of 
society against the spontaneously developed form of the process of production". 
Furthermore he says that this phenomena is, "just as much the nece cary product of 
modern industry as cotton yarn, self-actors, and the electric telegraph" [my 
emphasis). 466 Thus in this somewhat determinist account society necessarily reacts 
against the drive and domination of capital. And finally, in the notoriously 
reductive and economistic base-superstructure footnote in Vol. I of Capital, where 
Marx quotes from his 1859 Critique of Political Economy, he said, 
In the estimation of that paper, my view that the economic 
structure of society, is the real basis on which the juridical and 
political superstructure is raised, and to which definite social forms 
403 Lukac's, 1970, p23. 
4°4Marx, 1970, p268,. 
'°S1bid, 1970, p257. 
"° Ibid, 1970, p451. 
of thought correspond; that the mode of production determines the 
character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally, all 
this is true for our own times ... 
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Marx's statements here are entirely consistent with the "materialist 
conception of history" which he first outlined in the so-called transitional writings 
such as the German Ideology. The realities of economic life are the common basis, 
starting point and ground of consciousness. On the other hand, there is a huge 
difference between his view here and the one taken from the Grundirre on the 
"railways" understood as actual extensions of the human brain over and against the 
notion that such material phenomena is that which each and every individual is in 
the first instance born into. In the German Ideology of 1845, Marx unequivocally 
asserts, "It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines 
consciousness". ' 
Then again, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte he says, 
Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not 
under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the 
given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly 
confronted. The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the minds of the living' 
Paradoxically, such statements appear to be a complete repudiation of 
German Idealism. Yet returning to the historiography of Vol. I of Capital, Marx 
appears yet again to grasp the youthful idealism of the 1844 Manuscripts. This 
passage is of such importance that I will quote from it at length, again following a 
discussion of the passing of the factory acts which limited the length of the 
working-day in England, he said, 
lt must be acknowledged that our labourer comes out of the 
process of production other than he entered. In the market he stood 
as owner of the commodity "labour power" face to face with other 
owners of commodities, dealer against dealer. The contract by 
which he sold to the capitalist his labour-power proved - so to say, 
in black and white that he disposed of himself freely. The bargain 
40'Ibid, 1970, p86. 
i°"Marx, 1976, p37. 
4"" Marx, 1992, p 146. 
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concluded, it is discovered that he was no "free agent", that the 
time for which he is free to sell labour-power is the time for which 
he is forced to sell it,.... For "protection" against the "serpent of 
their agonies", the labourers must put their heads together, and, as 
a class, cümyvl the passing of a law, an all powerful social barrier that 
shall prevent the very workers from selling, by voluntary contract 
with capital, themselves and their families into slavery and death, 
[my emphasis]. 470 
Thus again, returning to the chapter on "Machinery and Modern Industry" 
he again invests Self-Consciousness with the ability to make its own world from 
within the inventive capabilities of the imagination. "' This time however, the Self- 
Consciousness is entirely that of the bourgeoisie. He said, "It would be possible to 
write quite a history of the invention, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of 
supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working-class". 47' And 
again, in the third thesis on Feuerbach he says, 
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances 
and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men... 
So it appears that every actor in Marx's sociological vocabulary is an 
"absolute idealist" of the Hegelian variety. The proletariat revolts, then being 
aware of where their interests really lie, the capitalist class employ technical 
specialists (inventors) to help them regain control. The technical specialists devise 
further practical ways for the manufacturing process to assist the capitalists and 
thereby help themselves, and the proletariat in their turn, find new ways to regain 
control. In this antagonistic dance it would appear that no one is a victim of 
historical circumstances. Each agent is trying to re-cast historical development 
after their own interests. Here then, in as complete a reversal as any thinker might 
be thought capable of, Marx attributes the passing of the factory acts, which are 
nothing less than historic institutional reforms, to the effects of the class- 
consciousness of the workers acting together as a class, i. e. subjectively. In this final 
account the working-class drives the process of social reform and capitalist 
reaction, a reaction which in itself is the result of conscious action. Such a 
paradoxical account of consciousness, such a contradictory analysis of the objective 
""Marx, 1976, p285. 
`A A position followed by other 'idealist' Marxist's, sec for example the famous essay by Gramsci, "The 
Revolution Against Capital". 
"'Marx, 1974, p411. 
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and subjective basis of class-consciousness, might appear to be the product of 
academic hair-splitting were it not for the fact that the precise philosophical status 
of class-consciousness is crucial to Marx's whole project and the true nature of his 
political philosophy. 
Turning to class-membership, rather enigmatically, Marx only comes to an 
explicit discussion of social class as membership at the very end of the third volume 
of Capital (Chp 52), and there the manuscript tails off after only a few paragraphs. 
The reason for Marx's apparent disinterest in the question of class-membership 
becomes quite apparent in these few paragraphs. Marx points out that the 
"classically" determined economic structure of -modern society" is presented in the 
case of the three great classes of England, these are "wage-labourers", "capitalists" 
and "landowners". However, Marx is also well aware that even in England there 
are "Middle and intermediate strata", such as "physicians and officials", "owners of 
vineyards", "forests", "farm owners", "mine" and "fisheries" owners which 
"obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere". Indeed, while the class of Doctors 
and those of state officials might want to claim for themselves a class, Marx 
remarks pointedly that they both "receive their revenue from one and the same 
source", to describe all such professional groups and crafts as "classes" is an 
irrelevancy. While the existence of these intermediate strata with their individual 
"sources of revenue" might well yield empirical data to a sociologist of the positivist 
stamp, for Marx, this stratification is "immaterial for our analysis". Thus the 
pointless and futile exercise of trying to "identify" classes according to revenue and 
occupation is clear enough. Rather, class is not an empirical event, but a moving, 
living, process of social thinking with a "continual tendency" and a "law of 
development". In other words, following Hegel, Marx considers class to be a 
product of the historically derived modes of Self-Consciousness. This historical 
consciousness takes on objective form in the later writings, as it did in the passages 
from the Grundrisse which we considered, an objective form which Marx simply 
denies Hegel. 
In any case, the law of capitalist development is well known, ever 
increasing amounts of labour are transformed into wage-labour and the means of 
production which were formerly scattered became concentrated into fewer and 
fewer hands, becoming divorced both from the landed class and the workers. " 
Much of the confusion concerning the status of class in Marxology occurs because 
Marx only made a clear distinction between class membership and class crinrcif. usnecr 
4"Marx, 1984, pps. 885-6. 
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towards the very end of his productive life i. e. in volume III of Capital. Also as in 
the case of the base/superstructure controversy and the Preface to a Critique of 
Political Economy, he often made apparently contradictory statements in a single 
document. 474 In any case, in the example we have just looked at from Capital Vol. 
III, we see that Marx, in failing to display any real interest in the notion of class 
membership and with any degree of seriousness, is making plain his real 
motivation, which is to define the true nature of class-consciousness not class- 
membership. Thus, according to Marx there are only two real classes in modern 
bourgeois society; the capitalist class and the working-class. Yet we are still left 
with the problem of beginnings: where does Marx's working-class consciousness 
come from if it is produced as a by-product of alienated social and economic 
activity which is essentially bourgeois? How is the privileged position of Marxism, 
as truth, even possible in the first instance? 
In addition to what has been said so far and in order to understand the full 
significance of problems of beginnings and class-consciousness, it is necessary to 
return to the German context, to the death of God and the notion of praxis. In his 
"Introduction" Towards a Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right, (which was composed 
in 1844 and published in the Deutsch franzöirche Jahrbücher). Following his earlier 
critique of Hegel's theory of the state in his essay On the Jewish Question, where he 
held that Hegel's political state emerges from an incorrectly de-politicised notion 
of "civil-society", Marx identifies the "proletariat" as the concrete historical agents 
of social change for the first time. Here a particular social agency was held to 
provide "material weapons" which were inherently 'philosophical', thus meaningful 
in some new sense. Only the proletariat could unmask the real meaning of history. 
To this effect then, Marx thought German "history" analogous to the life of 
a "raw recruit" who has the job of "performing trivial historical drill" after everyone 
has left the parade ground. " In other words, while the French had destroyed the 
ancien regime and replaced it with the alleged universalism of the emerging 
bourgeois, the Germans were trying to establish the former in the historical time of 
the latter. The "cotton kings" and "iron heroes" of Germany found expression in 
petty German nationalism, unlike their counterparts in France and England, who 
dominated society in the name of monopoly capital. Thus the real problem of 
German society: "the relationship of industry and the world of wealth in general to 
the political world" was masked behind a national "philosophy" (a philosophy of 
°" Eagleson, 1989, pp 165-175. 
"McLellan, 1988, p67. 
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"history" i. e. Hegelianism), which was as abstract as it was impractical, a 
philosophy which was far removed from the basic problems of real historical 
development per.. 
Marx used the phrase "the world" in the famous, Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, 
thus it is often assumed to be a statement of universal significance. It is in this 
thesis, which we have already encountered, composed in April 1845, where he 
states that, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it". This statement has all but masked the fact that this idea is 
rooted in this same understanding of the specifically German milieu. ' Thus the 
"world" here is basically the Germanic world (Germanische Welt) of Hegel's 
Introductory Lectures on World Hictory and of the Philosophy of Right. In other words, 
modern "Germanic" Europe only includes present day Europe. Only much later, 
during the analysis of colonial adventure in Capital, do we retrospectively 
understand this thesis on Feuerbach as truly universal. Thus, over one year earlier, 
while discussing this peculiar problem of German cultural development in the 
"Introduction" to his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, that is, the inability of 
Idealism to reform political and civil liberties and thus of coming to terms with 
modern industrial development, Marx first identifies his project of "changing the 
world" rather than merely "interpreting" it. Moving towards his definitive break 
with the Young Hegelians, he says in the Critique, 
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, supplant the criticism of 
weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force. But 
theory, too, will become material force as soon as it seizes the 
masses. 4 
According to Marx then, and following Cieszkowski, the first stage in any 
application of "praxis" must, in the. first instance, be the recognition by philosophy 
of its own completion. The idea of true "criticism" without presuppositions, i. e. 
without prior regard to theological or metaphysical speculation, must emerge from 
the "brain" of the "philosopher" and become actualised. In other words, returning 
to the theme of the 'objective' labour of the Grundrute, when "criticism" is grasped 
as a tool by the masses and rued by them to critique the actual world then it becomes, 
not just a mode of contemplation like that of traditional philosophy, but a form of 
practical knowledge and a material force. In other words, real knowledge takes 
4'° Ibid, 1988, p 158. 
'' Ibid, 1988, p69. 
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hold once the alienated "mist-enveloped regions of the religious world" have been 
left behind. 478 The death of God is no less important for Marx than it is for Stirner 
or Nietzsche. 
In the famous section 4 of chapter 1 of Capital which is devoted to the 
analysis of "Commodity Fetishism", Marx focuses on the clearing away of all the 
mystical elements which have dominated consciousness. This provides a new 
insight and underpins the new `privileged standpoint', that proletarian 
consciousness is reified and mystified only by the appearance of the "commodity 
form". Marx said, 
... the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of 
the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at 
work, but as what they really, are, material relations between 
persons and social relations between things". 
The implication here is, of course, that in a different kind of social 
arrangement the opposite would become true, that is, there would be crystal 
clarity in the social relationships between persons and in the material relations 
between things. 
Thus we arrive at the real utility of "criticism". "Criticism", 
epistemologically speaking, is both the means to a fully rational world order, and 
the end result of such an order. "Criticism" is not to be understood as mere 'talk' or 
philosophical chit chat, but as a form of conversation which is synonymous with the 
actual material force and violence of the proletariat. ' This idea presupposes a non- 
alienated life in which individuals are able to become fully self-actualised. This self- 
actualisation is, however, in itself but a form of reason objectified, here again Marx 
is much closer to Hegel than Marx would like us to believe. 480 In any case, now we 
see the true nature of class-consciousness in Marx's thinking: class-consciousness is 
a 'discursive social practice' which 'anticipates' the true appearance of social 
relationships between persons, thus this discursive practice, by definition, must 
478 Ibid, 1988, p436. 
''' Following Lukäcs, Gunn provides an interesting readingof praxis understood in this manner, the 
"modus vivendi of practically reflexive theorising is that of immanent critique", p97, and immanent 
critique is "unfolded in the Grundisse and Captal of Marx", p98. Furthermore, Gunn continues, "And in 
case the notion of 'conversation' should seem too polite to capture the Marxist notion of class-hatred 
(Negri), this is to be noted: nothing is less polite than rigorous conversation pursued to its end", p105 of 
Marxism and Philosophy: a critique of critical realism, Capital & Class. 
480 Ibid, p102, Gunn says, "In an estranged world, where is the audience whose freedom allows it a> 
evaluate the truth of a theorisation premised upon, and aiming towards, estrangement's critique"? 
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wave to one side all forms of religious, national, ethnic and other forms of self- 
mediations between both people and things. All such subjective forms of 
consciousness are wrong; they are "false forms". Such cultural mediations are a 
return to reification, that is, to objectify and give independent life to that which is 
very definitely a dependent social product. Thus, to use a favourite metaphor of the 
period, it is to introduce a spook or ghostly 'other' into a social practice as if it had 
a life of its own. 
The notion of the "false form" of consciousness makes its appearance during 
yet another attack on Max Stirner in the German Ideology's' Marx, wishing to make 
a distinction between his own notion of the privileged position and those of the 
other Young Hegelians, and most importantly Stirner's claim of righteousness for 
the position of the Ego, Marx accuses Stirner of just such a false consciousness. 
Because Stirner holds that every legitimate interest is actually an individual 
Egoistic interest of some kind, he is forced to explain the wide perception of 
collective interest that pervades societies. In addition, he is also forced to explain 
his own privileged position and why, given the predominance of the individual self- 
interest, there is so little actual 'true' Egoism. As we saw in chapter 3, Stirner does 
this with reference to alienation's, such as religious ideologies that promote 
misguided notions of justice and equality. Marx, returning to the structural theme 
which opened the Chapter, suggests that if Stirner had only made the discovery 
that he had made, "that definite modes of production' are "independent" "alien 
practical forces" which stand over and against individuals, then he would not have 
sought refuge in idealist explanations which posit a spiritual alienation. Thus 
claims Marx, Stirner paradoxically and in a some what roundabout manner, 
... admits that a 
definite consciousness [the regular Ego], is 
appropriate to definite people and definite circumstances. But at 
the same time he [Stirner) imagines that bir moral demand to the people 
- the demand that they should change their consciousness- will bring about thir 
altered consciousness, and in people who have changed owing to 
changed empirical conditions and who, of course, now also possess a 
different consciousness, he sees nothing but a changed 
consciousness. "' [my emphasis) 
48' Marx, 1976, pp 242-253. 
"82 1 bid, 1976, p2 50. 
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In other words, Marx claims that change is going on all the time behind 
Stirner's back and in the real world, as it were. However, Stirner, in Marx's view, 
only regards such change as a mental event. Thus in Marx's account, Stirner's real 
offence is to effectively separate consciousness from the individuals who are its basis 
and from their actual conditions so that the consciousness of the Egoist of "present 
day bourgeois society" does not correspond to his Egoism. In a note crossed out in a 
manuscript page of the German Ideology, Marx points out that this makes about as 
much sense as blaming the Greeks for not seeing themselves as we saw them, it 
amounts to "blaming them for being Greek". We might well ask in a similar 
fashion, why and how Marx can blame a bourgeois for being a bourgeois? This 
takes us directly back to his theory of praxis. 
The reason why Marx goes to such pains to address the real nature of 
`producer consciousness' in this manner is, in the first instance, to clearly delineate 
it from the much less interesting notion of class-membership which we already 
considered [above]. The problem with the concept of class-membership is obvious 
enough once his notion of class-consciousness has been adumbrated in the above 
manner. 'Class' as a genus is an essentially contestable concept which could be 
legitimately adapted to whatever the 'genus' under consideration might be, 
whether the class of patriarchy, doctors, lawyers, the class of women, the class of 
Albanians or whatever. In Marx's account of 'class-consciousness', class is defined 
by a discursive practice which is unmediated by anything 'other'. It is the total 
realisation of the Enlightenment vision of a culturally uncluttered; ` fully operational 
Reason. As Marx himself said, again in relation to Feuerbach, 
All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory 
to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in 
the comprehension of this practice. " 
However, I deliberately used the word `anticipates' when describing the 
necessary emergence of "criticism" [above) because it is not clear from what has 
gone before how Marx intends to break out of the problem of beginnings which he 
sets up in the German Ideology. His critique of Stirner's "Theory of [self)' 
Justification" would appear to be just as applicable to his own project as it is to 
that of Stirner's. Is it also not the case that Marx wishes to bring his own privileged 
position to bear on the proletariat of his own day. Does his creation of social 
meaning in the face of modern nihilism not compel him to make a demand upon 
a"i Ibid, 1976, p157. 
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the working-class; that demand being, revolt, in order that by doing so they can 
become truly proletarian and not just the soldier ants of the modern bourgeoisie? 
Marx appears to be caught in a double-bind of his own creation, if, as he 
maintained in the German Ideology, that "It is not consciousness that determines life, 
but life that determines consciousness" then it is never entirely clear how one is to 
break through the 'Gordian Knot' of the problem of the initiation of the Revolution 
by the revolutionary agency "' In other words, how is Marx able to arrive at and 
sustain his own privileged position? Marx appears to require a re-energised notion 
of "critique" but this re-energization in turn seems to require a new notion of 
"critique" to begin with and this is something which can only appear in the wake 
of material conditions which have already presented themselves. Thus Marx has to 
explain the gap that has occurred between the appearance of the new industrial 
proletariat, his discovery of them and the failure of proletarian revolution in hic MM 
time. Secondly, if we assume a change in his position which we saw reflected in the 
Grundrisse and in some areas of Capital, in-so-far as subjectivity predominates 
reality, then one is compelled to inquire as to why the subjective self- 
understandings of the proletariat would have any need of Marx or why revolution 
has not occurred of its own accord? 
Marx's solution to this problem is to welcome the death of philosophy and 
usher in the era of "praxis" which is able to legitimate the new 'privileged 
standpoint', not the standpoint of Hegel or of Stirner but of Marx himself. As he 
said in the "Introduction" to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 
This is the question: can Germany attain to a praxis that will be 
equal to her principles, i. e. can she attain to revolution that will not 
only raise her to the official level of modern peoples but to the 
human level that is the immediate future of these peoples. 
Due to the particular trajectory of German Idealism, the death of 
philosophy, traditionally understood as a form of abstract contemplation, 
necessarily follows hard on the heels of the death of God in this account. As Marx 
himself said, "The manifest proof of the radicalism of German theory and its 
practical energy is that it starts from the decisive and positive abolition of 
religion". " 
484 Marx, 1976, p37. 
4"5 McLellan, 1988, p69 
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To summarise briefly, the death of God, unlike the Enlightenment, was a 
specifically 'Germanic' event. That is to say that following Hegel, theology was 
never to recover from the Young Hegelian onslaught, including that branch of 
rational theology which emerged from Enlightenment. Marx had to replenish 
"critique", he had to rescue it from its encrustation's with the 'other' of Reason. In 
doing so he sought to further entrench the process of Reason itself as "praxis". 
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However, this entrenchment demanded some new notion of Reason. Again, not the 
Reason of the philosophers, they were simply the most abstract embodiment of an 
alienated consciousness. ' In a striking analogy taken from the German Ideology, 
Marx said, "Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to 
one another as onanism and sexual love". " Rather, demystification and unmasking 
requires an unmasked and unmystified consciousness, this consciousness, in Marx's 
view, is proletarian `class-consciousness' which is defined not by ever-changing 
forms of occupational membership but by its internal relationship to "critique" per 
. re. 
Reason exercised as a form of social thinking expressed as a particular form of 
social practice was the authentic form of class-consciousness in Marx's view. This 
signals a return to messianism, albeit a secularised version, since only in this 
manner could the initiative return to the Self-Consciousness of the privileged 
position without giving way to the very Idealism from which Marx believed it had 
arose, and following Marx's critique of utopian thought, another variant of Idealism 
in his own time, could a theory of "praxis" avoid accusations that it was utopian. 
While the work of the philosopher was always 'particular', the work of a mass 
popular movement to end all movements carried with it the promise of the 
`universal' solution to human suffering. 
I would like to finish this section by returning to Lukacs, who is one of the 
few Marxists to emphasise this aspect of Marxism. Of the Marx-Lenin 
understanding of "praxis"; he says, it is not the task of a "vanguard party" to create 
a revolution. Lukac's says of Lenin, 
... "the group of professional revolutionaries does not for one moment 
have the task of either 'making' the revolution, or- by their own 
independent, bold actions- of sweeping the inactive masses along to 
confront them with the revolutionary fait accompli. Lenin's concept of 
48° Marx, 1976, p2 52. 
48' Marx, 1976, p236. 
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party organisation presupposes the fact- the actuality of- the 
revolution". 
Rather, he continues, 
"The political organisation is ... conceived of as an instrument of 
class struggle in the revolutionary period... and the ability to foresee 
the impending revolution is never-the-less crucial". " 
488 Lukac's, 1970, p26 and p29. 
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The puppet called "historical materialism" is to win all the time. It 
can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, 
which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight. " 
Walter Benjamin 
When all interior conditions are fulfilled, the day of German 
resurrection will be heralded by the crowing of the Gallic cock. ' 
Marx 
III 
Messianism 
The 'cockcrow' of full German liberation was coeval with full human 
liberation and this was necessarily, in turn, a 'messianic' assertion. " In other 
words, it was to be an actual "resurrection". Marx's theory of class-consciousness is 
an excellent example of a secularised prophetic and apocalyptic form of 
eschatology. Marx was, first and foremost, a revolutionary, but this is hardly 
enough in itself to suggest that he was, as he himself was wont to deny on occasion, 
a "Marxist". 492 In the revolutions of 1848 which swept across Europe, the composer 
Richard Wagner and the anarchist Bakunin stood side by side on the barricades 
and the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer manned the barricades which opposed 
them. All three could be considered to be as revolutionaries in some sense, either 
literally or emblematically speaking, but none of them were "Marxists". 
To be a "Marxist", like Marx, must mean at the very least that one 
privileges the working-class as the universal revolutionary class to be sure, but as I 
have demonstrated, it must also mean that the theorist of "praxis" himself enjoyed 
a further privileged position in the first instance 493 The strength of belief in the 
veracity of the former is wholly dependent on the unification with the self- 
489 Benjamin, 1969, p253. 
49" McLellan, 1988, p73. 
491 Dictionaryof Symbols, 1996, pp209-11, like the Eagle and the Lamb, the Cock is also a symbol of 
Christ, emphasising his solar symbolism in the light of a new dawn and the resurrection. To Job, the 
Cock has the gift of foreknowledge and like the Messiah it announces that the darkness has vanished and 
the light has come., hence the Cock on the church steeple. 
492 Dictionary of Marxist Thought, 1988, p309, Engels once reported that Marx once said, in reference to 
certain phrases used by his son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, that "all I know is that I am not a Marxist", 
meaning possibly that he did not attempt to offer a comprehensive world view, suggests Irving Fetscher. 
4" Eagleton, 1997, p37. 
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understandings of the latter. Indeed the two must become one and it was the 
nature of this unification of the theories of the theorist with the practice inscribed 
upon reality which I strongly alluded to in the last section. 'Philosophy' is dead and 
social practice becomes `practical philosophy'. Thus, the redemption of humanity, 
which is to be a terrestrial redemption in Marx's account, is largely based upon a 
just settlement in this life where 'strength of belief is a singular measure of the 
prospect of future deliverance from the evils of self-estrangement and where the 
privileged position of the 'prophet' and his followers is central. The 'prophet' must 
be strong, undaunted by the size of the task and must inspire with his/her calls to 
the faithful. It is no accident that by the time of its first English translation in 
1886, Engels noted that on the Continent, Capital was already being described as 
"the bible of the working class". `'`" 
The "interior conditions" which Marx spoke of [see above) indicated that 
he considered that such conditions where the necessary precondition of the 
development of authentic class-consciousness as opposed to the 'positivist' notion of 
class-membership, which as I have already demonstrated, Marx decisively rejected. 
To be sure, class-consciousness is a by-product of Enlightenment rationality when 
wholly developed in a logical direction. Reason as "critique" leaves no stone 
unturned, it is the full depth of a socially-recognitive practice. However, the 
"German resurrection" still has to become a full "human resurrection". In Marx's 
view, the "Gallic cock" crowing was the sound of the universal principles of the 
French Revolution, "Equality, Fraternity and Liberty", which are as yet abstract 
values and are unrealised in Germany as else where. ' The "criticism of religion" 
and the death of God had, in Marx's view, determined that "German philosophy" 
as "praxis", the "weapon" of the proletariat, would provide the real means to 
"redemption". 
Redemption from 'suffering' meant, of course, the delivery from alienated 
forms of life, but the disenchantment of the world, associated in Marx's mind with 
the diremptions of modernity, as in the case of its highest philosophical expression 
in the work of Stirner, only served to undermine Marx's political project. Thus in 
one of the most quoted passages from the Gmlmunirt Manifeuo, Marx said of 
modernity, 
49 Marx, 1986, p 112. 
"' See McLellan, 1988, p71, where Marx says, "Germany is the political deficiencies of the present 
constituted into a world of their own and as such will not be able c overthrow specifically German 
barricrswithout overthrowing the general barriersof the political present. 
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All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new forms 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts 
into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to 
face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations 
with his kind. " [my emphasis) 
The sobering reality that Marx found in modernity was that element which 
represented the sheer meaninglessness of these same modern social relations, as we 
saw in chapter 1; this is what Hegel called utilitarianism. The 'sober' sense is a 
reason which is unmediated by any religious encrustation's or cultural 
intoxication's, a reason which is pure and unmediated. Utility is therefore viewed 
as a means without an end, as practicality and efficiency personified. Accordingly, 
the metaphor of sobriety and its opposite in intoxication, are repeatedly used by 
Marx when discussing both bourgeois social relations and reification. Intoxication, 
for its part, becomes the 'other' of reason. Contrast, for example, Marx's 
characterisation of the delusional need of the German upper-classes of the 1850's 
when they sought to emulate the opium- clad spiritualism of nineteenth century 
China, and its fantastic 'table turning' episodes [Stücken zu tanzen beganne), ' 
with the "sobering reality" which is reflected in the sterile work of bourgeois 
economists and arch modernists such as Cousin, Say, Constant and Guizot. " 
To be sure, Marx's characterisation of modernity in the Communist Manifesto 
would appear to be a world away from his Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, where as one 
commentator recently suggested, [Marx) .. "emphasised, the collective practice of 
suffering and (democratic) rebellion [as) an impetus for accurate social theory". ' 
Yet what else is Marx describing in the passage above but the struggle of the 
`privileged position'. against modern nihilism, a nihilism which undermines, 
corrodes and destroys all attempts to set up any kind of value system, past, present 
or future? 
In a statement which could have come from Nietzsche, Marx says, "The 
decomposition of the Hegelian system... began with Strauss". S0° Strauss, one may 
recall, challenged the very divinity of Christ. The decomposition of the Hegelian 
system ends with the diremptions of Egoism, according to Marx. The bourgeois, in 
49, McLellan, 1988, p224. 
49 Marx, 1986, 
49 Marx, 1992, p 147. 
99 Sec Gilbert, p 176, in Carver, 1996. 
S0" Marx 1976, p27. 
187 
this account of modernity, has no positive values, they are completely free of 
religious cant and hypocrisy and they simply preside over the ultimate 
disenchantment of the world. As he says in Capital, "Accumulate, accumulate! 
That is the Moses and the prophets", say the bourgeois. S0' "Accumulation" is here 
a value that is no value, rather it is simply a modus operandi. The move from the 
particular interests of the bourgeois Egoist to that of the universal interest of the 
collective, from the German followers of Hegel, and from philosophy to praxis in 
the "Introduction", to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, towards the march of 
the "expropriated" in Vol. I of Capital, is all one element of the same 'messianic' 
moment of Marxism. 50' I would like to summarise how this move is avoided in the 
thought of Hegel himself. 
In Hegel's Elements of the Philosoph}, of Right the motor or'engine' of history is 
the nation state {das Volk als Staat}' The relationships which Hegel mapped out 
in the Phenomenology, those which pass through patterns of non-recognition, 
misrecognition and finally full mutual, or social-recognition are also duplicated in 
the relations between states. Thus 'history' appears to be the "ceaseless turmoil of 
external contingency" in which "passions, interests, ends, talents and virtues" as 
well as "violence and wrongdoing" play their part in this development. The highest 
stage of the "dialectic of .... spirit", according to 
Hegel's own schema is this battle 
or play of recognition among nations. The nation state, therefore, is the "highest 
power on earth". This totality of struggle, Hegel calls "World History". 
While the play of forces between nations may 'appear' to be contingent 
because they are unpredictable expressions of a complex totality or inner play, that 
is, the constitutional, class and other struggles, which go on within nations in the 
realm of civil society, Hegel also argues in this book and in his "Introduction" to 
the Lectures on World History, that "spirit in and for itself" prepares and works its 
way towards the transition to its next and higher stage". In other words, the march 
of Reason goes on 'behind the backs' of the individuals and processes which 
constitute these nations, this is the so-called "cunning of reason". " This has been 
one of the most discussed and controversial aspects of Hegel's philosophy, not least 
because it simply begs the question of what spirit is. The further assertion that 
'freedom' is "spirit in itself' is unlikely to be helpful in this regard because this 
would, in turn, simply beg the question of what freedom is and so on, hardly 
sui Marx, 1986, p742. 
sot Ibid, 1986, p929. 
""Hegel, 1991, p366, para 331, p371, para 340, p373, pars 344. 
"" Hegel, 1987, p89. 
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unimportant when it comes to a comparative analysis of Hegel and Marx. Although 
this question is one which is certainly too complex to deal with here, for present 
purposes the most important point is that while Hegel identifies the "Germanic 
Realm" as having accomplished its task, as I have already demonstrated, Marx 
requires further movement from this "Realm" to yet another. 
For Hegel, the "turning point", from "World History" to 'post-history', or 
the "end of the world" as he describes it, is the self-conscious recognition of this 
movement [the task of the Germanic realm), a movement which revealed [or 
retrospectively understood] the "infinite positivity' of its own "inwardness", the 
"principle of the unity of divine and human nature and the reconciliation of the 
objective truth and freedom which have appeared within Self-Consciousness and 
subjectivity" said Hegel. " This is the ultimate completion of the Adamic story 
which we saw Hegel outline in the first volume of his Encyclopaedia and which I 
touched upon in the opening chapters. As we also saw in chapter two, this turning 
point, where the "as yet abstract" truth of these principles becomes actualised is 
the French Revolution. As Hegel put it in the culminating paragraph of the 
Philosophy of Right, it is the moment when "the spiritual realm brings its heaven 
down to earth in this world". ' 
All of this history, all of this freedom and knowledge is poured out of time 
and into socially-recognitive Self-Consciousness of the state as this same absolute 
power which is their power. However, as we also saw in Chapter II, Hegel does not 
make the messianic move into future time because he stays with 'the substantive 
content of the meaning of "World History", which in turn, he sees in the state as 
"the rationality of right and law" and in the providence of Reason. 507 
This 'concept' is what Hegel considers a mature individuality where one 
expresses "abstract being-for-self' fully in thought as the "principle of rational 
being and knowing". Again, returning to the last paragraph of the Philosophy of 
Right, he said, "In the state, Self-Consciousness finds the actuality of it substantial 
knowledge... ". This means then that Hegel need not find a historic agent of social 
change who is imbued with messianic potential, he need only find active 
functionaries of the process of "right and law", turning to the value-neutral 
"universal class", the beauracracy of the modern state. Messianism turns, however, 
sus Hegel, 1991, p379, para 358. 
50o Ibid, 1991, p380, para 360. 
so- Ibid, 1991, also p380, para 360 
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not upon abstract principles such as "right" and "law" but upon the premeditated 
prophetic activity of social agents. 
In his critique of Hegel's theory of the state, of right and of law, Marx 
clearly rejects these principles and their claim to rationality, viewing them as an 
attempt to stop history and politics in 'mid-stream' as it were. Because he cannot 
accept the substantive content of these principles Marx must demonstrate that 
particular social agents are further alienated from this process and that the process 
itself is fundamentally flawed. Marx, like all the Young Hegelians, rouses the 
Hegelian dialectic of universal and particular against Hegel himself, taking the 
view that radical political activity is preferable to what they saw as Hegel's anti- 
political administrative account. ' Returning to his "Introduction" or "Critique" of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx disputes Hegel's own description of the most 
fundamental social and political categories. Where Hegel builds a dialectic within 
and between the universal and the particular in the realm of the different states, 
within and between the private sphere of civil society and within and between the 
role of individuals in public life, Marx's own, sometime 'empirical', sometime 
'phenomenological' analysis remains mechanically caught between civil society and 
the state. " 
Marx's political philosophy, therefore, repudiates political theory in the 
Western tradition since he resuscitates alienation [Entfremdung and Entäußerung) 
both in 'civil society', where one would expect to find it, and in the state. Marx 
presented his 'philosophy' of praxis as a detailed class-conscious analysis of what 
was wrong with liberal democratic institutions together with a few scattered 
remarks on proletarian government which were drawn from carefully drafted 
historical writings such as the Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte. Marx usually took either one of two views regarding the modern 
state. In the first case he held that a "parasite state structure" exists over and above 
suu See Gilbert, "Political Philosophy: Marx and Radical Democracy", in Carver, 1996, p174. 
"'Marx, 1976, p31, thus under the heading, Premises of the Materialist Conception of History, Marx said, 
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which 
abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the 
material conditionsof their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their 
activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way" [my emphasis]. A few pages later 
he continues, "The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way 
enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate 
instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the 
social and political structure of production", p35. This stands in stark contradiction to the method he 
outlines in his introduction to the Grundrisse. 
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society, thereby constituting a political and social alienation. Or, as in the second 
case, he aligns the state with a particular class oppressor. "° 
Marx's messianic analysis forecloses on detailed political theory since all 
such theorising can only serve to undermine the many possible outcomes of futurity 
as such. This, the reader may recall, was the principal reason why Marx objected so 
much to the utopians of his own day. Thus reconstructing such theoretical 
fragments as there are demonstrates his desultory approach to theory and usually 
yields the view, at best, that Marx was a radical participatory democrat in the 
Aristotelian {zoon politikon) tradition. "' Thus Marx the democrat argued for a 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" in the most positive sense, that is, as an extension 
of radical participatory democracy against de-politicising passive forms of 
representative "counterrevolution". For Marx, the purpose of democratic bodies was 
actual governance, not simply to advise the executive, but to be both legislature 
and executive. Thus he said, "workers and their social allies {who) would combine 
legislative and executive leadership". SU Marx also sought the creation of a political 
community in which opposing classes where abolished and where status hierarchies 
faded away. "Elected leaders" were to be subject to immediate recall and were to 
be drawn from the ranks of the industrial proletariat. In addition to all of this Marx 
also held that in a communist society there would be no standing army, only a 
citizen militia. Finally, there is some loose evidence that suggests that he did 
believe in upholding juridical proceedings where these were clearly seen to be 
fair. "' 
Never-the-less, these mildly 'liberal' political positions can hardly be 
described as a comprehensive and coherent attempt to theorise political 
institutions. Furthermore, these sporadic responses belie the importance in Marxist 
theory, not of his ultimate vision of communist society, which is after all, little more 
than impressionistic, but of his political means, that is, of his notions of 
"resurrection" and revolution and the role of these in his political philosophy more 
generally. Indeed there is a very real sense in which all such 'political theory' can 
be reduced, not to these relatively harmless liberal demands, but to the nature and 
role of process of "critique" itself. In the German Ideology he gave, what is perhaps 
his clearest explanation for his refusal to engage in detailed normative political 
theorising. He said, 
s ro See Gilbert, in Carver, 1996, p 178. 
Ibid, 1996, for a concise version of this thesis. 
Ibid, 1996, p189. 
Evidence for this final position is often largely drawn from Marx's statements regarding the work of 
the English factory inspectors of the nineteenth century, see Gilbert, in Carver, 1996, p 189. 
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Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, 
an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call 
communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of 
things. The conditions of this movement result from the now 
existing premise. "4 
The "now existing premise" of communism is, of course, the appearance of 
the proletariat on the Germanic, then the "world-historical" stage. It is somewhat 
apropos that this passage falls under the heading of "estrangement" in the original 
manuscript of the German Ideology for the "real movement which abolishes the 
present state of things" is the movement of Marx's reinvigorated concept of 
alienation where self-objectification is but another kind of self-estrangement when 
located within the capitalist relations of production. To be sure, as Marx was to 
concede in his later years, the communist revolution might well be attempted by 
peaceful means, at least in England, where the proletarian consciousness is most 
highly developed. However, as Engels maintained in the preface to the first English 
translation of Capital, 
He [Marx) never forgot to add that he hardly expected the English 
ruling classes to submit, without a "pro-slavery rebellion", to this 
peaceful and legal revolution. "' 
Thus "communism" is not an end-state but the process of critical self- 
alienation which gives meaning to the suffering which is inscribed in capitalist 
social relations. The alternative is to suggest that the suffering of individuals is 
without meaning, the position taken by Stirner, something which Marx could not 
accept. In any case, alienation is the interpretative process which allows the 
theoretical separation of the "real movement", or true class consciousness from the 
"false" form of consciousness. Thus critically driven alienation prudentially 
struggles against philosophical and ethical nihilism. 
However, this process of self-legitimacy would appear to be, like the 
Stirnerian conception of messianic Egoism which was so heavily criticised by Marx, 
a tautology. Why should we be convinced by the correctness of the process if it is 
tautological? The 'process' is the final identification of alienation with the 
5 'Marx, 1976, p49. 
1 Marx, 1974, p17. 
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privileged standpoint [the unmask-er), where one is then able to spot "bourgeois 
relations" being "quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which 
society in the abstract is founded". "' Revolution [or as Engels might have it, at 
best, a civil war, which may amount to the same thing), therefore, which is both 
unavoidable and inevitable in this account, is nothing less than the decisionist arm 
of the privileged standpoint itself. In short, communism is meaning. 
In this messianic account, actions once enacted, once temporalized, have 
meaning precisely because that is what action means. Revolution, therefore, and in 
quite the same manner, has meaning because it is revolution. In other words, the 
historical presence of revolution is the alpha and the omega of the explanation. This 
is why Marx says in the Class Struggles in France, that "Revolutions are the 
locomotives of history". "7 In the Class Struggles in France, it is not a particular hour, 
or even a given day which is held to contain the revolutionary moment but the 
whole period from 1848 through to 1850. The "train of the revolution"" consists 
in the "vortex of events" and in the "torment of historical unrest", the revolution 
resides in the hearts, and breasts of individuals who are full of "revolutionary 
passions, hopes and disappointments""9 and a generalised "revolutionary fever". ' 
The ultimate legitimising component of praxis, is the ever present phenomenon of 
revolutionary crisis, which may ebb and flow, but never fully disappears from the 
advanced political, social and cultural horizons of the class consciousness of the 
'privileged standpoint' itself. 
Again, to finish on Lukac's, who said, 
"The actuality of the revolution: this is the core of Lenin's thought 
and his decisive link with Marx". '21 
Marx was stalked by the nihilism of modernity, by the social diremptions of 
the division of labour and by the sterile utilitarianism of the modern market 
economy. A specifically modern process, the free market swept away all traditional 
forms of culture, values and religion and was no more kind to new forms of self- 
understanding than the old. Marx had to find some way to resuscitate what he saw 
as a moribund and stagnating discourse of social and political liberation. Hegel 
"Marx, 1973, p87. 
s" Marx, 1992, p 117. 
"'I bid, 1992, p111. 
"9Ibid, 1992, p91. 
"°I bid, 1992, p92. 
521 Lukac's, 1971, p 11. 
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had, according to Marx's account, correctly mapped out the importance of freedom 
and self-actualisation but he had also failed to correctly identify the universal 
agency of modern social change in the proletariat. 
The principles of the French Revolution imploded in the events of the 
"Terror" and in the apparent meaninglessness of both life and death displayed 
there. Marx was required then, to find new meaning for a new historic teleology 
and thereby underpin the continuation of economic, social and political struggle. 
His chosen political agency, the emerging proletariat, had to share his own self- 
understanding that self-actualisation was both within their grasp and something 
worth struggling for. 
However, this raised an important 'philosophical' problem: how could the 
privileged position of the theorist, his 'truth' and the 'truth' of the universality of 
the proletariat be a) explained and b) become politically legitimated? Marx's 
solution to the first problem was to seek refuge, despite scattered references to his 
"empirical" epistemology, in German Idealism and in the practical-reflexivity of 
consciousness. In other words, his 'truth' was to be explained messianically. His 
solution to the second problem, that of legitimisation, was much more difficult. 
Marx had to simultaneously denude the traditional conception of philosophy, 
thereby avoiding any notion that his own 'philosophy' was contemplative or 
solipsistic if he was to further the cause of political action. His solution to this 
problem was to advance a messianic political form which was so naturally a part of 
the Young Hegelian milieu from which he himself emerged. Such a messianism 
would enable him to legitimate political action, from an idealist standpoint without 
committing him to getting down to normative political detail. Thus he could avoid 
being tainted by liberal institutions and structures as far as was possible. His 
concept of political action, therefore, had to be consistent with his messianic 
idealism, in other words, it had to be revolutionary. In this way Marx hoped to 
unite the historic epochal social change that was required with the philosophy of 
the 'privileged standpoint' itself, and with the self-understandings of the 
proletarian class consciousness: this was to be praxis, the "true philosophy". 
In Marx's vision of post-historical existence the meaning of, what remained 
for Hegel vestigial elements, i. e. unemployment, poverty, disease, wars and other 
sufferings, such as the unwelcome trappings of social madness and the socio- 
pathologies of market relationships, become for Marx, a powerful indictment of 
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German society per se. '" Only by swapping away the entire edifice could a much 
reduced concept of philosophy, as "revolution", as "historical locomotive", be 
demonstrated. Revolutionary theory begets the long revolution. To achieve this 
however, required considerable sacrifice, and sacrifice presupposes deeper meaning. 
In the Class Struggles in Frana Marx said, 
The worker's task will begin to be accomplished only when the 
world war carries the proletariat to the fore in the nation that 
dominates the world market, i. e. England. The revolution which 
here finds not its end [in France) but its organisational beginning is 
no short winded revolution. The present generation is like the Jews, 
whom Moses led through the wilderness. They not only have a 
world to conquer; they must perish in order to make room for the 
men who are equal to a new world. '23 
i 
522 Marx's rejection of traditional approaches to political theory cannot simply be reduced to his critique of 
Hegel's concept of civil society, since this critique itself must come from some other notion of 'real' 
identity between social subjects and the true universal interest. Thus even this critique of 'political 
economy', of a disguised social form, relies in the first instance upon some account of a more advanced 
self-consciousness of some kind. 
523 Marx, 1992, p112. 
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The degree and kind of a man's sexuality reaches up into the 
topmost summit of his spirit. 
Nietzsche, 1886524 
CHAPTER V 
Post-Historical Existence III: The Übermenscb 
Introduction 
The New Neitzschers 
My task in what follows is to demonstrate why a "psycho-analytic" 
understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy is not inconsistent or incompatible with 
his extreme and messianic style of politics but rather, can give us new insight into 
these overt political statements. ' Of course this already anticipates that which I 
will set out to demonstrate: that a "psycho-analytic" reading should be preferred 
over many other interpretations. Secondly, this also assumes that Nietzsche's 
political thought was, in some sense, messianic. ''' In the course of this chapter I 
shall discuss both of these questions. 
It is generally well known that Nietzsche's most basic ideas were greatly 
influenced by Schopenhauer's philosophy. ' It is also a commonplace of Nietzsche 
studies to assert that Nietzsche was also an implacable anti-Hegelian and that, 
rather neatly, these two seminal influences were diametrically opposed to one 
another in straight forward historical terms. " In other words, Nietzsche the 
'24Nietzsche, 1990, p 92. Compare this with Schopenhauer, 1969, p329, "The sexual impulse is proved 
to be the decided and strongest affirmation of life by the fact that for man in the natural state, as for the 
animal, it is his life's final end and highest goal". 
525 This is also the title of one recent study of Nietzsche which flows from the Heideggerean reading of 
Nietzsche as philologist, see Allison (Ed), MIT, 1988. 
... The most sophisticated and comprehensive of these recent "psycho-analytic" re-readings of Nietzsche 
is Staten, 1990. 
527 Staten, 1990, p5, it is also worth pointing out that Staten himself, takes the view that Nietzsche 
believed himself to be some kind of prophet, although he never fully develops this theme. He says, 
"Nietzsche addresses a future that he believes will be able to hear him as his own time cannot; and we 
are that future". 
sea Nietzsche, 1993, pps, 16-18, for example, in the opening few pages of his Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche's starting point is the similarity between Schopenhauers princrßrum indirisuationir. and his 
notion of the Dionysiac. These concepts are supposed to describe the undifferentiated mass of energy, 
whether malign or benevolent, which forms the fundamental basis of everything. 
Nietzsche, 1989, p114, see Nietzsche's own direct comparison of the significance of Hegel and 
Schopenhauer for the Germans,. 
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Schopenhauerean had set himself up against Hegel as Schopenhauer himself had 
done. 53° While this is certainly the case, I will also argue in what follows that 
Nietzsche's `Schopenhauerean' political philosophy balks at the prospect of 
traditional political theory precisely because of its historic complicity with nihilism. 
While Nietzsche's political philosophy is able to provide him -with a 
measure or standard of meaning, political theory in his own era, is only ever 
understood by him in eschatological terms. S3' Thus Nietzsche conflates the decadence 
of his own day with that of all political theory. Despite his abhorrence of Hegel and 
the Germans he remained locked into the most forceful product of Young 
Hegelianism, its attack upon Christianity. Finally, in his blanket acceptance and 
then eventual rejection of nihilism in favour of his denuded slant on 
Schopenhauerean metaphysics, Nietzsche is forced, following Stirner and Marx and 
in keeping with the eschatology of his own milieu, to reject political theory in 
favour of prophetic politics. 
The principal Schopenhauerean ideas which Nietzsche incorporated into 
his own political philosophy can be summarised as follows: 1) Nietzsche accepted' 
Schopenhauer's description of the underlying reality of everything as a kind of 
undifferentiated energy, 532 2) Nietzsche also accepted that the real reasons and 
motivations for our actions and beliefs are often hidden from us, S33 and finally, 3) 
although in his early writings he appears to accept Schopenhauer's pessimism, that 
this so-called energy or "Will" is essentially malign, in his mature work he is much 
more sanguine. In what follows I will assume that points one and two are relatively 
non-controversial, and instead I would like to concentrate on point three, the 
'sexual' and much more optimistic reading of Nietzsche's understanding of the 
Schopenhauerean "Will". " 
"'Schopenhauer 
, 1969, pxxi, referred to Hegel as an "intellectual 
Caliban", i.. e. a person of low 
character, a "degraded and bestial" character, from Shakespeare's, The Tempest. 
53' Meaning that Hegel's political philosophy is simply one of a number of manifestations of decadence, 
according to Nietzsche. 
532 Schopenhauer, 1969, pps . 100,125 and 
162, although in Nietzsche's mature thought he moves 
away from this notion of the "will" as a kind of cosmology. Eventually he appears to take the view that 
the "will to power" is a kind of differentiated second-order psychological drive. 
533 Schopenhauer, 1958, ppp 195,197,208-10,217-18. 
"4 Consider the following passage from Schopenhauer's, The World as Will and Representation, 1966, 
p533-34, the "sexual impulse" says Schopenhauer is... "the ultimate goal of almost all human effort; it 
has an unfavourable influence on the most important affairs, interrupts every hour the most serious 
occupations, and sometimes perplexes for a while even the greatest minds. It does not hesitate to intrude 
with its trash, and to interfere with the negotiations of statesmen and the investigations of the learned. It 
knows how to slip its love-notes and ringlets even into ministerial portfolios and philosophical 
manuscripts. Every day it brews and hatches the worst and most perplexing quarrels and disputes, 
destroys the most valuable relationships, and breaks the strongest bonds. It demands the sacrifice of life 
and health, sometimes of wealth, position, and happiness. Indeed, it robs of all conscience those who 
197 
Nietzsche's thought is replete with discussions, comments, and aphorisms 
on sex, sexuality and sensuality. 
Yet until relatively recently this concern with 
sexual matters was largely uncharted terrain. 
Of course, it has always been known 
by some of his more astute followers that 
Nietzsche was interested in the role of sex 
in human affairs and psychologists such as Freud and Jung grudgingly admitted a 
debt to Nietzsche. '" However, this exegetical imbalance has changed since both 
contemporary feminists, Deconstructionists and a recent influential book by Henry 
Staten suggested that Nietzsche's concern with sexuality was not a mere 
epiphenomenon of his philosophy of power but fundamental to his whole approach. 
In what follows I favour the view, principally Henry Staten's, that Nietzsche's 
political philosophy is understood against the backdrop of his "general 
136 economics". 
On the face of it, there would appear to be more consensus on the nature of 
Nietzsche's political opinions than on any other area of his thought but this 
appearance is deceptive. It seems quite apparent, for example, that Nietzsche had 
little time for liberalism, S37 socialisms or conservatism's' It is quite clear that he 
were previously honourable and upright, and makes traitors of those who have hitherto been loyal and 
faithful". 
'ss According to Donn, 1988, pps. 50-51, Jung deliberately avoided reading Nietzsche in his youth 
because he knew that his own views were very close to those of Nietzsche's and in the case of Freud, be 
emphatically said again and again that he had not read Nietzsche. However, as Donn points out, the 
work of Nietzsche was often the topic of discussion at early psychoanalytic gatherings. 
'36 Here I use the term "general economics" in this same Freud-Bataille sense, to convey the fact that, as 
Bataille himself said, "Human activity is not entirely reducible to processes of production and 
conservation, and consumption must be divided into two distinct parts. The first, reducible part is 
represented by the use of the minimum necessary for the conservation of life and the continuation of 
individuals' productive activity in a given society; it is therefore a question simply of the fundamental 
condition of productive activiry. The second part is represented by so-called unproductive expenditures: 
luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, 
perverse sexual activity (i. e. deflected from genital finality)", Bataille, 1991, p118. Following Freud, 
Bateille refers to these latter phenomena as the "Principle of loss". See also Freud, Beyond the Pleawn 
Principle, 1961, p14. It should also be noted that Nietzsche'e ontological presuppositions are derived 
from Schopenhauer, not Hegel, thus the concern with the unconscious and the Dionysion, begins with 
Schopenhauer. Never-the-less, in what follows I shall argue that Nietzsche took Hegelian Spirit to be 
the ultimate standpoint of modern nihilism. In other words, what ever reservations Nietzsche may have 
held in his later life regarding Schopenhauer's "nay saying" his ontological framework remained broadly 
Schopenhauerean whereas his hostility to Hegel and Hegelianism was implacable. Finally, my reading is 
to be distinguished from Staten's in-so-far as he goes much further towards actually psychoanalysing 
Nietzsche the man and writer, whereas I only attempt to understand Nietzsche's application of what 
might be termed his 'general economics'. 
"'Nietzsche, 1968, p82 for a typical critique of literalism's attempt to delineate tolerance and 
intolerance. 
538 Nietzsche, 1989, aphorism 285, on socialism and the distribution of property. 
939 Nietzsche, 1992, p82, where Nietzsche describes his task in Beyond Good and Evil as a critique of 
modernity, "not excluding modern politics". Also in Twilight of the Idols, 1968, pps. 96-7, Nietzsche 
takes issue with the conservatives for trying to dam up decademr, which can only serve, in his view, to 
make its final degeneration "more sudden". 
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considered the self-division of Europe into; nation states a disaster, ' 'and 
nationalism the most odious of all ideologies. ' It also seems clear that Nietzsche 
felt that the state was the most dangerous of modern developments, `'' he had little 
sympathy with representative democracy13 and he was genuinely appalled by anti- 
Semitism, and especially the German variant. 5« Nietzsche had little affinity with 
those who sought the "emancipation of women"" and he felt that modern 
bureaucratic and industrial' life was cramping the true realisation of what he 
considered to be life-affirming values.? 
In his Geo-political views, Nietzsche seemed to consider "free emigration" 
by Europeans and the working-class, in particular, as some kind of world-historical 
release valve, ' and his greatest fears appear to have come from the direction of 
Russia and Asia. '' Clearly then, given such views, Nietzsche's political thought 
does not fit comfortably within any contemporary notion of 'left' or 'right'. 
Furthermore, although there is a measure of agreement that these were the views 
that Nietzsche held there is still virtually no agreement as to why he held such 
views, or how such disparate opinions could hold together, if at all, hence the 
widely held perception that he was an irrationalist. 
It might appear strange to contemporary ears that there might be a 
`psycho-sexual' reason for fearing Russia or for justifying a more commanding role 
in international affairs for Germany or for the USA? Or that one could find a 
justification for the political map of a new Europe, in a theory of sex? This is 
perhaps a reflection of the extent to which we have forgotten Freud's central 
message in his classic monograph Civilisation and Its Discontents no less than the 
extent to which we have been unable to understand Nietzsche. Freud held in that 
essay that the more we 'civilise' the more we repress and the more we repress the 
more neurosis we encounter. Furthermore, it might also be strange to think that 
we might possibly think through new political institutions for an nihilist age, given 
540Nietzsche, 1984, aphorism, 47 5. 
"'See Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 251, against nationalism. Also Twilight of the Idols, 1968, p60, 
"Deutschland, Deutschland über alles was, I fear, the end of German philosophy"... 
'42Nietzsche, 1969, p75, "The state is the coldest of all cold monsters". See also, Daybreak, 1989, 
aphorism, 179, where he argues that politics, economics and the public scrutiny involved in such matters 
is a dreadful waste of the most gifted spirits. 
"Nietzsche, 1989, aphorisms 289 and 292. 
'"Nietzsche, 1990, aphorism 251, where he says, for example, "perhaps it would be a good idea to eject 
the anti-Semitic ranters from the country". 
5" Ibid, 1990, aphorism 239. 
sa"Nietzsche, 1989, aphorism 288, on the machine for example. 
14' Assorted Opinions and Maxims, aphorism 47. 
1411 See Nietzsche, Daybreak, 1989, aphorism 206. 
'49 Nietzsche, 1984, aphorism 475. 
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the essentially confusing use of this term, no less than what relation this alleged 
nihilism might well bare towards a theory of sexuality? 
S50 I will suggest that 
Nietzsche certainly believed that there was a relation between individual and 
collective sexual energies and politics and one which he consistently adhered to, 
despite the fact that his politics have all too often been written off as 'Russophobic', 
irrational or more importantly, as simply incidental to his philosophy of power. 
"' 
In the Introduction I will outline some of the influential early readings of 
Nietzsche before moving onto a more detailed discussion in section I of some of the 
more recent interpretations of politics in Nietzsche's thought. In Section III will 
describe Nietzsche's discourse of libidinal "general economics", "` and finally, in 
Section II I will assess some of Nietzsche's more important political statements 
with regard to his understanding of nihilism and his description of modernity, and 
in this final section I will justify my own reading. I will agree with some of the 
dominant scholarly readings which suggest that Nietzsche required of politics that 
they become subordinated to the personal uses of abundant and bounteous spirits. 
However, it will also be seen that the framework of "libidinal" power which 
Nietzsche used to identify such spirits, such "creators of value" is also extended 
into his analysis of politics more generally. "' With good reason then, Nietzsche 
could say of himself that he was an "unavoidable psychologist""' since his notion of 
power could only be read through his depth psychology. 
Nietzsche adopted the politics of eschatological prophecy because these 
were the required mode for the nihilist condition. We are not supposed to 
extrapolate from Nietzsche's messianic tone to his normative political thought of 
course, we should not take him too literally since the Übermensch does not provide an 
account of an actual historical agency in the same sense as Stirner's lumpenproletariat 
"'See Freud, 1975, p25, for example, where he says, "The history of human civilisation shows beyond 
any doubt that there is an intimate connection between cruelty and the sexual instinct; but nothing has 
been done towards explaining the connection, apart from laying emphasis on the aggressive factor in the 
libido". 
ss' This last position, that Nietzsche's overt political statements are simply incidental and of not to be 
seriously considered was first proposed in T. B. Strong's influential study, see Strong, 1988, p189. 
ssa Freud, 1989, p28, principally uses the term "economics of the libido" to refer to the general economy 
of expenditure. 
553 see Freud, 1975, p83, for a clear exposition of libido theory. Freud says, "We have defined the concept 
of libido as a quantitatively variable force which could serve as a measure of processes and transformations 
occurring in the field of sexual excitation". Also, note that Freud ultimately held that "sexual excitation" 
began with, if not determined by, a chemical process, thus he says, "The neuroses which can be derived 
only from disturbances of sexual life, show the greatest clinical similarity to the phenomena of 
intoxication and abstinence that arise from the habitual use of toxic, pleasure-producing substances", 
p82. This analysis closely follows Nietzsche's genealogy of master and slave economies, including the 
ascetic, in his On the Genealogy of Morality. 
554 Nietzsche, 1990, aphorism 289. 
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or Marx's proletariat. However, Nietzsche does require some agency of historical 
legitimisation which will work within his sexual archetypes and the related analysis 
of decadence. 
I shall follow those who argue that while Nietzsche's admiration for the 
cool calculative 'pathological' types such as Cesare Borgia, "a predatory beast", "' 
and Napoleon Bonaparte, a man of "inexhaustible fertility", sue was obvious, in his 
view the success of such men was becoming impossible in the 'democratic age'. It 
is worth noting that each of these leaders was a master of pragmatic state-craft, 
each subordinated the welfare of others to their own ends, each enjoyed a super- 
abundance of sexual energy and each rose from social chaos and imposed form upon 
man and society, the Apolline over the Dionysiac. "' In other words, the point is not 
to write Nietzsche's political analysis off as embarrassing but to understand the role 
such politics and typologies were to play, according to his own understanding, and 
given the alleged crisis of nihilism. We are then able, therefore, to read back into 
his nihilism from his political philosophy. 
In a recent short introductory survey of Nietzsche's ideas and their impact 
upon modern European thought, Michael Tanner has pointed out that Nietzsche 
has provided inspiration for an "astonishingly discrepant" and divergent group of 
people. Everyone from "anarchists, feminists, Nazis, religious cultists, Socialists, 
Marxists, vegetarians, avant-garde artists", to "devotees of physical culture and 
arch-conservatives", all have sought inspiration in Nietzsche. " Tanner then goes 
on to assess the impact of Walter Kaufmann's post-war interpretation upon 
Nietzsche studies in America. Kaufmann, argues Tanner, sought to distance 
Nietzsche's ideas from all political strains of interpretation, and from the Nazi 
appropriation in particular. However, in order to achieve this he, in effect, 
produced an anti-political Nietzsche who was part of the mainstream of the 
Western cannon, in other words, Kaufmann produced a "rationalist" Nietzsche 
who was concerned with issues of "objectivity, the nature of truth, and other 
harmless topics", says Tanner. "' Thus within the exclusionary agenda of a 
rationalist project such as this there could be no room for seemingly irrational 
politics, so these were put down to certain cultural 'pre-occupations' of the period, 
... Ibid, 1990, aphorism 197. 
"°Nietzsche, 1968, p 19. 
"" For a detailed account of Napoleon's apparent sexual energy for example, see Kemble, 1959. For a 
short aphorism on the relationship between the Apollinian and the Dionysion see Twilight of the Idols, 
1968, p73. 
sse See Tanner, 1994, p1, where he quotes from a recent study by Ascheim, 1992. 
"9 Ibid, 1994, p2. 
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that is, to a climate of German irrationalism which began with Schopenhauer. This 
view then, in Tanner's account, and rather ironically since Kaufmann wanted to 
provide a corrective to the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche in the first place, simply 
does yet more interpretative violence to Nietzsche's political positions. 
In post-1945 Europe, Nietzsche studies took a somewhat different turn, 
inspiring, existentialists, phenomenologists, and finally critical theorists, post- 
structuralists and Deconstructionists. The total effect of all of this has been, yet 
again, to disregard Nietzsche's political statements as ill-informed and 
embarrassing or just to ignore them altogether, taking the view that the very 
limited value of such political statements should be contrasted against the great 
therapeutic or existentialist potential of his philosophy as a whole. In short, most of 
the post-war Nietzsche literature has been either a reaction to some previous 
political appropriation of Nietzsche's thought, as in the Nazi case, or a reading 
which was clearly ideological in some other direction, as was the case with many of 
the French readings, which were often little more than an attempt to deal with the 
absence of a 'left-alternative' to the French Communist Party. 
For reasons of historical 'objectivity' then, the first section of the present 
account will concentrate on recent scholarly readings of Nietzsche's politics which 
are less 'reactionary' in the above sense, I will principally engage with more recent 
attempts to deal with Nietzsche's politics among the mainstream academic 
communities in England and America. In the course of which I will reject the 
existentialist and self-actualising accounts of Nietzsche's thought, and here I am in 
agreement with Anscll-Pearson, ' I will eventually return to the sense of urgency, 
the shrill and apocalyptic' tone which Nietzsche adopts as his key mode of literary 
presentation with regard to political matters. 
While attempting to avoid the anodyne readings so frowned upon by 
Tanner I will demonstrate that Nietzsche's politics were quite in keeping with the 
Young Hegelian progenitors from which he himself came. ` Nietzsche's politics 
S° Ansell-Pearson, 1995, pix. 
Nietzsche, 1992, p97, "apocalyptic" is surely not too strong a word to use with regard to Nietzsche, 
take the following for example, ".. when truth (i. e. Nietzsche) steps into battle with the lie of millennia 
we shall have convulsions, an earthquake spasm, a transpositionof valley and mountain such as has never 
been dreamed of'. 
562 Here I follow Staten, 1990, p3, characterising some of the more dismissive works of recent Nietzsche 
scholarship, he eventually turns to Richard Schacht, saying, "The 'frequent rhetorical excesses' and 'ill- 
considered shots... atvarious targets' which Richard Schacht dismisses as 'so much unfortunate static' are 
integral parts of the movement of Nietzsche's writing. To subtract them is to subtract Nietzsche's 
signature from his text, to be left with an anonymous patchwork of 'views". 
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were certainly a product of his cultural milieu but not in the manner suggested by 
Kaufmann. For example, despite Kaufmann's sensitive treatment of the German 
term Übermensch, he settles upon the view that this term, above all else, is an 
existential concept. 5`'; Thus according to Kaufmann's "Nietzsche", the value of an 
Napoleon to the world lay in Napoleon's own goal-realisation or self-worth and not 
in his value or significance to society as a whole. In Kaufmann's reading of 
Nietzsche, even Napoleon is de-politicised, for the argumentative thrust here is 
that Napoleon was `his own man', the perfect model of self-control' It is with 
good reason then, that Kaufmann refers to his modern stoical Nietzsche as the 
"Protestant Nietzsche". ' There are passages which appear to support Kaufmann's 
reading but these are only supportive of his view if read within the bourgeois 
context which Nietzsche himself decisively rejected. ' 
Such confusion concerning Nietzsche's political intentions can, no doubt, 
be related to the hyperbolic and apparently manic delivery of his writings. Yet I 
will hold that Nietzsche did require that in an age of nihilism nothing short of a 
super-human agency, an explosive personality, only one who was "dynamite" could 
save cultural man and man as such. In Nietzsche's view only men such as Cesare 
Borgia and Napoleon Bonaparte had the capacity for great deeds. ' Nietzsche did 
believe that only an earthly prophet, one who was filled with "promise" and was 
not afraid to say so (see below), and one who could struggle against all the odds 
could save man properly so-called. ' It was certainly the case that for many young 
Germans, and this is also part of the Nietzschean legacy, that this 'struggle' was 
often understood to necessitate either that some kind of social cleansing or an act of 
spiritual 'hygiene' such as war and imperialist war at that, would ultimately be 
required if true health was to be re-obtained' 
563 See Kaufmann, 1974, p309. 
S°4Ibid, 1974, pps. 314-15. 
s°s Ibid, 1974, p412. 
Foe example, see Daybreak, 1989, p107, As little state as possible, where Nietzsche said, "Political and 
economic affairs are not worthy of being the enforced concern of society's most gifted spirits: such a 
wasteful spirit is at bottom worse than having none at all". However, if one reads on it becomes quite 
clear that such an wasteful expenditure of energy is, in Nietzsche's account a product of bourgeois 
society, with its "workshops", "machinery" and "universal security", the later being the growth in the 
bureaucratic welfare state. 
sb'Nietzsche, 1992, p96, "lam not a man, I am dynamite". 
s°s Ibid, 1992, p96, although he has no desire to be "a founder of religion". 
s°9 For example, well before the German events of 1933, the young German intellectual Karl Löwith 
could recall how he volunteered to join the German infantry in October 1914 after having immersed 
himself in Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche, he re-called, amplified his "yearning to escape bourgeois 
narrowness" and instilled in him the passion to'live dangerously'. In this sense then, Löwith was certainly 
correct in his estimation of the urgency in Nietzsche's voice, in his'explosive' political views because such 
urgency was not a mere rhetorical device, it was a desperate medicine for what he clearly perceived, 
rightly or wrongly, to be a desperate illness. On the other hand, despite the tendency towards war on the 
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Of course, an equally important question mark might well be held against 
Nietzsche's 'psycho-sexual politics', and particularly from a traditional 
Enlightenment and liberal standpoint. For example, the view that Reason is 
immanent in history would, if successfully sustained, would do much to reduce 
Nietzsche's political views to the ramblings of self-induced sexual pathology. From 
such a perspective Nietzsche's 'cure', i. e. psycho-sexual release, might appear to he 
worse than the disease, i. e. the notion of decadem-e. s70 However, it could be that the 
value in taking Nietzsche at his word does not come from sanitising his politics for 
the twentieth century audience or in disregarding these same politics, it might 
well come from the full historical specificity of Nietzsche's project, freeing us, as it 
must, from at least one important obligation; to accept that his thought is also a 
thought for our own times. In other words, such an approach may free us from the 
Young Hegelian and modernist conception of freedom, which allegedly devalues' 
itself. We can, in fact, free our own thought from yet another ill-conceived, if 
admittedly exciting, eschatological project. 
part of Nietzsche's chosen heroes, one should not hold, as the young Löwith did, hold that Nietzsche 
eulogised war for the sake of war, see Löwith, 1986, p I. 
S' Note that in Nietzsche's demonology nihilism is synonymous with decadence. 
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Listen to me! for I am thus and thus. Do not, above all, confound 
me with what I am not 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homos" 
What defines me, what sets me apart from all the rest of mankind, 
is that I have unmasked Christian morality 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo572 
I 
Anti-politics? 
Nietzsche, of course, was not the first to unmask Christian morality, he 
followed in a long line of post-Hegelian thinkers who vigorously attacked and 
unmasked Christianity. A role call of the most effective would have to include 
Strauss, Feuerbach, Stirner and Marx. However, Nietzsche may well have been the 
most effective and consistently trenchant critic of Christianity and the self-belief 
that he was the most successful is still to be viewed with some sympathetic 
indulgence. More importantly, according to Nietzsche, modern politics are the 
legacy of Christian values, thus the criticism of Christianity is also a critique of 
political theory per . e. 
Of the many recent studies of Nietzsche's political thought, three have 
become standards in their own right and all either attempt to make Nietzsche's 
political views more palatable or they ignore them altogether. "3 These are as 
follows; first, there is the groundbreaking study by Tracy B. Strong, entitled 
Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration, then came Nietzsche and Political 
Thought by Mark Warren, then thirdly, and most recently, Daniel W. Conway 
turned to Nietzsche's politics in his Nietzsche & the political. In addition to these 
studies, Kieth Ansell-Pearson, has selected, edited and introduced a collection of 
Nietzsche's political writings, including his On the Genealogy of Morality, for the 
5 "Nietzsche, 1992, p3. 
s'ZIbid, 1992, p101. 
In addition to these there is also a re-reading of Nietzsche's politics by contemporary feminists which is 
collected together and provided by Paul Patton (Ed), in his Nietzsche, Feminism & Political Theory. 
However, although there is no single approach in this volume most of this work can be located within 
the Heideggerean reading in some sense. Most of the reading are concerned with Nietzsche the 
'philologisi or the de-constructionist, these seek to develop a politics of the 'other'. Most do challenge the 
gender positions developed by Nietzsche but claim that many of his 'philosophical' insights either 
mitigate or override such sexism, see the review by Claire Colebrook, 1994. 
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authoritative series, Cambridge 
Texts in the Ilirtory of Political Tbaugbt. s" I will now 
discuss each of these in turn. 
The picture of Nietzsche's political ideas which emerges from Tracy B 
Strong's analysis, some what ironically given Strong's own stated aim to take 
Nietzsche's politics more seriously, begins to look a little like the proto-facist model 
that Kaufmann attempted to repudiate much earlier. Strong's analysis turns upon 
Nietzsche's concern with culture and his love of the classical world. Particularly 
important in Strong's account is Nietzsche's writing on the theme of the Greek 
agon or "contest", which played an important part in his historical analysis of early 
state typologies. Strong argues that Nietzsche's primary concern is to ensure the 
succession of cultural greatness. "Culture" has two meanings for Nietzsche, 
according to Strong; the first is a form of "psychological health"" and the other is 
"conscious experimentation" S76 Great creative cultures, and note here that 'great' 
appears to denote innovativ culture in Strong's account, were the most important 
product of the pre-Socratic competitive state in which no single individual ever got 
the upper hand. Thus in this ancient typology, ... "inside the political space of the 
state, politics happen, they are not used", says Strong " 
Strong further argues that Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism suggested to him 
that as the agon was gradually replaced by the political state, i. e. a condition in 
which "The citizen existed in the city-state, but not for Ü,... '" then the gradual 
domination of the state by one leader, council and/or world-view became dominant. 
This alleged decline in ancient pluralism led, in turn, to a gradual genealogical 
masking, characterised by the now hidden, now apparent development of the 
struggle between master morality and slave morality. In other words, it began the 
period in which res entiment would eventually gain the upper hand. Thus, according 
to Strong's reading of Nietzsche, modern, post-Socratic politics, were simply a form 
of petty politics, that is, politics that were used as an end in itself or to defend some 
ideological position such as nationalism or socialism, an epiphenomenon of the 
Christian world view. 
S" In what follows I take Ansell-Pearson's introduction to this authoritative edition to be a distilled and 
compressed version of his other writings on Nietzsche. 
"s Strong, 1988, p 194, interestingly, although Strong clearly has some notion of"libidinal economics" in 
mind when it comes to Nietzsche's view of cultural value, it never occurs tu him to re-cxamine 
Nietzsche's politics in this light. Rather, Nietzsche's political views are historisized rather than viewed 
within Nietzsche's psycho-sexual standard. In other words, Nietzsche's political claims are not evaluated 
in their own terms. 
"° Ibid, 1988, p2 15. 
Ibid, 1988, p196. 
Sx Ibid, 1988, p193" 
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However, because Strong suggests that for Nietzsche, the agon was the 
"public" sense of a strong political culture, the drive towards democratisation and 
individuation which is represented in post-Socratic politics, only served to erode 
this same "public" sense, in other words, it sowed the seeds, of its own destruction. 
Thus for Nietzsche, modern politics, where an ... "active governing principle of 
philosophical authority... " is absent, is in itself, a definitive expression of nihilism, 
meaning therefore, that ... "present-day political happenings are at most 
unimportant", for Nietzsche claims Strong. " Thus Strong appears to be following 
Kaufmann in his designation of Nietzsche as an anti political philosopher; 
Leaving aside the question-mark as to Nietzsche's conception of the agon, 
Strong, unable to delay the inevitable for long, eventually turns - to Nietzsche's 
notion of the kind of "great politics" which he espoused against these same petty 
politics. With this same description of nihilism framing the backdrop of the drama 
being played out, he claims, "The role of strong politics for Nietzsche is to hide from 
consciousness the genealogical foundations of the state" [Strong's emphasis). ' Thus what is 
required are the kind of "new artist-philosophers" who can deliver a new set of 
concealment's or mythologies on a "social level". " 
This appears to be almost the complete reversal of what Nietzsche actually 
does in his Genealogy where Nietzsche consistently follows through on his own 
unmasking to the point of self-parody, he is reluctant to replace what remains 
beyond the most impressionistic and sketchy of outlines. '8` More seriously, Strong 
does not seem to take into his own account the mimetic realities of the event of the 
text itself. Something that Nietzsche would have been very aware of, in other 
words, the unmasking of slave morality, once achieved can never be forgotten. So 
the notion that Nietzsche had so much of his own historiography invested in such a 
notion of philosophical re-masking seems a little implausible. ' Finally, and here we 
return to the notion of the agon as some kind of proto-modern and democratic 
public forum, Nietzsche's historical hero's were strong, devious and powerful men, 
men with an abundance of aggressive instincts and sexual energy who ruthlessly 
brushed aside the political institutions of their own day. Such men hardly fit within 
s'y Ibid, 1988, p189. 
580Ibid, 1988, p195- 
1 bid, 1988, p2 13. 
""Nietzsche, 1995, p127, Nietzsche, as in the later Ecce Homo, has little to say regarding the precise 
nature of political life except that, Christianity's will to truth would continue to undermine itself, as 
would all higher values, thus he says this will be played out in Europe, in a "great drama of a hundred 
acts, " over the "next two centuries, the most terrible, most dubious but perhaps also the one rich in hope". 
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Strong's conception of the "artist-philosopher" characteristic of the period of the 
agon. 
Ultimately, Strong's account would appear to do either one of two things 
for Nietzsche's politics. His analysis would appear to excuse Nietzsche's politics on 
account of their weak, playful and inconsistent nature. Nietzsche's politics then 
become a kind of aesthetized political skulduggery, perhaps more remanicient of 
the ancient trivial arts such as those of the rhetorician, the logician and the 
grammarian, arts which are primarily designed to fool and trick. Or if we are to 
take Nietzsche's positions seriously as some kind of Machivellian art of state-craft 
type of approach, then as Benjamin and Habermas have noted more generally 
concerning aesthetized politics, this understanding sails uncomfortably close to the 
winds of what Fascism actually became3 What else would a new philosophy of 
concealment (as opposed to the old forms), propagated by a new kind of artist who 
would, in turn, re-legitimate the kind of strong "public" state through which is 
capable of defeating nihilism look like, if not like the stage-management associated 
with Fascism. 
Furthermore, Strong also holds with regard to Nietzsche's well known 
distaste for the nation state, that it also follows, therefore, that since one of the 
most dangerous petty productions of nihilism was nationalism, the struggle against 
nationalism had to transcend the particular ideological interest, in short, meaning 
must be global and comprehensive if it is to be successful according to this account. 
Thus says Strong, according to Nietzsche, ... "great politics means international 
politics". '' Again, according to this view of Nietzsche, says Strong, he wanted 
nothing less than a European "domination of the earth"' and the re-establishment 
of the kind of "order of rank" which in turn could produce a) strong individuals 
(culturally understood) and b) stability and continuity which were the basis for 
"psychological health" and innovation. 
While Strong at least correctly identifies a psycho-sexual model of sorts in 
the process of genealogical unmasking, in so far as he recognises that Nietzsche is 
developing a critique based upon the unconscious drives and impulses which 
might, in turn, underpin Nietzsche's political ideas. It also appears that the 
'philosophical' Nietzsche is the first casualty of his reading, for it has become a 
denuded shadow of philosophy in the Western tradition, almost the polar opposite 
s"i Benjamin, 1968,242, and Habermas, 1990, p99. 
Strong, 1988, p210. 
sas Ibid, 1988, p214. 
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of Kufmann's "rationalist" reading. That is, there seems to be nothing left for the 
philosopher to do in the future but to engage in myth creation and genealogical 
`research' of some kind. Secondly, the politics themselves are now reloaded with the 
usual number of proto-Fascist overtones and themes such as great leaders who 
build Euro-centric world "domination" through a stronger and unified Europe, a 
Europe which would be run along some kind of hierarchical caste lines, and where 
great cultural struggles would go on within a reinvigorated super-state system, a 
system in which more profound cultural battles would be waged over the heart and 
soul of meaning itself. This arrangement would, in turn, produce a limitless future 
of European, if not global, stability and continuity. If ibis is how we are to 
understand Nietzsche's politics then these ideas would appear to dovetail with an 
important historical moment in twentieth century history, to be sure, but at the 
expense of the historical specificity of Nietzsche's actual project. "' The "Führer 
Prinzip" amounts to another eschatological project but the historical lineage 
between the Nazi's conceptions and the eschatological projects of the nineteenth 
century are too complicated to be discussed in full here and must be left for another 
place. 
While there is no doubt that Strong does reconstruct some important 
elements that are present in Nietzsche's thought, for example, there is certainly 
something to be learned from his analysis of Nietzsche's interest in the agon, there 
is an open question regarding the comprehensivness of his view of Nietzsche in 
more general terms, largely because the agon only ever makes an appearance in 
Nietzsche's youthful writings and never in the published writings. 
The popular theme of creative stagnation which is ascribed to Nietzsche by 
Strong is also puzzling. The fear of the stagnation of creative impulses in 
industrialising societies was by no means limited to would-be 'political crackpots' 
like Nietzsche, such themes dominated the thought of many divergent thinkers of 
the nineteenth century, from thinkers of the periphery such as Carlyle, to 
mainstream thinkers and essayists such as John Stuart Mill. For example, after 
ss° Ibid, 1988, p310, Strong describes his own reading of Nietzsche as that of a 
left/splitter/theraputic/vitalist, whatever that may mean. A footnote reference which indicates that he 
draws on the work of MacIntyre, Magnus, Yovel and Vattimo does not help much, p364, but the 
relationship between his approach and his findings is puzzling. Clearly Strong's reading of Nietzsche's 
politics, while much more sophisticated than the Nazi rendition, there does still appear to be a family 
resemblance. Thus I suppose he means that his critique of Nietzsche is from a broadly leftist and 
hermeneutic tradition? As opposed to the notion that his Nietzsche is a left/splitter/theraputic/vitalist 
which I do not take him to be saying. Although it is still quite possible that this is indeed what he is 
suggesting. 
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some laudatory statements concerning Wilhelm Von Humbolt's The Sphere and 
Duties of Goie»tment, for example, Mill said in On Liberty, 
In this age, the mere example of nonconformity, the mere refusal to 
bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely because the 
tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach, it is 
desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that people 
should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always abounded; and the 
amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional 
to the amount of genius, mental vigour, and moral courage, which 
it contained. '8' 
The point is that the "age" to which Mill refers cannot be taken as 
uniformly understood, even if many of the normative panaceas where superficially 
similar. To reduce Nietzsche to yet another nineteenth century thinker in the 
Victorian mold, is to wrongly lump him in with the liberal tradition which he 
explicitly rejected and railed against as being a part of the problem. 
This same criticism could also be levelled at the so-called 'post-modern' 
readings of Nietzsche, such as those of Mark Warren, who simply dislodges 
Nietzsche's thought from the all important historical context of German idealism. 
The motivation behind Mark Warren's Nietarche and Political Thought, is to separate 
Nietzsche's "reasonable analysis of nihilism" and his "interesting theory of post- 
modern power", from his aberrant political opinions. In other words, Warren would 
also like to recover a kind of liberal Nietzsche, one who is concerned, like Mill, 
with preserving and encouraging non-conformity. Warren wants to "supplement", 
in his "reconstruction", what Nietzsche would have said had he understood 
himself. Thus Nietzsche's insights into the nature of the "post-modern philosophy 
of power", best supports value positions such as those of "individuation, command 
intersubjectivity, egalitarianism and pluralism". ' Warren concedes that these are 
not the values that Nietzsche affirmed but he asserts that they would "represent a 
consistent extension of his philosophy". 
To be fair of course, Warren does not set out to give an 'authentic' account 
of Nietzsche's political views but merely alert us to the paradoxical nature of these 
same views and their inadequacy vir-ä-vir the more reasonable standard of modern 
se= Mill, 1994, p67. 
'"" Warren, 1988, p247. 
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liberal democracies, which of course, already comfortably places Warren inside 
Nietzsche's own terms of reference as a decadent. More seriously however, this also 
immediately places Warren in the category of those who believe that Nietzsche's 
political opinions were simply incorrect and rather embarrassing, a view shared by 
other 'post-modern' scholars such as Richard Rorty. Rorty, for example, considers 
Nietzsche's political views untenable but seeks to retain his enduring philosophical 
insights to create a "postmodernist bourgeois liberalism" or "liberal ironism". "While 
Warren acknowledges a level of scholarly consensus regarding Nietzsche's 
overt political opinions, such as his hatred of the modern nation state, that he was 
anti-Reich and that he was disgusted with anti-Semitism, never-the-less, he is in 
agreement with both the French Nietzsche scholar, Marc Sautet and George 
Lukäc's, '90that Nietzsche sought to defend the interests of ... "an increasingly 
marginalized landed aristocracy", the social base of a "romantic anti-capitalism". 
Warren contends that Nietzsche's political philosophy is to be found in his 
philosophy of power not in his overt political opinions., Warren argues, therefore, 
that Nietzsche did not really understand the implications of this philosophy of 
power, and this in turn because he held to a number of uncritical assumptions 
about politics in modern societies. Warren suggests that these assumptions were a) 
that human nature included a will to political domination and b) that no standard 
exists for the judgement of political action and finally c) such judgement that 
might exist stems from the will to dominate. 
Warren is quick to acknowledge one of the main lines of contemporary 
understanding of Nietzsche's view of political philosophy, that is, that he injected a 
political content into his "will to power" which was "fundamentally at odds" with 
his intrinsic political values (i. e. his alleged philosophy of liberal values). In other 
words, Nietzsche's elaboration of the "will to power" becomes an ontological 
category as political domination, which could only be rooted out at the expense of 
life as such. Warren claims, however, that this reading does not sit well with the 
"will to power" once this is understood as a "self-reflective telos", the "self- 
reflective telos" which emerges from Warren's own reading. 
According to Warren then, Nietzsche is a kind of phenomenologist who 
ultimately privileges critical and reflexive thinking per se, thus some values such as 
"positive freedom, autonomy, individuality and plurality" do not square with 
589Conway, 1997, p 157. 
'90Lukäc's, 1990, p341, meaning that the "struggle against the capitalist division of labour" was 
ultimately nostalgic. 
211 
notions of political domination. Warren puts down the "bloody aspects" of 
Nietzsche's politics to Nietzsche's poor knowledge of modern politics. According to 
Warren, Nietzsche a) wrongly assumed that cultures of sufficient quality to 
individuate power require an institutionalised division of cultural and economic 
labour in society, b) he wrongly estimated the effects of nihilism as the fact that the 
vast majority in Western cultures were incapable of grasping the opportunities for 
individuated power presented, in turn, by the dissolution of the Christian era, i. e. 
the herd problem. Thus he claimed that " all mass institutions such as modern 
democracies and parliamentary processes were engaged in a levelling down 
operation, and finally c) that all of the above are rooted, in turn, on a number of 
mis-placed biological assumptions. This last assumption is particularly important, 
Warren argues that all of this occurs because Nietzsche held to the Lamarkian idea 
that generational traits and environmental responses become physiologically 
inherited. The point here is that Nietzsche's characterisation of nihilism, in this 
account, understood as 1) a loss of conceptual orientation 2) a loss of self-hood and 
meaning and finally 3) experiences of powerlessness and historically evolving 
cultural structures which provide displaced and vicarious self-identities, were all 
accumulatively compounded under the biological rubric of'will to domination'. 
There are many problems with this account of Nietzsche's political 
philosophy. In the first instance, the notion that Nietzsche held to any kind of 
liberalism is particularly hard to sustain, again, given his trenchant opposition to 
the all of the actual political institutions and dominant ideologies of his own day, 
including that of liberalism. Then there is the question of Warren's method, as one 
commentator has recently remarked, Warren's analytic reading of Nietzsche 
amounts to a "smorgasboard" approach. " Clearly, one could object to the way that 
Warren splits up Nietzsche's thought in such a relatively arbitrary fashion and as 
we shall see with regard to the notion of "general economics", it is perfectly feasible 
that one could accept each component of Nietzsche's thought, his philosophy and 
politics for example, without apology, and still make sense of it in terms which do 
not sacrifice textual fidelity and more importantly, which does not lead one to 
conclude that Nietzsche's political thought 'anticipated' some brand or other of a 
generalised concept of Fascism, or that his overt political thought was simply ill- 
informed. 
In any case, in Warren's view, Nietzsche becomes a philosopher of post- 
modern politics, suggesting that he addressed the causes of the de-centred subject, 
'y'Woolfolk, Political Theory, Vol 14, No 1. 
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such as the self-dissolution of the historical subjects of the Enlightenment; 
principally those of reason, progress and freedom, and provided new 
understandings more appropriate for the present period of mental and temporal 
dislocation. Nietzsche then, according to Warren, provides solutions nowhere 
stated and attends to problems he could not have known. There is surely something 
fundamentally wrong when a philosopher's stated project is either ignored or 
reversed, as it is in the case of the liberal Nietzsche, or expanded upon, as in the 
case of the post-modern Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche's analysis does, however, amount to a critique of his own 
understanding of modernity, including its dominant ideologies, and presents a 
highly specific historical and political escape route from this same modernity but as 
we shall see, this escape has little in common with so-called `post-modern' politics. 
Thus Nietzsche tells us in his final testament, Ecce Homo, of his ultimate ambition in 
Beyond Good and Evil, one of his most important published works that, 
This book is in all essentials a critique of modernity, the modern 
sciences, the modern arts, not even excluding modern politics, 
together with signposts to an antithetical type who is as little 
modern as possible, a noble, an affirmative type. 592 
In other words, Nietzsche could hardly have anticipated, and is not 
concerned with so-called postmodernity, with issues of consumption, space-time 
dislocation and the de-centred subject but with a number of classical modern issues 
such as the emerging evolutionary materialism of his own day, (which he associated 
with Darwin), with Enlightenment utilitarianism, instrumental reason and the 
inflated optimism of the physical sciences, with the egalitarian and bureaucratic 
nature of the emerging mass democratic state and with Wagnerean aesthetics, 
which he felt induced 'romantic' intoxication or what we might call 'escapism' 
today. According to Nietzsche each of these specific modern phenomena are 
moments of the decadent, thus it is not that these are products of nihilism, rather 
these are constitutive of nihilism in the modern period. 
The nihilism of modernity, as we have already seen with regard to Stirner 
and Marx, is rather, when epistemological conventions and cultural conventions 
break down, and when moral norms and once solid ethical values break away from 
their traditional religious sources. It is the product of so-called centred subjects, 
592Nietzsche, 1992, p82. 
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satisfied in their self-evident moral autonomy and 'enjoying' the period of mass 
bureaucratic societies as these move towards national growth and division. If 
postmodernism looks like this in some way, which I do not believe it does, then this 
is simply grist to the mill of those who have always thought the post-modern just a 
contiguous extension of the modern. 
Returning to Warren's account then, it is also worth noting that Warren 
takes the view that Nietzsche's "will to power" is largely a kind of naked self- 
assertion, a form of existentialism, and that this also remains problematic. 
Maudmarie Clark's recent influential study, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 
suggests rather, that Nietzsche really viewed the "will to power" as a complex of 
second-order psychological drives, as such, one could expect such drives to produce 
much more than simple self-assertion, indeed such a complex psychological account 
might well provide very different explanations of effects. In other words, a 
'Freudian' reading could explain self-assertions own negation, as Freud himself was 
to demonstrate with notions such "passive aggressive". It might well be argued, as 
Staten does, that like Schopenhauer before him, Nietzsche always held to a 
conception of human nature that was composed of a bundle of drives which were as 
often as not concealed from daylight. In Daybreak Nietzsche certainly appears to 
take this view when he says, 
However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can 
be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which 
constitute his being. " 
Thus Warren mis-identifies Nietzsche's conception of such drives as 
exclusively Lamarkian and evolving whereas Nietzsche appears to take the view 
that one's drives are more often than not likely to be hidden from one, the total 
economy of the drives may well change but the now partial, now complete, 
obfuscation of such drives remains a permanent element of the human possibility. 
Of course, Nietzsche was a little more optimistic than Schopenhauer concerning 
the possibilities that might exist for unmasking drives and motivations, and this 
might well make life a little more tolerable from time to time, never-the-less, the 
"will to power" is very differently conceived when viewed through the lens of sexual 
and other drives than when, as in the case of Warren, it is simply seen as an 
unchanging power and will to dominationper. e. 
5" Nietzsche, Daybreak, 1989, p74. 
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Alan Woolfolk, has also pointed out that any understanding of Nietzsche's 
account of nihilism must consider his doctrine of "honesty" [Realichkeit), 
something which Nietzsche held grew out of Christian moral culture itself and 
which perishes with Christianity's demise. Such a view relocates Nietzsche firmly 
with the Young Hegelian milieu, which is more readily supported by the consistent 
themes of his texts, the precariousness of the great historical subjects such as 
rationality, morality and freedom upon which so many readings of Nietzsche are 
based, emerged from a Hegelianism which represented the highest eschatological 
form in Nietzsche's view. As Nietzsche repeatedly said, nihilism was when the 
highest values devalued themselves. 
The total effect of all this is that in Warren's account he simply ignores 
Nietzsche's eschatology. Of course the question of Nietzsche's playful use of 
different styles is too large a topic to be covered in depth here, however, two 
elements seem incontrovertible; the first being his philological use of metaphor, 
metonymy and 5% the second being the shrill and apocalyptic tone of 
his entire ourve, from his early career choice as an "untimely" man, through his 
period of prophetic exuberance in Zarathustra and finally, to his self-induced pathos 
in Ecce Homo and his Wagner writings, his feelings of being either mis-understood 
or ignored in his own time are fundamental to his entire project. 
There is a natural tension in Nietzsche's thought which is expressed in 
these two dominant modes of writing, the eschatological and the philological. On 
the one hand the apocalyptic tone suggests a desperate sense of urgency, a time of 
crisis, a need to be taken seriously and a concern with self-legitimisation, however, 
on the other hand, one must be aware that one must not take everything Nietzsche 
wrote literally since Nietzsche sought to highlight the essential uncertainty and 
openness of epistemological claims vis a vis nihilism. The problem of interpretation, 
therefore, is what statements one should regard as typical of the first type and 
which the second. Although there is no simple solution to this problem it' is not 
intractable. Throughout I shall take as my guide, the style in which Nietzsche's 
politics are delivered. Thus Nietzsche's political positions, few though they are, 
when discussed openly, should be understood from within the system of meanings 
provided by the eschatological style of delivery and with the reconstruction of the 
affirmative values. His metaphorical statements regarding politics, on the other 
"The first of these is a device whereby words can take on new meanings by being applied in different 
ways, it suggests an infinite transferability of words. The second suggests the endless redrawing 
entailment relations within language, such as between cause and effect, or substance and attribute or 
between subject and predicate. Finally synecdoche refers to the inherent partiality of all linguistic 
description, see Axiotis, 199 1. 
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hand, and his use of analogy, are the work of Nietzsche the philologist and 
his 
concern more often than not is principally critique per .r and so 
I will place these on 
one side. 
Danial Conway, drawing on the philological Nietzsche, has noted, much 
like Micheal Tanner, that Nietzsche was a man for all seasons. In other words, that 
all of the traditions which have lain some claim to being Nietzsche's true heirs, can 
look to some text or Nietzschean 'sound bite' for support, notes Conway. Although 
Conway accepts that Nietzsche specifically repudiated many of these 
interpretations Nietzsche's rhetorical style was always going to be open to abuse, 
thus says Conway, ... "nothing 
he [Nietzsche) says rules out definitively the Nazi 
interpretation of his writings". ' Conway suggests, for example, that almost every 
major interpretation, including that of Arendt, Kaufmann, Schutte, Habermas, 
Warren, Detwiler and Ansell-Pearson subscribes to some version of Nietzsche as a 
"failed radical voluntarist", an idea which he locates in Heidegger's reading. In 
other words, such scholars have long maintained, although to differing degrees of 
course, that while Nietzsche may have been an acute critic of political modernity, 
ultimately his own politics were a kind of "naive voluntarism", in that he believed 
that a 'powerful' individual, full to overflowing with energy, invention and vitality 
could live a life above the herd. 5`'6 
The problem here, and this is something that I have already alluded to with 
regard to Warren's reading of Nietzsche, is that Nietzsche's rhetorical style, if not 
ignored, is often used to justify an "aesthetized politics" kind of reading, 
"aesthetized politics" being synonymous with Fascism in such accounts. However, 
the eschatological milieu in which Nietzsche believed he had found himself did not 
lead in any. necessary sense towards an anaesthetisation of politics. All that is 
required is that the bearer of eschatological hopes is able to self-justify that which 
he/she or it, bares with reference to an coherent, if not always compelling, epochal 
conception of an "end-time". 
To be sure, Nietzsche did, from time to time, suggest that living one's life 
should be done artistically (or philologically) but this is a very different idea than 
the notion of the complete Subsumption of political life to aesthetic considerations 
that Fascism land Futurism) implies. `" Rather, Nietzsche's rhetorical style, was a 
... Conway, 1997, p 120. 
s' lbid, 1997, p122. 
"' Nietzsche, aphorism 290, "One thing is needful. - To "give style" to one's character- a great and rare 
art! ". 
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deliberate device which was chosen because it might have been the most effective 
mode of critique. Although Nietzsche often heaped scorn and derision upon social 
and cultural instrumentality, " this was always within the context of the dominant 
decadent values, no where is there the outright rejection of instrumentality as such, 
or to an instrumental means to affirmative values in there own right. ' Thus rather 
than "failed naive voluntarist", Nietzsche's politics, like those of Stirner and Marx, 
should be characterised as those of a 'post-Hegelian eschatological revolutionist'. 
Another series of attempts to make sense of Nietzsche's allegedly 
embarrassing political legacy, if not to apologise for them, are those of Bruce 
Detwiler' and Keith Ansell-Pearson [also considered by Conway, see above]. 
Detwiler and Pearson's views are very close so in what follows, I will discuss 
Pearson's account since it is the most recent of the two. Ansell-Pearson has 
pointed out, in the tradition of Lukacs and others, that Nietzsche did,... "not 
regard the human person as inviolable and human life as sacrosanct; neither does 
he believe that all persons should be treated with equal respect as moral beings". 6°' 
Furthermore, Ansell-Pearson suggests that "order of rank" was the "central 
political concept" which was used by Nietzsche to try and organise his cultural 
imperatives and the supporting economic arrangements thereof. In general terms 
this focus on Nietzsche's notion of the "order of rank" has suggested either some 
form of "Heroic individualism" or "Aristocratic Radicalism". ' 
However, while there can be no denying Nietzsche's frequent use of either, 
the notion of "order of rank" or of the "aristocratic spirit" throughout his writings, ' 
neither phrase is used consistently in the sense suggested by Ansell-Pearson. 
Rather, and this was first noted by turn-of-the-century anarchists such as Emma 
Goldman, when Nietzsche spoke of "order of rank" it was quite often used in the 
sense of a designation of "rank-ordering" and the "rank-defining of value 
judgements"' and in the case of the aristocratic spirit, he was referring to the 
598Nietzsche, 1990, p 106, Nietzsche said, "You utilitarian, you too love everything useful only as a vehicle 
of your inclinations- you too really find the noise of the wheels intolerable? " s99Ibid, 1990, p86, for example where Nietzsche talks of using religion for Machiavellian purpose, in this 
case for mobilising the consent of the governed by the governers. 
600 Detwiler, 1990. 
60' Pearson, 199 5, px. 
602 See Thiele, 1990, where he uses the term "Heroic individualism to denote Nietzsche's theoretical 
struggle to establish "individuation", although he is also aware that Nietzsche never uses the term 
"Heroic individualism", p3. 
603 Nietzsche, 1995, p13. 
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aristocratic sensibility, the "spiritual nahlerse", a "typical character traits" 
he said in 
On the Genealogy of Morality. ' 
It is also worth noting that none of Nietzsche's historical heroes were 
aristocratic in any traditional sense, both Cesare Borgia and Napoleon Bonaparte, 
for example, were common born soldiers. " Indeed, Nietzsche said in Ecce Homo that 
he ... "wouldn't award to the young German 
Kaiser the honour of being my 
coachman"X06 Ansell-Pearson is well aware of this spiritual/actual distinction but 
ultimately adheres to Strauss' notion that Nietzsche himself extrapolated, through 
the device of "order of rank", from aristocratic spirit to aristocratic politics, in so far 
as this denotes those who choose to rule through a self-conception which is 
primarily founded upon hierarchies and upon a "consciousness of difference" .' 
Ansell-Pearson sums up the Nietzschean aristocratic spirit in the following 
terms (and here I am paraphrasing); it is the self-knowledge of one who knows that 
he only has duties to his peers, and that one should have the freedom to do as one 
pleases towards those who do not share this peer position and finally, such values 
suggested a Nietzschean indulgence in a rather "sophisticated concept of 
friendship", " Idea's which are summarised in the following manner by Ansell- 
Pearson, 
For Nietzsche it is only by placing themselves in the service of 
unconscious purposes and higher goals, such as the production of 
genius, that individuals are able to give meaning and purpose to 
their groundless existence. 0`' 
Furthermore, Ansell-Pearson appears to automatically assume that this 
"challenging" and "disturbing" vision of political, social and cultural life is not our 
own, thus the ultimate value in Nietzsche's thought must be his ability to 
`provoke' we intellectually moribund moderns. While there is no doubt that this 
'0' Nietzsche, 1995, p15, also in Nietzsche, 1995, he says that the "aristocratic value equation" is as 
follows, good = noble = powerful= beautiful =happy = blessed, pig, also see pl5. 
oo'Nietzsche, 1995, pps. 25-6, Cesare Borgiä slather was, of course, Pope Alexander III, but although he 
was from a warrior and Papal clan who had connections with the Spanish House of Aragon, they were 
not'blue blooded' in the conventional sense. In fact Cesare was the second bastard son of Alexander 111. 
It is also worth noting that when Nietzsche refers to the noble "blond beast" this is a historical reference 
to the ancient Germanic celtic tribes, for as he says, ... -between the old Germanic peoples and us Germans there is scarcely an idea in common, let alone a blood relationship". 
"16 Nietzsche, 1992, p12. 
c07 Ansell-Pearson, 1995, pxiv. 
o"'Ibid, 1995, pxv. 
09Ibid, 1995, pxxi. 
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can be the spirit of a certain reading of Nietzsche, it should also be noted that, as 
in the case of Strong's Nietzsche, these are the themes which are developed by the 
young twenty-four or five year old Nietzsche who wrote the unpublished fragment, 
The Greek State. A more complete understanding of Nietzsche's mature thought 
must acknowledge the full complexity of his theory of human drives, their 
sublimation and their suppression., In short, any reading should take into account 
his notion of the "will to power" and what Ansell-Pearson calls, following Staten, 
the "total economy of the whole". 
Leaving aside the question of the ultimate value of Nietzsche's thought, 
which is certainly something which cannot be settled within this chapter taken 
alone, Ansell-Pearson aligns himself with a kind of general conclusion to 
Nietzsche's political philosophy that we have seen else where, i. e. that Nietzsche 
was concerned with the need to produce "genius" and eccentricity and 
furthermore, he sought to give meaning to an otherwise groundless existence, and 
finally, in his role as the grand inquisitor of our values, change should be pressed 
home with violence if necessary, Nietzsche the philosopher once politically 
emasculated, still takes pride of place in the legitimate Western cannon of 
`thought provoking' thinkers. 
On the other hand, this conventional reading tells us little about the 
paradox of Nietzsche's "bloody politics", as Warren has referred to them. For 
example, we can see that even on first glance, according to Nietzsche, the powerful 
are the beautiful and to be beautiful one must be happy and free from rersentiment, 
[this latter term is another phrase that he was addicted to, like "decadence"] . 
610 
Clearly, in Nietzsche's view, his notion of "beautiful" was not even a physical 
characteristic at all but a spiritual one, and the same is true of his general 
conception of power. Although, to be sure, it is also the case that Nietzsche took 
the view that power was ultimately determined by a physiological origin, this was 
not held to be a'physical' phenomena in the sense of a strictly naked self-assertion 
i. e. specifically political powerper. ie. 
Thus, put most simply, Nietzsche's "grand politics" are those which are 
carried out by individuals or cultures which act, not coercively from crabbed and 
inferior feelings, but by providing spiritual leadership from principles which are 
produced by an overabundance and excess of feeling, sometimes such action will be 
oIONietzsche, 1995, p21, where he says, "The beginning of the slave's revolt in morality occurs when 
ressentiment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: ",... Denied recourse to action, Nietzsche calls 
this birth of values "imaginary revenge". 
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violent and sometimes not. 61' For Nietzsche, political violence 
did exist in the world 
and such violence might even have been inevitable, a part of the total economy of 
life, but this does not necessarily suggest that he thought that spiritual and moral 
leadership always required violence nor that it was always beneficial to civilisation. 
Again it is worth repeating that two of his most important historical heroes, 
Borgia and Napoleon, tried to provide a new basis for 'national' and then 
continental, stability, the first did much to unite some of the fractious city states of 
Northern Italy and the latter mainland Europe. In both cases Nietzsche held these 
projects to be beneficial because they were products of the greatest effort of the will 
and encouraged "racial mixing", one of the prerequisites of great strength in his 
view 6u In any case, the more important point is that it is clear that such cultural 
and anthropological politics have little to do with modern liberalism and its 
concern with the collective re-production of inspiration, "genius" and eccentricity. 
In a sense there is nothing wrong with Ansell-Pearson's characterisation of 
Nietzsche's philosophy as a kind of "aristocratic radicalism", the problems begin, 
rather, when this concept is extended into his political account of Nietzsche's 
thought. The fact is that Nietzsche's historical compass was much larger than the 
comparatively recent liberal concern with the untoward effects of modern 
industrialisation than the politics of liberalism might suggest. Nietzsche's crisis of 
nihilism had roots which extended back to the beginnings of the slave revolt in 
man, which for Nietzsche, meant going back to the early Jews TM3 Here Nietzsche is 
an audacious prophet, some might even say a delusional, who stands not, as the 
'untimely man' of Germany in the nineteenth century, but of several millennia of 
Western history, "truth steps into battle with the lie of millennia" he says of his 
life's work in Ecce Homo. '" "Grand politics" are not simply the politics of the anti- 
Reich but of a whole new value-form of civilisation, in Nietzsche's account. 
Finally, in one of Nietzsche's most important aphorisms on "grand politics" 
we see that he flatly contradicts Ansell-Person's reading of these as a kind of 
aristocratic politics. This passage is worth quoting at length; 
all Nietzsche, 1992, p97, where the theme of freedom from ressentiment is viewed as a pre-requisite for 
"grand politics". 
""Nietzsche, 1990, aphorisms 242 and 251, where the unification and mixing of Europeans becomes a 
"great physiological process" in which an "essentially supra-national and nomadic type of marl" gains a 
world-historical foothold, dispossessed of climatic and class determinates such a man is able to become a 
"tyrant- in every sense of the word, including the most spiritual. " 
614 Nietzsche, 1990, aphorism, 195. 
014 Nietzsche, 1992, p97. 
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On grand politics. - However much utility and vanity, those of 
individuals as of peoples, may play a part in grand politics: the 
strongest tide that carries them forward is the need for the feeling of 
power, which from time to time streams up out of inexhaustible 
wells not only in the souls of princes and the powerful but not least 
in the lower orders of the people. There comes again and again the 
hour when the masses are ready to stake their life, their goods, their 
conscience, their virtue so as to acquire that higher enjoyment and 
as a victorious, capriciously victorious nation to rule over other 
nations (or to think it rules). 
Nietzsche goes on to point out, in a theme more highly developed in the later On 
the Genealogy of Morality, that it is precisely when princes and leaders are able to 
harness such energy from the masses that they are most likely to spout moral 
platitudes of justification for their rule, and it is, similarly, when such energy is 
catharthetically "discharged" that the designation of "evil" to describe such 
behaviour emerges from the vanquished. "' 
`Nietzsche, Daybreak, apothems, 189. 
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Our most sacred convictions, the unchanging elements in our 
supreme values, are judgements of our muscles. 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power16 
Schopenhauer's question immediately comes to us in the most 
terrifying way: Has existence any meaning at all? 
Nietzsche, The Gay Scienceb17 
The Birth of Tragedy .... it smells offensively 
Hegelian... 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homob18 
II 
The general economics of'sickness and health'619 
I began the introduction to this chapter by pointing out that Nietzsche's 
writings are full of references, comments and observations concerning sexuality and 
its role in the formation of culture and civilisation. From the Birth of Tragedy, 6D 
through mature works such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, to Beyond Good and Evil and 
Ecce Homo the role of sexuality is never far from Nietzsche's thoughts. In Nietzsche's 
psycho-sexual philosophy, 'civilisation', can be read as a sexual text through the 
ever present hieroglyphs of cultural and social mores. Thus, according to Nietzsche, 
the health of a civilisation, as of individual people, is determined by their ability to 
freely "discharge" their sexual energy ." Whole societies can 
become bearers of a 
616 Nietzsche, 1968, p 173. 
o" Nietzsche, 1974, p308- 
""Nietzsche, 1992, p48. 
61 The term "general economics" is taken from Habermas, 1990, p211, to refer to Bataille's re-reading 
of Freud. Habermas said of this project, "Bataille seeks an economics of the total social ecology of drives; 
this theory is supposed to explain why modernity continues its life-endangering exclusions without 
alternatives, and why hope in a dialectic of enlightenment, which has accompanied the modern project 
right down to Western Marxism, is in vain:.. ", 1990, p2 17. 
620Nietzsche, 1993, p7, where he says for example, "Is madness not necessarily, perhaps, the symptom of 
degeneracy, decline, of the final stage of a culture? Is there perhaps such a thing- a questions for 
psychiatrists- as neuroses of health? " Also, he begins his study of aesthetics in the following manner, 
... "Just as the reproduction of the species 
depends on the duality of the sexes, " so to the duality of 
Apolline and Dionysiac, p14. The Dionysiac, according to Nietzsche, is the sexual seething of "primal 
oneness', p29. 
621 Particularly important here is aphorism 119 in Daybreak which has been more fully discussed by 
Henry Staten, the first few lines read, "Experience and imrntion - However far a man may go in self- 
knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which 
constitute his being. He can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb 
and flood, their play and counter-play among one another, and above all the laws of their nutriment 
remain wholly unknown to him. This nutriment is therefore a work of chance: our daily experiences 
throw some prey in the way of now this, now that drive, and the drive sizes it eagerly; but the coming and 
going of these events as a whole stands in no rational relationship to the nutritional requirements of the 
totality of the drives: so that the outcome will always be twofold- the starvation of someone the 
overfeeding of others". Nietzsche talked of a "large scale accounting" and of the "amazing economy of 
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particular bundle of sexual and social mores through the rules, regulations and 
commitments of particular religious or cultural formations, whether these are of the 
Pagan, Jewish, Catholic, humanist, or Protestant variety, according to Nietzsche. 
Thus to dam up the sexual drive or to obscure the purpose and function of such 
drives through a cloak of moral humbug is to invite disaster. 
Indeed, not only did Nietzsche follow Schopenhauer's psychological 
insights concerning the unconscious drives and motivations of persons, but he also 
developed a relatively sophisticated theory of sublimation's and eventually, he was 
to prioritise the sexual drive among these. For example, in Daybreak he said, "I find 
no more than six essentially different methods of combating the vehemence of a 
drive". G' Nietzsche then goes on to characterise these as 1) self-denial or placing 
one's self outside of temptation 2) what he called "strict-regularity" or what we 
might call 'rationing' 3) then comes "unrestrained gratification" 4) then there is 
the device of "mental association", such as the association of the "devil and sexual 
enjoyment", suggests Nietzsche 5) then comes "strenuous labour" or re-direction, 
such as a heavy self-inflicted work-load and finally says Nietzsche 6) he points to 
asceticism and physiological weakening. Nietzsche's conclusion to this particular 
passage then amounts to nothing less than an early version of the "will to power", 
he said, 
While 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a 
drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another; 
for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of 
a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or 
even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in 
which our intellect is going to have to take sides . 
`3 
Furthermore, in this sexual economics there is obviously no place for social 
meaning of the kind which might go beyond such instincts, ["There are no moral 
phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena ........ '4 he said in Beyond 
Good and Evil), to try to give such instincts a deeper or more significant meaning is 
ultimately a sign of decadence or a further manifestation of nihilism in his view. 
'Sick' civilisations are those which sublimate in ways, such as in the famous case of 
the preservation of the species", GS aphorism 1. According to Nietzsche, the suppression of female 
eroticism among the polite classes, and the bourgeois marriage which he associates with this process, he 
regards as the monstrous "psychic knot", GS ap7 1. And of the .. "economy of my soul", GS ap338. 622 Nietzsche, Daybreak, 1989, p64. 
°'' Ibid, 1989, p64. Compare this with Nietzsche, 1990, aphorism 36, p66, for example. 
624 Nietzsche, 1990, aphorism 109, p96. 
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Christian pity, which threaten to do so at the expense of life as such, again what 
Nietzsche himself called the "total economy of life" in Beyond Good and Evil. `' In 
other words, in his total economy of sexual drives, damming the drive in one place 
can only lead to a kind of store of social neuroses, such as those classic symptoms of 
decadence, nationalism and socialism, in another. Of such sublimation's, Nietzsche 
always singled out 'German philosophy' and the 'German's' for their special 
contribution to nihilism itself, but . 
before I discuss this particular aspect of the 
literature I shall briefly look at some of the examples of the 'general economics of 
sexuality' that we find in Nietzsche's texts. 
Reflecting upon the nature of the Dionysiac impulse he said, "In the 
Dionysian intoxication there is sexuality and voluptuousness",... ' And quoting 
from the final lines of Isolde's Liebestod, from Wagner's Tristan und holde, Nietzsche 
notes that the ... "way 
back to the womb of the sole true reality" is rapture and 
"supreme joy" {höchste Lust], which provide the final transfiguration into the great 
unconscious (Unbewußt) of the "primal oneness". 
In Zarathustra there is, among many references to sex and sexuality, a very 
sensual account of a visit to a brothel which invokes such places as hot nihilistic 
wastelands of "good, clear, oriental air", where any concern with social history 
would be absurd, "no clouds and no thoughts are hung" save for the most basic 
sexual instinct 6'' 
Wonderful, truly! 
Here I now sit, 
Beside the desert, and 
Yet so far from the desert, 
And in no way devastated: 
and then comes the important sexual refrain, 
For I am swallowed down 
By this smallest oasis: 
-it simply opened, yawning, 
Its sweetest mouth, 
The sweetest smelling of all little mouths: 
b25lbid, 1990, aporhism, 23. 
o'° Nietzsche, 1967, p420. 
°' Nietzsche, 1969, p314, "Among the Daughters of the Desert". 
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Then I fell in, 
Down, straight through- among you, 
You dearest maidens! Selah. ' 
In Beyond Good and Evil there are countless references to the total economy 
of 'sickness' and 'health' and again, usually with reference to the store and 
discharge of sexual energy. For example, he says, "Disgust with dirt can be so great 
that it prevents us from cleaning ourselves- from 'justifying' ourselves". ' This 
concern with the self-overcoming of "disgust" is one of Nietzsche's more latent 
themes, sexuality, as it turns out, is one of the few ways in which this can be 
achieved. In another place he says "The sense of the tragic increases and diminishes 
with sensuality" 6i0 Then, of course, there is the epigram with which I began this 
chapter, where he says, "The degree and kind of a man's sexuality reaches up into 
the topmost summit of his spirit". 
However, it is in the relatively uninhibited self-analysis of his 
'autobiography', Ecce Homo, that we are given the most personal glimpse into 
Nietzsche's sexology of degeneracy and health. Although even here one should note 
that self-analysis can never reveal everything of a person, "l am one thing, my 
writings are another" he says. °'In any case, the "abyss", according to Nietzsche, is 
the final victory of decadence i. e. nihilism, and represents the ground gained through 
rerentiment and the slave mentality- thus in one of his most painful analogies, he 
invokes this condition in a comparison with the "absolutely hellish machine" which 
is at work in his mother and his sister. 632 His sister, whom he called elsewhere an 
"anti-Semitic goose", represented and embodied the moral humbug and modern 
degeneracy of petty >ntiment that he loathed most. 
According to Nietzsche, resrentiment is "Vexation, morbid susceptibility, 
incapacity for revenge, the desire, the thirst for revenge, poison-brewing in any 
sense", and such impulses are most dangerous, he says, in one who is 
"exhausted". " There seems to have been at least some basis for Nietzsche's 
negative assessment of his sister. Elizabeth Förster Nietzsche married an anti- 
Semitic pamphleteer and attempted to set up an Aryan colony in Paraguay, a 
project that Nietzsche loathed. Perhaps even worse, in her later years Elizabeth 
°Z" Ibid, 1969, pps. 315-6. 
a29 Nietzsche, 1990, aphorism 119. 
"° Ibid, 1990, aphorism 155. 
"'' Nietzsche, 1992, p39. 
"i' Nietzsche, 1992, p11. 
°" Nietzsche, 1992, p15. 
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expressed her admiration for Hitler, who's own autobiographical 
history would 
undoubtedly have made him a prime candidate as one who was suffering from 
Nietzschean resentiment. Finally, it is also known that Elizabeth demonstrated little 
regard for honourable scholarly conventions, forging many letters that she claimed 
that her brother had sent her and surpressing those manuscripts of Nietzsche's that 
she did not like or understand. " 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, felt himself to be "so wise" precisely because 
he understood the sickly catharsis of one who was himself a decadent, he himself 
suffered greatly, so he was one who understood "illness" from the inside, as it were. 
Daybreak, his "brightest book" he tells us, was produced "In the midst of torments" 
and during an "uninterrupted three-day headache" which was "accompanied by 
the laborious vomiting of phlegm". " He composed and created life-affirming works 
"tenaciously for years on end [in) almost intolerable situations, places, residencies, 
{and] company" he says ' 
When Nietzsche turns to a system of health, albeit in a rather heavy- 
handed metaphorical style of self-parody, his thoughts turn to the special role of the 
Germans in his account of nihilism. The German's always occupied a special 
position in Nietzsche's demonology and they always produced his most vehement 
loathing. When Nietzsche turns to "diet, place, climate and recreation" in his 
analysis, the economics of creativity are determined by an aversion to heavy 
German "puddings" and "Leipzig cookery", {Schopenhauer}, "vegetarianism" 
[Wagner], wine and beer [the German herd) and undisciplined snacking between 
meals [which might conceivably just be snacking between meals! ). 
For a 'healthy' climate Nietzsche turns away again from the German, for 
... "the German climate alone is enough to 
discourage strong and even heroic 
intestines" 67 Here "metabolism" is again invoked as the key libidinal category, a 
metabolism which can be slowed or speeded up according to "climate". Here 
Nietzsche is looking, as in the case of the nihilistic brothel, for "dry-air", the kind 
of air which is to be found in "Paris, Provence, Florence, Jerusalem and Athens", 
says Nietzsche. Of course, Paris is the heavy-handed clue that these cities are but 
metaphors since Nietzsche knows that we know that Paris enjoys a damp, wet and 
°-" For a full account of Elizabeth's attempt to set up an Aryan colony see Ben Maclntyre, Forgotten 
FutherLsnd: " the search for Elizabeth Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche, 1992, p9. 
Ibid, 1992, p 16. 
Ibid, 1992, p24. 
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grey climate, not unlike that of most of Northern Germany, we are led to it and the 
other regions mentioned for other reasons, indeed not for climate but for the 
important role that such centres have played as producers of cosmopolitan culture 
and artistic lightness of touch. ' 
Nietzsche was "so clever altogether" because he learned to avoid 
'geographical' locations such as Basel, and anywhere in Germany if possible, which 
had proscribed for him a "spiritual diet" of classical philological over-reading 
which, ... "was a perfectly senseless abuse of extraordinary powers without any kind 
of provision for covering this consumption, without even reflection on consumption 
and replacement", says Nietzsche. 639 In other words, according to Nietzsche's map 
of his own psyche, the purpose of such philology was lost to the moderns, the 
seriousness of cultural issues was lost to a mechanised schooling for the re- 
production of the modern bourgeoisie. 
In effect, Nietzsche is complaining that the narrow specialisation of the 
field implied in this process was undermining his own libidinal energies because he 
could no longer draw on 'life' in all its richness, or in the "total economy... " as 
such. 6'i° Finally, and here there is little that can be added to the theme more 
generally, comes the turn of "recreation", where upon Nietzsche returns to some of 
his favourite enthusiasms, principally those of music and walking. Music remains 
for Nietzsche the crucial Schopenhauerean form of the plastic arts, and walking,, he 
associated with high Alpine summits, again the "dry air", hygiene and honesty 
[elevation) of soul and spirit. 
In the working notes [the Nacbkss) which spanned much of the period 
under consideration here (1883-88), and which have come to be known as The Will 
to Power there are over twenty-five aphorisms, some shorter, some longer, which are 
concerned with issues of sexual energy. Of these I have selected just two which are 
of relevance here, the first concerns the creative power of the artist and the second 
concerns value-judgements. Of the artist and sublimation Nietzsche says, 
Artists, if they are good, are (physically as well) strong, full of 
surplus energy, powerful animals, sensual; without a certain 
overheating of the sexual system a Raphael is unthinkable,... 
638 Nietzsche, 1992, p27, in this regard he names Moliere, Corneille, Racine as well as Paul Bourget, 
PierreLoti, Gyp, Meilhac and Anatole France. 
`91bid, 1992, p25. 
010 For a more general critique of bourgeois society, including one which overlaps with his concern here, 
see aphorism 206 in Daybreak, entitled "The impossible class". 
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and he continues, 
... chastity is merely the economy of an artist 
6" 
Nietzsche, wholly `anticipating' Freud, views the total sexual drive of a 
person the measure of their self-power. ' Those that are creative rather than 
reactive are so because they have a superabundance of such energy and will. 
therefore, sublimate in acts which are either active or reactive. It follows therefore, 
that those who do not enjoy such sexual powers are forced to conserve what they 
have and in so doing become resentful, miserly and ultimately, in Nietzsche's 
terms, 'destructive'. Thus Nietzsche, displaying his usual deftness when handling 
playful and metaphorical allusions and ironies, calls sexuality the "basic biological 
question" 643 For those with a superabundance of sexual energy there must be some 
kind of libidinal release, whether of art or violence, it is clear that Nietzsche ideally 
prefers the former. 
Nietzsche, as we have seen, frequently uses highly stylised sexual allusions 
and metaphors to draw attention to the total economy of drives and another good 
example is to be found in his theory of criminality. Nietzsche, going `beyond good 
and evil' considers that crime might well be committed for the right reasons, and 
therefore, that such a criminal might well be courageous rather than resentful. 
Nietzsche notes, for example, that Dostoevsky held that the inmates of the Siberian 
prisons "... formed the strongest and most valuable part of the Russian people". `' 
However, should the criminal belong to the "race of criminals", in other 
words, should he be filled with ressentiment, of the criminal 'type', then Nietzsche 
suggests that "one should make war on him before he has committed any hostile 
act (first operation as soon as one has him in one's power: his castration)". 6" Here, 
of course, a petty criminality which is rooted in popular remntiment is held to have a 
°'" Nietzsche, 1968, p421. 
"I have placed 'anticipating' in inverted commas because it is, of course, Freud who follows Nietzsche 
here, in his Three Essays on Sexuality, Freud seeks to distance himself from C. G Jung and in doing so also 
aligns himself firmly with Nietzsche and against those who would interpret the "will to power" as a 
general theoryof drives, although this was hardly Freud's intention. He said, "For the present, therefore, 
no further development of the libido theory is possible, except upon speculative lines. It would, however, 
be sacrificing all that we have gained hitherto from psycho-analytic observation, if we were to follow the 
example of C. G. Jung and water down the meaning of the concept of libido itself by equating it with 
psychical instinctual force in general", 1975, p84. 
" Nietzsche, 1968, p26. 
°"I bid, 1968, 
" Ibid, 1968, pps. 391-2. 
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sexual grounding in the inability of the criminal mind to discharge of an abundance 
of sexual energy in more psychologically appropriate and useful ways. The criminal, 
by definition, transgresses the laws for the wrong reasons. In other words, 
Nietzsche is implying, presumably, through the metaphorical removal of the 
criminals testicles, that his sexual energy must be reduced or removed altogether, 
since the criminal does not know how to discharge. `' 
In a second aphorism on sexuality Nietzsche jots down some notes on the 
theme of morality and genealogy, one of his most relentless themes. Noting that 
moral problems are often judged by a somewhat sleepy and acculturated ignorance 
and by passive acceptance, again related to religious conventions of one kind or 
another he said, 
The problem "thou shalt": an inclination that cannot explain itself, 
similar to the sexual drive, shall not fall under the general 
condemnation of the drives; on the contrary, it shall be their 
evaluation and judge. " 
Here then Nietzsche breaks the rules and conventions of society into two 
different components, particular laws and law as such. In Nietzsche's view the 
notion of the law as such is fundamental to the operation and vitality of the 
particular laws. Thus even when the moral grounding of the particular laws 
change, as they do with the cultural disintegration in the "belief in God", the 
ultimate law command position, or meta-law that holds that laws are necessary in 
the first instance, must remain in place. The analogy with Nietzsche's theory of 
sexuality is instructive, for in the total economy of the drives, many drives may 
come and go, increase or diminish according to cultural and environmental factors, 
but the sexual drive as the ultimate evaluative tool must, in Nietzsche's view, 
remain fundamental to any critical project. 
The discourse of libidinal economics charts the course of the symptom and 
the cure in the individual patient, from the neurosis itself through the therapy and 
towards the cure, as in the psycho-analytic tradition. History, in this case 
represented by Hegel or Hegelianism, stands in the way of a cure. Much like 
Stirner, Nietzsche does not believe that the Young Hegelian have gone far 
O4° If this seems a bizarre suggestion on Nietzsche's part then it must be recalled that there have been 
calls recently by certain criminologists for the chemical castration of repeat offending rapists. Thus one 
must assume that such criminologists believe that the rapists desire to overpower the victim has sexual 
origins. 
°"Nietzsche, 1968, p 156. 
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enough, however, unlike Stirner, Nietzsche claims that his more highly 
developed 
"sense of smell" to what was offensive about the Germans, picked up on the theme 
of reactive and active freedoms. Thus Stirner's negative all consuming Ego, 
although an important turning point, is left behind in Nietzsche's critique of 
nihilism. 
In other words, Nietzsche's discourse of nihilism or decadence, approached 
the cultural crisis of modernity within an analogous libidinal frame-work although 
through this critique of history. As is well known, according to Nietzsche, 
modernity was essentially nihilist because of the most profound crisis of values, 
however, Nietzsche also held that the dominant values of the epoch, the "summit 
of the spirit" which was held to be the achievement of Hegel and the German 
spirit, was nothing less than the most decadent product of modern "sexuality" in 
various modes of denial, decline and its philosophical sublimation's. 
Furthermore, this is also why Nietzsche's antagonistic approach towards 
the "Germans" was always more shrill, more hysterical than that which he meted 
out to any other individual or culture, and this is the most important point, while 
the seething undercurrent of drives represents the 'eternal' in Nietzsche's thought, 
the growth and development of cultural variation and the so-called 'civilising' 
virtues are 'historical' and contingent factors which regulate the "will to power" in 
his view. 
As is often well known but little understood, Nietzsche never failed to 
attach great 'subjective' significance to the personal views, moral outlook and 
ethical predispositions of the philosophers. Philosophy, according to Nietzsche, is 
never a series of objective meditations or wholly abstract discussions on distant 
objects and theoretical principles. Rather, philosophy is simply the most complex 
mask of these same predilections, moral presuppositions and ethical principles. 
It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy 
has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind 
of involuntary and unconscious memoir... " 
Finally, in his essay On the u ser and disadvantages of hirtary jor life, it is cleat that 
Nietzsche held Hegel largely responsible, as the founder of history as the "world- 
"'Nietzsche, 1990, p37. 
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process", e'' for the final articulation of "modern man", or as Nietzsche was to call 
him in both Daybreak and in Zarathustra, the "last-man" 650 Thus the "last man", 
egalitarian, fat and satisfied with his state handouts, soft, secure and comfortable 
life is suffering from a "weakened personality" 651 It is just because the last man is 
so comfortable that he is unable to reinvigorate life with a goal, he arrogantly 
surveys history with divine omnipotence and concludes that there is nothing left to 
be achieved, thus taking his cue from Feuerbach, Nietzsche says of Hegel, he was 
the "delayer" of atheism "par excellence". 65' Hegel's own personality was deeply 
Christian ascetic, according to the rules of Nietzsche's general economics. 
"Untimely Meditations, 198ß, p 111. 
0SO See Daybreak, 1989, p65, and Zarathustra, 1969, p45. And note that Hollingdale translates the 
Letzte mensche as "Ultimate man", Kaufmann's "last man" is better because ultimate man is too close 
to superman in English and is misleading. 
651 U'TM, 1988, p83 
652 Nietzsche, 1974, pps. 306-7. 
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To breed an animal which is able to make promises- is that not precisely 
the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to 
humankind? is it not the real problem of humankind?... 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality65; 
... if only the 
higher-ups constantly legitimise themselves as 
higher... 
Nietzsche, TheGg Scienc 6 
III 
Eschatology and Übermensch as 'privileged standpoint' 
Nietzsche went much further in his own version of philosophical and 
political eschatology than either Stirner or Marx. For while, Stirner and Marx 
posited a particular eschatological solution in each case; the Lumpenproletariat and the 
Proletariat, Nietzsche is much more radical in his eschatological claims since he 
sought to elevate eschatology per . re, that 
he did so, like all post-Hegelians, in the 
service of atheism really goes without saying. Nietzsche hoped to provide a model 
oflegitimisation, not for a particular historical agency, but one which was suitable 
for all historical agency. The Übermensch is not an particular individual or class but 
the post-historical 'privileged standpoint' raised up to the status of truth per jr. A 
process began by Stirner and completed by Nietzsche. 
The background to all of this then, according to Nietzsche, is provided 
through an analysis of general economics in which the constitution of nihilism is 
understood as the final death throws of Christian asceticism (Hegel). However, 
according to Nietzsche, nihilism was a dangerously "quiet problem" because 
Christian asceticism had successfully re-directed the cultural direction of suffering 
and of reuentiment inwards towards the sinful self. 6" Thus Nietzsche held that before 
him the question of good and evil and good and bad had hardly ever arisen. All of 
this emerges from Nietzsche's general economics which places all such re- 
directional projects in the category of sexual sublimation. Nietzsche, like all 
°" Nietzsche, 1995, p38. 
°s'Nietzsche, 1974, p107. 
°Sb Here I am paraphrasing from Ansell-Pearson, 1995, pxix. Also see Nietzsche, 1995, p15 for reference 
to the "quiet problem". Also see Nietzsche, 1992, p99, "In the general economy of the whole the 
fearfulness of reality (in the affects, in the desires, in the will to power) are to an incalculable degree 
more necessary than any form of petty happiness"... 
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eschatologists, concluded from this that such a culturally ubiquitous phenomenon 
as decadence required a special condition of belief in something 'other' still to come, if 
the downward spiral of nihilism itself was to be broken. 
Nietzsche hoped to expose the "quiet problem" of nihilism and its 
genealogy with the exuberance, excess and noise of the prophet 6' However he was 
not and did not want to become, in his own words, a ... "fear inspiring.. moral 
fanatic" in the manner of a de-theologised George Eliot so he faced the difficult 
problem of how to open up the question of morality without being moral and truth 
without presenting a new truth. 657 It could be argued here that Nietzsche managed 
to overcome this problem through the use of his general economics, which would 
appear to have a quasi-physiological and psychological basis in sexuality but as we 
have seen, Nietzsche also holds to the view that cultural phenomena impinged 
upon such drives, subverting their health. However, a more serious problem for 
Nietzsche remained the necessary self-legitimisation of the bearer of the 
eschatological truth, especially since Nietzsche's own 'truth' appears to be based 
on'untruth'. This problem is most famously demonstrated in Beyond Good and Evil, 
where he says, 
What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'?... Why not rather 
untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? ' 
I would suggest that Nietzsche manages to overcome this problem by 
writing an eschatological account in the style of self-parody which is, never-the- 
less, supposed to be taken seriously as eschatology. "'- The rather dubious 
celebration of self-parody which is engaged in by Nietzsche occurs in two of his 
most important texts, Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Ecce Homo. On the one hand, I take 
the seriousness of Nietzsche's intentions to have been already demonstrated by the 
context of his analysis of nihilism, which as we have seen already, forms the 
backdrop as the Nietzschean philosophical problem par excellence. However, on the 
other, the full ambiguity of Nietzsche's self-parody has still to be explored and in 
order to fully explore the function of self-parody in Nietzsche's thought it becomes 
650 Even Kaufmann, so cautious in any designation of Nietzsche's thought said of him that he [Nietzsche] 
thought of himself as "a kind of prophet", see The Gay Science, p21. 
°' Nietzsche, 1968, p69. 
... Nietzsche, 1990, p33. 
°59 Here I describe Zarathustra to be self-parody because I take Zarathustra to be Nietzsche. I think this 
view can be supported by reference to the values of both Zarathustra and the analysis of Nietzsche's own 
sickness and health in F. ce Home. A book which is supposed to be Nietzsche's autobiography. 
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necessary, in turn, that we briefly explore what I will call 
his 'micro-economics' of 
laughter. Ci6° 
The discussion of the philological function of laughter presents itself in 
many of Nietzsche's texts, but probably finds its most extended treatment in The 
Gay Science. In Nietzsche's thought laughter has three distinctive functions; first, 
laughter breaks through tensions within the individual subject, secondly, it 
presents the opposite of its subject more seriously then before the laughing event 
and finally, it breaks down tensions that may pertain between subjects. Ultimately, 
Nietzsche is able to present his untruth, as one among many to be sure, but one 
which is more perspicacious than any other. 
In a discussion of the first kind Nietzsche points out in The Gay Science that a 
man "needs a rest from himself'. Meaning supposedly, that if one is serious all of 
the time then one becomes moody, gloomy, perhaps morbid, and again, the worst 
of all possible cases according to Nietzsche, one becomes resentful. Rather, he says, 
we should wear the "fools cap... precisely because we are at bottom grave and 
serious human beings", thus he continues "we need it in relation to ourselves", 
indeed we are more like "weights" than men. 66` More importantly, and this is an 
example of laughter and its `other', Nietzsche suggests that laughter is a means to 
"artistic distance" and that the "hero needs a fool". It would appear that for 
Nietzsche, the heroic would be impossible to define if it were not for its opposite in 
the cowardly (or stupidity), but while that may be a logical truth it is not 
Nietzsche's main concern. Rather, how does one challenge the seriousness of 
untruth without providing an opposing truth commitment? 
For example, in choosing the title of his `autobiography', Ecce Homo, the 
words used by Pilate on the presentation of Christ before him, Nietzsche 
undoubtedly sought to shock his audience, and it certainly had the desired effect 
on his Sister, who we know suppressed the manuscript for a number of years. The 
comparison with Christ was also present in Zarathustra 's Prologue, when 
Zarathustra, then aged thirty, goes off into the wilderness, an obvious reference to 
the life of Christ. This desire to shock is, however, not just the shrill expression of 
the lonely and despised outsider, as has often being suggested by some 
commentators, but a useful rhetorical device. Nietzsche, in presenting himself as a 
°°" Itisworth noting that one could just as well explore this self-parody equally efficendy through his 
micro-economics of histrionics, play-acting or multiple masks, however I have chosen laughter in the case 
which follows. 
"Nietzsche, 1974, 
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new Christ invites one of two responses; either we are to take him as a new prophet 
or he is quite simply mad. 
Let us assume that he intends to encourage the former view, that is, that he 
is a new prophet. Immediately we see a tension and its associated anxiety arise 
between Nietzsche and his audience. A religious audience, if not all audiences' of 
the period, would be likely to regard such claims as blasphemy. Then comes our 
second and more important response to Nietzsche's claim that he is a new Christ; 
following anger and surprise the second response would be likely to be one of 
laughter, that its all a big joke at his own expense, after all, he cannot be serious. 
Also, and this is important, laughter is an involuntary affect, that is to say that it 
has a physiological basis, and Nietzsche would want to communicate his truths to 
those who had the 'stomach' for them i. e. the requisite physiology since these are 
part of the general economy of the person. 
However, in breaking the tension through the mechanism of laughter 
Nietzsche has now achieved a new intimacy with his formerly hostile audience, 
they forgive the joke, or at least suspend judgement on the blasphemer and he 
recognises their new receptivity, thus the relationship can now proceed in earnest. 
In this act of suspension the audience is now in a position to appreciate that, at the 
very least, if Nietzsche is not serious about being another Christ then he must be 
serious about something. Nietzsche, for his part, is now in a perfect position to 
present to them his serious issue and as we might expect the serious issue has a 
deep and profound Christ relation; that is, either take Christ seriously, Nietzsche 
would hold that few Christian's do so, ' or find some new goal. That goal being the 
re-evaluation of all values which was the whole point of Nietzsche's life work, after 
all, let us not forget that Ecce Homo is an intellectual retrospective of his life. 
"Nitimur in vetitum: in this sign my philosophy will one day conquer", ' he said in 
Ecce Homo. 
In short then, even laughter is a serious affair for Nietzsche. Indeed the 
idea that laughter cannot have a serious function is just one more social 
"prejudice", he said. `i64 Nietzsche's self-parody is not a means to the denial of 
eschatology and prophecy, rather, it is a means to making it more effective. As he 
oo2Nietzsche, 1969, pps40-1, for example where the ascetic in the forest is saluted by Zarathustra for his 
unquestioning faith in God. Also, in The Anti-Christ, 1968, (AC) Nietzsche said, ... "in reality there 
has 
been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross", p151. 
"Nietzsche, 1992, p4, We strive after the forbidden (Ovid). 
'Nietzsche, 1974, p257. 
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said in Zarathustra, "Who among you can at the same time laugh and 
be exalted? " 
and most trenchantly of all he has the following words come from the mouth of 
Zarathustra, "One does not kill by anger but by laughter. Come, let us kill the 
spirit of Gravity". 665 
Finally, returning to the Nietzschean political positions with which I began 
this chapter, we are able to see that these are not simply the ill-informed opinions 
of one who little understood the facts of modern life or those of someone who simply 
read his philosophy of power into political claims. The picture is certainly far more 
complex than this. Nihilism was the deepest human crisis, according to Nietzsche, 
and it was manifest in modern politics as it was in all other human relations and 
even in the sexology of individual persons, as is well known, Nietzsche held that 
liberalism, democracy, socialism and nationalism, were all such expressions. These 
were all manifestations of Christian pity and Christianity threatened to purge all 
such societies of "master morality", i. e. it threatened to suppress those who enjoyed 
a superabundance of drives, particularly the sexual drive and its sublimation's, at 
the expense of life per . e. 
All of these modern 'isms', including feminism, were in 
Nietzsche's view a cultural disaster of apocalyptic proportions. 
More importantly, however, was the "quiet" nature of this same nihilism in, 
which each of these modern political forms, which were supposed to be opposites, 
were actually engaged in the deepest possible collusion. Nietzsche detested 
capitalism because it used people for the most vulgar of purposes; making money, 
and the state according to Nietzsche, was the most dangerous development of all 
precisely because it was the most potent manifestation of this same collusion. Every 
one of these modern ideologies supported the state, (except anarchism of course, 
which Nietzsche understood as a variant of democracy and socialism). 
Nietzsche's Geo-political views, such as they were, included a deep 
suspicion of Russia, a celebration of the promise of the USA and a deep foreboding 
for the future of Germany. The last of these, is of course, often taken to be further 
evidence of Nietzsche's prophetic power. That is, he correctly 'predicted' the role 
of Germany in something terrible to come. However, Nietzsche held Germany in 
special contempt for the role that its philosophers played in the development of 
nihilism, thus "Schopenhauer and Hegel were brothers who wronged one another 
as no other brothers had". Luther, Kant and Hegel were a cultural calamity 
according to Nietzsche because they were such creative proponents of Christian 
""Nietzsche, 1969, p68. 
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pity. Hegel's system represented the apotheosis of this problem in Nietzsche's 
account. Nietzsche feared Russia because, according to the laws of his general 
economics, feudal Russia was a slumbering giant of total repression, harmless 
"Russian fatalism" might not always remain so irrelevant, he feared that it might 
eventually sublimate in disastrous fashion, perhaps by waging war on Europe and 
thereby destroying the 'Greek' in we Europeans. 
Finally, in Nietzsche's account the USA and the other migratory lands 
represented a chance for the pagan in us to regain some ground, migration pitted 
man against nature in the most fearful of struggles and such activities acted like a 
gymnasium of the spirit, this fact plus the promise to mix the races as never before 
made the USA the most potentially spiritual of all countries. If one must draw 
conclusions from all of this then the most likely scenario suggests that in Geo- 
political terms, Nietzsche believed that the USA ought to protect Germany against 
itself (through the migration of the German working-class) and. Europe from 
Russia. And there is some indication that once this historical mission is complete 
then the US should disarm itself from a position of strength. Thus Nietzsche's 
politics definitively have nothing to do with Nazism. Nihilism however, precisely 
because of its collusive nature prevented conversion to the probity of these 
Nietzschean insights. Nietzsche, therefore, sought legitimisation for master 
morality in his philosophical critique as eschatological, in other words, it necessarily 
predicted the end of nihilism and the time of the Übervxnsch. 
Nietzsche has only contemporaneous evidence (as opposed to actual 
historical evidence) of nihilism, since it is a matter of interpretation, the facts, as he 
knew more than anyone, do not speak for themselves. From this Nietzschean 
interpretation of the present (and past) a standpoint on the future suffused with 
new meaning, the time of the Übermensch emerges. Thus again, unlike Hegel, for 
whom prophecy is ex eventu, Nietzsche is rooted in present and future rather than in 
past and present. While we are at least able to judge Hegel's revelation by 
philosophical discussions over the meaning of such events as have already occurred, 
we are being asked again, as in the case of Stirner and Marx, to judge Nietzsche on 
the veracity of his promises concerning the future. Nietzsche's genealogical analysis 
of nihilism is a historical form, to be sure, but the conclusion drawn by Nietzsche 
from this is quite typically, unsound. The philosophical concept of nihilism, like 
alienation, is only an interpretation of histories events, it must be re-called, not 
history itself. Nietzsche's politics then, are revelations forward in time without ex- 
eNerttri justification, but they are not without legitimacy since he regarded the belief 
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in the power of his prophetic statements persuasive enough to constitute a kind of 
legitimacy. 
What is revealed in Nietzsche's analysis is the dissection of modernity, the 
expose of the "Last-Men" and the future, the overcoming of their decaying morality 
by the Übermenschen. This total philosophical anatomy is presented in less than 
four pages of Zarathustra 's Prologue. All of Nietzsche's key concepts are compressed 
into as few pages, the idea that "God is dead! ", ' the announcement of the coming 
Übermensch, the atheism of the new message, "I entreat you, my brothers, remain 
true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of extra-terrestrial 
hopes! ". ' And finally, remaining with the medical/psychological analogies with 
which this chapter began, within these same few pages we have mentioned the 
social 'neuroses' itself which is ultimately the problem, the most "contemptible, 
... the last man", 
6ffi with his lazy, self-satisfied bourgeois conformism to the 
dominant social mores of the period. 
There is no question that Nietzsche intended that we do take his political 
philosophy seriously, the whole point of all true eschatology is to galvanise belief, 
"Seeing that I must shortly approach mankind with the heaviest demand that ever 
has been made on it, "... he said in Ecce IIomo. 66' Nietzsche's political views may be 
grounded in his general economics, but in circuitous fashion, his call for master 
morality is legitimated in eschatology itself. However, given Nietzsche's consistent 
critique of all philosophy as but a sexual reflex of the philosopher he had to 
galvanise belief, not in a particular historical agency, ".. I erect no new idols", 
which would certainly leave him open to accusations of self-contradiction, in other 
words we would simply point the finger at Nietzsche's own sexuality, ` but in 
agency per . e. 
To do this his eschatology had to be one which produced difference 
while protecting agency as such, master-morality is just such a notion of a re- 
energised conception of agency. 
In the forward to Ecce Flomo already quoted from Nietzsche, following an 
important discussion of eschatology in which he claims that Zarathustra is no 
"preacher" or "seducer", Nietzsche quotes from his own writings at length, and 
note that he claims that "Within my writings my Zarathustra stands by itself", he 
said, and here I quote at length, 
OnOIbid, 1969, p41. 
Ibid, 1969,42. 
Ibid, 1969, p46. 
°°Nietzschc, 1992, p3. 
"'O This is, in effect, what Henry Staten does in his penetrating psychological reading of Nietzsche. 
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"Go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra! And better still: be 
ashamed of him! Perhaps he has deceived you. 
The man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies but also to 
hate his friends. 
One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. 
And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels? 
You respect me; but how if one day your respect should tumble? Take care 
that a falling statue does not strike you dead? 
You say you believe in Zarathustra? But of what importance is Zarathustra? 
You are my believers: but of what importance are all believers? 
You had not sought yourselves when you found me. Thus do all believers; 
therefore all belief is of so little account. 
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied 
im will I return to you"... ' 
In other words, it would appear that Nietzsche does not want followers and 
he does not want to found a religion in the manner of other prophets. Rather he 
wants everyone to dig deep and to find what they have within themselves, those 
that have the pre-requisite makings of master-morality such as an over-abundance 
of energy will emerge eventually. However, Nietzsche still cannot resist becoming 
the prophet since the desire to tell us that that being so, as he has told us all along, 
.. "only when you have all denied me will I return to you".... Our faith in 
his own 
self-belief and in his new values, and that he will prove to be right in the end, 
remains the characteristic legitimating hallmark of the privileged eschatologist, 
and so it was with Nietzsche, as it was with Stirner and Marx. 
°"Nietzsche, 1992,6. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Modernity and the Messianic Rejection of'Theory' 
Karl Löwith once suggested that the German philosophical obsession with 
nihilism began with Max Stirner's legacy. In this thesis I have responded to this 
idea and furthermore, I have suggested that this concern with nihilism began in 
Hegel's thought and not just within Hegelianism. Indeed I have suggested that 
the interrelated themes, the death of God, the attempt to develop a self- 
legitimating theoretical practice, the critique of German social and political 
development according to this same practice, the quest for meaning and the 
'promise' of the future that this entailed, reached a crescendo in nineteenth 
century Germany. I argue that these developments are the result of a philosophical 
turn, a rejection of Hegel's system, and from his own detailed theoretical reply to 
the French Revolution in his Philosophy of Right. 
More specifically, I have demonstrated the extent to which the prophetic 
political philosophy of Max Stirner, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche is 
dominated by their own perceptions of one dominating problematic: the search for 
meaning in the light of social-recognition's negativity. This is the scarifying 
implication of an abstract principle of freedom, which is in turn, based upon the 
historical emergence of complete adult autonomy. Not the Kantian notion of 
autonomy as self-governance, but as the denouement of government per .e 
because 
it seems to lead only towards a moral and ethical vacuum and the suspension of any 
real standard of judgement when applied in practice. The terror of the French 
Revolution has demonstrated that complete freedom can be contained within no 
boundary as social chaos and mass murder reign supreme. In short, freedom de- 
values itself, thus the full implication of social- recognition has to be significantly 
re-interpreted by each theorist in his turn. 
In my analysis of nineteenth century German thought, at least when 
represented by Hegel, Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche, I hold that two theological 
concepts dominate the philosophical and political landscape: alienation and 
nihilism. Both concepts have a long genealogy, in the case of alienation we see that 
before its use as a common legal term of the medieval period, it was principally a 
religious term which denoted man's relationship, or lack of it, to God. However, it 
was Hegel who most effectively defined the modern use of the term alienation. In 
his account it refers to both a sense of self-estrangement from the world, from 
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oneself and from others, as well as an expression of one's objective personality. In so 
defining alienation we see how Hegel brings together insights from both religious 
anthropology and modern philosophy in his Phenomenology and system. 
In the case of nihilism the picture is more complex. Seldom explicitly 
mentioned by name, it does never-the-less, appear to be apparent in Hegel's 
account of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. For in Hegel's analysis 
the History of Philosophy discovers Thermidor before it occurs in Politics. 
Represented by Diderot in his short work Rameau's Nephew, we see this phenomena 
demonstrated in the cold utilitarianism and one-sided rationality of the 
Enlightenment. Here reason is allegedly one-sided because it is only concerned 
with subjects as objects, and it appears to circumnavigate the essential human 
worth of subjects as such. All of this becomes cathartic in the exposure of a 
meaningless life and death in the violence between revolutionary subjects. 
Innocence and guilt lose their meaning during the Terror, as do good and evil. ' 
There remains only the corrosive effects of suspicion, says Hegel. 
The point of all of this for the present thesis is that the destructive drive of 
critique, made possible only by Enlightenment and socially-recognitive freedom, 
drives towards a series of self-reviving projects in Hegel's most important epigones. 
Nihilism and Modernity, the title of this study, when used in this general non- 
Nietzschean sense, refers to the death of God and an end to the moral and ethical 
certainties entailed by organised religious structures. Nietzsche, of course, only 
subscribed to this sense of modernity in the most general sense since his 
understanding of nihilism can be traced back to the period of Socrates. However, it 
is the decisive case of the `enlightened', progressive "Last-Man" which Nietzsche 
associated with Hegel's philosophy, and in the final analysis, it is Hegelianism that 
both frames his notion of the modern, and that which he balked at. 
In any case, one important implication in all of this is that following the 
turning point I represent in the thought of Hegel's thinking on the Revolution, 
philosophy and politics become primarily concerned with practices of judgement 
and legitimisation. This turning point is generally held to be the province of Kant 
or Kantianism, however, Hegel marks this particular turning point far more 
dramatically than Kant ever did. While Kant's deism, his "categorical imperative" 
and the postulates of practical reason remain modestly within the boundaries of 
biblical tradition, Hegel's "Absolute Knowing" attempts to rework eschatology for 
the greater glory and advancement of philosophyper se. In other words, while Kant 
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appears to have given philosophical support to the formal religious content of the 
moral law, Hegel seeks religious support for the philosophy of 
freedom. These are 
very different projects. 
In his Early Theological Writings, (and following Lukäc's analysis in The Young 
Ilegen, we see in Chapter I how Hegel attempted to rescue Jesus and the 
Protestant tradition, which Hegel thought the most important attempt to build a 
purely moral religion, from what he perceived to be the 'positivity' of both the 
Jewish and Roman Catholic traditions. I mentioned a number of sources such as his 
essay The Sermon on the Mount Contrasted with the Mosaic Law and with Kant's Ethics, an 
early example of his attempt to preserve and transcend alienation. Hegel held that 
Kant failed to serve Jesus's teaching in-so-far as he accepted the notion of the 
diremption of the subject, and between the dualism of the need to obey the 
objectivity of positive law, and thwart individual inclinations and desires. The great 
personal merit of Jesus himself, suggests Hegel, is that in his critique of the 
Pharisees, for example, and their formal interpretation and account of the law, is 
his attempt to make 'duty' subjective and thus harmonise these apparent 
oppositions. 
The point for Hegel in these youthful theological writings, is that 
commandments such as "Thou shalt not kill" should become superfluous in-so-far 
as Reason becomes so deeply felt so as to become a moral religion, i. e. one 
unencumbered by rituals, catechisms and superstitions. Only then will the full 
rationality and truth of religion as such present itself. In the case of his later theory 
of the modern state, Hegel holds that there has to be a deep personal identification, 
(and thereby the deepest possible integration, by the individual of her own 
interests, purposes and goals), with that of the State itself, if alienation is to be 
successfully transcended. 
In the Introduction to this thesis and in the Chapters on Hegel I flesh out 
the nature of Hegel's eschatology more fully. We see, for example, that Hegel's 
analysis remains ex eintu, that is, he plays the role of the revelationary prophet only 
'after the fact'. Hegel's apocalyptic imagination remained within an empirical and 
interpretative conceptual framework which looked only to the present and past for 
self-legitimation. Hegel asks his audience to believe in the veracity of his 'End 
Time' based, not upon the strength of his belief in the eventual success of some 
correctly prophesied state of affairs to come, but upon the coherence and 
explanatory power of events which have already occurred, principally events such as 
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the various forms of non-recognition, mis-recognition and finally upon the mutual 
or social-recognition that we see in the opening Chapters. In other words, Hegel's 
revelation is his bringing to light the past nature of mankind's alienation and the 
emergence from that alienation. In the case of Hegel, the struggle over 
interpretative terrain remains firmly within the Western epistemological tradition 
since disputes over the validity of his narrative are the preserve of philosophical 
history. 
However, when we come to consider Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche, we see 
that a decisive break occurs in the manner of the proceedings. Stirner prophesies 
the coming of Egoism based not upon the consciousness of the lumpenproletariat, but upon 
the self-confirming validity of his Egoistic consciousness; Marx prophesied the 
coming of a communist man based not upon the consciousness of the proletariat but 
upon his own consciousness, and its method, and finally Nietzsche required an 
Übermensch in order to break free from what he perceives to be the mediocrity of 
modernity, a mediocrity which is in turn defined by the presence of the prophet 
himself. In what amounts to a blanket rejection of Hegel's attempt to close his 
system, the allegedly contemplative Hegelian "self-thinking idea" becomes yet 
another version of an alienated or nihilistic consciousness, depending on which of 
our Young Hegelians we turn to. 
This is all a far cry from Hegel's account of the content and significance of 
our religious beliefs. In Hegel's Philosophy of Religion the triadic structure of the 
Holy Trinity finds its analogy in the objects of 'life', in Hegel's special sense. Thus 
the 'Holy Ghost' is the collective worldly realisation of the community, the 'Son' is 
the process of representation and appearance of the same, as is the presentation of 
the Creation, it is the Fall and the final reconciliation. Finally, God is the 'Father', 
who is in-and-for-himself, he/she is self-development as such, the "self-thinking 
idea" of the later Encyclopaedia. In Hegel's thought, ultimately, there is little 'room 
for either alienation [Entfremdung) or nihilism. 
However, following Hegel, conceptions of crisis dominate and these become 
dramatically diffuse because in each individual thinker's case, contingent 
contemporaneous sociological, empirical and conceptual frameworks vary widely. 
For example, Nietzsche's Schopenhauerean metaphysical assumptions and 
philological methodology is quite unlike Marx's {sometime} empirical studies of the 
economy, or even of Stirner's racialized and metaphorical Hegelian historiography. 
Yet a number of basic modern assumptions and concerns remain true of each. All 
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but Hegel unequivocally accepted the death of God event and each sought to find 
some form of eschatological 
legitimation for their prophetic standpoints. In a mirror 
image of Hegel's "Absolute Knowing", each of them proposes some alternative 
model of the 'privileged standpoint' which is consonant with prophetic political 
agency. Despite some differences of approach therefore, I demonstrate that Stirner, 
Marx and Nietzsche were best understood within this 'German' context of crisis 
and agency. 
The subtitle of this thesis is Political Response in a Godless Age, however, this 
study is not intended to be an in-depth comparative analysis of the respective 
political theories of four major European thinkers. Rather, political response refers only 
to the eschatological method of legitimation which was common to these particular 
thinkers and their times. Therefore I only touch on the prophetic utterances of 
Stirner (the Union of Egoists), Marx (the Communist society) and finally, Nietzsche 
(the era of great-politics), where such ideas might demonstrate something valuable 
with regard to the eschatological method of presentation by each. 
However, as we clearly see, and this is an important point, each prophetic 
theory did assume some level or other of non-freedom or an implicit account of 
restrictions upon the movements, beliefs and practices of individual agents. 
Although a more complete reading of freedom in the case of Stirner, Marx and 
Nietzsche is beyond the scope of the present thesis, a version of what freedom ir, is 
strongly implied by each in the mere fact of the continuation of alienation 
[Entfremdung] and nihilism. (Do not forget that according to Nietzsche k-adenx 
hobbled individuals every bit as much as alienation did for Stirner or Marx, but in a 
very different sense). In other words, in each case some normative definition of 
freedom lurked behind such analyses. Also, this demonstrates that although Hegel 
sought closure to alienation {Entfremdung} only to face nihilism, we can also see 
that there is some conceptual overlap, historically speaking, between these two 
concepts. Alienation continues to be an issue for all of the Young Hegelians and for 
Nietzsche, although in Nietzsche's case alienation as such is closely interwoven 
with nihilism. However, in Nietzsche's case -alienation appears to be part of the 
human condition whereas nihilism is historical, the latter not the former, 
constitutes an ontological perversion of man's true essence. 
Returning to the question of the 'privileged standpoint' vir a vis this 
conception of political rerporue I asked: how is it possible that an non-alienated 
prophet could understand the hieroglyphics of freedom in the first instance? In the 
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case of Hegel the suggestion is that the unfolding richness of the "Absolute Idea" 
was constitutive of this same standpoint. Thus Hegel's political theory would have 
to run parallel with the 'evidence' for this retrospective or ex eventu claim. A 
prophetic claim of the other type is something else again. Whether one thinks 
Hegel was successful or not in his distinctive fusion of religion and philosophy I 
have attempted to present a case in which the logical consequence of Hegel's 
political philosophy should not and did not rule out political theory of a traditional 
kind, not so in the case of some of his followers followers. The point is that the 
political response in question to which I referred is less the detailed proscriptive 
policies that each thinker held to, than it is the internal logic of their respective 
accounts and how their philosophical premises underpinned their political 
assumptions. 
Furthermore, we also see, with the possible exception of Hegel, that these 
proscriptive policies, limited and sketchy though they are, are largely dated and 
uninteresting. One only has to recall Stirner's individualistic "rebellion", Marx's 
relatively reformist demands, particularly those which he, Engels and the 'working- 
people's' committees made in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, or of Nietzsche's 
entirely reasonable Pan-European Geo-politics of sexuality. The notion of a 
messianic agency might well appear to' be the more exciting since it awaits to 
surprise us when we least expect it, thus we are continually held in a condition of 
excited and expectant suspense. Such agencies, the socio-pathological 
Lumpenproletariat, the ruthless Proletariat and the dynamic Übermensch, continue to 
exert a strong but misplaced fascination, they continue to command our attention 
in the same manner as the character development in a superlative work of fiction 
might. But such political agencies do not constitute political theory in the rich 
tradition of 'Western' political thought from Hobbes to Hegel. Rather, Stirner, 
Marx and Nietzsche constitute a definitive break with this tradition. 
This rejection of the 'Western' tradition of political theory, I call 'post- 
historical' existence. This concept we see has little to do with the notion that in one 
way or another, liberal capitalist democracies represent the final evolutionary 
moment of economic and political development. Or even the idea that history has 
stopped, slowed down or become pest-histoire. Rather, my conception of 'post- 
historical' existence is Hegelian eschatological time, an 'End Time' in which the 
world is stalked by spiritual disaster, arising in turn from various damaging false 
forms of consciousness. Thus, in each of our prophetic thinkers we see an attempt 
to 'kick-start' history, in each there is an attempt to change history by changing 
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social-consciousness, not through ever more complex and sophisticated models of 
socialisation, as in the case of Hegel's Philarophy of Right, 
but by effecting a massive 
cataclysmic shift in the belief systems of society. 
To return to cases, we see that Stirner's political response to the death of God 
was to postulate that dissident intellectualism (probably including Stirner himself), 
and "vagabondism" (thieves, paupers, prostitutes and cast outs, the 
lumpenproletariat) could create a deep-seated social rebellion without positing an 
historical subject beyond Egoism per se. Such people, it might be thought, had 
nothing to lose and everything to gain. However, Stirner is faced with the difficult 
problem of how to legitimate his own `privileged position' as a bearer of Egoist Self- 
Consciousness, and how that Self-Consciousness can be inscribed into his chosen 
messianic social agents, put more simply, how can he explain that it had come 
about that he is an Egoist and they are not? 
The uninteresting answer to this question is that he had read Hegel and 
they have not, but such a position would only serve to legitimate Hegel not Stirner. 
As we see Stirner founded a new anarchistic conception of individualism, one that 
could bridge the gap between his own advanced Egoist consciousness and the 
apparent passivity and deference of the masses. In other words, Stirner has founded 
an Egoism on the sheer self-possessive capacities, or lack of them, of individual 
agents as such, as interpretative agents of their own interests. Such a minimalist 
account of individual sovereignty and obligation can hardly fall foul of even the 
most impassive and helpless of societies unfortunates. Thus his explanation would 
appear to be irrefutable since even the most morbid symptoms of social pathology 
can be viewed, in this schema, as some kind of existential lifestyle choice, in other 
words, as a reliable measure of that individuals self-capacities of power. 
We also see that Stirner's contemporaries Feuerbach and Bauer have 
posited two interpretative improvements in the wake of Hegel's post-historical 
"Absolute Idea". The first of these is the notion of "species-man" and the second is 
unlimited "critique". Stirner, however, considers both of these concepts unfinished 
business. Stirner considered Feuerbach's "essence" simply a further alienation of 
the Ego and he thought much the same of Bauer's notion of "critique". In effect, he 
argues that both of these amounts to nothing less than new forms of fetishism. As 
such these ideas remain pseudo-religious concepts that modernity must outgrow. 
We see that in Stirner's account Hegel's "Absolute Idea" remains an abstraction 
and as far as he was concerned only when an actual bearer of uniqueness emerges 
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would modernity properly so-called be fully accessed. To use one of Stirner's 
personal growth metaphors, modernity is the time of full "manhood". Thus the 
social agency of Egoism is the Hegelian "Absolute Idea' as agency. Unlike Fichte's 
metaphysical Ego, Stirner's concept is a form of direct realism, it was the individual 
qua ne plus ultra. 
Löwith's account of the importance of Stirner in the history of ideas is not 
exaggerated, Stirner's Der Einzige plays a casting role in the development of post- 
Hegelian conceptions of modernity. The pace and progress of the dying God 
increases and intensifies with every advance in Young Hegelian critique, however, 
with the appearance of Stirner on the scene, this amounts to a series of mortal 
blows. The coming of Egoism, as Stirner develops it, stands at the end of one time 
and at the beginning of another. The past is relegated to the dark mists of time and 
superstition and the Ego steps out into the daylight of a new dawn. This dawn is an 
amoral world in which the self-possession and self-power of the Ego will decide the 
future course of all events. In short, Stirner marked the spot where alienation is 
supposed to have ended in reality and where nihilism proper really begun, 
according to this account. 
Taking my cue from Gilles Deleuze I also hold that nihilism proper begins 
here because of the destructive energy of the Ego. Thus, with the absolute Ego the 
messianic entailments of Stirner's thought became apparent, ' for it is only through 
destruction and consumption that the Ego is able to preserve its freedom. Only 
through the constant destruction of all social mores, values and institutions could it 
constantly reaffirm its Egoism, as soon as it creates or posits anything of its own it 
immediately became a bondsman to that idea or institution. It's negativity would, 
in effect, become something less than absolute. 
My reading of Stirner's place in intellectual history holds that Stirner's 
political philosophy is likely to produce a counter-reaction once the full thrust of his 
argument becomes more widely known, since Stirner's politics are as 
uncompromising as his Egoism. Stirner holds that only a loose association of Egoists 
is compatible with the 'absolute negativity' of the all-consuming rapacious Egoist, 
thus he opposes all the popular and not so popular institutions of his own day. He 
rejects the State, popular assemblies, all government, welfare institutions and all 
the political parties. Here it appears, that in his rejection of all the then current 
social and political institutions, that he lapses into a kind of political solipsism. 
Although I rejected this idea in Chapter III this is certainly Marx's understanding 
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and one of his claims concerning Stirner. More importantly 
however, is the wider 
Young Hegelian point that Hegel's "self-thinking idea" is but a form of religious 
contemplation that failed to revolutionise reality in harmony with the 
idea itself. 
Stirner appears to leave himself open to claims that his Egoism merely replicated 
this development. Never-the-less, Stirner's philosophy of negativity resolutely 
rejects political theory. 
Turning to Marx, we see that Marx, despite claims to the contrary, remains 
firmly within this developing tradition of German idealism. An idealism which 
prioritised the operation of consciousness in history, an idealism which theorised an 
eschatological account of social development, which appears to unintentionally 
move towards ethical and value neutrality at best, and the conscious appropriation 
of nihilism at worst. Marx desperately seeks to avoid the worst of these excesses, 
but as we see, in his concept of Revolution he is less than successful. The most 
important interpretative point I make concerning Marx is that the deep cleavage 
he strikes between the notion of class-consciousness and that of class-membership 
is not peripheral to our understanding of Marx but central to his whole approach. 
The latter proved to be a largely irrelevant empirical detail in his thinking while 
the former concept, as one would expect from an idealist thinker, takes pride of 
place in his epistemology. 
There is no question that Marx loathed Max Stirner's ideas and he devoted 
more critical energy in his attempted repudiation of Stirner than of any other 
individual thinker. In order to justify and legitimate his own Egoism, Stirner has to 
slice off those particular interests of society, those of the Lumpenproletariat, which 
best mirrors the condition of nihilism, with its unstable and fluid conception of 
absolute negativity. Marx, for his part, is left in the position of finding some ground 
for rejecting Stirner's chosen social agents of change. Marx remains a hostage to 
German idealism's fortunes in-so-far as he tries to find a solution to this problem, 
not in empirical analysis but by returning again and again to the question of the 
role of consciousness in human history. Marx seeks meaning in history where 
Stirner's thought now implied that there is none. 
We see, therefore, that Marx is forced to re-apply Stirner's and the other 
Young Hegelian critique of Hegel, against Stirner himself. Thus while he holds 
that Stirner has hoped to revolutionise consciousness without revolutionising reality 
itself, this leads to something of a paradox in Marx's own thought: on one level 
Marx constantly refers to Stirner's idealist Ego as but a form of solipsism but more 
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importantly, in order to demonstrate this Marx has to constantly revisit that which 
Stirner has allegedly left behind, the notion of human alienation [Entfremdung). 
Stirner's nihilism posits no social or collective meaning beyond the empty negative 
Hegelian conception of social-recognition in his "Union of Egoists" and as we see 
this argument only legitimates acts of destruction and consumption in minimalist 
social expressions of self-serving co-operation. ` 
When I examined Hegel's analysis of the French Revolution I suggested 
that mutual or social-recognition was empty of positive content, meaning as such 
that it presented no normative content only an empty negative void which was as 
yet to be filled with positive deeds. In other words, social-recognition presented 
only the mutual-awareness in each of the negativity of each. Thus Stirner's 
Lumpenproletariat would only be likely to act as individual thieves, beggars and 
cheats as circumstances present themselves. Deception and deceit are certainly 
compatible with the naked self-power of individual negativity. As we see in 
Chapter IV, Marx, recoiling, is required to posit a social consciousness which 
rejects this analysis, committed as it is to an instrumental conception of human 
behaviour which amounts to nothing more than a version of bad faith. According to 
Marx, this is a kind of social agency which nothing good can come out of. 
In stark contrast, Marx is forced to deny the nihilism of modernity and the 
Egoism of Stirner. Following his critique of Stirner, Marx returns to the promise of 
self-actualisation, but not in the Hegelian sense of Entäußerung, but in the sense of 
necessary cataclysmic change. We see this shift in emphasis, from individual 
conceptions of self-development to collective conceptions in The German Ideology. 
This text contains some of Marx's most constructive passages, such as the'need for 
the ultimate mitigation of the affects of the social division of labour, the prospect of 
harmony from potential multiplicitous activities and the life-plans of social agents 
in communist society and so on. Never-the-less, Marx is aware that Stirner has 
effectively undermined the humanist grounding of Feuerbach's "species-being" 
which appears to underpin just such a project. Thus Marx is forced to take another 
route out of nihilism; I argue in this regard that like all the Young Hegelians, he 
takes flight in the self-legitimating consciousness raising practices of an 
atheistiezed eschatology. 
In other words, Marx takes the death of God seriously and his hope of a 
fully rational economic and social system is dependent upon this same demise. 
However, if God is dead as a cultural event, then the further alienation 
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[Entfremdung and Entäußerung) of man has to be re-staked and then overcome. In 
Marx's view this requires the return to a new concept of the "self-thinking idea". 
Taking his cue from August von 'Cieszkowski, Marx immerses himself in the 
philosophy of theory and practice. Like Cieszkowski, Marx accepts the mimetic 
relation between critique and practice and the further critique of that same 
practice and its critique. In other words, Marx takes Hegel's alleged philosophical 
relexivity and converts it into 'practical reflexivity', ripping into the heart of 
Hegel's system. From Hegel's "self-thinking idea" we see the concept 
metamorphose into "Praxis", the core concept of Young Hegelianism itself. 
The method of praxis allows Marx to redefine Hegel's anatomy of human 
alienation. Marx reflexively examines social practices and categories and concepts 
such as 'work', and concludes that these are not fully rational according to his new 
standard, insisting that these must become fully universal. Since such social 
practices remain particular they must also be alienation's in his new sense. We see 
this analysis applied by Marx in the case of his critique of the utopian thinkers of 
the period. Marx holds that the work forms of Robert Owen, Adam Smith and 
Fourier fail to conform to the demands of genuine personal authenticity because in 
each case is posited a particular historical conception of work rather than the 
creative potential of man per 2. Here we see Marx at his most Hegelian, where 
there are claims that particularity is a moment of alienation by definition because 
the agent fails to identify the reason immanent in the universal interest, thus also 
failing to identify personally with the self-objectification of reality. The reader may 
recall that Marx demonstrates that utopian notions of work, far from being open to 
the universal, hinge upon the contemporary whims and opinions which characterise 
the particular imaginations of the present, not the future, in Marx's view. 
The point is made that this Young Hegelian methodology serves Marx well, 
he emerges from his analysis of utopianism and alienation with two new sources of 
social meaning; in the first case the death of God and the disenchantment of the 
world prepares the ground for full rationality in matters of economic, political and 
social life. Secondly, all such social action had to be planned in advance, modified in 
the light of its success and reconstituted again and again through future-oriented 
projects. In other words, the standards provided by alienation, as the basis of 
suffering and sufferings judgement, would be applied and re-applied. 'Planning' is 
not be confused with so-called 'socialist planning' of the former Soviet variety. 
Rather, planning is broadly conceived as but the 'struggle' to appropriate the world 
for reason. Political theory as traditionally conceived becomes the first victim of this 
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analysis since, according to Marx, meaning itself is to be found in the political 
'struggle' against capitalism and its institutions of law and so on. The latter is 
always particular, representing as it must the private interests of private property. 
As such it constitutes civil society and therefore, is irrational by definition. This 
does not mean that private persons cannot act rationally to maximise their 
particular interests, only that the social organism as a whole cannot act rationally 
since this would presuppose a genuine collective interest. 
Thus this peculiar form of Hegelian rationality provided Marx with the 
bridge towards his identification of struggle with 'German' proletarian 
consciousness and the 'privileged position' of the theorist himself. Unlike Hegel's 
cleavage betuwn both political society and civil society, Marx's new cleavage runs 
through both political society and civil society, in this way Marx is able to rejuvenate 
alienation and reload it with the suffering which Hegel had mitigated. We see 
how, in his early critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right Marx identifies the new 
emerging mass industrial army of workers as the social agents who will complete 
the French Revolution in its Germanic form. Once inscribed with the appropriate 
Self-Consciousness of themselves as the bearers of the universal interest, they prove 
the truth of Marx's own critique. In other words, in an argument which is as 
circular as it is seductive, Marx posits a denuded conception of philosophy in the 
Western tradition, praxis as the mailed fist, the legitimating power of his own 
strength of belief. The latter function is what Marx describes as a proletarian 
consciousness, a concept which is forged decisively against the empirical and 
sociological notion of class-membership. 
However, because Marx attempts to make his own 'privileged position' 
viable only after the objective formation of this proletarian consciousness in history, 
it might be supposed that his thought is ex eventu in much the same manner as 
Hegel's. While this might appear to be true to a limited degree, the ultimate 
validity of Marx's interpretative role as the anatomist of the social hieroglyphics 
rests, in the final analysis, not on some historical or empirical fact, but on the 
persuasiveness of his own prophetic vision. This is because the truth of his analysis 
can only be demonstrated once the bearer of eschatological hopes, carries out their 
historic messianic role and produces a communist society. In other words, Marx's 
eschatological truth is cast forward and thus is held a hostage to fortune, but a 
fortune that can be forever held in a state of purgatory, according to the standard of 
judgement provided by his re-worked of concept of alienation. In this account, 
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suffering today is supposed to galvanise the strength of 
belief in the coming dawn 
of a newer and brighter tomorrow. 
On the other hand, Marx is well aware of the fact that the growth of 
proletarian consciousness need not necessarily become eschatological. Class- 
consciousness might, for example, be expressed in various forms of political 
reformism. In this sense, both social democracy and socialism might well be 
thought of, before being dispatched by Stirner's critique of course, as modern 
responses to the death of God. However, following Stirner, Marx believes that 
neither social reformism nor utopian socialism can legitimate themselves after 
Stirner's Egoism. Marx, therefore, has to find his own legitimating theory of the 
'last-things', this is to be found in his version of the final cataclysm: total social 
revolution. 
I departed from Löwith's account of Marx in-so-far as he believes that the 
dominant factor in Marx's messianism was the Jewish tradition from which Marx's 
own family had sprung and thus he decisively rejected all eschatology. Throughout 
this thesis however, I have claimed that the tradition of German Idealism is itself 
the dominant element in Marx's conceptual schema. This is an important point 
when we come to consider Marx's concept of revolutionary change. As we see in 
Section II of the Introduction to this thesis, the Judeo-Christian tradition of 
apocalypyticism is mystical in most cases, concerned with the past and with 
reconciliation. However in Marx's one-sided understanding the measure of 
prophetic belief is in the persuasive powers of deliverance. The revolution, of 
course, promises to deliver from alienation and suffering. Thus the revolution is cast 
forward, reconciliation is promised in the future not in the present or past. This has 
nothing to do with Marx's Jewish roots and everything to do with his idealist 
account of the power of ideas to change the world. 
I argue that within the genre of apocalyptic literature there are two further 
refinements which are made; the first kind of apocalyptic literature is the kind of 
mystical narration which sought to reassure, and the second is that of temporal, 
horizontal and ex eventu prophecy which is written in the liturgical manner of 
"symbolic protest". I argue that Hegel's apocalypticism is closer in spirit to the 
classical Judeo-Christian tradition of apocalypse, a tradition which is rooted in past 
and present and which sought to reassure and find reconciliation. In the case of 
Marx, this classical account is dispensed with, as is the exevvntu nature of his claims 
in his rush towards the critical function of the 'privileged standpoint'. 
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In broad strokes, we see how Marx's concept of messianic social agency, 
prophetic literature (The Manifesto of the Communist Party and Capital) and the belief 
in the coming revolution, take him well beyond Hegel's own historical framework. 
Marx principally protests against the present and professes into the future. 
Although I have left Löwith's general sweep across German intellectual 
development largely intact, I have argued that the detailed trajectory of Marxism 
owed more to Stirner's radical idealism than it did to Hegel's re-working of 
religious eschatology. As long as there exists the possibility of social revolution by 
messianic agents then the ultimate validity of critique lies in waiting. 
In my discussion of Nietzsche's political response in Chapter V, I demonstrate 
that despite his radical Pyrrhronism, his political ideas should not be, either 
dismissed as an embarrassment, or neglected because they were ill-informed. 
Rather, I claim that his political views, though they may have been limited and did 
not conform to the rich systematic standards of the Western tradition, did provide 
interesting insights into his understanding of the death of God, his critique of 
German development, decadence, the associated problem of political legitimacy and 
the quest for meaning. 
It is seen that Nietzsche's libidinal. understanding of human economy can 
be retrogressively teased out from these same political concerns (or as in the case of 
Henry Staten's work, from Nietzsche's own psycho-social development). This also 
implied that Nietzsche's prophetic form of delivery is also to be taken seriously and 
should not be interpreted as but another example of his literary playfulness because 
the prophetic form is an integral element of these same psycho-sexual politics. In 
the past the tendency has been to dismiss the politics as unworthy of consideration 
and the prophetic form as simply a cry for help from a desperate outsider trying to 
be heard. This was a role often acted out in his personal correspondence. 
One of the most difficult problems to arise from Nietzsche's own analysis of 
nihilism is the self-refuting nature of this same analysis. I argue that this problem is 
most provocatively discussed in Zarathustra and in quite extended discussions in 
Beyond Go(d and Evil. Thus in Nietzsche's post-historical, political philosophising 
the problem of the self-legitimacy of the philosopher is more apparent than in the 
previous two cases examined, Stirner and Marx. This problem is more dramatically 
apparent in Nietzsche's case because, in keeping with his acceptance of nihilism's 
essential meaninglessness and the materialism of his libidinal economics, he holds 
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that all philosophy is, in truth, but an unconscious involuntary reflex of the 
philosopher, his pre-dispositions and inclinations. Thus, the question arises as to 
why we should believe Nietzsche's own account of the human condition or his 
critique of decadent values themselves? This turn towards seeking legitimacy in 
prophecy is all the more remarkable once one recalls that previous to this period, 
legitimacy, would be sought not in the form of a given philosophers views, but in 
judgements of an epistemological nature. 
In any case, as we see, Nietzsche's route out of this paradox of self- 
refutation is to place his critique of decadence itself into the mouth of a prophet. At 
first this prophet is allegedly a fictional character, as it is in the case of Zarathustra, 
but as Nietzsche's 'philological' method becomes more sophisticated he extends his 
prophetic message into the biographical genre with Ecce Homo. Although even here 
the prophet remains fictional or pseudonymous to a degree. Indeed I imply in my 
analysis that Zarathustra might well be as autobiographical as Ecce Ilomo is fictional. 
In any case, it is also clear that the mechanism of self-parody which is so effectively 
mobilised by Nietzsche, is not mobilised in the service of his scepticism but in 
order to emphasise the complete seriousness of his millenialist claims concerning 
the age in which he lives and the options open to its people. In Nietzsche's account 
of Hegel's modernity, in particular, this message became more shrill as the deaf-ear 
of the loathsome "Last Man" reaches new levels of auditory insuperability. 
In Nietzsche's libidinal economy only those 'strong' individuals who enjoy a 
superabundance of sexual energy are truly creative and not reactive. All of 
Nietzsche's artistic heroes enjoy such overflowing capacities, especially in the realm 
of sexuality. When it comes to politics, no less than artistic achievement, Nietzsche 
holds his Übermensch to account according to the principles of these same libidinal 
categories. Thus it is but one easy step to further include the 'prophet' in this 
psycho-sexual taxonomy. In examples of life's overcoming, Nietzsche cites among 
them, the need to overcome self-denial, self-disgust, unrestrained gratification, 
overwork, and inordinate quantities of self-moderation. We see that in Nietzsche's 
analysis of'sickness' and 'health' that he is not averse to including a self-analysis of 
his own'economy' as but an example of what rules true greatness must conform to. 
In other words, Ecce Homo, despite the obvious implications of the title, suggests 
that Nietzsche was to become the "bridge" to the future, as he described the 
process in Zarathustra. Much as John the Baptist paved the way for the coming of 
the Messiah so Nietzsche prepares the way for the coming of the Übermensch. 
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Of course, prophets found religions and Nietzsche made it quite clear that 
he had no intention of becoming one such prophet, and there is every reason to 
believe him. This could also be said of both Stirner and Marx for whom the status of 
quasi-religious leadership could only serve to provide a measure of how little they 
had been understood. But this fact alone would also mark out our three radical 
atheist eschatologists and their form of prophecy as being particularly unique, for as 
we also see in the Introduction, the notion of forming a new religion was not 
something new or strange to German Idealism, but was integral to its original 
development. No doubt influenced by the veneration of the Greek civil religion, 
Hegel's early writings were peppered with references to the need for a "religion of 
the senses", and for a "new religion" which would be "the last and greatest work of 
humanity". Also in Hegel's early theological writings we see there his concern with 
the complete lack of the kind of religious mythology which was suited to the needs 
of the people of central Europe. For Hegel the great meta-narratives of the Old 
Testament are true and good but the historical context made them too "positive" 
As alienation's these were all but unappreciable to modern Germans. 
It is apparent throughout this thesis that Hegel, Stirner, Marx and 
Nietzsche, despite their many differences, are all concerned with the 
disenchantment of modernity. This is the problem which is principally constitutive 
of German Idealism as it is emerges from the more theologically conservative 
Deism of the Enlightenment. But while Hegel's study of politics was informed by a 
prophetic rear-guard action on behalf of God, understood as a peculiar, kind of 
freedom, and in the name of philosophy. Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche abandon 
philosophy. Instead they use the prophetic move forward to legitimate these same 
presuppositions, that is, those arising from God's demise, and this is the point: 
Hegel could, due to his religious understanding of the dialectical method, retain 
the option of trying to re-work Christian and particularly Protestant morality into 
the framework of his understanding of society as it already stood. Hegel always 
holds that Christianity is but the final form of freedom, we see this in the spiritual 
adventures of the Phenomenology. Thus, from this analysis Hegel produces a form of 
freedom as a type of action which is in harmony with Reason and Christian teaching. 
In Hegel's account Christianity only survives as a civic code of customs, practices 
and socialisation's which are able to fully reject alienating dogma. In other words, 
now that the inwardizing of the Christian message is made compatible with the 
world trajectory of Reason and freedom, its form can be abandoned. In Hegel's 
thought Christianity is dead and God is perhaps even dispensed with and 
forgotten, but God in Hegel's account, strictly speaking, is not dead. 
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On the other hand, following this same disenchantment we sec that 
Scirner, Marx and Nietzsche face the much more difficult task of trying to inscribe 
life with new meaning, since all three understand the essential nihilism of this 
modernity in terms which leave no room for even the content of the Christian 
message. For each in his turn holds this Christianity is untenable without the 
theological dogma which underpinned it. Thus, it is a natural conclusion to draw 
that without Christianity there could be no God. Each in his turn then has to find 
some new account of human freedom and that freedom has to become self- 
supporting and self-legitimating. 
In the case of Stirner, the self-confirming power of the individual Egoist 
consciousness provides the self-legitimating 'privileged standpoint' of negative 
freedom, and the world is thereafter one of the Egoist's future projects. Marx 
reacting to, as he saw it, Stirner's solipsistic individualism returns to the nature of 
alienation, re-invigorating the concept with new life and prepares an account of 
alienation's self-overcoming. To do this he requires a self-actualising account of 
freedom which rejects, what he sees as Hegel's 'Feuerbachean' religious 
existentialism, and he grounds freedom in a new belief structure which is 
galvanised through praxis and yet another version of what is privileged in the 
privileged standpoint. 
Finally, while Nietzsche had little time for any account of alienation since 
he adheres to a form of Schopenhauerean metaphysic, still he holds that decadence or 
nihilism itself, crippled the 'strong' spirits who alone can give some new account of 
meaning. But without any empirical or phenomenological account of how this can 
be done, Nietzsche follows the dominant technique of his milieu and hopes to 
found his call for new values in the veracity of this same need in he who calls. 
In conclusion, the most dominant theorists of post-Hegelian idealism have, 
during what I have termed 'post-historical existence', shied away from the kind of 
hard work, and thorough examination, of what u, for an eschatological 'short-cut' 
which is concerned with what could be. But they did not do this in terms which 
replicated the architecture of traditional normative or utopian thinking, (as we saw 
in the case of Marx especially, his conceptual categories are often formed in 
criticism of such thought), rather, our post-historical thinkers choose to adopt a 
specific form of aetheized prophetic eschatology in which to deliver their political 
rei)onre. 
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Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche, eschewed the kind of pragmatic criticism, 
philosophy's "grey on grey" associated with Hegel, and turned instead to the 
politics of vision, but not one that is legitimated through traditional conceptions of 
epistemology, ontology, or which is based on a careful empirical analysis, they 
choose, rather, a highly specific religious conception of 'end-times' and of new 
possibilities. While it is often claimed that Marxism, to give but one example, is a 
form of religious belief without any 'scientific merits', this claim is often made by 
those who are opposed to Marxism primarily on ideological grounds, (I am thinking 
here of Karl Popper). Such critics tend to base their claims, not on the texts 
concerned, but on the political outcomes of actual history, these they relate, not to 
the principles of the political philosophy themselves but on the expediencies of 
actual historical figures such as Lenin, Stalin or Hitler. Yet only the most 
superficial of textual analysis could find some family resemblance between Hegel 
and Stalin, or between Nietzsche and Hitler, in this sense, the abandonment of 
political theory certainly plays out in favour of our post-historical trio. On the other 
hand, the abandonment of political theory which I have traced here clearly demonstrates 
some other important limitations which are perhaps less extreme than the actual 
failures of twentieth century history. Stirner, Marx and Nietzsche's denouement 
makes them appear quite dated vii a vis the challenges of our troublesome complex 
and resilient modern political structures since they would seem to have very little 
to offer in this regard. Hegel, it would appear, has more to say to us today 
concerning our particular problems. 
I hope that I have demonstrated in this thesis that a disenchanted and 
secular eschatology is the very stuff of post-Hegelian German Idealism, a form of 
idealism which did not end with Stirner but which carried on through to Nietzsche 
himself. As it progresses this idealism becomes increasingly shrill and apocalyptic 
as it also becomes in almost equal measure more prophetic. In the first one hundred 
years since the last of its theorists put pen to paper, such eschatology might be 
thought of as having enjoyed a success that it could scarcely have imagined and an 
even more dramatic decline than would have been thought possible, even by them 
themselves in their most visionary moments. On the other hand, if this thesis has 
successfully suggested to the reader that the author's analysis might well 
demonstrate just one good reason for returning to the political philosophy and 
theory of Hegel and his ex-et'entu form of philosophical and theoretical discourse, 
then his efforts will have been well and duly rewarded. 
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